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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The central question in this thesis asks how the rule of reason, the standard of 
reasonableness and the principle of proportionality may function in assessing fair 
individual taxation and efficient and fair tax systems. This question is answered by 
investigating the case law of selected jurisdictions on the standard of reasonableness 
and the principle of proportionality particularly regarding human rights and 
international trade in their interaction with taxation.  
                
This work also discusses how the international canons of taxation, (equity, certainty, 
and economy) may be balanced via proportionality coupled with reasonableness. 
Would there be an optimal solution to combine those canons and other fundamental 
tax principles? How would be possible and desirable in terms of efficiency and 
fairness to apply an international standard of reasonableness in tandem with the 
principle of proportionality to tax issues that have reciprocal consequences in 
different jurisdictions, such as cross-border situations addressing tax avoidance, 
fiscal supervision, non-discrimination, and other tax issues that may go to the 
foundations of many tax systems? The hypothesis that is also tested is whether they 
may be regarded as overarching principles of law. 
                
 The above fundamental questions are also posed in the light of international human 
rights that may be the ground and the foundation for fair taxation. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the subject of this thesis is proportionality and reasonableness in 
the interaction of fundamental freedoms, fundamental rights - with some regard to 
trade and taxation. The focus is not on any specific issues that are analysed as an 
illustration of how those principles may work and whether or not they achieve 
fairness. 
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 Introduction 
 
The main statement of this thesis is that the principle of proportionality, coupled with 
the notion of reasonableness, is a fundamental tool to achieve fairness,
1
 effectiveness 
and consistency in the interpretation and application of other principles and rules, 
particularly concerning the interaction between taxation and fundamental rights. This 
work will also examine some aspects of barriers to trade, since the role of 
proportionality and reasonableness appear to be relevant to tax issues that may affect 
domestic and international trade.
2
 As a corollary to this analysis, the issue of 
proportionality in tandem with reasonableness as a general principle of law in its own 
right (and, arguably, an overarching principle of law) will also be discussed. Overall, 
this thesis will also seek to give greater clarity to the role of proportionality and 
reasonableness as applied to taxation. 
 
Reasonableness and proportionality are generally regarded as standards of judicial 
review or principles for the interpretation and application of other legal principles 
and rules. The reasonableness test may just require a rational - as a general logical 
relationship between ends and means - interpretation of any law, to avoid absurd 
results. In general, the reasonableness standard of review may either narrow or 
broaden the scope of normative acts according to their purpose and within their 
specific or general context.  Proportionality may have the same objective - to avoid 
unreasonableness or absurdity in law in search of more fairness and consistency, 
adding the ingredients of balance, conciliation, optimization of effectiveness
3
 and 
efficiency. As a result, it may require a higher degree of scrutiny through which 
                                                 
1
 On the conception of fairness and fair taxation see Chapter I, section 3. 
 
2
 Although this thesis mainly deals with reasonableness and proportionality as applied to taxation and 
fundamental rights, the notions of non-discrimination and equality - to which reasonableness and 
proportionality are fundamental - are widely applied to domestic tax barriers to trade (see for example 
the dormant-commerce clause in the US) and EU Law (see the objective of internal market and the 
fundamental freedoms of goods, services, capital and persons in the EU) and the core principle of non-
discrimination within the WTO. 
 
3
 The more weight given to one principle may be detrimental to other principles and interests at stake 
in each case. On the role of the principle of proportionality as an optimal principle, see Alexy, Robert, 
“On the Structure of Legal Principles” (2000) Ratio Juris 13/3, p. 298; Schwarze, Jürgen, European 
Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1992), p. 690; Beatty, David M., The Ultimate Rule of Law, 
(OUP, 2004), p. 163. See also, in particular, Chapter III.2.3 (c.4 and d) on the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR. 
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principles must be balanced against each other and any measure must be reasonably 
proportionate or necessary to its legitimate ends.
4
 Whereas the proportionality test 
may accept only the less intrusive measure to the overall interests at stake, the 
reasonableness test may accept a more intrusive measure, if it is not absurd, 
irrational, or illogical. 
 
However, the above distinction is not Cartesian, as both principles may interact and 
sometimes are interchangeable.
5
 Thus, proportionality coupled with reasonableness 
may scrutinize at the same time fairness and consistency, and sometimes even the 
efficiency of tax principles and rules, as well as their optimization and interplay with 
other legal principles.
6
 This subject may be of interest not only to practitioners but 
also to legal theoreticians as it deals with fundamental issues of taxation, including 
tax policy, in domestic and international jurisdictions, as illustrated below and in 
Chapter I. 
 
Cases of discrimination are remarkable illustrations of how reasonableness and 
proportionality work in tandem as tools to assess the fairness and the consistency of 
apparently discriminatory rules, such as the joint taxation of couples.
7
 There must be 
a reason why they should be taxed jointly. Treating the family as a tax unity may be 
reasonable either for tax avoidance or simplification purposes. However, joint 
taxation may be disproportionate where this tax treatment results in taxing spouses or 
civil partners more heavily than non-married couples who live together, particularly 
if there is an underlying policy or constitutional objective for the State to recognize, 
protect and encourage the family.
8
   
                                                 
4
 See more elaborate descriptions of the principle of proportionality in concert with reasonableness in 
Chapters I, sections 2 and 3; III, section 2.3.a; and IV, section 1, and the first paragraph of the 
Conclusion. 
 
5
 See Chapter I, section 2, on the distinctions and similarities between both principles. 
 
6
 See Chapter I, section 2. 
 
7
 On discriminatory taxation, see Chapters II.3; III, sections 2.5 and 3.2; and IV, sections 2, 3, and 4. 
Particularly on joint taxation of couples, see Chapters II.2 and III.2.5.a. 
 
8
 See Chapter I, section 2, and its references to other examples, which are analysed in all following 
Chapters on the essential role played by reasonableness and proportionality in the concepts of equality 
and non-discrimination. 
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The same role of reasonableness and proportionality can be seen in a different set of 
cases, where there is no issue of discrimination, such as retrospective taxation.
9
 
There must be a reasonable basis (not caprice, for example) for a later tax rule to 
catch previous transactions. Even if the reason is legitimate, such as to tackle tax 
abuse, the retrospective rule may be disproportionate to its objective, regarding 
transactions that have occurred a long time ago or have been performed with a 
business purpose other than tax avoidance. In addition, the rationale for retrospective 
taxation must contrast with and balance against the legitimate or reasonable 
expectation of those concerned.  
 
Different courts have already discussed these issues and other cases on the basis of 
principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Nevertheless, there are other issues 
still untested by judicial decisions, such as the conflicting interests of source and 
residence taxation, in which proportionality and reasonableness may have an 
underpinning role. One of these issues may be the limits of taxation at source and its 
interaction with the tax system of the country of residence.
10
 
 
Here it is also worth pointing out the method used to prove the main statement of this 
thesis and the characteristics of both proportionality and reasonableness. As 
unwritten and judge-made principles and standards of review, analysing their origin 
and their evolution within domestic and international courts is a starting point. Thus, 
where proportionality and reasonableness come from as well as their differences as 
rules of interpretation will also be discussed.
11
 From national jurisdictions to 
international courts - such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court 
of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and international trade 
organizations such as the World Trade Organization - the principle of proportionality 
has evolved to balance and construe the legal principles underpinning domestic and 
                                                 
9
 On retrospective taxation and proportionality coupled with reasonableness, see Chapters II.4; III.2.6; 
and IV.8.  
 
10
 The source taxation principle is based on a benefit principle that must be balanced with the 
residence principle, which is based on the ability to pay principle. See Chapter I, section 3. 
 
11
 See Chapter I, sections 1 and 2. 
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international issues.
12
 Proportionality and reasonableness may not only be general 
legal principles, but may also be applied to specific national claims to tax and to 
fundamental rights in tax matters.  
 
This thesis relates to taxation, but for two reasons it will also discuss some non-tax 
cases. First, these non-tax cases have described the characteristics of proportionality 
and reasonableness, and may reveal them as general or, arguably, overarching 
principles of law, which is one of the objectives of this work. Secondly, comparing 
some tax cases with non-tax cases may also demonstrate that tax law is not a field of 
law separated from others, such as competition law, administrative law, 
environmental law, international and constitutional law, as if they were unrelated or 
could not sometimes interact with each other.  
 
Tax measures are not only used to address and enforce economic and social policies, 
but also may sometimes affect other legal principles and rules, such as the 
fundamental rights and freedoms. A tax - as any other regulatory measure - may have 
a confiscatory effect on goods or assets or prohibit an economic activity and thus 
may breach the rights to property and to freedom.
13
 A tax measure may hinder or 
                                                 
12
 On General International Law see Cannizzaro, Enzo, Il Principio della Proportionalità 
nell’ordinamento Internationale (Giuffrè, Milano 2000), and the more specific article by that author 
“The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures”, (2001) EJIL Vol. 12 No. 
5, pp.889-916. 
On international trade and the role of proportionality principle, see Hilf, Meinhard, and Puth, 
Sebastian, “The Principle of Proportionality on its way into WTO/GATT Law”, in European 
Integration and International Co-ordination (Kluwer Law International, 2002), p.199; Armin Von 
Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis, Yves Meny, (Eds.); Osiro, Deborah A, “GATT/WTO Necessity 
Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and its Impact on the Autonomy of Domestic Regulation” 
(2002) Legal I.E.I., 29(2), pp.123-141;. On the main principles of law applied by the WTO, such as 
abuse of rights, good faith, balancing of rights and obligations, necessity and proportionality, see also 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, “Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: 
Challenges for World Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society” (2006) LJIL 19, pp.633–
667. 
 
 
On human rights and proportionality, analysing some national jurisdictions and the European Court on 
Human Rights, see Clayton, Richard, “Regaining a sense of proportion: the human rights act and the 
proportionality principle” [2001] E.H.R.L.R. 5; McBride, J., “Proportionality and the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, in E. Ellis (ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999); and Arai-Takahashi, Yutaka, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 
Oxford 2002).  
 
13
 On excessive and confiscatory taxation and proportionality, see Chapters II.2; III.2.7, b) and c); and 
IV.2.1. 
 12 
establish (un)reasonable requirements for the exercise of the international human 
right to move or to change residence from one country to another, even for tax 
purposes.
14
 Any regulatory measure and legal obligation that may affect fundamental 
rights is also submitted to the tests of proportionality and reasonableness.
15
 
 
As a result of globalisation and economic liberalisation, there are no longer any rigid 
national borders, and “the less the State retains its monopoly as an international actor 
and the more systems of dispute settlement we are likely to find.”16 With respect to 
international tax law, mechanisms provided by double or multilateral taxation 
conventions may provide examples of dispute settlement in which reasonableness 
and proportionality may be efficient and convincing legal tools, depending on how 
appropriate for each case.
17
 Bilateral investment treaties may also deal with tax 
matters and the settlement of disputes may be based on proportionality and 
reasonableness as standards of review.
18
 As well, international and regional free trade 
agreements - such as the WTO, the Mercosur, the Nafta, the EFTA, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Free Trade Area (ASEAN) - may be based on non-discrimination to avoid 
unjustifiable protective tax and non-tax measures.
19
 Furthermore, in the European 
Union the proportionality principle has been an essential instrument in ascertaining 
and enforcing the internal market and the fundamental freedoms of persons, capital, 
                                                                                                                                          
 
14
 See Chapters III.2.5; and IV, sections 5.3 and 6.2 (exit taxes). 
 
15
 On fundamental rights, see extensively Chapter III.2. 
 
16
 See Higgins, Rosalyn, “The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law” (2003) 52 ICLQ, 
p.12. 
 
17
 See the Conclusion, section 2.4. 
 
18
 See Chapter I, section 3. 
 
19
 Regarding trade barriers, this work analyses the WTO decisions only, since some regional free trade 
agreements do not have a court or a separate body (quasi-judicial), such as the Appellate Body of the 
WTO, to decide issues raised from their interpretation and application. Other agreements that provide 
a court, such as the EFTA, or a panel, which issues binding decisions, such as NAFTA, are just 
regional comprising only a few countries unlike the WTO. But it is interesting to note that NAFTA 
has as one of its main standards of review the reasonableness principle, which may be regarded as a 
broad application of the principle of proportionality where it may have the “requirements of 
suitability, necessity, transparency, participation and perhaps, as suggested by some, even 
proportionality” (Ortino, Federico, “From ‘Non-Discrimination’ to ‘Reasonableness’: a Paradigm 
Shift in International Economic Law?” 2005 Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/05, p.39).  
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services and goods. Both domestic tax legislation in national jurisdictions and EU tax 
legislation have been construed and sometimes struck down in the light of the rule of 
reason and proportionality.
20
   
 
This work will also focus on how this principle has spread worldwide from national 
jurisdictions
21
 and will make some comparisons between international courts, 
particularly the ECHR and the WTO, with the EU and the American jurisprudence.
22
 
Although the comparison will be mostly between the U.S. and some international 
courts, the principle of proportionality cannot be attributed to only a few nations or 
communities, since “it is a fundamental idea common to all civilised countries and 
extending far beyond the legal system.”23 The comparison with the American system 
may also be relevant because the seeds of the proportionality principle may be 
regarded as having been sown and developed originally in the U.S. from the rule of 
reason and the reasonable standard of review. In addition, reasonableness and 
proportionality have been applied to tax issues that have reciprocal consequences in 
different jurisdictions, such as worldwide unitary taxation,
24
 transfer pricing,
25
 
                                                 
20
 Although the concept of proportionality as it is understood in international law and some national 
jurisdictions may not have been considered as a very familiar concept in the common law (Singh, 
Mahendra P., German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective, (Springer, 2001), p.160 et 
seq.), its notion and reasoning has been applied by and large in human rights’ situations in common 
law countries (see Clayton, Richard op. cit. n.2, particularly, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom) not to mention other areas of law including taxation. On the 
distinction between the common law and civil law concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, see 
Chapter I on reasonableness as a standard and the Wednesbury principle.  
 
21
 In this thesis, only one domestic jurisdiction, the US, will be analysed, as there would not be enough 
room within the word limit for further investigation.  
 
22
 On the close relationship between the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity concerning 
Federalism, see the interesting comparison between the US and the EU made by Edward T. Swaine, 
“Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice” (2000) 41 Harv.I.L.J., 
pp.1-60. That author suggests that the same interest regarding the judicial control via proportionality 
and reasonableness tests exists in the U. S. and in the EU (op. cit. p. 6-9, 51, and 58). See also 
Rosenfeld, Michel, “Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes 
and contrasts” (2004) 2 I.J.C.L, pp.633–668. 
 
23
 Messerschmidt, Klaus, “Efficiency and the Principle of Proportionality” available at 
<www.eurofaculty.lv/papers>, p.5 (last visited 8 July 2010). From a comparative perspective the 
principle of proportionality has been described as the classical example of “borrowing” or 
transposition of one jurisdiction to another (Lenaerts, Koen, “Comparative Law and EC Law”, in 
Comparative Law before the Courts, Canivet, Guy, Andenas, Mads and Duncan Fairgrieve (Eds.), 
(2004) BIICL, p.121). 
 
24
 See Chapter II, section 5 (Barclays case). 
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controlled foreign companies,
26
 thin capitalisation rules,
27
 and the necessity of rules 
on cross-border situations addressing tax avoidance,
28
 balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between States,
29
 taxation on grounds of environmental protection,
30
 and other 
tax issues that may go to the foundations of many tax systems. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the subject of this thesis is proportionality and reasonableness in 
the interaction of fundamental freedoms, fundamental rights - with some regard to 
trade - and taxation. The focus is not on any specific issues but certain issues are 
discussed as an illustration of how those principles may work and achieve their 
objectives.  
 
Equally, whether or not proportionality and reasonableness may undermine the 
separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary will be analysed as 
fundamental constitutional issues arise from this.
31
 The apparent judicial activism of 
the Courts where they apply those principles may have a clear purpose of balancing 
conflicting interests and rules in order to make them more compatible with the 
fundamental rights and values of the rule of law. By so doing, and depending on how 
convincing the rulings are, the Judiciary may also strengthen the acceptability of its 
                                                                                                                                          
25
 See Chapter II, final part of section 5; Chapter IV, section 5.3 (Société de Gestion Industrielle SGI 
case); the Conclusion, section 2.4; and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations, OECD, Paris, 1995. 
 
26
 CFC legislation may also be tested under the proportionality principle and “should not go beyond 
what is necessary to prevent the abuse or the clearly unintended use” (Observation 27.7 made by the 
in Netherlands on Article 1 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, January 2003, 
OECD, p.67). See also Chapter IV, section 6.2 (Cadbury Schweppes case). 
 
27
 See Chapter IV, section 6.2 (Lankhorst-Hohorst  case). 
 
28
 See Chapter s III, section 3.2.b (Dominican Republic Cigarettes concerning evasion and Bovine 
Hides on tax avoidance cases); and IV, section 6.2 (ICI v Colmer and Emsland-Starke cases, inter 
alia). 
 
29
 See Chapter IV, section 5.3 (Marks & Spencer and Rewe Zentralfinanz cases). 
 
30
 See Chapter IV, section 4 (Commission v Italian Republic, C-21/79; and De Coster cases, inter 
alia). See also Chapter III, section 3.2.c, the cases US – Gasoline and Brazil -Retreaded Tyres, in 
which legitimate measures were justified under the exceptions to protect environment, but failed to 
comply with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.as disguised discrimination according to the 
proportionality reasoning.  
 
31
 See the Conclusion, sections 1 (proportionality in tandem with reasonableness) and 3 (costs and 
benefits of proportionality coupled with reasonableness). 
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decisions and make different legal systems socially fairer in circumstances that may 
transcend national borders.
32
  
 
With regard to all the other principles of each legal system, proportionality in concert 
with reasonableness may aid conciliation and balance them in a more acceptable and 
convincing way. The relationship between proportionality and reasonableness will be 
also analysed in order to test the following statement: the better way to interpret and 
ascertain the meaning of the term “reasonable” appears to be via the proportionality 
test, just as it seems that the better way to keep proportionality flexible is to apply it 
through the more open-ended notion of reasonableness.
33
 
 
Finally, this work will discuss whether the broader and necessary application of 
proportionality to international human rights, tax and trade matters may be regarded 
as its final evolution or just a step towards further developments or alternatives.
34
 
Where different jurisdictions may impose economic protective tax measures on 
imports and exports, or claim to tax the same income - for example with respect to 
worldwide taxation, transfer pricing, thin capitalization and CFC rules, and to other 
specific or general anti-avoidance rules or principles - many disputes arise. In the 
same vein, the issue of the interaction between two or more tax treaties, or of a 
source country in contrast with a residence country, may be analysed according to 
the proportionality test as it may be seen as a possible way to achieve a rational and 
political consensus.  
 
The first Chapter will consider the origin, the differentiation and the general 
importance of proportionality and reasonableness in search of fair taxation. 
 
The second Chapter will comment on some aspects of the notion of reasonableness 
according to the US Supreme Court and its difference, if any, from the 
proportionality principle in tax matters. It will discuss issues such as equality, non-
discrimination, retrospective legislation, “use tax” as a disguised sale tax, interstate 
                                                 
32
 See Chapters III, sections 1 (ICJ), 2 (ECHR) and 3 (WTO); and IV (ECJ). 
 
33
 See Chapter I, section 2, last paragraph and its footnotes, and section 1 of the Conclusion.  
 
34
 See section 2.2 of the Conclusion on the role of proportionality coupled with reasonableness in 
evolving new principles of Law. 
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commerce and taxation, worldwide unitary taxation, and transfer pricing rules as 
illustrations of how reasonableness and proportionality may work. 
 
The third Chapter will discuss the proportionality principle in the light of the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization, and mainly the European Court of Human Rights. How far these 
international tribunals accept the principle of proportionality as a general principle of 
international law will be considered as well as how it is related to tax matters, 
particularly regarding fundamental rights and trade. 
 
The fourth Chapter will discuss the characteristics of the so-called “core” principle of 
European Law, especially in tax matters, and its distinction from the notion of 
reasonableness. Particularly in this Chapter there is a discussion of how 
proportionality has been applied to the four fundamental freedoms and their tax 
consequences; how the rule of reason was created via proportionality reasoning, and 
its interaction with tax and non-tax overriding requirements in the public interest; 
how that principle was useful in determining principles of a specific tax (VAT) and 
making them effective; and how the legitimate expectation of non-retrospective tax 
legislation was inferred from proportionality as a vital instrument to balance different 
and sometimes apparently conflicting principles and rules. 
 
Lastly, the advantages and the disadvantages of proportionality and reasonableness 
and whether these principles have complied with their objectives will be considered. 
Overall, this thesis will seek to assess the extent to which proportionality coupled 
with reasonableness may be an essential instrument to weigh different legal 
principles, rules or measures, particularly regarding taxation and its interaction with 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and international trade, in order to apply them 
effectively, consistently and fairly.   
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I. The relationship between the rule of reason, the standard of reasonableness 
and proportionality. Their distinction and their general importance regarding 
fair taxation. 
 
This Chapter will focus on the origins of the principle of proportionality, its 
distinction from and its relationship with the rule of reason and the standard of 
reasonableness, and their general role in assessing fair taxation.  
I.1. The origins of the standard of reasonableness, the rule of reason, and the 
principle of proportionality. 
The reasonableness standard of review has its roots in equity and in the rule of 
reason
35
 and may be part and parcel of the proportionality principle, according to 
which all rules must be proportionate to their objectives (i.e., a reasonable 
relationship between ends and means) under a three-pronged test of suitability, 
necessity and balancing or proportionality in the narrow sense. The latter principle 
also derives from the broad and general objective of equity and fairness in law,
36
 as 
well as from the foundations of modern constitutionalism.
37
  
                                                 
35
 See the origin of a constitutional standard of reasonableness as applied under the due process 
clause, in Chapter II, sections 1, 1.1, and 1.2 on the US; and further, on the explicit role of the rule of 
reason in the US (Chapter II, section 2); and in the EU, see Chapter IV, section 2.2. In the UK, see the 
notion of the rule of reason and standard of reasonableness that can be found as early as the end of the 
sixteenth century in Rooke’s  (1598) 5 Rep. 99b case (Lord Halsbury in Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 
173, cited in Wade, H.W.R., Administrative Law (OUP, 1994), p. 387, and Singh, Mahendra P., 
(2001), p.151, and in the 20th century, in Wednesbury [1948] 1 KB 223, the  statement by the court on 
the reasonableness standard of review, see this Chapter, next section. Jean-Paul Costa pointed out that 
the first expression of the principle of proportionality in France goes back to 1933 when the Conseil 
d’Etat decided the famous Benjamin (CE 19 May 1933) case dealing with the freedom of assembly 
(“Legal Concepts in the European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law: the Influence of Various 
National Traditions”, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, JPC/nk, unedited paper of 
07/10/2003, for a lecture at Inner Temple, London, on 13 October 2003). As the seed of the rule of 
reason, see Cicero (106-43 BC), according to whom “True law is right reason in conformity with 
nature” (Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, de Re Publica III.22.33). 
36
 Although equity deals not only with equality but also with natural justice and fairness (see Snell’s 
Equity, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, pp.4-5), a parallel can be made with proportionality, which has its 
roots in the notion of retributive justice and appropriate distributive justice (see Schwarze, Jürgen 
European Administrative Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, pp.678-9). Alexy cites R. von Krauss (Der 
Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit, Hamburg, 1955, p.41), who mentions the “natural right in a 
timeless sense of the individual to be protected from burdens to the extent that they exceed the degree 
necessary” (apud Alexy, R., A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford, 2002, p.69, n.90). According 
to Karl Larenz, the proportionality principle is a substantive principle, “that directly results from the 
notion of justice, fair measure, moderation, often modifying the equality principle” (Metodologia da 
Ciência do Direito, Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997, footnote 110, p.501). 
37
 See Chapter II, section 1, on the US (McCulloch v Maryland [1819] 17 U.S. 316). According to the 
historical origin of the proportionality principle, J. J. Gomes Canotilho states: “The proportionality 
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The rule of reason may generally be regarded as a legal method of construction and 
interpretation through which the scope of laws may be either narrowed or broadened 
according to their purpose and within their specific or general context. It may also 
convert a rule into a principle by taking into account other principles and policies and 
striking a reasonable balance between them, which is one of the essential features of 
the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness. Dworkin pointed out 
the following classic example: 
“The first section of the Sherman Act states that every contract in 
restraint of trade shall be void. The Supreme Court had to make the 
decision whether this provision should be treated as a rule in its own 
terms (striking down every contract ‘which restrains trade’, which 
almost any contract does) or as a principle, providing a reason for 
striking down a contract in absence of effective contrary policies. The 
Court construed the provision as a rule, but treated that rule as 
containing the word ‘unreasonable’, and as prohibiting only 
‘unreasonable’ restraints of trade. This allowed the provision to 
function logically as a rule (whenever a court finds that the restraint is 
‘unreasonable’ it is bound to hold the contract invalid) and 
                                                                                                                                          
principle was initially related to issues concerning executive power limitations, considered as a 
remedy to administrative limitations of the individual freedom. Based on this connotation, the State 
has adopted the principle as a positive maxim in the eighteenth century. However, this principle was 
introduced to the administrative law as a general principle of legal rights only in the nineteenth 
century” (Direito constitucional, p.386). See also Emiliou, Nicholas, The Principle of Proportionality 
in European law (Kluwer, 1996), Chapter 1. See also Solem v Helm case [1983] 463 U.S. 277, in 
which Justice Powell’s majority opinion traced the history of proportionality rules regarding the 
Eighth Amendment of American Constitution (prohibitions on excessive fines and forfeitures) to the 
Magna Carta of 1215 (paragraphs 20-21, ‘fines should be graded according to offense seriousness and 
should also not deprive the offender of his livelihood’) and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 
(Sullivan, E. Thomas, and Frase, Richard, Proportionality Principles in American Law – Controlling 
Excessive Government Actions, OUP, USA 2009, pp.136, 149, 244 n.93). The constitutional principle 
of practical concordance and the unity of the Constitution - the Constitution as a whole - require that 
rights and values in collision be limited according to the principle of proportionality in search of an 
optimal solution (Martin, Maik, and Horne, Alexander, “Proportionality: Principles and Pitfalls – 
Some Lessons from Germany” (2008) Judicial Review 13(3) at p.174, citing case law and the doctrine 
of Professor Konrad Hesse, former judge of German Federal Constitutional Court; Kommers, Donald 
P., “Unity of the Constitution as a Logical-Teleological Entity”, in The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke University Press, 1997) at p.45; and Hesse, Konrad 
(Elementos de Direito Constitucional da República Federal da Alemanha (Fabris, Porto Allegre 1998) 
at pp.66-67, translation of the German 20th edition Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland). 
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substantially as a principle (a court must take into account a variety of 
other principles and policies in determining whether a particular 
restraint in particular economic circumstances is ‘unreasonable’).”38 
This creative standard of reasonableness may address not only the issue of 
arbitrariness in law, but also its purposive interpretation by applying a logical method 
of relationship between ends and means that depends to an extent on each 
jurisdiction and the values at stake.
39
 In this task of striking a reasonable balance 
between the various interests in play, reasonableness is close to proportionality, as 
analysed further in the next section.
40
  
 
I.2. Their interaction, their differentiation, and their classification as rules, 
standards or principles.  
 
A clear illustration of how the rule of reason works in tandem with the standard of 
reasonableness and proportionality is the concept of discrimination. The reasoning on 
equality and the non-discrimination provision in international and domestic 
jurisdictions is quite similar, construing the prohibition of discrimination as 
containing the word ‘unreasonable’. Thus, only unreasonable discrimination would 
be unlawful, which may demonstrate once more that the rule of reason as a basis for 
legitimate differentiation lies at the heart of reasonableness and proportionality.
41
 
                                                 
38
 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (HUP 1978) pp. 27-28. The cases mentioned are 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. US [1910] (221 US 1) and US v. American Tobacco Co [1911] 221 
US 106. See also Chapter II.1.2. Emphasizing the constitutional clause of the right to contract and 
freedom of commerce and the Congress’ intent to protect them, Chief Justice Edward White 
concluded that “the law covered only ‘unreasonable’ restraints of trade and that a common-law 
standard of reasonableness should be used to identify the actions that the act prohibited” (Barbara C. 
Steidle, in The Oxford Guide to US Supreme Court Decisions, Kermit L. Hall (Ed.) 1999, p.293). 
 
39
 On the role of the legal standard of reasonableness in requiring a purposive interpretation to 
legislation, see Chapter II.1.3; and also on its task of “weighing up and striking a reasonable balance 
between the social claims” and the various interests at stake, see Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 
OUP (1961), pp.128-29.  
 
40
 Particularly to its third prong, proportionality in strictu sensu (balancing). From the case law of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) it has been rightly suggested that proportionality in 
the narrow sense is “identical with the Law of Balancing” (supra note 18, Alexy, 2002, p. 401). This 
states: “The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must 
be the importance of satisfying the other” (Idem, p.401). 
 
41
 See the US Supreme Court cases Quaker [1928] 277 US and Hoeper [1931] 284 U.S. 206. Chapter 
II.3; in the ICJ see Minority Schools in Albania case (PCIJ, Series A/B, n. 64, p.19), of 1935, Chapter 
III.1; in the ECHR see the Belgian Linguist cases of 1963 and 1964 decided on 23 July 1968 in which 
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Besides the above issue of discrimination and some brief illustrations given in the 
Introduction, one hypothetical example may also aid to explain how the 
reasonableness standard may work and differ from the proportionality test. Higher 
income tax rates for those who weigh over 180 pounds - on grounds of health 
protection and ability to pay - may lack a reasonable justification and be regarded as 
unreasonable for being irrational, unfair and arbitrary. However, a similar measure 
according to a reasonably flexible standard combining earnings, age, height and other 
medical recommendations by the public authority could be reasonable and (arguably) 
suitable to decrease obesity, particularly if there was also a tax incentive for those 
who try to lose weight. A different conclusion would be most likely reached under 
the proportionality principle, as it is generally understood under its three-pronged test 
of suitability, necessity and balancing. Higher taxation on overweight people may be 
unnecessary, as there may be other measures less intrusive to the fundamental rights 
to property and freedom to achieve the same or higher levels of healthy protection.
42
 
At the same time, the underlying policy or principle of health protection must be 
weighed against other policies or principles, such as the ability to pay principle and 
unfair discrimination on grounds of weight, which must be reconciled with each 
other. Thus, according to the proportionality principle, the questioned measure may 
be disproportionate, although it might be reasonable to tackle obesity.  
 
It has been suggested that reasonableness and proportionality are “different models - 
one looser, one tighter - of the same juridical concept”, which would be the 
                                                                                                                                          
the Court (in a Grand Chamber) construed the non-discrimination Article under the standard of 
reasonableness and the proportionality principle as a legal principle in its own right (Chapter III.2.3.a). 
In the same vein, see the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, when it construed the 
principle of non-discrimination and analyzed its direct and indirect effects, it clearly adopted the rule 
of reason and proportionality reasoning (see Chapter IV, sections 2 and 3). Within the WTO also, all 
the explicit exceptions to the non-discrimination principle as well as the general prohibition on 
‘arbitrary or disguised discrimination’ were construed in the light of the reasonableness standard and 
the proportionality reasoning (Chapter III.3.2.c). All these jurisdictions have construed the concept of 
equality and non-discrimination, inserting the reasonableness notion coupled with proportionality test 
within the wording of statutory law, according to a purposive interpretation in search of fairness. 
 
42
 Other less restrictive measures, though indirectly related to tackling obesity, would be to tax junk 
food or “fattening food of little nutritional value”, which, like taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and 
gambling, might also encourage taxpayers to live healthier. On some economic flaws of the idea of 
tackling obesity through the tax system, see The Economist August 1
st
 2009 (and some Papers at 
www.economist.com/fattaxes) (last visited 8 July 2010).  
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avoidance of arbitrariness.
43
 According to the less intensive form of 
unreasonableness (like the English Wednesbury principle
44
), a court should strike 
down or set aside a decision or a measure “only if it is ‘so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever come to it’. Whereas the principle of proportionality, 
as it has been developed in EU case law, holds that the decision of a public body 
should be quashed only if its adverse effects on a legally protected interest or right go 
further than can be justified in order to achieve the legitimate aim of the decision.”45 
It may be worth analysing whether reasonableness and proportionality are in 
themselves rules or principles.
46
 Reasonableness seems to function as a rule or 
method of interpretation of statutory law (such as the rule of reason analysed above), 
and sometimes as a separate standard explicitly provided by law, such as the 
                                                 
43
 Laws J. in R. v. MAFF, ex parte First City Trading Ltd [1997] CMLR 250, at 278-9, paras. 67-9, 
apud Green, Nicholas, “ Proportionality and the Supremacy of Parliament in the UK”, in The 
Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 1999), p.155. 
 
44
 Paul Craig summarised that well known principle stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses 
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, at 228-30, regarding the two meanings of the term 
“unreasonable”, as follows:  
1. “In one sense ‘unreasonable’ was used simply as a synonym for a host of more specific 
grounds of attack, such as taking account of irrelevant considerations, acting for improper 
purposes and acting mala fide, which, as the Master of the Rolls accepted, tend to run into 
one another.” 
2. “The other sense of the term unreasonable is that which now has become known the 
Wednesbury test: a decision can be challenged if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable 
public body could have made it. To prove this would require something quite extreme.”  
(Craig, Paul, “Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law”, The Principle of Proportionality in 
the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing, 1999), p.94). 
 
45
 De Burca, Gráinne, “Proportionality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Influence of European 
Legal Concepts on UK Law” (1997) 3 EPL 561, at 562, apud Walter van Gerven, op. cit. p.59. 
Comparing the Wednebury reasonableness standard with the proportionality principle Craig again may 
be right to suggest that proportionality is more structured, requires more reasoned analysis from the 
decision-maker, including the Courts that may decide “on grounds which are more readily identifiable 
and ascertainable”, and may encourage more transparency (Craig, Paul, supra. n.32, p. 99). 
 
46
 There are two main differences between rules and principles according to Dworkin (supra note 20 
pp. 24-26). First, rules are all-or-nothing norms, either they are applicable in a case or they are not, 
whereas principles may allow some degree of optimization in their application and enforceability as 
they must take into account other competing principles with which they must be reconciled. Secondly, 
principles have a dimension of weight and importance that is lacking in rules. Sometimes rules may 
function as principles. See Alexy, Robert (2002) Ibid, pp.44-66, and “On the Structure of Legal 
Principles”, Ratio Juris, 13/3, (2000).   
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concepts of ‘reasonable person’, ‘reasonable care’, ‘reasonable profit’ or ‘reasonable 
tax rate’.47  
Likewise, the proportionality test seems to function as a principle and not a rule of 
interpretation though it may comprise a set of rules (its three tests). According to 
Alexy‘s distinction between rules and principles, proportionality would not be a 
principle as its three sub-principles (suitability, necessity and balancing) are not 
weighed against other things and “they do not take precedence in one situation and 
not in another.”48 Actually, in that sense proportionality would be a legal method 
consisting in a set of three rules for interpretation and application of other rules and 
principles. However, taking into account other criteria for characterization of 
principles, such as a higher legal status, evolution and significance for the legal 
system
49
 or the “dimension of weight and importance”50, proportionality would be a 
principle of law. 
Like the rule of reason, the proportionality test works as a principle or a tool to elicit 
further principles from rules. Similarly, where reasonableness is an explicit word 
contained in statutory law (such as ‘reasonable consumer”, “reasonable profit”, etc) it 
functions as a standard, which is similar to a principle by being flexible, open-ended 
and requiring a balance between competing interests and principles.  
Besides the word reasonable, the word necessary as explicitly provided in statutory 
law may require a scrutiny of proportionality. On the difference between 
                                                 
47
 Under Dutch tax law, interest is deductible if the transaction is performed for valid business 
purposes or if the interest is actually taxed at a reasonable tax rate. The Dutch Supreme Court stated in 
the Case 36358, of February 8, [2002], that a tax rate of 10% in the other state was reasonable in 
comparison with similar group finance regimes taxed domestically (see de Bruin, Daan, “Netherlands 
Supreme Court Interprets ‘Reasonable Taxation’,” 2002 ITR.). See also the OECD Reports on 
Harmful Tax Competition that seem to be in search of a reasonable level playing field among all 
countries and jurisdictions that does not undermine the fairness and integrity of each country's tax 
system. According to the 2004 Progress Report, “although a low or zero effective tax rate is the 
necessary starting point of an examination of a preferential regime, it alone is not sufficient to find 
harmfulness. Any evaluation requires an overall assessment of each of the above factors and once a 
regime has been identified as potentially harmful the economic effects would have to be examined 
(where necessary)” (see Introduction, note 2). 
 
48
 (2002) Ibid, p.66 and note 84. 
 
49
 Ibid, p.46. 
 
50
 Dworkin (1978), p.26. 
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proportionality and reasonableness, Graig pointed out an interesting decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights,
51
 according to which the word “necessary” was 
apparently more clearly ascertained, since it was regarded neither as “synonymous 
with indispensable” nor as having the malleability of expressions like “admissible”, 
“useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”.  A “pressing social need” was implied by the 
word necessary.
52
 Whereas the ECHR took the view that necessary would be 
somewhere between indispensable and more flexible expressions such as useful, 
ordinary, admissible, desirable or reasonable,
53
 the Appellate Body of the WTO 
considered it closer to one of the poles of that ‘continuum’ as indispensable rather 
than to the other pole as making a contribution to.
54
 “Such a contribution exists when 
there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and 
the measure at issue.”55  
 
It has also been suggested, “When one passes beyond the most general and abstract 
level of analysis there are more differences and similarities between the concepts”.56 
Although they may interact with and aid each other, the degree of fairness of the 
balance appears to be higher in proportionality and arguably absent in reasonableness 
according to the UK common law, Wednesbury principle for example.
57
 
Furthermore, proportionality “doctrine directs attention not only to the interests or 
considerations weighed against each other, but also to the relative weights which the 
primary decision-maker attached to the various interests or considerations.”58 As 
                                                 
51
 Sunday Times v. UK (1979-80) 2EHRR 245, paras. 59, 62, 65, in Craig, Paul, “Unreasonableness 
and Proportionality in UK Law” (1999), op.cit. p.93 
 
52
 Ibid, See also on the interpretation of the wording ‘necessary’ within the ECHR, in the Handyside 
case on Chapter III.2.3.b; and.within the WTO agreements, Chapter III.3.2.b. 
 
53
 See Handyside (Application No. 5493/72) in Chapter III.2.3.b. (proportionality and other 
fundamental rights). 
 
54 
Korea - Various Measures on Beef  Report, paras. 161-162 and 164. See Chapter III.3.2.b. 
 
55
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, para 145. See also Chapter III.3.2.b. 
56
 Feldman, David, “Proportionality and the Human Rights Act” in Evelyn Ellis (ed.), The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, 1999), p.127. 
 
57
 Whereas the notion of unreasonable may mean that no reasonable authority could reach a specific 
decision, proportionality may require a test of fairness of the balance of all possible solutions or 
measures (Ibid, p.127-8). 
 
58
 Ibid, p.128. 
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already said, proportionality may go further than the notion of reasonableness in 
some jurisdictions, since the requirements of necessity and suitability may determine 
whether a disputed measure is less restrictive or not to the relevant interests in play. 
Indeed, if one might draw a line between reasonableness and proportionality, where 
both principles may co-exist, that distinction (scrutiny of which necessary and 
available measure is the least restrictive within an overall balance of the interest at 
stake) seems to be their significant difference. However, as already pointed out in the 
Introduction, this distinction is not Cartesian, as proportionality and reasonableness 
may sometimes be interchangeable and intertwine with each other.
59
  
A clear demonstration of that interaction, as also shown further,
60
 is over whether the 
better way to interpret and ascertain the meaning of the term “reasonable” would be 
via the proportionality test, just as whether a better way to keep proportionality 
flexible would be to apply it through the more open-ended notion of reasonableness. 
Thus, the principle of proportionality may be applied according to the more flexible 
standard of reasonableness,
61
 which may permeate its three-pronged test (suitability, 
                                                                                                                                          
 
59
 See for example in the US the roles played by balance and necessity (less restrictive measure) when 
the Supreme Court applies the standard of reasonableness (Chapter II). According to Hart (1961, 
p.132),  “the open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be 
left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between 
competing interests which vary in weight from case to case.” 
 
60
 See Chapters III.2.2 and IV.2.2. See also the analysis of unreasonable measures that are 
unreasonable because they fail to pass the test of proportionality, particularly regarding discriminatory 
tax measures, anti-avoidance tax measures and retrospective tax measures (Chapters II, sections  3 and 
4; III, sections 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, and 3.2; IV, sections 6.2, 6.3, and 8. 
 
61
 As it is in taxpayer and consumer protection, which is one of imperative requirements that may 
justify trade restrictions (such as effectiveness of fiscal supervision, tax avoidance, environmental 
taxation, and fiscal coherence), the ECJ applied the proportionality principle and stated, “that it is 
necessary to take into account ‘the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably 
well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’” in Jans, Jan, “Proportionality Revisited,” 
(2000) L.I.E.I. Vol. 27, No. 3, op. cit. p.251-2 (Estee Lauder Case C-220/98 [2000] ECR I-117 para. 
27). See also the legitimate expectation of taxpayers as reasonable citizens, Chapter IV.8.1. 
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necessity and balancing or proportionality ‘stricto sensu’)62  as appears from the 
jurisprudence of international
63
 and some domestic courts.
64
 
I.3. Their general importance to fundamental tax principles and issues 
(equality, legal certainty, tax avoidance, international human rights, 
international trade and double taxation) in search of fairness. What is tax 
fairness? 
If proportionality coupled with reasonableness comes from and serves the purpose of 
fairness since its conception,
65
 it is worth recalling what fairness is about and 
investigating whether there is a common idea about its definition. Likewise 
reasonableness and to some extent the principle of proportionality itself, fairness 
cannot be strictly defined, since it is a standard, not according to a particular 
subjective view, but to what can be generally accepted in a democratic society.  
Individuals within the same community and different peoples and nations may 
sometimes disagree on philosophical and practical characteristics of fairness or 
equity; however, one may suggest that one of its most basic requirements is 
                                                 
62
 In this sense, any restrictive measure to a fundamental right or freedom must be reasonably 
adequate, reasonably necessary, and reasonably balanced with other interests and rights at stake. 
Overall, see Chapters III.2 on the ECHR and III.3 on the WTO, and IV on the ECJ. 
 
63
 See on the WTO Chapter III.3. sections 2.b regarding “necessity” that requires a reasonable 
relationship between ends and means and reasonably available alternative measures; and 2.c. about the 
reasonable exceptions to discrimination and the reasonable balance of competing rights under the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. See also Vastberga Taxi (Application No. 36985/97) decided by 
the ECHR, on striking a reasonable balance between the importance of what is at stake requiring that 
the means employed must be reasonably proportionate to its legitimate aim (Chapter III.2.7.b).  
 
64
 In a case concerning the prohibition of a commercial activity (hiring out workers to building 
contractors), the justification was to avoid tax evasion, and breaches of labour and welfare law. The 
German Constitutional Court recognized that there was an alternative measure less restrictive to the 
professional freedom: a more effective control on and supervision of building sites. Notwithstanding, 
the Court held that the individual could not expect that “public resources, which are only limited, 
should be used beyond what can be reasonably expected of society to extend the official department 
responsible for combating these undesirable state of affairs” (BVerfGE 77, 84 (110f), apud Alexy, 
2002, p.400). See also BVerfGE 41, 251 (264), where the Court speaks of “an overall balancing 
between the seriousness of the infringement and the weight and urgency of its justifying reasons” 
(idem p.102 and n. 217). In the US, the balancing test has been considered as “the favorite intellectual 
constant in contemporary American constitutional law for analyzing claims about rights” (Durham, 
W. Cole, “General Assessment of the Basic Law - an American view”, in Germany and its Basic Law 
- Past Present and Future - A German-American Symposium, Editors: Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. 
Kommers, Nomos (Baden-Baden, 1993), p.42. See also Chapter II.1 on the US jurisprudence. 
 
65
 See section 1 of this Chapter and note 36.  
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equality.
66
 A sense of fairness seems to exist even when children at early stage ask 
why different treatment is given to their siblings or classmates. Also, according to a 
more general view, fairness “can broadly be seen as a demand for impartiality.”67 
This does not mean that a specific rule may not favour more vulnerable people or 
specific economic and social activities, such as tax incentives that must be justified 
on grounds of relevant economic and social reasons and principles. 
A fair tax base is traditionally and rightly “described as a matter of ´horizontal 
equity´, while the specification of tax rates is characterized as a question of ´vertical 
equity.’”68 Both of these types of equity are required by the ability to pay principle,69 
according to which taxes should be limited to an affordable amount, taking into 
account traditional sources of revenue, such as income, consumption and wealth. 
Each of these sources, separately as well as taken together, should form a fair tax 
base that should not be excessive or confiscatory.
70
  
It is also my opinion that fairness requires a reasonable balance between all the 
relevant interests at stake. Moreover, fair rules or decisions must further and be 
founded on the fundamental rights of those concerned, be practical, enforceable, 
                                                 
66
 To treat equal people in equal circumstances in an equal way (horizontal equity) and treat 
differently those who are not equal (vertical equity), James and Nobes, The Economics of Taxation, 
Financial Times-Prentice Hall, New York 2000, p. 78.  
 
67
 See Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 54. It is intellectually 
and morally attractive the notion of justice as fairness by which Rawls elaborated two basic rules for 
setting up impartial institutions. First, as individuals are rational, free and morally equals, each person 
should have a basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others (liberty principle). Secondly, as 
social and economic differences seems to be inevitable, they should be arranged so that they are both 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage (greatest benefit of the least advantaged people, as 
the “difference principle”), and attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunities  (Rawls, John, The Idea of Justice (original edition of 1971 and revised edition of 1999 
by Oxford University Press 1999) and Justice as Fairness a Restatement (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2001). For a constructive and critical analysis of justice as fairness, see again Sen, 
Amartya (2009), pp. 55 and sequitur. 
 
68
 Duff, David, “Tax fairness and the tax mix,” paper presented at the third workshop on The Social 
Contracted Revisited, Oxford 23-25 April 2008, p. 4, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in 
affiliation with The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, www.fljs.org. 
 
69
 The ability to pay principle is a general principle of tax fairness that is appropriate for allocating 
public costs whose benefits are indeterminate and generally shared, reflecting a principle of political 
equality; whereas the benefit principle justifies the allocation of costs of publicly provided goods and 
services to their users only, such as highways, collection of waste and sewage (Duff, David, idem pp. 
3-5).   
 
70
 On excessive and confiscatory taxation and the role of reasonableness and proportionality in 
assessing their fairness, see Chapters II, section 2; III, sections 2.7.b) and c), 2.8; IV, section 2.1. 
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effective, and based on objective factors (as opposed to subjective impressions or 
bias). Indeed, any concept of fairness may be more acceptable, if permeated by 
standards of reasonableness and proportionality to be ascertained by a majority of 
decisions makers, if a consensus is not possible. In other words, reasonableness and 
proportionality are legal tools to weigh and optimize the different principles and 
interests in play, this task being inherent in my view in the concept of fairness.
71
 On 
the one hand, proportionality coupled with reasonableness requires a fair balance 
between the public interest and individuals regarding human rights,
72
 as well as a fair 
exercise of rights balanced with the rights of other States under international 
agreements.
73
 On the other hand, a fair allocation of taxing rights between different 
countries is derived from the rule of reason that may require a fairness test as set out 
by the principle of proportionality in tandem with the standard of reasonableness.
74
 
Fair balance also requires impartiality, objective justification, and avoidance of 
subjective reasoning. Thus, decision-makers should be consistent, base their 
decisions on objective factors, and step out of themselves.
75
 This idea of multiple 
interests and fair balance is opposed to both a utilitarian view of taxation and the 
rational choice theory as the pursuit of self-interest only, at least where the legitimate 
interests of others are not taken into account properly. However, taxpayers can act in 
their self-interest where they avoid or minimize taxes, as any reasonable homo 
economicus would do, but within a social context that requires a balance of the 
                                                 
71
 Besides the examples of non-discrimination, retrospective taxation and tax avoidance given in this 
section, showing an explicit relationship between fairness and proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness, other cases illustrate that interconnection, such as the fairness of tax penalties 
(Chapters III.2.7.b, and IV.2.1, Louloudakis, Case 262/99), substantive tax measures (Chapter IV, 
section 7.1), procedural tax measures (Chapter IV, sections 7.3, and 8.5).  
 
72
 See Chapter III, sections 2.5.a  (Johnston case),  2.6.b (Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium case), 
2.7.b (Janosevic v Sweden case), 2.7.d (Bulves case), among other cases. 
 
73
 See Chapter III, section 3.2.c (US – Shrimps case).  
 
74
 On the imperative requirement in the general interest called balanced allocation of taxing rights 
within the European Union, derived from the rule of reason, to which proportionality is closely 
connected, see Chapter IV, section 5.2. See also the analysis of fair apportionment in the US, in 
Chapter II, sections 1.1 (Complete Auto Transit case) and 5 that are permeated by the standard of 
reasonableness. 
 
75
 To reach a fair decision judges can step into parties’ shoes to better grasp their arguments, but at the 
same time stepping back from any personal subjective involvement. A parallel can be made here with 
Rawls’s original position according to which individuals being morally equals, rational and free, 
would minimize bias and prejudices by setting up fair institutions with a highest minimum standard of 
justice (see note 67).  
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principles of equality, individual freedom, legal certainty, and the right to property 
against some other competing principles, such as horizontal and vertical equity, 
equality of opportunities, abuse of rights, and good faith for instance.
76
 
Furthermore, if “taxation is all about drawing distinctions”,77 and the classification of 
taxes, allocation of tax jurisdiction, determination of tax rates, of tax basis, and of 
taxpayers all involve distinctions, then non-discrimination may tend to be one of the 
most important and sensitive principles of taxation. Thus, the power to tax can be 
controlled by the reasonableness standard of review and proportionality, which lie at 
the core of discrimination, as will be explained further.
78
 
Another set of cases in which the proportionality principle may work in concert with 
reasonableness deals with retrospective legislation that may impair the obligations 
and rights that arise from previous transactions. In the light of the implicit or 
expressed principles of constitutions - such as the rule of law, principles of legality, 
certainty, predictability, and ability to pay - that should be proportionally weighed in 
interpreting and applying retrospective laws, what would be the reasonable result? 
The example of the principle of non-retrospective legislation will be further 
discussed and compared because not only “there is a close link between the principle 
of proportionality and non-retroactivity”,79 but also it can be seen as one of the 
clearest examples of how the courts in different countries and international 
jurisdictions have inferred the unwritten principle of non-retroactivity in tax matters. 
Any retrospective measure must be justified according to its necessity and proportion 
to its objectives, and by balancing it with the legitimate or reasonable expectations of 
the taxpayers. In the words of the US Supreme Court on retrospective legislation, 
“the question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or 
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and 
                                                 
76
 See below more general analysis about tax avoidance and fairness, particularly notes 82-84. The 
homo economicus may be not separated from the homo sociologus, the homo psychologicus, the 
homo ethicus, and the gentleman, who pay fair taxes for the price of civilization. 
 
77
 Thuronyi, Victor, Comparative Tax Law, Kluwer, 2003, p.82. 
 
78
 See Chapters II.3; III, sections 2.5 and 3.2; and IV, sections 2, 3, and 4. 
 
79
 Ibid, p.144.  
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the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end” (emphasis added).80 
In the sense of fairness requiring a balance of competing interests, any public interest 
to justify retrospective taxation to tackle loopholes or abusive transactions must be 
weighed against the individual rights or legitimate expectations and personal 
circumstances of those concerned.
81
  
However, the above issues of non-discrimination and non-retroactivity are neither the 
only, nor perhaps the most important, examples of the relevance of the 
proportionality principle in tandem with reasonableness that may be applied to tax 
issues in search of fairness. For instance, if “equity and certainty are in conflict,”82 
regarding the implementation of anti-avoidance rules - general or specific - 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness may be the analytical tool to give them a 
proper and legitimate justification and construction. Thus, equity and certainty may 
be balanced and reconciled through proportionate anti-avoidance rules that must take 
into account other principles, such as the general principle of good faith.
83
 Anti-
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 Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, [1934] 290 US 398, at 438, Supreme Court(Chapter 
II.1.2 and also relating to taxation the cases US v. Hudson [1937] 299 US 498; Welch v. Henry et al. 
[1938] 305 US 134, and US v. Darusmont [1981] 449 US 292 (Chapter II.4). See also the ECHR cases 
explicitly applying the proportionality principle (Chapter III.2.6) and the analysis of the ECJ cases at 
Chapter IV.8. 
81
 “Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by 
prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled 
transactions” General Motors Corp. v. Romein [1992] 503 U.S. 181. On legitimate expectation and 
retrospective taxation, see extensively also Chapter IV, section 8.  
82
 “Tax equity demands that artificial tax avoidance schemes should be of no effect, yet certainty 
demands that the tax laws should be such that an individual can arrange affairs in the expectation that 
he will not have to pay tax” (Tiley, John, Revenue Law, 2005, p.101-02). On proportionality, tax 
avoidance and discrimination see Hoeper in the US (Chapter II.3), and, on tackling tax avoidance to 
justify retrospective taxation, Milliken v. US [1931] 283 US 15, US v Carlton [1994] 512 U.S. 26, 
Nichols v. Coolidge [1927] 274 US 531, Boldgett v. Holden [1928] 275 U.S. 142, and Untermayer v. 
Anderson [1928] 276 U.S. 440 (Chapter II.4); within the ECHR see the cases on retrospective 
legislation and tax avoidance (Chapter III,  section 2.6.b); within the WTO, see Bovine Hides and 
Dominican Republic - Cigarettes cases (Chapter III.3.2.b); and within the ECJ see the cases analysed  
in Chapter IV, sections 6 and 8.4.  
 
83
 The general principle of good faith also appears to be relevant in determining whether there is abuse 
of law to be caught by general or specific rules that must be construed according to the principle of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness. See the following cases that were explicitly decided on 
abuse, good faith and proportionality grounds: Intersplav and Bulves regarding the right to a tax 
refund decided by the ECHR (Chapter III.2.7.d); and by the ECJ the following cases in Chapter IV, 
De Lasteyrie du Saillant Case C-9/02 [2004] ECR I-2409 (section 6), Optigen Ltd, Fulcrum 
Electronics Ltd and Bond House Systems Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise Joined cases C-
354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 [2006] ECR I-483 (carrousel fraud cases) and Federation of 
Technological Industries and Telios Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 [2006] ECR I-
483 regarding joint tax liability requiring reasonable behaviour, good faith and proportionality 
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avoidance rules are also justified by their objective of raising tax collection and 
avoiding artificial transactions with no business purpose. The issue of how specific 
anti-avoidance rules - such as rules relating to transfer pricing, controlled foreign 
companies, and thin capitalization, - are justified and interpreted as proportionate and 
adequate to their objectives needs to be addressed. If apparently indeterminate rules 
may be necessary for anti-avoidance purposes, the notion of reasonableness and the 
proportionality test may be used to assure a desirable margin of certainty and 
predictability pursuant to the objective of fairness. Once freedom is recognized as a 
fundamental right, including the freedoms of contract and effective management 
exercised by the taxpayer, the proportionality principle may also act as a reasonable 
restrictor of this freedom and, at the same time, as a reasonable limitation to the 
power to tax. The role of balancing may also be present in weighing up the relevant 
economic factors to ascertain the open-ended notion of tax abuse.
84
  
Both the standard of reasonableness and the principle of proportionality are also 
relevant to interpret and apply other legal principles and rules, particularly vague 
ones, such as equality.
85
 Vague standards, such as reasonableness itself and its 
corollaries, such as ‘reasonable person’,86 must be as objectively ascertainable as 
possible to achieve fairness and certainty in law. Perelman emphasizes that the limit 
of interpreting vague concepts is their unreasonableness or unacceptability,
87 
which 
not only results from the inconsistency of rules, but also from their construction in 
the light of their purpose and the legislative intent. The introduction or application of 
                                                                                                                                          
(section 7.3); Schlossstrasse Case C-396/98 [2000] ECR I-4279 concerning retrospective taxation, 
legitimate expectation and good faith (section 8.3). 
84
 See for instance Halifax Case C-255/02 [2006] ECR I-1609 and Part Service Case C-425/06 [2008] 
ECR I-897 cases, Chapter IV.7.2. 
 
85
 According to Cass R. Sunstein, standards “like ‘equality’ and ‘reasonable’ are vague because they 
need a great deal of determination to have meaning for particular cases” (Reason and Political 
Conflict, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.124). 
 
86
 The standard of ‘reasonable person’ applies in tort law, criminal law, and administrative law, in 
which equality has a fundamental role in its objective ascertainment (see Moran, Mayo, Rethinking the 
Reasonable Person: an Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
87
  Etica e Direito, p. 682, Le raisonnable et le deraisonnable en droit (LJDJ, 1984). See, also, 
Emiliou, (1996), n.20, pp.254, 270, 273 and Takis Tridimas (1999), p.140, about the close affinity of 
the notion of proportionality to that of reasonableness. That close relationship is quite logical since in 
order to be necessary and proportionate, “the means must be reasonable” (Messerschmidt, Klaus, note 
17, p.4). 
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forms and special rules of legal argumentation is necessary to meet the requirements 
of a more ascertainable law or legal rule, with as much certainty and predictability as 
possible. On the other hand, some degree of uncertainty and indeterminacy in law 
may be inevitable, as in life itself. One never knows when, where and how one will 
die, but one should reasonably know how one’s gains and transactions might be 
taxed. Other uncertainties or ambiguities in law may reflect the lack of consensus at 
the legislative level in adopting precise and complete concepts or terms.  This 
malleability of legal rules provides another layer of complexity in the search for 
certainty and predictability of law, as well as in determining its meaning.  
Proportionality in concert with reasonableness may also play a fundamental role in 
making more effective some principles and rules. Moreover, effectiveness may be 
also regarded as closely related to fairness, which is the ultimate objective of 
proportionality.
88
 It has been rightly suggested that if the application of a system or 
some principles and rules lack fairness, they may fail in “political acceptability” and 
may tend to fail in effectiveness “as enforcement becomes difficult and non-
compliance grows.”89  
Furthermore, the reasonableness standard and the proportionality principle are 
broadly applied in different jurisdictions not only as techniques for the determination 
of open-ended concepts, but also in the interpretation, construction and even 
derogation of legal rules, or more precisely, in considering some statutory rules as 
unconstitutional and so null and void.  
According to Larenz, the proportionality principle widely dominates tax law, 
especially at the level of justice and the ability to pay,
90 
where the necessity of its 
application is even clearer. A lack of its consistent application may lead to 
arbitrariness and uncertainty, which would be repulsive to human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and fairness in international tax relations. 
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 On effectiveness, see Chapters III, sections 2.1, 2.3.c)2 and d); IV, sections 8.5 and 9; and section 
2.3 of the Conclusion. 
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 Piccioto, Sol, International Business Taxation (W&N 1992),  p.83. 
90
 Derecho Justo – Fundamentos de Etica Juridica, (1985), p.141 
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In terms of the economics of taxation, a test for taxes is to raise revenue without 
harming enterprises too much
91
, except perhaps for sin taxes. In other words, the 
economic test requires a reasonable balance between those objectives. If a tax were 
easy to avoid, it would lack one of those requirements. The canons of taxation 
(fairness, efficiency, and simplicity) should be pursued together and the simpler a tax 
the less fair it may be. Thus, a reasonable balance between those objectives should 
exist within a tax system and its particular taxes to make them more efficient and 
fair
92
 as well as the whole tax system.
93
  In the light of the general public interest and 
fundamental rights, any tax measure or rule might be scrutinised first on the political 
and legislative stages and secondly on the judicial level under the proportionality 
principle coupled with reasonableness. 
Between different jurisdictions there appear to be conflicting interests in applying 
some principles and rules, such as an international “trade neutral allocation of tax 
jurisdiction”94 and those concerning source and residence countries.95 The benefit 
principle tends to favour source countries (generally developing countries), and the 
ability to pay principle is more connected to residence countries (a principle usually 
advocated by developed countries). What could be the limit for the application of 
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 The Economist, September 19
th
, 2009, p.17. 
 
92
 The role of proportionality coupled with reasonableness may be seen as remarkable in assessing any 
particular tax, such as VAT, as analysed in Chapter IV.7. 
 
93
 According to David G. Duff the concept of tax fairness should be considered in the light of three 
broad goals: 1. the collection of revenues to finance public expenditures, 2. the regulation of social 
and economic behavior, and 3. the distribution of economic resources. Regarding the first goal the 
combination of two principles - benefit principle and ability to pay – is a useful criteria to assess its 
fairness; whereas for the second the justice of the regulatory goal and the rational relationship between 
its objective and its distributional effects are more appropriate to assess tax fairness; and lastly for the 
third goal, broader considerations of distributive justice should be taken into account for assessing 
fairness (“Tax fairness and the tax mix”, 2008, pp 1-8).  Proportionality may be clearly applied to all 
three goals; to the first by combining the benefit and the ability to pay principle, assessing not only 
which revenue is more appropriate to each principle, but also assessing the two principles themselves; 
to the second by assessing the legitimate ends of regulatory goals and the appropriate means to reach 
them; and to the third by assessing the criteria for the distribution of economic resources as 
proportionality has its roots in the notion of retributive justice and appropriate distributive justice (see 
note 36). 
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 Van Thiel, Servaas, “General Report” in Lang, Michael, Herdin, Judith, and Hofbauer, Ines (Eds.), 
WTO and Direct Taxation (Kluwer, 2005), p.47. 
 
95
 See inter alia, Source versus Residence – Problems arising from the allocation of Tax Rights in Tax 
Treaty Law and Possible Alternatives, Lang, Michael, Pistone, Pasquale, Schuch, Josef and Staringer, 
Claus (Eds.), (Kluwer, 2008). 
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both principles? Proportionality and reasonableness may interact with them in order 
to achieve more fairness in an international scenario.
96
 Regarding double taxation 
conventions, many of their articles may be interpreted in the light of proportionality 
and reasonableness to achieve more fairness in the allocation of profits, enforcement 
of tax claims, and the exchange of information.  
Sometimes the vaguer notion of reasonableness contained in the Vienna Convention 
(Article 32(b))
97
 may not be the most persuasive reasoning and the only method for 
solving tax disputes. The well established test of proportionality used by the ECHR 
to restrict state immunity under international law and convention rights
98
 may be 
regarded as a decisive rule to apply to fiscal sovereignty in some circumstances. Also 
regarding the interpretation and application of bilateral investments treaties, the 
proportionality and reasonableness tests may have a relevant role in general, 
particularly in tax matters and the fiscal sovereignty of States.
99
 The host country 
may impose tax measures that fall foul of the “fair and equitable treatment”100 and 
the “national treatment and the most favoured nation” clauses, as well as the 
expropriation requirements that may be breached by general or specific tax rules. 
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 The rationale for applying the principle of proportionality to the equitable apportionment of 
resources between watercourse states (Gabcikovo-Ngymaros Project case, ICJ Reports, 1997,7, apud 
Cannizzaro, “The Role of Proportionality…” (2001) EJIL 12, p.898) may similarly be extended to the 
issue of fair apportionment of tax where income is related to two or more countries.  
 
97
 Supplementary means of interpretation 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
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 See Higgins, R, (2003), n.2, p.10. 
 
99
 See Walde, Thomas and Kolo, Abba, “Investor-State Disputes: The Interface Between Treaty-
Based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty”, (2007) Intertax, Volume 35, Issue 
8/9, pp. 424-449. 
 
100
 On this clause, see Tudor, Fiona, “The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, in International 
Law of Foreign Investment (OUP, 2008). On the express application of the principle of proportionality 
to treaty investment disputes within the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ clause, see inter alia Xiuli, Han 
“The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v Mexico” (2007) Chinese Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, 635-652. In this article Prof. Han Xiuli points out that China has 
agreed to over 300 bilateral investment treaties including the fair and equitable and expropriatory 
requirement clauses, and states that proportionality may philosophically be compatible with the 
Chinese doctrine of moderation. 
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In conclusion, the reasonableness standard as a judicial tool to construe any law and 
control its constitutionality was developed by the American system of 
jurisprudence
101
 and may have become an implicit and explicit source for 
jurisprudence for various countries. The case law of community and international 
courts, such as the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Appellate Body of the WTO, may have also founded their core decisions on 
the principle of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness.
102 
As an apparently 
indeterminate concept, the notion of reasonableness has evolved throughout the 
years, and has sown the seeds of proportionality. Their role in taxation may be 
pervasive, possibly covering essential issues, such as equity, fairness, legal certainty, 
avoidance, evasion, enforcement, simplicity, tax incentives, non-prohibitive or 
reasonable taxation, tax rates and tax basis, public policies, equality and non-
discrimination, fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as further development of 
new principles. Other issues will be covered, such as whether the principle of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness may be regarded as an overarching 
principle or method of interpretation and application of law as applied in domestic 
and international courts. The emphasis will be given to tax matters and their 
interaction with international trade and with fundamental rights, which may be the 
foundation and the ground for fair taxation and efficient tax systems.      
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 See the following Chapter, sections 1 to 4. 
 
102
 See Chapters III and IV. 
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II. American Legislation and the US Supreme Court  
 
The importance of this Chapter lies in the analysis of the origin of both the principles 
of proportionality and reasonableness and their relationship with the rule of 
reason,
103
 particularly in relation to the Due Process Clause enshrined in the 
American Constitution. Reasonableness and proportionality themselves will be 
investigated as to whether or not their reasoning may be regarded as an essential tool 
for interpretation and application of principles and rules, such as equality and 
discrimination. It may not be a new finding that proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness may be at the heart of discrimination, in searching for fairness in each 
case. It has also been suggested that “proportionality is key to preventing excessive 
government intrusion into individual autonomy and also to striking a meaningful 
balance between the federal government’s limited powers and the state’s police 
power.”104 
 
Furthermore, how the reasoning of proportionality in both of its forms - strict and 
loose - permeates judicial decisions will be demonstrated, particularly within the tax 
field, regarding not only equality and discrimination, but also retrospective taxation, 
worldwide unitary taxation and transfer pricing rules. All these rules and principles 
may be construed and interpreted in the light of reasonableness and proportionality in 
balancing public interest, policy reasons, fairness, legal certainty, predictability, 
equality, ability to pay, non-abusive tax avoidance and other taxpayer’s rights as will 
be shown in this Chapter. These particular issues have been chosen not only to 
illustrate how the standard of reasonableness - sometimes interchangeable with the 
principle of proportionality - may be applied in search of fairness and consistency in 
each case before the Supreme Court, but also to point out some arguable 
inconsistencies and unfairness that may be contradictory to its alleged objectives. 
                                                 
103
 The rule of reason may be regarded as a method of construction and interpretation of the law 
through which the scope of laws may be reasonably either narrowed or broadened according to their 
purpose and within its specific or general context. As a result, exceptions to general or specific rules 
may be construed by taking into consideration imperative or pressing social needs under the test of 
proportionality. See Chapter I, section 1, Chapter II section 2 and within the EU context, Chapter IV, 
section 2.2. 
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 Sullivan, E. Thomas, and Frase, Richard, Proportionality Principles in American Law - 
Controlling Excessive Government Actions (OUP, USA 2009), p.83. 
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Finally, wherever possible, some distinctions will be drawn between tax and non-
taxes cases regarding how proportionality and the rule of reason govern them. 
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II.1. The constitutional clauses regarding reasonableness and proportionality 
standards of review. The rule of reason. 
II.1.1 The role of proportionality in American federalism and an overview of the 
constitutional grounds for proportionality and reasonableness. 
It is worth noting that an aspect of the test of proportionality between ends and 
means has been existent in American jurisprudence since the beginning of its 
constitutionalism. In McCulloch v Maryland, Justice Marshal stated:   
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, but consistent with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” 105 
It has been suggested that the US Supreme Court has applied a stricter test of 
proportionality to state actions under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as 
discussed below, though only to laws that restrict fundamental rights or draw 
distinctions on grounds of unreasonable classification.
106
  
 
The First Amendment
107
 provides for freedom of speech that is enforced to an extent 
that any restriction to this right is closely scrutinized as “debate on public issues … 
[should be] … uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”108 Thus, any kind of taxation that 
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 [1819] 17 U.S. 316. This case concerned a State tax that was declared unconstitutional, since it had 
been imposed on a bank incorporated by the Federal Union.  Marshall’s “ever immortal words” 
(L.Y.F., Virginia Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 7, May, 1933, p.722) dealt with the implied powers of the 
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the enumerated powers of the Federal Union (see also Tushnet, Mark, “US: Eclectism and 
Pragmatism”, Interpreting Constitutions - a Comparative Study, (OUP, 2006), pp.7-54.  
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 Tribe, Lawrence, American Constitutional Law, (1987), ch. 16:6-13, apud Beatty (2004), pp.162 
and 182. 
 
107
 First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” 
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 [1964] 376 U.S. 254 at 365, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice William Brennan.  
 38 
appears to be a restriction to or discriminatory against the freedom of the press is also 
submitted to a strict test of scrutiny.
109
 
 
The interpretation of the Fifth (1791) and Fourteenth (1868) Amendments,
110
 which 
established the protection of the due process clause, has broadened and applied the 
reasonableness standard in particular cases  from different fields of law,
111
 including 
federal and state taxation.
112
  
 
Also, by virtue of the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution, the Judiciary 
is empowered to review the reasonableness of search and seizure measures 
(unreasonable searches and seizures).
113
 The Supreme Court construed 
‘reasonableness’ as “requiring a balancing of the strength of the government interests 
supporting the search or seizure against the nature and degree of the intrusion on the 
citizen’s privacy, liberty, and/or property rights.”114 The case law on ‘unreasonable 
searches and seizures’ clearly demonstrates how ‘proportionality’ intertwines with 
and interchanges with ‘reasonableness’ as a standard of judicial review, applying the 
ends-means reasoning to assess the seriousness of the offences and sometimes the 
least-intrusive means test.
115
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 See further discussion on this issue, the Grojean case, this Chapter section 3. 
 
110
 Fifth Amendment: “No person shall be…., nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law;…” 
Fourteenth Amendment: “…. nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”   
111
 As Justice Stevens also stated in Ewing v. California, “the Due Process Clause directs judges to 
employ proportionality review in assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards on a 
case-by-case basis. See, for example, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore [1966] 517 U.S. 559, 562.”  
112
 See the following sections 2, 3, 4 respectively regarding excessive taxation, tax discrimination and 
retrospective taxation.  
113
 A close relationship between proportionality and unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
may also be seen in Atwater v City of Lago Vista [2001] 532 U.S. 318. 
114
 Sullivan, E. Thomas and Frase, Richard S., (2009), p.97. 
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 See Atwater v.City of Lago Vista above, penultimate note, Terry v Ohio [1968] 392 U.S. 1, 
McDonald v United States [1985] 472 U.S. 479, Welsh v Wisconsin [1984] 466 U.S. 740, Tennessee v 
Garner [1985] 471 U.S. 1, and other cases analysed by Sullivan and Frase (2009), pp.97-103. 
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A proportionality test is also a standard of review under the Eighth Amendment, 
according to which “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”116  In contrast with other 
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court has held the death penalty to be constitutional under 
the test of proportionality.
117
  
 
The commerce clause prohibits restrictions on interstate trade, whether or not 
discriminatory, unless the measures concerned comply with the requirements of 
objective justification based on a valid reason other than protectionism (in case of 
discrimination) or their costs do not exceed their benefits (in case of non-
discriminatory measures).
118
  Those state regulations are then scrutinized under the 
test of objective justification and cost-benefit analysis, which have similarities with 
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Beatty (2004), p.182, by mentioning Lockyer v. Andrade [2003] 538 U.S. 63 and Ewing v. 
California [2003] 538 U. S. 11, under the Eighth Amendment (“Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  In the latter case Justice 
O’Connor stated, that this Amendment "prohibits ... sentences that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed," and that the "constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in 
this Court for almost a century" (at 284, 286).  
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 In Stanford v Kentucky [1989] 492 U.S. 361, by a majority of four to five, the death penalty was 
regarded as proportional and neither cruel nor unusual punishment for even criminals of 16 or 17 
years of age. See Jackson, Vicki C, and Tushnet, Mark, Comparative Constitutional Law, (Foundation 
Press, 1999), pp.153-57, and the Chapter III.2.c.3 on proportionality and the right to life under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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  In C & A Carbone, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Town of Clarkstown [1994] 114 S. CT. 1677, 128 L, 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, summarized the types of discrimination and 
protectionism that are unconstitutional under the commerce clause:  
“The scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial creation. On its face, the Clause provides 
only that ‘[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . 
.’ U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. This Court long ago concluded, however, that the Clause not only 
empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but also imposes limitations on the States in the 
absence of congressional action: …………. We have generally distinguished between two types of 
impermissible regulations. A facially non-discriminatory regulation supported by a legitimate state 
interest which incidentally burdens interstate commerce is constitutional unless the burden on 
interstate trade is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. See Brown Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142. Where, however, a regulation ‘affirmatively’ or ‘clearly’ discriminates against interstate 
commerce on its face or in practical effect, it violates the Constitution unless the discrimination is 
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to protectionism. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma [1992] 
502 U. S. (slip op., at 15-16); Maine v. Taylor [1986] 477 U.S. 131, 138. Of course, there is no clear 
line separating these categories. ‘In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the 
statute on both local and interstate activity.’ Brown Forman Distillers, supra, at 579.” 
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proportionality reasoning.
119
  In tax matters, the Supreme Court developed the 
doctrine of ‘nexus’ with the taxing state and the requirement of ‘fair apportionment’ 
under the commerce clause,
120
 also based on the reasonableness standard which may 
function as a principle. States have the right to tax interstate commerce if a four 
prong test is met, according to Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
121
 that requires 
the tax:  
(1) be applied to an activity with substantial nexus with the taxing state, 
      (2) be fairly apportioned, 
      (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and 
      (4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state. 
Whereas some American commentators also see similarity between the rulings on the 
commerce clause and the proportionality reasoning of the European Court of 
Justice
122, others consider that this was “an American rendition of the principle of 
proportionality found in German and European Union law.”123 My view is that, 
regarding discriminatory measures, the US reasoning is the same as the objective 
justification on grounds of necessity and balancing (typical of proportionality), 
whereas concerning non-discriminatory measures the scrutiny of cost-benefit is 
different from proportionality by the margin of discretion of the public authorities. In 
other words, when the US courts assess whether local benefits exceed or not trade 
costs, there is no deference to the discretion of States, which is present in 
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 Regarding cost-benefit analysis and proportionality see Trachtman, Joel P., “Trade and … 
Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity” (1998) EJIL, 9, p.64; and on the difference 
between proportionality and cost-benefit analysis, see Chapter III, section 3.2.b, on the WTO. 
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 See also section 5 (Container and Barclays cases).  
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 [1977] 430 U.S. 274. See also Hellerstein, Walter, “The US Supreme Court’s State Tax 
Jurisprudence”, pp.108-18, in Comparative Fiscal Federalism Comparing the European Court of 
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 Bermann, George A., Goebel, Roger J., Davey, William J., Fox, Eleanor M., Cases and Materials 
on European Community Law, American Case Book Series (West Publishing Company, 1995), 
p.358). 
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 Sullivan and Frase (2009) supra, p.57. Contrasting the Supreme Court decisions on the commerce 
clause and the European Court of Justice on restrictions on intra-community trade, see also Maduro, 
Miguel, We, the Court - the European Court of Justice & the European Economic Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, 1998), pp.90-95.  
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proportionality.
124
 Regarding the criterion of fair apportionment the standard of 
reasonableness must take into account the legitimate interests of other states based on 
objective factors as should happen with the transfer pricing rules and in the fair 
allocation of taxing rights between States. 
 
Summing up the case law of the Supreme Court, Sullivan and Frase point out that 
there are two rigid standards of scrutiny: the strict and the rational. Whereas the 
former is applied to more fundamental liberties and suspect classes, the latter is 
applied to a ‘garden-variety socio-economic legislation’.125 The strict scrutiny is 
more rigorous and closer to the test of proportionality in its three prongs – suitability, 
necessity and balancing of the all interests at stake, as decided in Harper (to tax the 
right to vote) and Hoeper (joint taxation of couples).
126
 The rational basis is more 
deferential to intrusive measures and may be closer to the reasonableness standard of 
review, as demonstrated in Lehnhausen.
127
 However, there is also an intermediate 
scrutiny according to which medium-high protection is provided for gender 
discrimination, state encroachment of federal powers, violation of free speech by 
content neutral regulation, criminal matters, severe fines and forfeitures.
128
 Grosjean 
on State taxation and the right to free speech as well as cases on retrospective 
taxation are examples of this intermediate scrutiny, where the relationship between 
ends and means, as well as the balance of the interests at stake are also clearly 
present.
129
 Thus, the intensity of scrutiny may also vary in tax matters for which the 
Supreme Court developed similar standards of review to assess the intrusiveness of 
excessive or discriminatory taxes in violation of the fundamental rights, the due 
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 See further on this issue, Chapter III, sections 3.2.b (last paragraph) and 3.3. 
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 Idem, 2009, p.203, n 11. 
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 See both cases in section 3 of this Chapter. As happened in Harper, sometimes a right is regarded 
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restriction (v.g. the imposition of a tax to exercise the right to vote).  
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 See section 3 of this Chapter. See further Chapter I, section 2, on examples of measures that would 
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 Sullivan and Frase (2009) supra, pp.5, 52-53. 
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 On Grosjean see section 3 of this Chapter; on retrospective legislation see Home Building in the 
next section (1.2); and on retrospective taxation, section 4.  
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process and commerce clauses, varying the degree of scrutiny according to the values 
and interests in play.  
All the above illustrations show the foundations of proportionality and 
reasonableness on constitutional clauses that may have a similar construction based 
on the rule of reason. This point is analysed in the following section, since it may be 
suggested that proportionality and the broad reasonableness standard of review have 
their origin in the rule of reason and in the interpretation of the constitutional clause 
of contract protection.  
II.1.2. Constitutional clause on contract protection (the rule of reason, reasonableness 
and proportionality) 
This section aims at investigating the relationship between the rule of reason
130
 in the 
US and the standard of reasonableness that may be interchangeable with the 
proportionality principle. This investigation leads to and corroborates the conclusion 
that the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness in relation to other 
fields of law is the same as that applied in tax matters. It may also aid in drawing 
some distinctions between tax and non-taxes cases, and from them to infer its main 
purpose: the search for fairness in a logical, principled and reasoned way.  
To demonstrate this, it is worth starting with two sets of cases in which the Supreme 
Court applied the notion of reasonableness and necessity to restrict the apparently 
broad wording of the constitutional clause on contract protection.
131
  
The first set of cases concerns retrospective legislation that may impair the obligation 
of previous contracts. The constitutional prohibition on the impairment of contracts, 
literally interpreted, seems to be absolute (“No State shall […] pass any ... Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts”), with no room for any exceptions, but the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether or not reasonable or necessary impairments 
should be admissible. The landmark case was Home Building & Loan Assn. v. 
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 On the origin of the rule of reason and its broader general relationship with the standard of 
reasonableness and proportionality, see Chapter I, sections 1 and 2. 
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 Article I, Section X, clause 1 of the American Constitution states “No State shall […] pass any Bill 
of Attainder, ex post facto law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts […].” 
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Blaisdell,
132
 in which it was held that to ascertain the scope of the constitutional 
prohibition of interfering with contractual obligations, the course of judicial 
decisions should be examined taking into account not only the fair and reasonable 
aim of contracts, but also of any law including the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme 
Court stated that it was beyond question “that the prohibition is not an absolute and is 
not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula”.133 The question 
that should be answered is whether the law that retroactively applies to the obligation 
of a contract has a legitimate purpose, as well as whether the adopted measures are 
reasonable and appropriate for that purpose.
134
 This decision may be compared in 
two ways with the reasonableness of retrospective taxation as analysed in section 
four of this Chapter. First, a similarity between them in relation to the application of 
the same standard of reasonableness functioning as a principle
135
 of interpretation 
regarding tax matters, suggesting that this field of law is not out of touch with 
general legal principles of interpretation.
136
 Secondly, the degree of scrutiny might 
differ, but again the rationale behind the construction of laws in the light of the rule 
of reason and proportionality seems to be the same search for fairness in each case.
137
 
The second set of cases deals with any other impairment of the obligation of 
contracts. In Lochner v. New York
138
, the Supreme Court stated:  
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 [1934] 290 US 398. 
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 290 US 398, 428. 
 
134
 Blaisdell, idem, 438: “The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts 
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and 
the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.” 
 
135
 See Chapter I, sections 1 and 2, on how reasonableness may be interchangeable with 
proportionality as a principle particularly in its role of balancing. 
 
136
 Tim Koopmans, Professor of Constitutional Law and former judge at the European Court of 
Justice, pointed out that taxation is the clearest illustration of active judicial imposition of substantive 
legal standards on areas of law which were characterised by administrative discretion, stating that, “by 
extending constitutional rules and principles, such as equal protection and protection of legal 
certainty, to tax matters the courts have helped to transform fiscal administration into tax law” in 
Courts and Political Institutions: a Comparative View (CUP, 2003), p.275. 
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 A retrospective measure must be not only appropriate to its legitimate end, but must also comply 
with the legitimate expectations of citizens based on fairness, as the Court stated in General Motors 
Corp. v. Romein [1992] 503 U.S. 181. See this Chapter, section 4, on retrospective taxation. 
138
 198 US 45. 
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“The [state] act must have a more direct relation, as a mean to an end, 
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act 
can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an 
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in 
relation to his own labor.”139 
In this case, the Court gave no weight to the social purpose and utility of the 
measure, but only regarded public health, safety and morals in contrast with the 
individual liberty of contract, to invalidate the law that imposed maximum hours of 
daily work.
140
 
It has been suggested that it is hard to ascertain vague terms like “liberty” or 
“property” that do not make a choice among substantive values.141 However, what 
may be more interesting here is to point out again the relationship between 
reasonableness and proportionality with regard to the relationship between legitimate 
ends and means.
142
 The terminology ‘proper’, ‘not going beyond the limits of a 
constitutional right’, particularly the term ‘reasonable’, was contained in some laws 
and constitutional provisions such as the protection of equality. The Framers of the 
Constitution also acknowledged that its “broad provisions are subject to legal rules of 
interpretation that derive from common sense and that the construction must be 
natural and reasonable.”143 Thus, the Judiciary was left with the task of ascertaining 
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 Idem at 57-58.  
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 The Supreme Court also invalidated minimum wage laws, laws protecting unionizing and 
consumer protection laws, but later on started giving broad deference to state socio-economic 
legislation  (Sullivan and Frase (2009) supra, pp. 62-63). 
 
141
 This has not been the problem with Lochner.  What was wrong with Lochner was that the Court 
chose “wrong values to enforce, wrong in the sense that complete laissez-faire capitalism was neither 
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 Sullivan and Frase (2009) supra, p. 172, citing The Federalist no. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the reasonableness of the facts analysed in the light of the circumstances and the 
reasonable purpose of the law.
144
 
The interpretation of the Sherman Act is one of the landmark examples of the 
introduction of reasonable and unreasonable expressions in the law.
145
 Justice White 
reasserted the necessity of attributing a meaning to the vague terminology ‘restraint 
to trade’. This ascertainment should follow the sense of preserving the individual 
right to contract without hindering interstate trade, considering that the free 
circulation of goods is the goal protected by the law.
146 
Thus, the Supreme Court 
stated again that the standard of the rule of reason - universal in its application - was 
clearly required to provide effectiveness to the remedies provided by law, preventing 
unreasonable limitations on the freedom of contracting, adopting an ends-means 
relationship as well as balancing the constitutional freedom of contract, legitimate 
restrictions and the purpose of the Act concerned.
147 
 
A similar reasonableness standard may be required in tax matters concerning 
reasonable profits, reasonable taxation, and reasonable or acceptable tax avoidance. 
The point that may be made here is that, where fundamental rights and principles are 
in play, such as the fundamental freedom of contract, they may be limited by 
imperative requirements or pressing social needs in the general interest. However, 
these limitations must be tested according to the reasonableness and proportionality 
standards of review in order to make them most effectively and rationally compatible 
with each other. Furthermore, where the margin of discretion is apparently unlimited 
or broad enough to defy the requirements of legal certainty and non-arbitrariness, 
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proportionality coupled again with reasonableness may consistently be used to 
ascertain their boundaries.  
In this section, the rule of reason and its relationship with the standard of 
reasonableness (ends and means) and proportionality (balancing) was analysed 
within the context of non-tax cases, particularly concerning the fundamental freedom 
of contract with reasonable restrictions and limitations to retrospective legislation 
(Home Building) and any other possible impairment such as in Lochner. This section 
also served the purpose of showing that tax law is not a separate body of law with its 
own rules and principles of interpretation, in which there might be no room for the 
fundamental principle of proportionality and the pervasive notion of reasonableness.  
The next section will illustrate a distinction between reasonableness and arbitrariness 
and how the former standard may give prevalence to a purposive interpretation of 
laws over a literal method of construction.
  
II.1.3. Reasonableness as a determinant of either the preponderance of the literal 
meaning, or the legislative intention – The possible distinction between what is 
reasonable and what is non-arbitrary 
According to Repetti, in 1945 the Supreme Court pronounced a decision revealing 
American jurisprudence’s position regarding the tension that exists between the 
search for a strict and a literal meaning of the law, and the legislator’s intent.148 The 
former is the generally prevailing interpretation technique of the common law, 
specifically in the United States. Thus, every time a literal meaning or a sense that 
was divergent from a law’s purpose needs to be put aside, the reasonableness rule is 
used as the interpretation technique. The idea of proportion or adequacy also lies 
beneath this technique. Every time the literal meaning proves inadequate to the 
proposed goal or to the legislator’s objective, the golden rule (literal technique) is 
surpassed by some other method or interpretation of the rules, although always based 
on reasonableness. The legislator’s objective has to be valid, reasonable, and in 
accordance with the constitution. In order to give preponderance to the clear and 
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literal meaning of the legislative language, it is also important to notice the possible 
difference between absurd and unreasonable results. 
The decision in question also showed that the Supreme Court frequently followed 
that objective instead of the literal words, even weighing up the case where a clear 
meaning would not provide absurd results, but only unreasonable ones, divergent 
from the purpose established in the legislation.
 
Absurdity and reasonableness remain 
as vague terms, endowed with indeterminacy. It is possible to infer that the absurd is 
something that totally breaks rules, conditions and reason. Unreasonableness would 
be at a lower intensity level, not actually breaking rules and limits, and always 
analysed in the light of concrete circumstances. The retroactivity of a more severe 
law to be applied to facts which had occurred more than three years earlier could be 
considered absurd; given that the reasonable time limit was two years (see Welch v. 
Henry
149
, concerning income tax).  
Thus, the American Trucking case is a landmark decision in which the Supreme 
Court applied the standard of reasonableness to give preference to a purposive 
interpretation over a literal method. This might bring more uncertainty to tax law 
interpretation where legal certainty and clarity are required by taxpayers; however, 
my view is that the purpose of the standard of reasonableness is to bring more 
rationality to laws making them more logical, consistent with other rules and 
principles, and as fair and effective as possible. Moreover, a right balance between 
the open-ended standard of reasonableness and certainty can be achieved through 
proportionality as shown in the dilemma about tax avoidance (legal certainty 
opposing equity).
150
  
The next section will consider another relevant characteristic of reasonableness.  
II.1.4. The living and changeable notion of reasonableness in new circumstances. 
The application of the due process clause has often been invoked to bar the 
enforcement of a tax similar to the sales tax (domestic/local tax payable on retail 
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sales) by state legislation. The use tax was collected in the state of the acquirer of 
out-of-state products consumed or used in the buyer’s state. Although the financial 
burden always falls on the purchaser, the vendor has the duty to collect the tax. Sales 
taxes are only charged on the transactions completed in each state. With the lack of a 
specific anti-tax avoidance rule, such state tax could be avoided if the sale is 
performed in the vendor’s state or even in a third state, and the goods consumed in 
the purchaser’s state. This is the reason why states that already collect sales tax also 
implement a use tax, payable on goods acquired out of the state in which they are 
used.
151 
If the sellers do not collect the use tax in an interstate sale, the buyers in their 
other state had to collect the use tax, as if they were the taxpayers as the users of 
goods brought into their state. As a matter of fact, the use tax is the equivalent to the 
sales tax that would be due in an intrastate sale had the seller an establishment in the 
taxing state. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court considered as reasonable the collection of use tax 
payable on goods acquired outside of the purchaser’s state, but only if the vendor had 
a physical presence or there was a nexus between the vendor and the state that had 
implemented the tax.
152
 Consequently, the state would inform the taxpayer located in 
another state who would be charged with the tax. However, twenty-five years later, 
the Supreme Court abandoned the due process clause criteria as a constitutional 
obstruction to the imposition of the use tax in the case of sales through mail order.
153
 
The Supreme Court held that a state had jurisdiction to bring action against people 
who had minimum contact with the state, without offending the traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice, having stated: 
“This Court's due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially 
since Bellas Hess, abandoning formalistic tests focused on a 
defendant's presence within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry 
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into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it 
reasonable, in the context of the federal system of Government, to 
require it to defend the suit in that State.”154 
Thus, the formal-physical presence criterion was abandoned as a consequence of the 
application of the standard of reasonableness under the due process clause that is 
flexible and adaptable to new, relevant economic circumstances. From a physical 
presence to determine the taxpayer’s connexion with a state, the standard of 
reasonableness accepted a new reality (electronic sales and virtual presence in 
another state) as a factor of connection for tax purposes as well. However, the fact 
undeniably remains that modern trade incorporates several commercial activities 
exclusively performed through mail and electronic communications, regardless of the 
trader’s physical presence, and even if his or her intentions are exclusively addressed 
to out-of-state customers. Based on these underpinnings, and taking into 
consideration economic circumstances and the flexibility of the reasonableness 
standard, the decision in Bella Hess was overturned, a ruling that would allow the 
collection of the use tax without impinging on the due process clause. 
Due to its indeterminate aspect, the due process clause has proved changeable 
throughout the years, according to differing socio-economic circumstances. This 
adaptability can be seen and is indeed demonstrated by this tax jurisdiction issue.  
This and the previous sections (1.1 to 1.4) discussed some constitutional foundations 
for the general standard of judicial review of reasonableness and its different 
applications to fundamental rights, other constitutional protections, as well as its 
characteristics of giving prevalence to a purposive interpretation over a literal one, 
and flexibility. Where reasonableness functions more as a principle, particularly in its 
role of balancing different interests or other principles at stake, it is close to 
proportionality that itself functions in tandem with the standard of reasonableness. 
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In the next sections, the main tax issues of excessive taxation, tax discrimination, 
retrospective taxation, and the extra territorial effects of domestic legislation will be 
analysed in the light of reasonableness and proportionality inferred from a number of 
clauses of the American Constitution. 
 51 
II.2. Excessive taxation (due process clause, reasonableness and 
proportionality). 
 
Under the apparently broad ‘formula’ of due process of law in the American 
Constitution, no person can be deprived of life, freedom or his/her assets without due 
legal process. That is, the deprivation of freedom or expropriation should be allowed 
only according to the broad concept of the rule of law, which may be ascertained in 
each case via a broad or strict notion of the rule of reason and proportionality.
155
 
Thus, the Supreme Court has based itself on the Due Process Clause to control the 
constitutionality of statutes that had unreasonable and inconsistent restrictions on the 
freedom and property of citizens.  
 
If an activity, such as the production and sale of ice cream, is regarded as lawful and 
legitimate, it can be taxed provided that the tax “be reasonable in amount and not 
prohibitive.”156 In this case, an excise tax of seven cents per quart on all ice cream 
sold - which amounted to more than 30% of the wholesale price - was held invalid on 
the grounds that it was so excessive as to tend to ruin and suppress a legitimate 
business. There was also evidence in the market that, if the excise tax were passed on 
to consumers, there would be losses due to a substantial sales decrease. 
 
As will be discussed further
157
, the expressions ‘reasonable’ and ‘proportionate’ may 
be interchangeable, and where a close scrutiny is applied to any measure or rule to be 
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 In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources [1993] 509 U.S. 443, concerning excessive 
awards, the Court reiterated that it had already “recognized that the requirement of proportionality is 
implicit in the notion of due process” (509 U.S. 443, 479). 
156
 Martin v. Nocero Ice-Cream Co [1937] 269 Ky. 151, 106 S.W. 2d 64. 
157
 See in this Chapter Quaker, Lehnhausen, and Grosjean cases on section 3 (non-discrimination); 
and Hudson , Welch and. Darusmont cases on section 4 (retrospective taxation). See also the ECHR 
cases explicitly applying the proportionality principle to the analysis of reasonableness (Chapter 
III.2.2); Vastberga Taxi, on striking a reasonable balance between the importance of what is at stake 
requiring that the means employed must be reasonably proportionate to its legitimate aim (Chapter 
III.2.7.b); and  WTO cases (Chapter III.3), sections 2.b regarding “necessity” that requires a 
reasonable relationship between ends and means and reasonably available alternative measures; and 
2.c. about the reasonable exceptions to discrimination and the reasonable balance of competing rights 
under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.  
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considered as reasonable, it must be adequate, necessary and (depending on the 
fundamental principles and rights in play) the least intrusive one.  
 
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court recognized that legislators had a broad 
margin of appreciation in regulating certain activities or products, regarding them as 
harmful or inconvenient on public moral or health grounds.
158 
The Supreme Court 
has considered excessive taxation, stating that, if laws passed within the legitimate 
sphere of legislative power and reasonable enforcement ‘for the security of private 
rights, the harshness, injustice and oppressive character of such laws will not 
invalidate them as affecting life, liberty or property without due process of law.’159 
However, a tax prohibiting an activity would be unreasonable, disproportionate and 
consequently unconstitutional (null and void), if the occupation is legitimate and the 
product is harmless.
160   
As an open-ended and flexible concept, the term 
“reasonable” may be brought into play to consider a rate of tax as substantially 
harmful to a kind of business, but not to another, due to different market competition. 
A specific tax rate that may be prohibitive at any one time, due to a change in 
circumstances may not be prohibitive any longer at another time. This was expressly 
stated in Glenn v Field Packing Co. by the Supreme Court regarding an excise state 
tax on oleomargarine.
161
 If proven that a kind of margarine is seriously unhealthy, a 
prohibitive tax could be imposed on it without violating the due process clause. The 
analysis of prohibitive taxation via proportionality reasoning is also made by the 
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  Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co. case, [1916] 240 US 342, in which the Court said that regarding 
the harmfulness and inconvenience of some goods, “not the courts, but legislatures, may be the best 
judges, and. it may be, the conclusive judges.” See also Mugler v. Kansas case [1887] 123 U.S. 623. 
See also Various Items of Personal Property v. US case, [1931] 282 US 577, in which the Court 
upheld the excessive taxation, penalties charges and confiscation of alcoholic beverages, on grounds 
of due process as well: “Whether the exaction be a tax or a penalty; or partly the one and partly the 
other, there is no constitutional objection to enforcing it by forfeiture of the offending property.” 
 
159
 Knowlton v. Moore [1900] 178 US 41, 44. In this case, the Court analysed whether or not a 
succession tax which was construed to fall on the recipients of the property transmitted rather than on 
the estate of the decedent was arbitrary and confiscatory.  
160
 See above Martin v. Nocero Ice-Cream Co. 
161
 [1933] 290 US 177, in which the Supreme Court affirmed the decision from the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals holding that an excise tax on oleomargarine confiscatory and prohibitive of the exercise of a 
legitimate business under the State Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  
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European Court of Human Rights,
162
 and the justification for restrictions to trade in 
goods on public health and environmental grounds in the European Court of Justice 
is also based on the proportionality test.
163
   
 
Whereas the substantive analysis of the due process clause may be regarded as an 
evolution of a living Constitution, tax sovereignty and the exercise of police power 
by the legislature may have justified the apparently more self-restrained approach to 
tax matters with respect to declaring unconstitutional some taxes based on their 
confiscatory nature. Additionally, a constant concern regarding tax collection may 
have contributed to that self-restraint. A closer and more obvious relationship 
between due process and proportionality with regard to equality may be seen in the 
following analysis regarding non-discrimination.  
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 See Chapter III, section 2.7.c. 
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 See Chapter IV, sections 2 and 4. 
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II.3. Tax discrimination (due process, equality principle and proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness). 
 
The influence of the notion of reasonableness and proportionality in determining the 
equality principle
164
 in taxation is noteworthy. As already pointed out, taxation is 
about drawing distinctions,
165
 and proportionality coupled with reasonableness have 
been extensively applied as legal tools to make any distinction, and particularly 
discrimination, acceptable and justifiable. Some degree of fairness may also be 
necessary to draw distinctions and make taxes reasonably acceptable by, and 
enforceable on, taxpayers either as citizens with political rights or as enterprises that 
are ultimately controlled by individuals.  
Moreover, as has been suggested, if there is “no objective and reasonable 
justification” for different or distinct treatment of similar situations, there is no 
equality,
166
 not only according to the European Court of Human Rights, but also to 
other international and domestic jurisdictions, including the U.S. where ‘suspect’ 
differentiation is subject to a ‘strict scrutiny’ or a strict proportionality test.167   
In a landmark case concerning equality, Quaker City Cab. Co. v. Pennsylvania
168
, the 
Supreme Court had to decide whether the higher taxation of corporations in 
comparison with individuals carrying on the same business activities would be 
admissible or not under the equal protection clause. Justice Brandeis discussed the 
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 Although only the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly provided the equal protection principle, it is 
settled law that also the equality principle is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment and falls within the 
general protection of due process which is fundamentally based on fairness (Maxwell v. Bugbee 
[1931], 250 US 525; Coolidge v. Long [1931] 282 US 582; Heiner v. Donnan [1932] 285 US 312; 
Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp. [1941] 314 US 463). 
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 See Chapter I and Thuronyi (2003), p.82. 
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 Meussen, Gerard, Conclusion, p.173, in Eucotax Series on European Taxation: the Principle of 
Equality in European Taxation (Kluwer Law, 1999), pp.169-174, 1999,  
167
  Fredman, Sandra, (2002), pp.116-7. See also on the ECHR, Chapter III, sections 2.3.a, and 2.5; 
and in EU taxation, Chapter IV, sections 2.4, and 3-5.  
168
 [1928] 277 US 389. 
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essentials of the equality principle concerning a tax case, suggesting that the 
following requirements should be met:
 169
 
a) Reasonableness of classification, based on real differences among individuals 
or taxed objects. 
b) The existence of a justifiable purpose for the classification. 
c)  Logical connection between the pursued purpose and the classification that 
will provide the conditions to achieve this purpose. 
The relationship between means and ends required by law is crystal-clear. It entails a 
substantial analysis of the alleged motive, which undoubtedly reflects the key 
concept of reasonableness and proportionality. The role of balancing different or 
opposing interests at play is lacking. However, this balancing can be sometimes 
implicit and the interests of those concerned were in this case on the one hand 
corporations being taxed as individuals, and on the other, the public interest in taxing 
them based on their privileges to act as corporations. The Court held unconstitutional 
the heavier taxation of corporations, with the dissenting vote of Justice Brandeis.
170
  
In a unanimous later decision, the Court formally overturned Quaker pointing out 
compelling reasons why corporations could be taxed differently by comparison with 
individuals and partnerships.
171
 In Lehnhausen the legal issue was the alleged 
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 Brandeis dissenting said: “In other words, the equality clause requires merely that the classification 
shall be reasonable. We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent, just minded, 
civilized man could rationally favor. In passing upon legislation assailed under the equality clause we 
have declared that the classification must rest upon a difference which is real, as distinguished from 
one which is seeming, specious, or fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated alike, 
that the object of the classification must be the accomplishment of a purpose or the promotion of a 
policy, …, and that the difference must bear a relation to the object of the legislation which is 
substantial, as distinguished from one which is speculative, remote, or negligible, to this limitation of 
reasonableness, the equality clause has left unimpaired, both in range and in flexibility, the state's 
power to classify for purposes of taxation” (277 US 38). 
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 See Case Comment, “Taxation. Discrimination between Corporations and Individuals in State 
Taxation” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 (April 1933), pp.738-739; “The Corporate 
Character of the Taxpayer as a Basis of Classification in State Property Taxation” Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (January 1931), pp.443-447. 
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 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co [1973] 410 U.S. 356. Justice Douglas stated the 
following, justifying the purpose of the differentiation and its logical connection with the 
classification  referring to the dissenters in Quaker led by Brandeis and the privileges granted on 
corporations:  
" The continuity of the business, without interruption by death or dissolution, the transfer of 
property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of business controlled 
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discriminatory nature of the property tax the State of Illinois imposed on 
corporations only, leaving individuals free from the tax charge, for a number of 
reasons, such as practicalities for assessment and enforcement, fairness, and some 
privileges granted to corporations.
172
 Justice Douglas cited among others cases Allied 
Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, in which it was stated that the equal protection clause 
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment “imposes no iron rule of equality, 
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of 
state taxation.”173 Thus, the Court concluded that Quaker was outdated; there have 
been no reason any longer why corporations could not be taxed differently from 
individuals, giving states a large discretion to impose their taxes on those grounds.  
This standard of reasonable tax discrimination may be loose, although some 
rationality must justify the differentiation between classes of taxpayers and the 
relationship between the ends of discrimination and the means to achieve it. 
However, where taxation is in play with other specific federal rights, apart from 
equal protection, the scrutiny of the Supreme Court is strict and not just rational.
174
 
Again Justice Douglas cited in Lehnhausen the classic examples of taxes that 
discriminated against newspapers, struck down under the First Amendment 
(Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 ) or that discriminated against 
interstate commerce (see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 
157) or required licenses to engage in interstate commerce.
175
 In the Grosjean case, 
the issue at stake was the constitutionality of a license tax of two per cent of the gross 
receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertisement business in publications 
having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, in addition to all other 
taxes and licenses levied and assessed in the State of Louisiana. In this case the 
Supreme Court closely scrutinized the purpose of the license tax and the class of 
                                                                                                                                          
and managed by corporate directors, the general absence of individual liability, …. It is this 
distinctive privilege which is the subject of taxation, not the mere buying or selling or 
handling of goods which may be the same, whether done by corporations or individuals." Id., 
at 161-162.  
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 See the previous note. 
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 [1959] 358 U.S. 522, 526 -527. 
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 See this Chapter, section II.1.1 on those two types of scrutiny. 
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 Lehnhausen, footnote 3 of the Opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Douglas. 
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taxpayers (newspapers and other publications) who could ultimately bear their 
burden as an indirect and direct restriction to their activities. The Court held that the 
license tax was invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and stated,  
“The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not 
measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured 
alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the 
advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of penalizing the 
publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of 
newspapers.”176  
On its face the license tax was charged on advertisements but indirectly targeted the 
publications, particularly newspapers. This analysis of the end result of a specific tax 
to ascertain its validity under the equal protection and other constitutional clauses is 
quite similar to the test of justification for indirect discrimination.
177
 Furthermore, in 
this case taking into account the volume of circulation and not the number of 
advertisements was considered as inappropriate to the objective of a license tax on 
advertisement business. In other words, there was no reasonable relationship between 
ends and means.  
Although the term proportionality may not have been systematically and clearly 
distinguished from reasonableness in the above tax cases, it is right to suggest that 
the way the Supreme Court reasoned and decided some cases demonstrates a clear 
application of a test of justification in assessing discrimination, ends and means 
relationship, and reasonableness as in the Quaker, Lehnhausen, Grosjean, and 
Container
178
 cases.  
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 [1936] 297 U.S. 233, 251.   
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 See further cases of indirect discrimination, for example Darby v Sweden (Chapter III.2.5.c) and 
Schumacker (IV.5.1), in which the ECHR and the ECJ did not apply the proportionality principle in an 
explicit way, but adopted the same rationale as the test of justification to accept or not discrimination. 
Although Mr Darby and Mr Schumacker were not residents in comparison with residents they were 
discriminated against as the newspapers in the Grosjean case. 
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 [1983] 463 US 159, which is analysed in section 6 of this Chapter. 
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Regarding equality, and also tax avoidance, another interesting case is Hoeper v. Tax 
Commission of Wisconsin.
179
 In this case, the progressive tax on married couples was 
assessed on their joint income, subjecting them to a higher rate than the one that 
would be applicable to each of them separately. The Supreme Court struck down the 
blatantly clear tax discrimination between married and single persons under the due 
process clause, and refused the justifications that had been offered on grounds of 
necessity to tackle tax avoidance that could exist between the spouses. The other 
justification that was disallowed was the greater and different privileges enjoyed by 
couples in comparison with single persons that could validate a difference of tax 
treatment. Contrasting this decision with Quaker and Lehnhausen, if it were possible 
to treat marriage as a business venture, one might consider as permissible to tax 
married couples as a transparent partnership but not as a corporation. The Court 
stated that the discriminatory tax rule was clearly “a revenue measure, and not one 
imposing regulatory taxes.” In terms of tax avoidance, the measure could be regarded 
as excessive and as such disproportionate, since other measures would be available to 
control tax avoidance, taking into account fiscal supervision to check if one and not 
the other spouse have actually accrued income.  
The joint taxation of spouses would be lawful where a constitutional provision 
provided for a more favourable tax regime for single persons to the detriment of 
married couples, or another constitutional allowance for taxing the economic or 
social benefits of marriage, or if an earlier regime were still valid in which the wife 
did not have any right to her own income. This decision is also quite interesting from 
a comparative perspective, since other constitutional courts reached the same 
conclusion via a proportionality test.
180
 
Fredman
181
 pointed out an interesting contrast between the US Supreme Court and 
the European Court of Human Rights regarding discrimination and equality, noting 
that, whereas for the latter sex discrimination takes priority in terms of strict scrutiny, 
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 Fredman, Sandra, (2002), p.118. See also on the strict scrutiny for a category of rights, Sullivan 
and Frase (2009) supra, p. 5. 
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for the former, race is on the top of the hierarchy of issues requiring scrutiny. From a 
tax perspective, it may be suggested that, for both Courts, discrimination in taxation 
might be somewhere in between the top and the bottom of a virtual hierarchy and 
may vary according to the underlying criterion for classification.
182
 Another side of 
the coin of tax discrimination is to use a tax measure as a requirement for exercising 
a fundamental right, such as the right to vote
183
 and to move or change residence 
(exit taxes).
184
 Arguably the same may be equally true of the right to change 
nationality or citizenship, which can be conditional on proportionate tax measures, 
such as the requirement of a minimum period of time for taking effect or demanding 
the payment of tax on potential gains previously crystallized to tackle tax avoidance.  
It may be suggested that the proportionality principle coupled with reasonableness - 
or reasonableness in the form of strict scrutiny - has become more important than the 
equality principle, as the latter may not be properly applied from a perspective of 
fairness without the aid of the former.
 
Both of them may be prerequisites for a fair 
interpretation and application of any fundamental right; however, while equality 
determines the application of fundamental rights to every person in a similar way, 
proportionality concretely allows the compatible construction, allocation, fair 
balance and application of all fundamental rights, including equality.  
Under either the juridical notion of reasonableness or proportionality, the due process 
clause was applied to different legal rules and principles. The objective of its 
application and development was to make different rules and principles effective and 
compatible with the rule of reason that had also evolved based on the due process 
clause. The next section will consider how both standards of review may demonstrate 
the relative importance of each principle. Alternatively, it may be construed as an 
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 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections decided on 24 March 1966 (383 U.S. 663) the Supreme 
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 See cases regarding exit taxes in the European Community (N Case C-470/04 [2006] ECR I-7409 , 
Chapter IV.5.3, and De Lasteyrie, Chapter IV.6.  See also the European Court of Human Rights 
(Chapter III, sections 2.5.c and 2.7.b, particularly Riener, Application No. 46343/99). 
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overarching principle from which many others may derive, such as the principle of 
non-retrospective taxation.  
 61 
II.4. Retrospective taxation (the relationship between reasonableness and 
proportionality). 
In the light also of the due process clause, retrospective legislation may violate the 
right to property or freedom, depending on some factual circumstances. In fact, like 
many other jurisdictions the United States does not have an explicit constitutional 
rule that prohibits retrospective legislation, except for criminal charges.
185
 The 
system of jurisprudence of the Supreme Court insists on denying the limitless 
application of this principle, basing its position on the due process clause.  
The Supreme Court considers as constitutional all retroactive tax measures, once the 
retroactivity is applied to periods close to the period when a draft law is discussed in 
and afterwards passed by Congress. This is the case with tax laws whose purpose 
consists of encumbering income acquired either during the year that the law was 
enacted, or during the legislative session prior to its enactment taking place. It is 
equally important to consider the magnitude of alterations that were introduced, as 
well as the taxpayer’s recognition of the possibility of change that may occur in the 
legislation.
186  
In a unanimous decision in Milliken v. US
187
, the Supreme Court reiterated its case 
law allowing the retroactivity of more burdensome tax laws, always paying attention 
to the peculiar circumstances of each case. Among these circumstances, the specific 
type of the disputed tax, predictability, and the taxpayers’ own behaviour should be 
taken into account. In Milliken a father made a donation (gifts in contemplation of 
death) to his children in December of 1916. These gifts were taxed at the same tax 
rate as that applied to testamentary disposals, according to the principle of equality of 
estate taxation. The purpose of this tax on gifts was also to tackle tax avoidance of 
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  Section 9 of the US Constitution, clause 3: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.” The same prohibition is addressed to States under clause 1 of Section 10 of the US 
Constitution. 
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 See US v. Hudson [1937] 299 U. S. 498; Welch v. Henry et al. [1938] 305 U.S. 134 , and US v. 
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estate tax on transfers at death, under the law already in force in 1916. Nevertheless, 
in 1918 new legislation was introduced increasing the tax rates of both gifts in 
contemplation of death and testamentary transfers of property, following the equality 
principle and the tax avoidance purpose that underlined the original Law. Two years 
later, in 1920, the father passed away and the gifts were taxed at the higher rate. 
Apparently, as submitted to the Court, to apply tax rates “not in force when the gift 
was made” and to “the value of the property not when given, but at the uncertain 
later time of the death of the donor” was blatantly retrospective and contrary to legal 
certainty and predictability under the due process clause. However, the Court stated 
that it was foreseeable that a gift in contemplation of death would be taxed at the rate 
in force at the moment of death (1920), since the legislation in force at the time of 
the gift was made (1916) had already provided for the equal treatment of both 
situations. In other words, the taxation at higher rates was justified on grounds of 
equal treatment of both situations (gifts in contemplation of death and transfers at 
death), taking into account as well that a reasonable taxpayer could have predicted 
under the law of 1916 that a higher rate could come into force before his or her 
death.  
However, in Nichols v. Coolidge, Boldgett v. Holden, and Untermayer v. 
Anderson
188
, the donations were regarded as having been given without any 
prediction or anticipation of testament, and they occurred prior to the more recent 
law.  Application of the new law to these cases would be unreasonable and arbitrary, 
in violation of the due process clause enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, what would be considered a reasonable time to admit reasonableness 
as one of the circumstantial elements of each case? There is no fixed time since the 
notion of reasonable time itself will depend on numerous other factors (the nature of 
the tax, taxpayers’ behaviour, legislative intent, and statutory purpose, to name but a 
few).  
Nonetheless, in Welch v. Henry,
189
 the Supreme Court held again that the due process 
clause did not prohibit retroactive legislation, except when the consequences were 
extremely harsh and oppressive. In this particular case, the tax payable on dividends 
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was based on a 1935 statute, the applicability of which relied on the base period of 
1934 being extended to a distribution that was made in 1933. The assumption that the 
shareholders who received the dividends might have refused them on realising that 
their earnings could be subsequently submitted to another tax or to an increase of 
pre-existing taxes was excessively hypothetical. This could be seen as a generally 
broad consideration of predictability without taking into account the possible 
disappearance of the dividends after one or two years: they could be consumed, 
invested or even lost in some other economic activity. In fact, the reasonableness 
principle and the notion of predictability itself could have reached their boundaries, 
in the sense that even the majority had agreed with the relatively open notion of 
“recent transactions.” This notion has played a fundamental role in the acceptance of 
retroactivity of the law in question. The new statute could refer to these “recent 
transactions” when applied to income received in the year of the legislative session 
prior to the enactment of the law. For instance, a specific law that was enacted in 
1935 was applied to income declared in 1934 but received in 1933 -- two years 
before the law’s enactment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered that the 
current tax might have been approved or might have reached the limit of admissible 
retroactivity. Six judges from the United States Supreme Court, led by Justice 
Stone,
190
 affirmed that they could not say that the tax had exceeded that limit.  
Another justification for retrospective legislation is to amend errors of previous 
statutes on grounds of tackling tax avoidance, as decided in United States v. 
Carlton.
191
 In this case, the Court applied the same standards for reviewing 
retroactive economic legislation, requiring a legitimate purpose and rational means. 
In other words, again without mentioning the word proportionality, a rational or 
reasonable relationship between ends and means is required. Thus to collect tax from 
“those who had made purely tax-motivated” transactions, having taken advantage of 
an uncorrected version of the statute, was regarded as legitimate purpose.
192
 In 
addition, the necessary and more efficient way to achieve that purpose was to enact a 
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retrospective amendment to make clear the real intent of the legislature, correcting a 
technical imperfection in the previous legislation.  
Summing up the US case law on retrospective taxation, one may suggest that there 
must a reasonable relationship between ends and means and a balance must be struck 
between the legitimate public interest in pursuing a retrospective measure and the 
rights of those concerned. The similarity of requirements for retrospective legislation 
seems to be quite clear when compared with other domestic and international 
jurisdictions. This fact may point out that the proportionality reason that served as a 
basis for these decisions tends to be the same irrespective of inevitable procedural 
and substantive constitutional dissimilarities among different jurisdictions.
193
 
This section has demonstrated how proportionality and reasonableness are flexible 
and more qualitative than quantitative in order to secure other principles such as 
predictability. Due to its open-texture nature and flexibility, proportionality may also 
cause conflicts between different tax jurisdictions regarding cross border 
transactions, as discussed in the next section.  
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II.5. Domestic notions of reasonableness and proportionality and their 
international tax dimension (due process and commerce clauses). 
State income tax that may affect international jurisdictions is another controversial 
tax considered legitimate by the Supreme Court in the light of the due process clause. 
State income tax encumbers global profits of unitary groups of multinational 
enterprises that operate in each state, proportional to the average of salaries, 
properties and sales performed in or attributable to the state, regarding their global 
values (national and international).
194 
In the Container Corporation case, the 
Supreme Court upheld the presumption that a group of companies is unitary when 
the overseas subsidiary company operates in the same business field, considering that 
the purpose of this is probably to achieve a better usage of the controlling company’s 
resources. Although a bright line rule could be reasonable and practical, the Supreme 
Court rejected that precise rule including the substantial flow of assets, because the 
constitutional requirement was a flow of values, not a flow of assets or goods.
195 
Again, the criteria that allow taxation based on the global profits of the company 
considered unitary - once there is a relevant and reasonable connection with each 
state - were yet to be precisely defined. In this case (Container), however, Justice 
Brennan explained that the component of justice or reasonableness of the income 
distribution formula had two requirements, according to the notions of fairness and 
reasonableness that are at the heart of the proportionality principle:  
1) ‘internal consistency’: according to which “the formula must be 
such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more 
than all of the unitary business income being taxed”; and  
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2) ‘external consistency’: according to which “the factors or factors 
used in the formula must reflect a reasonable sense of how income is 
generated.”196  
The Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California
197
 case is interesting 
in this respect because, until then, all precedents were only related to American 
multinationals companies. This was the first time the Supreme Court heard a case in 
which a non- American multinational was involved. The Supreme Court held in June 
1994, with only two dissenting votes by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, that the 
interested parties insufficiently demonstrated the unreasonableness of the state’s tax 
system, and that the rules against vagueness of concepts were not mechanical (e.g., 
reasonableness). In addition, the decision also held that taxpayers could have 
demonstrated methods of calculation or reasonable approximations to the tax 
authority. Once the taxpayer failed to demonstrate this, the tax authority could not 
refute them. The decision included the consideration that multiple taxation is not an 
inevitable consequence of the system and that the existing alternative of separate 
accounting would not defeat this. Indeed, it could even increase the risk of double 
taxation. Furthermore, the decision emphasized that since the U.S.-U.K. Treaty had a 
provision applicable to state income taxes, the federal government would not be 
impeded in acting with one voice in international trade. However, this provision was 
included, allowing the states to collect taxes within reasonable limits, until Congress 
decided to intervene in this situation. In fact, state double taxation was likely to occur 
in this system. Salaries were one of the factors taken into account because they were 
higher in California than in the other sixty countries where the English Bank 
operated. This difference could genuinely distort the taxation result, as argued in the 
case. Yet again, the peculiarities of this case played a crucial role in reaching a 
majority conclusion concerning the reasonableness of the state tax system, in 
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 [1983] 463 US 159, “The Constitution does not "invalidat[e] an apportionment formula whenever 
it may result in taxation [463 U.S. 159, 170]   of some income that did not have its source in the taxing 
State . . . ." Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 272 (emphasis added). See Underwood Typewriter Co., 254 
U.S., at 120 -121. Nevertheless, we will strike down the application of an apportionment formula if 
the taxpayer can prove "by `clear and cogent evidence' that the income attributed to the State is in fact 
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Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)]." Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 274.” 
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 [1994] 114 S. Ct. 2268.  
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accordance with certain legal-economic parameters considered relatively reasonable 
and possibly rather subjective.
198
  
Finally, it was argued in the Barclays case that the existence of a prior California 
state law represented an incompatibility with the due process clause. This provided 
for the presentation of a reasonable estimate method by the taxpayer, in order to 
reduce the burden’s submission or compliance with the arithmetical calculation 
based on percentages, salaries, sales and assets. It was also claimed that there was a 
lack of standard measurements or models to determine which estimates would be 
accepted or not. This discretion without any limitation could be interpreted as a 
violation of due process, so that the taxpayer did not have to demonstrate damage or 
injury existing in such arbitrary application. While proclaiming the majority decision 
of the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg
 considered the term “reasonableness” as a 
guideline, an instrument to assure that the movement would follow its course 
alongside a specific line.
199
 The decision admitted a legal revision in a myriad of 
subjects, sometimes incorporated by express texts of laws – from the Constitution 
itself (Fourth Amendment) to the very tax laws – giving rise to an idea of uncertainty 
or indeterminacy, but providing the reassurance that it would be analysed and revised 
by impartial people, based on rational underpinnings. The point that may be made in 
comparison with proportionality is that this principle may go further than the notion 
of reasonableness or rationality, since it may require the application of the less 
restrictive measure and not only measures that are not absurd. In other words, 
according to the proportionality principle the Court could have scrutinized whether 
the worldwide taxation formula was less restrictive and less burdensome to the 
taxpayers in order to tax the real economic income. 
The use of the term reasonable by the legislator in an open and flexible manner is 
another contemporary problem. This flexible notion is used as an element of a type 
of tax rule to restrain the use of means considered abnormal, inadequate and abusive, 
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 On that arguable decision, see Oliver, J. David B., “Unitary Taxation: the Denouement?” [1994] 
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Unitary Taxation and Worldwide Combined Reporting” [1994] BTR, 6, 572-597. 
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such as the concept of reasonable expenditure, reasonable business purpose, “valid 
economic reasons”,200 and still the notion of reasonable tax rate.201 
Likewise, Section 482 of the United States Federal Revenue Code is an illustration of 
indeterminate legal terminology - the interpretation and application of which were 
explicitly informed via the proportionality and reasonableness principles by the 
judiciary. The language of this legal provision is apparently extensive, endowing the 
tax authority with discretionary (but not arbitrary) power.
202
 
A fair market value in the case of prices in comparable circumstances by unrelated 
taxpayers is the appropriate standard that should be followed (arm’s length pricing). 
The interpretation of Section 482 concludes that the tax authority’s determination of 
any adjustment on taxable profits is presumably correct, considering that taxpayers 
have the burden of proof in a sense that it would be “unreasonable, arbitrary, 
capricious.”203 In another decision, the Judiciary pointed out that “the 
reasonableness” of the result was the most relevant aspect for the application of that 
legal provision, and not the peculiarities of the examination method utilized by the 
tax authority.
204
 
According to Dworkin’s terminology, the best elucidation for legally indeterminate 
concepts was to resort to the moral concept of reasonableness, which was currently 
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 See Merger Directive (90/334/EEC), Article 11(1)(a), which is analysed in Chapter IV, section 6.3. 
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 See Chapter I, section 2, note 47. 
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  According to IRC, Section 482: In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses… 
owned or controlled directly by the same interests, the [Internal Revenue Service] may distribute, 
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among [them], if 
[it] determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent 
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any [of them]. 
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  American Terazzo Strip Co. v. Commissioner case [1971] 56 TIC 961, 1971. In: Gustafson, 
Charles H., Peroni, Robert J. and Crawford Pugh, Richard, Taxation of International Transactions: 
Materials, Text and Problems, 33, (3d ed. 2006), p.367. 
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 I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. US [1979] 606 F 2d 445: “The amount of reallocation would not 
be easy for us to calculate if we were called upon to do it ourselves, but s.482 gives that power to the 
[IRS] and we are contend that his amount (totaling some $18 million) was within the zone of 
reasonableness.” The Fiscal Court analyzed another case of transfer pricing, approaching the profit 
margin, due to some contracts, and the risks involved between the foreign subsidiary and the 
controlling company in the United States. The profit margin of the subsidiary was higher than 200%, 
which was maintained, while the tax authority had arbitrated a margin of only 23%. (See Pagan, Jill 
and Wilkie, Scott. Transfer Pricing Strategy in a Global Economy, 1993, p.75-97).  
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used as a method of interpreting and applying the law.
205
 In opposition, it was 
disregarded as a way to revoke an arbitrary law itself, due to its absolute lack of 
reasonableness, akin to the analysed precedents including the application of the due 
process clause. An apparently arbitrary tool may be the appropriate answer to avoid 
the taxpayers’ arbitrariness in artificially transferring profits from one corporation to 
another controlled company, with the sole aim of saving tax.
 
If, on the one hand, the 
instrument is considered arbitrary due to its relative indeterminacy, on the other hand 
it guarantees to taxpayers the possibility of proving the contrary. In this case, 
taxpayers’ performance can be relatively important not only by the form, but also by 
the substance of the transaction in searching for relevant economic benefits other 
than tax avoidance, in which proportionality may have a fundamental role.
206
 
This Chapter has demonstrated the main characteristics of the rule of reason, 
reasonableness and proportionality that may be regarded as similar to those notions 
as applied in other jurisdictions. Having had its origin in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, subsequently, even without express 
constitutional provisions, ideas regarding reasonableness and proportionality were 
further developed. 
However, the same idea for its flexibility and open-ended nature, though effective 
and rational, may result in disparities and apparently insoluble conflicts between 
different tax jurisdictions such as those analysed in this section, since a reasonable 
price or profit for one tax jurisdiction may not be reasonable or fair for another one 
in cross border transactions. The role of proportionality may also be relevant in 
determining the solutions via multilateral or bilateral tax treaties and their 
interpretation. The next chapters will describe how different and similar outcomes 
were achieved in international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Appellate Body of the WTO, and the European Court of Justice. Similar issues of 
the ability to pay, equality, discrimination, excessive tax and penalties, tax 
retrospective legislation, and tax avoidance, will be discussed in the light of 
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 Taking Rights Seriously, supra, p.136. 
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 See Chapters III, section 2.6.b; and IV, sections 6, 7.1, and 7.2. 
 
 70 
proportionality and reasonableness in order to compare them and evaluate their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
This Chapter analysed the role of reasonableness and proportionality as standards of 
review in a domestic jurisdiction and the next Chapter will discuss their function in 
international jurisdictions, particularly their interaction in tax matters, international 
trade and human rights. 
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III. International Jurisdictions and Proportionality and Reasonable Standards 
of Review (the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the World Trade Organization).  
The analysis of the proportionality and reasonableness principles is also relevant in 
the field of international law, due to its remarkable importance for the interpretation 
and application of treaties, particularly with regard to human rights conventions.  
First, the approach of the International Court of Justice regarding proportionality will 
be analysed in this Chapter. Although the ICJ has apparently not yet decided any tax 
cases, the analysis of its jurisprudence will serve the purpose of demonstrating to 
what extent the proportionality and reasonableness tests would be the same principles 
as applied by other jurisdictions, and whether or not they could be regarded as 
general principles of international law.  
Secondly, the international law on human rights will be discussed as proof of the 
general application of the proportionality and reasonableness principles, particularly 
the former as to whether it can be regarded as an overarching principle of 
Convention interpretation and application. Regarding tax matters, unlike the ICJ, the 
ECHR has broadly applied proportionality in tandem with reasonableness, 
particularly in the areas of tax discrimination, fiscal penalties, and protection of 
property. The contrast with national and other international jurisdictions will be 
made where appropriate to discuss whether the principle is the same and whether 
there are different degrees of judicial review and adjudication of proportionality and 
reasonableness.  
Third, this Chapter will discuss international law concerning international trade 
within the WTO agreements to examine the extent to which proportionality and 
reasonableness are applied to discriminatory measures, including direct tax measures, 
and to the balance of rights between sovereign States. 
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III.1. The role of proportionality within the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. 
Based on some of the most important decisions of the International Courts in 
question, Corten
207
 emphasizes the initial ambiguity concerning the notion of what 
“reasonableness” is. His work starts with empirical cases and “reasonable” functions 
to achieve a relative systematisation, pointing out methods in its formal and 
substantial definition. Founded on an International Court of Justice decision, Corten 
initially notes that “reasonable” and “equitable” in any case are dependent on 
circumstances.
208
 
The following examples of legal rules illustrate the express application of the 
terminology “reasonable”:  the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art 
32.2) mentions reasonable interpretation, namely, the non-prevalence of a particular 
interpretation that reaches “absurd and unreasonable” results. In addition, the 
recognition of freedom of the high seas and the regulation of the discretionary power 
of sovereign states, as the second Article of the 1958 Geneva Convention on high 
seas establishes that this freedom should be carried out by all states “with reasonable 
regards to the interests of the other states.” 209 
A close relationship between the non-discrimination principle and reasonableness 
may be noted in the early case law of the Permanent Court of Justice. In the Minority 
Schools in Albania case,
210
 the Court stated, “equality in law precludes 
discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of 
different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes equilibrium between 
                                                 
207
 Corten, Olivier, “The Notion of ‘Reasonable’ in International Law: Legal Discourse, Reason and 
Contradictions” (CUP, 1999) in International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 at pp.613-625, 
which is a brief explanation of his doctoral thesis “L’Utilisation du Rasonable par le Juge 
International” (Bruylant, 1997) 
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 Continental Shelf  (Tunisia, Lybian Arab Jamahiriva) ICJ Rep. 1982, for Go. In: Carta…, v. 48, p. 
613-625, July 1999. op.cit., p.613. 
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 See also the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
21 May 1997, 36 ILM (1997) 700, Art. 5; Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(Consolidated Version), 24 Dec. 2002, OJ (2002) C 325/33, Art. 77; European Convention on Human 
Rights, 4 Nov. 1950, ETS 5, Art. 5(3), apud Shany, Yuval, “Toward a General Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in International Law” [2005] EJIL 16, p.914, note 45. 
 
210
 PCIJ, Series A/B, n. 64, p.19 (1935). 
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different situations.” As Malcolm Shaw pointed out based on the jurisprudence of 
international courts, the appropriate test of acceptable differentiation in such 
circumstances will centre upon what is just or reasonable or objectively and 
reasonably justified.”211 
The International Court of Justice has explicitly applied the proportionality principle 
as such in three different types of cases. First, with an apparently substantive 
approach, it tries to ascertain the meaning of the arbitrary taking or expropriation 
forbidden by International Public law, as it may be considered unreasonable.
212
 
Secondly, the Court ascertains the requirements for the use of force according the 
proportionality principle, since States are allowed to use forceful measures in self-
defence only if they are necessary and proportional.
213
 Concerning the law of State 
responsibility, it is generally accepted that the principle of proportionality is a “key 
element” for controlling the States’ right to redress unlawful international acts.214 
Thirdly, apparently in a different way, the Court applies a rule of proportionality in 
maritime delimitation cases. Although this latter rule concerns the relationship 
between shelf awarded and the length of coastlines, it is applicable as an element of 
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 International Law (CUP, 2008), p.288, citing the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the ECHR, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  
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 Corten, op.cit., (1997), p.623, mentioning the Eletronica Sicula ICJ case, Resp. 1989, 76. The three 
stages to determine a behaviour’s reasonableness, according to the standard legally adopted are: (a) 
The Legitimate Objective or Purpose -- in principle, States have a discretionary power to proceed with 
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bello. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at 245; 
Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b), “Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law” 
[2005] EJIL 16, p.915 note 53.  
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 Moreover, the role of proportionality is dual: external and internal according Cannizzaro idem, pp. 
897-99. In the Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran of 1980 
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equity “in order to establish the necessary balance between States with straight, and 
those with markedly concave or convex, coasts.”215 This role of equity principles as 
part of international law aims “to balance up the various considerations which it 
regards as relevant in order to produce an equitable result.”216 This points out a clear 
similarity between equity and proportionality in their role of balancing all the 
relevant factors to decide a case.
217
 
Thus, one may suggest that in these fields of law (State responsibility for wrongful 
acts, the use of force, and expropriation) the International Court of Justice has 
applied the proportionality principle as a fundamental tool to scrutinize State 
measures, balancing the interests in play. As Human Rights Conventions are a 
fundamental part of international law, the next section will analyse the European 
Court of Human Rights jurisprudence that also regards the proportionality principle 
coupled with the notion of reasonableness as key principles of law. 
                                                 
215
 See para. 98 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany and Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969. See also Higgins 
(2003) , p.229. 
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 ICJ Reports (1982) 18 at para. 71, apud Higgins, Ibidem, p.228. 
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 See Chapter I, section 3. 
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III.2. The European Court of Human Rights: Proportionality and 
reasonableness tests in tax matters and in general. 
In this section, the origin and development of the principle of proportionality within 
the ECHR case law will be analysed and compared with other national and 
international courts.  First, general principles of the Convention will be considered 
having the objective of classifying the standards of reasonableness and 
proportionality within its legal framework. In other words, whether proportionality 
may be regarded as an overarching principle within the Convention and to what 
extent the jurisprudence of the Court may aid in considering it as a general principle 
of international human rights law and of international law. This may have relevant 
effects on tax law. Besides some leading cases on reasonableness and 
proportionality, other landmark examples will be cited regarding their application in 
tax matters. The main cases of retrospective taxation and avoidance, joint taxation of 
spouses and others regarding discrimination, as well as the application of tax 
principles, such as the ability to pay and fiscal sanctions, will be analysed and 
contrasted with other domestic and international jurisdictions.
218
 Furthermore, this 
section will demonstrate whether or not the principle is the same as applied in other 
jurisdictions and its relationship with the margin of appreciation doctrine. Finally, the 
degree of scrutiny using either a loose or a tighter test of proportionality will be 
analysed to ascertain its role within the scope of taxation and human rights. 
III.2.1. General Principles of Human Rights Conventions and the origin of 
proportionality and reasonable standards of review in the ECHR.  
As Robert Blackburn
219
 insists, the fundamental aim of all international human rights 
treaties is to secure individual rights “and not lay down mutual obligations between 
states which are to be restrictively interpreted.” This characteristic is derived from 
the legal nature of the Convention itself as a law-making treaty (traité-loi) rather than 
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 76 
a contractual treaty (traité-contrat).
220
 Thus, the Convention is “not designed to 
create reciprocal rights and obligations between Member States, but to maintain and 
strengthen public order aimed at the protection of human rights.”221 Further, as a law-
making treaty, the Convention must not be interpreted restrictively. The Court may 
well have extended some obligations by narrowing the scope of limitations to some 
fundamental rights.
222
 On the other hand, as a legal and living instrument according 
to the Court’s own jurisprudence, some principles may be regarded as characteristic 
or predominant in guiding its decisions. Among these principles, Steven Greer
223
 
mentions the following: effective protection; legality; democracy; commonality, 
autonomous and evolutive interpretation; subsidiarity and review; and 
proportionality. Although some of these may not be strictly considered as principles 
of interpretation, it is worth noting them and how they interact and to consider 
whether or not there is an overarching principle of interpretation. 
Another feature of other jurisdictions is that there is a close relationship between the 
proportionality principle and the standard of reasonableness. To prove this within the 
ECHR it will be useful first to observe the term ‘reasonable’ as expressly found in 
some articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. It will also be important 
to analyse how reasonableness is ascertained and to what extent it may be close to 
the evolution of proportionality as an unwritten principle. Furthermore, as discussed 
in the following sections, the notions of reasonableness and proportionality 
themselves are at the heart of the concept of discrimination as construed by the 
Court.  
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 See Matscher, F., “Methods of Interpretation of the Convention”, in The European System of 
Protection of Human Rights, Macdonald, R.ST.J.; Matscher, F.; Petzold, H. (Eds.), (Kluwer, 1993), 
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 Arai-Takahashi, idem,, ibidem. See also Matscher, F. idem, ibidem. 
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 The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Human Rights Files no. 17 (Council of Europe Publishing, 2000) pp.15-20. 
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III.2.2. The meaning and ascertainment of reasonableness via proportionality 
reasoning. 
Articles 5 (right to liberty and security) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights assure, respectively, to any detainee the right to trial 
within a “reasonable time”, and to every individual a fair and public hearing again 
within a “reasonable time.” 224  
Initially, the State may justify the length of the process. Only after the justification is 
presented, can a marginal review take effect, usually applying the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.
225
 Hence, this formal standard is applied to investigate the 
conduct’s reasonableness and is followed by five cumulative elements.226 First, if any 
explanation for the delay is not provided, it is considered unreasonable. Second, the 
justification should be presented rationally, defined as a series of propositions that 
attempt to explain the reason for the delay. Third, there has to be a mutually 
subjective comprehension of the explanation provided. If the delay in certain steps of 
the procedure is not understandable, the conduct is considered unreasonable. The 
fourth formal element requires a justification free from contradictions and 
incompatibilities among distinct aspects of the explanation. Finally, the fifth element 
of this formal standard requires an explanation provided by relevant legal authorities. 
This requirement is not fulfilled, according to international legal standards, merely 
because the domestic law was invoked and fulfilled. These five formal elements 
provide a minimum legal certainty to the application of an imprecise concept such as 
reasonableness. One may suggest that at the heart of this notion of reasonable lies 
the fourth requirement of consistency or lack of contradiction. According to 
Habermas,
227
 this minimum legal certainty represents the procedural reason or 
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 Art 3 (right to free elections) of the First Protocol states that the Convention’s parties should hold 
elections within “reasonable intervals” with no further definition. 
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 See this Chapter section 2.4. See also Steven Greer (2000), supra, p.36, and Eissen, Marc-André , 
The Length of Civil and Criminal Proceedings in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human 
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justification, remaining rational, coherent and logical, even within acceptable 
contemporary patterns of rationality, deprived of an ontological basis. 
However, this formal standard is not sufficient according to international and 
domestic democratic standards of the rule of law. A substantive standard is also 
demanded, similar to the concepts adopted by national and international Courts.
228
 
This substantial standard assumes a sufficient relationship of cause between the 
legitimate purpose and the measure supposedly considered as reasonable. Here also 
proportionality plays its role in ascertaining “the acceptability both of delays in civil 
and criminal proceedings, with the complexity of a case being weighed against the 
time taken to resolve it, and of interferences with an individual’s access to a 
court.”229 
Thus, a conclusion is drawn from the evolving case law of the Court, on three set of 
cases under Articles 5 and 6 where they refer to the wording reasonable. They are 
provided by Article 5 paragraph 1 (c), which allows detention on remand if justified 
by “reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so”,230 and its paragraph 3 (the right to a trial within a reasonable time),231 and 
Article 6 paragraph 1 (the entitlement to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time).
232
 The conclusion in my view is that the legal conventional 
wording reasonable relates to an unwritten proportionality reasoning which takes 
into account all the circumstances of the case in assessing the measures applied by 
public authorities in contrast with the treatment of a person presumed to be innocent 
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 See Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece (Application No. 13427/87), analysed 
further under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) in the next section 2.3.c.2, in which a whole assessment 
was necessary to ascertain the reasonable time limit of the trial (paragraphs 51-56 of the judgment).  
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until proven guilty. As already analysed, the standard of reasonableness is sometimes 
interchangeable with proportionality as a principle, particularly in its role of 
balancing.
233
 
Founded also on Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, Perelman
234
 considers 
that reasonableness does not lead to a single solution. He suggests that it implies a 
plurality of possible solutions, although considering that there are certain limits, such 
as absurd or illogical results. In this sense the margin of discretion would still be 
broad.
 
Dworkin
235
 has a different perception by defending a correct answer even to 
very complex cases. He explains that judges and arbitrators should have a limited 
margin of discretion and a radical ethical attitude while seeking a fair decision, in 
accordance with the integrity of the principles and rules of the system.
236
 
In this section, the relationship between the standards of reasonableness and 
proportionality have been analysed as an aid to ascertaining what is reasonable. In 
the following section, the explicit origin of proportionality and its inherent 
relationship with reasonableness will be discussed. The extent to which 
proportionality evolved as a legal principle in its own right and eventually as an 
overarching principle of interpretation and adjudication will also be analysed. 
 
III.2.3. Fundamental rights, reasonableness and proportionality as an unwritten 
and overarching principle. 
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a) Discrimination: reasonableness coupled with proportionality. Its relationship 
with tax matters.         
As discussed in Chapter I, section 3, taxation deals mainly with drawing distinctions, 
whereas a political and natural sense of fairness as well as constitutional values may 
require the enforcement of the equality principle as a fundamental right in each 
individual case. Thus, the test of reasonableness, whether or not intertwined with 
proportionality, may justify discrimination and may influence the assessment of fair 
individual taxation and tax systems.
237
  
According to Article 14 of the Convention, rights protected by the Convention must 
be recognized “without discrimination on any ground” or, in the French version, 
“sans distinction aucune.” Based on its plain meaning, it is perfectly clear that the 
Convention has prohibited discrimination in any form. However, the European Court 
of Human Rights has interpreted the English and French versions based on the 
equality principle assured by the Convention itself, proclaiming that the principle is 
violated only if a distinction has no objective and reasonable justification, drawing 
such conclusion from principles which guide the legal practice of a large number of 
democratic States. In earlier cases,
238
 the European Commission of Human Rights 
stated, in accordance with the general doctrine on discrimination, but with no express 
reference to proportionality, that certain differentiations might be legitimate.
239
 
For the first time in the Belgian Linguist cases decided on 23 July 1968,
240
 the 
European Court of Human Rights by its Plenary (Grand Chamber) referred to 
proportionality as a legal principle apparently in its own right. Taking into account 
the principle of equality and the notion of discrimination, the Court drew a 
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 Applications No. 104/55 and 167/56 cited in Application No. 2299/64 decided on 12 December 
1966. 
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 The reasoning on discrimination in other international and domestic jurisdictions is quite similar, 
which may demonstrate once more that the rule of reason for legitimate differentiation lies at the heart 
of reasonableness, proportionality and equality. 
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 See the case "Relating to certain Aspects of  the  Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in 
Belgium"  v. Belgium (Applications No. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64).  
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reasonable and bright line rule between justified and unjustified differences of 
treatment. The Court accomplished this by introducing the notion of reasonable 
discrimination under which there must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between means and ends: 
 “.... the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction 
has no objective and reasonable justification.  The existence of such a 
justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the 
measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which 
normally prevail in democratic societies.  A difference of treatment in 
the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only 
pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is 
clearly established that there is no reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised.”241                                                   
Proportionality was established as “the second component of an objective and 
reasonable justification – the first being the legitimate aim – and not an additional 
condition.”242  The Court also expressly provided an interpretation of discrimination 
and equality very similar to those interpretations given by a large number of 
democratic states, adding the express reference to proportionality. Not only has the 
American Supreme Court provided the same interpretation, for example concerning 
the due process clause, equality and discrimination,
243
 but so have European and 
other non-European national jurisdictions. In the same vein, the European Court of 
Justice, when construing the principle of non-discrimination, and analysing its direct 
and indirect effects, clearly adopted the rule of reason and proportionality 
                                                 
241
 Paragraph 10 of the judgment, Ibid. n.181. A good summary of the facts and conclusion of the case 
is found in The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, p.39 by Steven Greer. On this case see also Partsch, Karl Josef, 
“Discrimination”, in The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, (Kluwer, 1993), 
pp.578-82. 
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 Eissen, Mar-André, (1993), p. 145. It may be right to affirm that proportionality reasoning 
underpins the justification of the Court where it refers to the expression “without reasonable 
foundation” regarding for example the right of property as occurred in James and others and 
Mellacher and others.  
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 See Chapter II.3. 
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reasoning
244
 All these jurisdictions have construed the concept of equality and non-
discrimination, inserting the reasonableness notion coupled with the proportionality 
test within the wording of statutory law, according to a purposive interpretation in 
search of fairness.
245
  
Not only is a legitimate aim required to justify discrimination, but so is the existence 
of reasonable and necessary measures to achieve the aim pursed in search of fairness; 
or, in other words, those measures must not be excessive.
246
  
Steven Greer concludes according to the case law of the Court that four factors draw 
the line between discrimination (which is prohibited) and “different” treatment 
(which can be justified).
247
 First, there must be a less favourable treatment between 
comparable groups; secondly, the practice must be reasonable and rational; thirdly, 
the effects of the treatment must be disproportionate to its own objectives and pursue 
a fair balance between the public interests and the fundamental rights. A fourth factor 
consists in pondering whether the treatment in question is considered as 
discriminatory in other democratic states. As the first requirement for a complaint to 
be decided on grounds of discrimination is the existence of comparable situations, 
the question of justifications and proportionality may not be addressed where those 
comparable factual and legal situations are not found.
248
 
Another feature of proportionality common to other jurisdictions as a method of legal 
reasoning is the role of balancing, contrasting and reconciling the public interests at 
stake and the fundamental rights in play,    
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 See Chapter IV, sections 2 and 3. 
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 This technique is the same as ‘the rule of reason’ by which the wording reasonable is implicit in 
‘restrain to trade’, such as in the US (Chapter II.2) and in the EU (Chapter IV.2.2). See also Chapter I, 
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 In National Union of Belgium Police v Belgium (Application No. 4464/70) (paragraph 49) the 
Court stated “that the test of proportionality requires that consideration be given to whether the 
disadvantage suffered by the applicant in pursuit of a legitimate aim is excessive” (Jacobs and White, 
2002, p.428). 
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 Greer, Steven, (2000), supra, p. 11. 
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“Article 14 does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are 
founded on an objective assessment of essentially different factual 
circumstances and which, being based on the public interest strike a 
fair balance between the protection of the interests of the community 
and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the 
Convention.”249 
The same rationale above seems to be applicable to the right to property, which has a 
close relationship with procedural and substantive tax measures as discussed in the 
next section.  
b) The right to property, its three rules and the overall assessment of 
proportionality. Its intrinsic relationship with taxation. 
The right to property is closely related to tax matters. There are two express 
restrictions provided by the first and second paragraphs of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol. First, persons could legitimately be deprived of their possessions “in the 
public interest and subjected to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.” Second, the right of a State is not impaired in any 
way “to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.” In Handyside, the Court stated that the Contracting States 
were the only judges to assess the necessity for an interference with the right to 
property, having restricted itself “to supervising the lawfulness and the purpose of 
the restriction in question.”250 But then ten years later the Court expressly introduced 
the notion of proportionality as a requirement also of an interference with the right to 
property in James.
251
 As discussed previously in connection with the concept of 
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 Belgian linguistic case, paragraph 8 of item 7 (3. Decision of the Court). 
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 Handyside v the UK (Application No. 5493/72), paragraph 62. See also Arai-Takahashi (2002), 
p.153. 
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  “Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on the facts as well as in 
principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’, but there must also be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see, amongst others, 
and mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Ashingdane judgment, para. 57)” (James and others v 
UK, Application No. 8793/79 of 21 February 1986, Grand Chamber, paragraph 50). See also 
Mellacher and others v. Austria (Application No. 11070/84), paragraphs 47-8; Greer, Steven, (2000), 
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discrimination, proportionality is an essential element of the ‘reasonable and 
objective justification.’  
On the other hand, according to the settled case law of the Court, the right to 
property comprises three distinct rules. The above two (deprivation of possessions 
and control of use of property), which are expressly limited in the general or public 
interest, and a third one that recognizes the “principle of peaceful enjoyment of 
property,” which is more general and apparently unlimited.252 As stated in Pressos 
Compania Naviera
253
 following the authority of James and Others, the express 
limitations are to be construed according to the general principle of enjoyment of 
possessions and “there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a 
person of his possessions.”254 In Stran255 the Court considered a retrospective law 
neither as an expropriation (second rule) nor as a measure to control the use of 
property (third rule), but under the first rule as affecting the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions. The Court then proceeded to apply the test of balancing 
conflicting interests to this retrospective law. Thus, all three distinct rules that 
compose the right to property are subject to the test of proportionality. Moreover, the 
third rule comprises also the right of a State ‘to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties’, which must be appropriate within the broad margin of 
appreciation subject also to the test of proportionality. 
One question arguably remains unclear: whether or not the protection against 
procedural and substantive tax measures falls exclusively within the above third rule 
                                                                                                                                          
supra, p.13; and Arai-Takahashi (2002), pp.151-4, mentioning some previous Commission’s Reports 
regarding the right to property and proportionality. 
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 See Draon v. France, (Application No.1513/03), Grand Chamber, para 69, citing also Pressos 
Compania Naviera S.A. and Others. 
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 Pressos Companhia Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium (Application No. 17849/91). 
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 Pressos Compania Naviera, paragraph 38. See further analysis of this case on retrospective 
legislation, this Chapter, section 2.6.a and c. 
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 Stran (Application No. 13427/87), at paragraphs 68 and 69 in which the Court scrutinised “whether 
a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”, what is an essential feature of 
proportionality. See also further comments on this case in this Chapter, section 2.6.c, contrasting 
retrospective legislation in tax and non-tax cases. 
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of Article 1 of the First Protocol, “to secure the payment of taxes”.256 In other words, 
the issue that seems to be open is whether only procedural tax measures are covered 
by this rule while substantive taxation could be caught by the first rule (the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions) or the second (expropriation) or by the first part 
of that third rule (a measure to control the use of property).  
 
From the case law of the Court analysed below it is clear that all rules regarding the 
right to property are construed in the light of the same rationale. Even if Article 1 did 
not provide express reference to tax measures, the right to property would cover 
taxation matters, since a tax may be confiscatory (expropriation),
257
 or simply affect 
the enjoyment of possessions or control the use of property in a manner incompatible 
with the rule of law principle.
258
 In all these cases, tax measures were tested under 
the proportionality and reasonableness standards. For example, a tax rate of 100% on 
income could be regarded as confiscatory and disproportionate to the objective to tax 
income taking into account other principles such as the principle of ability to pay and 
the freedom to undertake a waged activity. Other fundamental rights could be 
unreasonably impaired since to live, to enjoy possessions, to marry, and exercise 
other rights such as the freedom of movement, the individual should have income 
available to spend. Nevertheless, as the case law stands at present, and is further 
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 In Gasus (Application No. 15375/89) the Court rightly drew a distinction between substantive and 
procedural tax rules, but it was “not called upon to ascertain whether this right, as the wording of the 
provision may suggest, is limited to procedural tax laws…” (Application No. 15375/89, paragraph 
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 In the Hentrich v France case (Application No. 13616/88), the Court held a French law with anti-
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The Court considers it unnecessary to decide this issue, since the two rules are not “distinct” in the 
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demonstrated below, not only procedural measures (which may encompass 
retrospective legislation), but also substantive tax measures may be regarded as those 
“to secure the payment of taxes.” 
Generally where a measure is blatantly unlawful with no legitimate aim the Courts 
such as the ECJ and the ECHR refrain from examining its proportionality.
259
 
However, they may assess this even when apparently squarely unlawful measures or 
when the requirements of general or public interest are not met. This feature of 
scrutinizing even where it would not be necessary is intriguing and may serve the 
purpose of a complete and persuasive justification, as occurred in Dangeville.
260
  
From the evolution of a living Convention, it may be suggested that proportionality 
was incorporated into the right to property initially as a requirement of the necessity 
assessment leaving room to regard it as a general principle of law. Moreover, it has 
been rightly suggested that the requirement of proportionality and other principles 
such as legality and purposiveness within Articles 8(2) through 11(2) are “likewise 
part and parcel of the rule of law principle.”261 
Proportionality is not only related to the core concept of discrimination and the right 
to property; it is also intrinsically related to other fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Convention. This may prove that proportionality is more than a simple principle 
derived from the notion of the rule of reason in justifying rational differentiations and 
the reasonable relationship between ends and means, as will be further substantiated 
in the following sections.  
    c) Proportionality and other fundamental rights. 
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the right to recover tax unlawfully collected (paragraph 58). Then the Court went on to state that 
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 Emberland, Marius, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR 
Protection (OUP, 2006), p.45. 
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As proportionality spreads from Article 14 to other rights, such as the right to 
property discussed above, it may be suggested that, like in other jurisdictions, it may 
have turned into a general and overarching principle of interpretation and application 
of human rights law as follows:
262
 
c.1) Express Limited Rights (to freedoms of expression, thought, association, 
movement and to private life), proportionality and taxation. 
The second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 provide legitimate exceptions to the rights 
to private life, freedom of thought, of expression and of association. These 
exceptions are required to be necessary and in accordance with the law, but the Court 
added the requirement of proportionality (“proportionate to a pressing social need”) 
in order to render them acceptable.
263
 In the landmark Handyside case the Court also 
provided for some guidelines to ascertain the meaning of necessity and pressing 
social need.
264
 It has been suggested that in Handyside proportionality was viewed 
“not as an autonomous condition – although that is a proposition which is not 
untenable – but rather as a corollary to ‘necessity in a democratic society.’”265 Had 
proportionality remained limited to the construction of exceptions or derogations and 
only linked to the assessment of what is ‘necessary’, then perhaps it could not be 
considered as an overarching principle in its own right. 
In Riener v Bulgaria
266
 the right to private and family light was discussed in the light 
of the proportionality of the restrictions, which in this case was for tax reasons. A 
Bulgarian national was banned from leaving her country and visiting some of her 
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 Handyside v the UK, paragraphs 48-50. See Greer, Steven (2000) supra, pp.9-10. 
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 “The Court notes at this juncture that, whilst the adjective "necessary", within the meaning of 
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 (Application No. 46343/99).  
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relatives living abroad because of her tax debts. Regarding her rights to private and 
family life the Court stated,                               
“The applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life was 
also considered as irrelevant and no attempt was made to assess 
whether the continuing restrictions after certain lapse of time were 
still a proportionate measure, striking a fair balance between the 
public interest and the applicant’s rights …”267 
The freedom of movement as guaranteed by Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol is also 
construed according to the principle of proportionality. This right, which comprises 
the freedom to move within and leave any country and choose one’s residence, may 
also be limited on a number of grounds, such as “national security or public 
safety,...for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” The principle of proportionality has a crucial role in 
ascertaining the legitimacy of those objectives and the appropriateness of the 
measures implemented to pursue them. In Riener v Bulgaria
268
 the freedom of 
movement was extensively discussed in the light of the proportionality of the 
restrictions, which was for tax reasons. This case will be discussed further below, 
since it has far-reaching implications within the context of European Law for its 
interplay with the fundamental freedom of persons and the principle of 
proportionality.      
c.2) The right to a fair trial (Article 6); the right to an effective remedy (Article 
13) and the proportionality principle.  
Article 6 is also closely scrutinized under the proportionality test. The leading case 
which expressly applied the proportionality principle to the right to a fair trial is 
Ashingdane v. the UK. of 1985.
269
 In this case, the Court not only referred to the 
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authority of the Belgian Linguistic case, but also adopted the same rationale to 
scrutinize limitations on the exercise of fundamental rights with no detriment to their 
essential meaning.
270
 In some cases, the Court held reasonable the length of the 
proceedings even under a proportionality reasoning,
271
 but disproportionate the 
interference with the core right to a fair trial.
272
 The Court may assess not only the 
reasonableness of factual and legal limitations to the right to a court and the length of 
the proceedings under Article 6(1), but also the presumption of innocence under 
Article 6(2), on proportionality grounds.
273
 In some cases of retrospective legislation, 
there appears to be ‘prima facie’ no basis for the Court holding it invalid without a 
proportionality assessment.
274
  
Equally, the right to an effective remedy provided by Article 13
275
 of the Convention 
is closely connected to the proportionality principle. Article 13 may be regarded as a 
corollary to one of the maxim of equity, according to which where there is a right 
there must be a remedy.
276
 This right is distinct from the right to a fair trial as it is an 
autonomous one and the effective remedy required is not necessarily a judicial 
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protection. “Ombudsman and other non-judicial procedures”277 may meet the 
essential requirement of effectiveness “in practice as well as in law.”278 As 
proportionality has as one of its fundamental roles of making rights as effective as 
possible in practice and in law, it may serve the purpose of assessing whether or not 
an appropriate remedy is provided on substantive and procedural grounds.
279
 The 
Grand Chamber reiterated in Kudla
280
 that Article 13 requires “the provision of a 
domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the 
Convention and to grant appropriate relief.”281  In analysing whether the relief 
granted is appropriate or not the Court applies the proportionality reasoning in a tax 
context, as arose in Reiner v Bulgaria:
282
 
 “…. a domestic appeals procedure cannot be considered effective 
within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, unless it affords a 
possibility to deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under 
the Convention and to grant appropriate relief.”283  
From the case law on Article 13, one may draw the conclusion that proportionality 
has the dual role of assessing the appropriateness of domestic remedies in terms of 
their effectiveness in practice and in law, and the adequacy itself of the national 
authority’s decision providing a specific remedy.  
    c.3) Absolute rights, implied limitations and proportionality and some tax cases. 
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It has already been suggested
284
 that according to the ECHR jurisprudence only those 
rights that may be restricted, as not being absolute, could be subject to the test of 
proportionality. However, there is compelling case law to demonstrate otherwise.  
 
On the one hand, the reasonableness test, which can be coupled with the 
proportionality principle, is applicable to both categories of rights, either limited or 
absolute. On the other hand, in the case of unqualified rights, apparently not 
providing for restrictions, such as the prohibition on torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, “regard has been had to the objective behind a strict security 
regime being pursued and not just its effects on the prisoners concerned.”285 The 
prohibition of the death penalty may also be seen as involving the proportionality 
principle in ascertaining reasonable limits to penalties, by contrasting the right to life 
and necessary punishment depending on the seriousness and gravity of a crime.
286
  
 
Concerning also the apparently absolute prohibition on forced or compulsory labour 
under Article 4, proportionality may ascertain whether that proscription may apply to 
a particular act. In the Van der Mussele v Belgium
287
 case the Court did not regard 
the free service of a pupil avocat as a “burden which was so excessive or 
disproportionate to the advantages attached to the future exercise of that profession 
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that the service could not be treated as having been voluntarily accepted beforehand.” 
Thus, the Court applying the principle of proportionality to the facts and to the legal 
requirement for a professional qualification, concluded that “the burden imposed on 
the applicant was not disproportionate,” and that there was not “a considerable and 
unreasonable imbalance between the aim pursued - to qualify as an avocat - and the 
obligations undertaken in order to achieve that aim.”288 In this case, the Court 
expressly stated that its assessment did not ascertain whether the pupillage would fall 
within the wording of services not included in the prohibition of compulsory labour, 
under paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Convention. The proportionality reasoning did 
not require in this case the classification of the Belgian pupillage in the light of its 
legal context and purpose as a ‘normal civic obligation’.289 However, one may 
suggest that a different kind of free service might fairly derogate from the prohibition 
of forced labour. 
 
It is interesting to point to a similar case on forced labour regarding the collection of 
taxes. In the Four Companies v Austria
290
 case, the Court held that “the obligation 
for employers to withhold tax on wages and other contributions of their employees is 
not compulsory labour and does not go beyond normal civic obligations.”291 Whereas 
in the Van der Mussele case the Court did not apply the express derogation of normal 
civic obligation from forced labour, in the Four Companies case the Commission 
straightforwardly dismissed the complaint on the basis of that limitation provided by 
paragraph 3 of Article 4. There was no further consideration of proportionality, 
particularly concerning the necessity justification and the analysis of less restrictive 
alternative measures to enforce tax collection.  It is clear that this system of 
enforcement had a legitimate aim of facilitating the supervision and efficiency of tax 
collection. Whether or not there are other less burdensome alternatives for employers 
with similar efficiency and practicability in a fair balance between the interests at 
stake seems to be open to debate. On the other hand, what appears to be more certain 
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is the disproportionate nature of a measure requiring companies to withhold income 
tax from the employees of their suppliers. Or still, to require companies or 
individuals to withhold a corporate tax due by their service providers. 
 
Under Article 50, the proportionality test can be a determining factor for the 
acceptability of a claim for costs.
292
 Even regarding the express prohibition against 
retrospective application of more severe criminal law under Article 7 of the 
Convention, proportionality may aid to construe it under special circumstances.
293
   
 
Other set of rights enshrined in the Convention are neither limited nor absolute but, 
according to the case law of the Court, do have implied limitations such as the rights 
to vote and to marry under, respectively, Article 3 of the First Protocol and Article 
12. In these cases, proportionality is a fundamental tool to override some 
unreasonable restrictions.
294
 Prisoners must be entitled to exercise the right to vote 
and the same could be applied to the right to marry, which has implied limitations. 
One may contrast the implied and purposive limitations of rights according to their 
nature and the theory of implied powers as “usual and appropriate means” of 
carrying out any enumerated powers, under the test of appropriate means to 
legitimate ends within their scope and spirit.
295
 A similar comparison can be made 
between the role of reasonableness and proportionality by the application of the rule 
of reason in restrictions to trade.
296
      
                                                 
292
 Mc Bride, Jeremy (1997), supra, p.28, citing Campbell and Fell v UK (Applications No. 7819/77, 
7878/77). 
 
293
 See the following cases illustrating the inapplicability of Article 7 in Jacobs and White (2002), 
pp.211-15, particularly Papon v France (Application No. 54210/00), CR v United Kingdom 
(Application No. 20190/92). 
 
294
 In a case concerning the dismissal of a tax inspector from his former job as a KGB agent (Ždanoka 
v. Latvia Application No. 58278/00), the Grand Chamber of the Court summarised its case law on 
Article 3 of the First Protocol (which could interact with Article 10 of the Convention), asserting that 
the former right is under a less stringent test than those applied to Articles 8-10, but also subjected it 
to the principle of proportionality (paragraph 115, ‘c’, of the judgment). 
 
295
 See McCulloch v Maryland, Chapter II.1.1. 
 
296
 Another area in which proportionality may play a fundamental role is over whether or not and to 
what extent a positive obligation of the State exists under Article 1 (“The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention”) to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Convention are guaranteed (Ilascu and Others 
v Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, paragraph 332. See also Jacobs & White (2002), p. 
28; and Eissen, Marc-André, (1993), pp.139-40.  
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d) Conclusion. 
From this section one may draw the conclusion that proportionality is pervasive and 
has become one of the fundamental principles of interpretation and application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, the previous sections extensively 
covered the fundamental rights under the principle of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness that was the legal tool to interpret and ascertain them with examples 
of tax and non taxes cases.
297
 Articles 5 (right to liberty and security) and 6 (right to 
a fair trial) were covered in section 2.2; Article 14 (non-discrimination) in section 
2.3.a); Article 1 of the First Protocol (right to property) in section 2.3.b); Articles 8 to 
11 (the express limited rights to freedoms of expression, thought, association, 
movement and to private life) in section 2.3.c.1); Articles 6 (core right to a fair trial 
and not only length of the proceedings) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) in 
section 2.3.c.2); Articles 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment), 4 (prohibition on forced labour), 7 (non-retrospective application of more 
severe criminal law), 12 (right to marry), and 3 of the First Protocol (right to vote) in 
section 2.3.c.3). Schwarze
298
 is absolutely right to suggest that proportionality’s 
effectiveness “is not linked to a particular fundamental right, but covers the entire 
range of fundamental freedoms”, being its main purpose “to give substance and 
meaning” to their protection.  
Furthermore, as a general principle of interpretation and application of legal rules 
and principles, the proportionality principle can be regarded as an optimizing 
principle
299
 which gives as much life and effectiveness as possible to all fundamental 
                                                                                                                                          
Lastly, where those absolute rights may compete with themselves or other fundamental rights, the 
proportionality principle also seems to take on the relevant role of contrasting and balancing the 
conflicting interests or principles in play (Belgian linguistic cases, paragraph 8 of item 7 quoted in this 
section III.2.3.a, and Chassagnou and Others v France, Applications No. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 
28443/95). See also Reiner v Bulgaria this section at c.1 above on the express limited rights, and 
section 2.7.b below on fiscal sanctions, freedom of movement and protection of the rights of others, as 
competing rights. 
 
297
 More extensive analysis of tax cases and tax principles and rules is made in the following sections 
(5, 6 and 7). 
 
298
 (1992), p.679. 
 
299
 Beatty (2004), p.163. See also Schwarze (1992), p.679. In the context of the margin of appreciation 
of States to regulate the right to a fair trial and proportionality, the Court reiterated by its Grand 
Chamber in Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (Application No. 42527/98) at 
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rights that may apparently be conflicting with each other in a specific case. On the 
other hand, optimization is also pursued by the balance between the general interest 
and fundamental rights as both serve the purpose of the twin concepts of “individual 
and society” and there seems to be no reason why there should be a clash between 
them.  
The next section will analyse proportionality in its interaction with the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and consider further whether or not the former is an 
overarching principle that may affect and govern other Convention principles, 
particularly with regard to tax principles and rules. 
 
III.2.4. The margin of appreciation doctrine and its interference with the 
proportionality principle. Tax and non-tax matters. 
a) Notion of the margin of appreciation. Differences from the proportionality 
principle. 
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the principle of proportionality 
goes even further than just to permeate the whole range of fundamental rights. As an 
overarching principle, proportionality also governs the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. The case law of the Court is extensive on this doctrine, which has not been 
strictly defined or exhaustively ascertained. What has been suggested is that “no 
simple formula can describe how it works”, “its casuistic, uneven, and largely 
unpredictable nature” having remained its most outstanding characteristic.300 Broadly 
speaking, the margin of appreciation doctrine primarily serves the purpose of 
recognizing the States’ sovereignty in terms of choice of policies and their 
                                                                                                                                          
paragraph 45, “In this context, it should be recalled that the Convention is intended to guarantee not 
theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and effective.” 
 
300
 Greer, Steven, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (CUP, 2006), p.223. See also Macdonald, R. St. J. “The Margin of Appreciation”, in The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Macdonald, R.ST.J.; Matscher, F.; Petzold, H. 
(Eds), (1993), pp. 83-124; 
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implementation,
301
 as they are in principle in a better position than the European 
Court to assess them.
302
 Only where those policies and respective measures may 
disproportionately affect the fundamental rights, then the Court exercise its judicial 
review to override the former by giving precedence to the latter. 
The margin of appreciation in social and economic policies is very wide according to 
settled case law of the Court.
303
 However, this does not hinder the Court from 
reviewing the facts of the case and taking into account all the relevant principles of 
interpretation and application of the Human Rights Convention, such as the principle 
of proportionality, the evolutive and dynamic interpretation and the comparative 
approach. 
In Handyside,
304
 the Court mentioned for the first time the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation, stating that is very broad, but at the same time expressly introduced 
proportionality under Article 10, implying that this latter principle should guide and 
govern the former.
305
  The confiscation of property (books) was justified essentially 
on moral grounds under Article 10, which falls within the broader notion of the 
general interest under the right to property. Then, ten years later, the Court expressly 
introduced the notion of proportionality as a requirement also to interfere with the 
right to property in James.
306
 Subsequently, there has been no room to apply the 
                                                 
301
 Macdonald refers to the margin of appreciation as an illustration of the general approach of the 
ECHR “to the delicate task of balancing the sovereignty of Contracting Parties with their obligations 
under the Convention” (Ibid, p.83). Similarly, Arai-Takahashi describes the margin of appreciation as 
a reference “to the latitude a government enjoys in evaluating factual situations and in applying the 
provisions enumerated in human rights treaties” (2002, Ibid, p.2). 
 
302
 The Court held in a number of cases that “because of their direct knowledge of their society and 
their needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to 
appreciate what is ‘in the public interest’” (James, paragraph 46; and Pressos Compania Naviera, 
paragraph 37). See Arai-Takahashi (2002), p.157, and Steven Greer, (2000), p.8. 
 
303
 See again James, under the test of proportionality, particularly at paragraphs 47-50.  
 
304
 See the previous sections 2.3.b. on the right to property and 2.3.c.1 on proportionality and limited 
rights.  
 
305
 Unlike Article 10 in this same case where the Court stated that the Contracting States were the only 
judges to assess the necessity for an interference with the right to property under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol, having restricted itself “to supervising the lawfulness and the purpose of the restriction in 
question” (Handyside, paragraph 62). See also Arai-Takahashi (2002), p. 53. 
 
306
 (Application No. 8793/79), at paragraph 50. See previous section 2.3.b on the right to property and 
proportionality. 
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doctrine of margin of appreciation except within the boundaries of the test of 
proportionality. 
In Stec and Others v UK
307
 the Court by its Grand Chamber stated the general 
principles that govern the scope of the margin of appreciation doctrine, “according to 
the circumstances, the subject-matter and the background.”308 This case concerned 
non-discrimination, but due to the broad scope of these principles they tend to be the 
same for other fundamental rights.  
The assessment of the margin of appreciation is not prior to the proportionality 
review, as the latter may assess not only the legitimacy of a policy which interferes 
with fundamental rights but also the measures chosen to implement that policy in the 
public interest.  In other words, the assessment of proportionality is a necessary 
requirement for applying the margin of appreciation doctrine according to the rule of 
law in terms of legal and principled justification. Furthermore, not only are the 
objectives and the measures to achieve them submitted to the margin of appreciation 
and to proportionality, but also their consequences.
309
 If the margin of appreciation 
doctrine fundamentally “enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of Contracting 
Parties with their obligations under the Convention”310, there may not be a better way 
to balance national sovereignty and international obligations to comply with 
individual rights than via the application of the proportionality principle. As Steven 
Greer points out, the key issue of margin of appreciation is that “the legitimate 
exercise of discretion by States under the Convention hinges critically on the 
                                                                                                                                          
  
307
 (Applications No. 65731/01 and 65900/01). See further analysis of this case grounded on 
proportionality in this Chapter, section 2.5.b, regarding tax discrimination on grounds of sex. 
 
308
 See Petrovic v. Austria (Application No. 20458/92), § 38. As a general rule, very weighty reasons 
would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based 
exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention (see Van Raalte, cited above, § 
39, and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, § 67). On the other hand, a wide margin is usually allowed 
to the State under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy 
(see, for example, James, § 46; National and Provincial Building Society and Others v. the UK, § 80), 
unless it is “manifestly without reasonable foundation” (ibidem, paragraph 52). 
 
309
 Arai-Takahashi (2002), supra, p.157. 
  
310
 Macdonald, (1993), p.123. 
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appropriate application of principles which enable the Convention to be properly 
interpreted.”311  
In a number of cases, the Court reiterated its deference to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, but always directly or indirectly assessing and striking a fair balance 
between the competing interests using proportionality reasoning. As analysed in the 
previous section, proportionality pervades all fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Convention in practice and in law. There has been left no room for applying the 
margin of appreciation to some rights without consideration of proportionality.
312
 As 
has been rightly suggested, proportionality is the “yardstick”313 of evaluation as well 
as “a corrective and restriction”314 of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
Conversely, when the Court recognizes to States a wide margin of appreciation to 
initially chose the means to implement their policies and even assess them via 
proportionality,
315
 that margin does not hinder the judicial review of the Court on the 
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 The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2000), p. 7. In his latest work on the European Convention Rights, Steven Greer 
approaches the margin of appreciation in the same way still and primarily under the subordination to 
what he called as ‘Convention’s primary constitutional principles’, (2006), p.225). Assuming the 
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‘democracy’, ‘rights’, and ‘priority to rights’ principles” (idem, p.217). In other words, one may 
suggest that even assuming proportionality as a secondary constitutional principle, there would be no 
proper and substantive primary constitutional principles without it. 
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 Either proportionality is considered together with margin of appreciation, or on its own. On the 
other hand, some authors pointed out that the margin of appreciation has never been invoked 
regarding Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the prohibition of torture), or Article 4 (the right 
against forced labour), having had a very limited role in respect of Articles 5 and 6 (Greer, Steven, 
2006, p.225). On the important role of proportionality in relation to Articles 2, 3, and 4 mentioned 
above, see the previous section. Arai-Takahashi (2002) on p.8, indicated that the Court justified the 
extension of the margin of appreciation doctrine to all Convention rights via the general exercise of 
‘balancing’, but “with the exception of four non-derogable rights”, under Article 15 (derogations in 
time of emergency), paragraph 2, which prohibits derogations from Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 
(proscription of torture), Article 4 (prohibition of forced labour) and Article 7 (non retrospective 
criminal law). 
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 Arai-Takahashi (2002), pp.18 and 128.  
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 Matscher, F. ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’ (1993), p.79. 
 
315
 See Arai-Takahashi (2002), pp.156-7. 
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same grounds of proportionality.
316
 This principle is so rooted in and inherent to the 
Convention that States must apply it to their own policies first and then to measures 
that may affect the effectiveness of fundamental rights to not only respect but also 
strengthen them under the subsequent review of the Court.  
At least five differences between the margin of appreciation and the principle of 
proportionality can be identified. First, the margin of appreciation is more a 
doctrine
317
 or a principle of justification
318
 rather than interpretation, whereas 
proportionality may be treated as a principle of interpretation, application and 
justification. Secondly, whereas the former is considered as ‘uneven and largely 
unpredictable’,319 and either ‘more rhetorical than substantive’ and ‘transitional’ or 
not a principled doctrine or in favour of a minimalist approach regarding a common 
denominator of human rights protection,
320
 proportionality is more predictable, 
fundamentally substantive in practice and in law, and permanent, which in most 
cases reaches its main objectives of consistency, effectiveness and fairness. Thirdly, 
whereas the former applies to only some fundamental rights (and may possibly 
extend to others, except to the four non-derogable rights),
321
 the latter is considered 
either as inherent to or applicable to all of them. Fourthly, regarding competing 
enshrined and not enshrined rights the margin of appreciation doctrine appears to 
have little role in comparison with proportionality.
322
 Fifthly, when States exercise 
their margin of discretion they may (or perhaps must) observe the proportionality 
principle; however, ultimately it has an ancillary role within the Convention in 
                                                 
316
 Another characteristic of the relationship between the margin of appreciation and proportionality is 
the more weight given to the former the less stringent the latter test tends to be. “Conversely, the 
narrower the margin, the more exacting the proportionality test will be” (Dembour, 2006, p.71, also 
analyzing James, and Arai-Takahashi, 2002, p.2). 
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 See Greer (2006), p.222. 
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 See Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation” (1993), p.123. 
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 See Greer (2006), p.223. 
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 See Arai-Takahashi (2002), p.18. 
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 See the analysis of non-derogable rights (to life, non-torture, unforced labour, non-retrospective 
criminal penalties), in the previous section, as well as n.357. 
322
 See above section 2.3.c.4 on competing rights, Chassagnou (Applications No. 25088/94 and 
28331/95). 
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respect of its own assessment, which is necessarily subjected to proportionality as 
assessed by the Court.
323
 
Furthermore, although they may intertwine, proportionality is more pervasive within 
the Convention, and governs as an overarching principle the margin of appreciation 
itself as well as other principles, such as effective protection in law and in practice. 
According to the jurisprudence of the Court, it may be right to conclude that there is 
no method of construction and adjudication of fundamental rights as effective as the 
proper consideration of proportionality coupled with reasonableness.  
b) The margin of appreciation in taxation. 
Particularly with respect to taxation, the Commission recognized from the earliest 
cases that the margin of appreciation is broader than in other areas.
324
 The Svenska
325
 
case dealt with the broad margin of appreciation of States concerning fiscal, 
economic and social policies. In this case, there was an implicit reference to the 
proportionality principle by regarding the measure as not “disproportionate” or “an 
abuse.”326 In addition, that decision stated broad limitations on the power to tax under 
the right to property,
327
 as the applicants disputed the destination of a special profit 
tax and social contribution to Public Funds for pensions and acquiring participations 
in some public companies. Regardless of the broad margin of appreciation, the 
                                                 
323
 As analyzed above the margin of appreciation is the sovereignty remained with States to adjudicate 
fundamental rights whereas the proportionality is the way the Court assess whether or not national 
sovereignty was properly exercised within the Convention. 
 
324
 In GG and TV and Company v Iceland (Application No. 511/59) the issue was related to a once-
for-all tax of 25% on wealth above a certain limit, and the Commission taking into account the critical 
economic circumstances, did not take it for consideration and regarded as "manifestly ill-founded." In 
Wasa Li (Application No. 13013/87), the Commission stated that “…a margin of appreciation is left to 
them and it must be wider in this area than it is in many others. … A government may often have to 
strike a balance between the need to raise revenue and other objectives in its taxation policies.  The 
national authorities are obviously in a better position than the Commission to assess those needs and 
requirements” (Paragraph 6 of the decision). 
 
325
 Svenska Managementgruup AB v Sweden (Application No. 11036/84). 
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 Paragraph 14 of the judgment. In this case, the applicant had to pay a new tax equal to a certain 
reasonable percentage of its profits and increase in social pension charges of 0 .2-0 .5 per cent.  
 
327
 “The levying of a tax or other contribution would only be in violation of the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions if the person concerned was saddled with an intolerable burden or if his 
financial situation was overturned” (Heading of the decision). 
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judicial review of the Strasbourg organs allows them to assess the legality, 
reasonableness and proportionality of any tax measure that may interfere with 
fundamental rights.
328
 
 
In Hentrich
329
 the Court also reiterated the margin of appreciation but again 
submitted it to the principle of proportionality regarding the right of pre-emption to 
counteract tax evasion under the right to property. In Riener,
330
 the Fifth Section of 
the Court unanimously mentioned the authority of Hentrich and gave prevalence to 
the full assessment of proportionality with the analysis of less restrictive measures as 
occurred in Hentrich with no further consideration of the margin of appreciation.  
 
Regarding tax discriminations, the Court also gives deference to States to assess 
“whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
different treatment”, but subjecting the margin of appreciation to the proportionality 
test.
331
 Any difference of treatment must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim and its means. 
Summarizing the case law of the Court in relation to the weight given to the margin 
of appreciation, Jacobs & White conclude,   
“So, as has been seen, there is little room for choice where the 
discrimination is based on sex, race, nationality, religion, legitimacy 
of children, and sexual orientation. However, in matters of, for 
example, housing policy designed to ensure an adequate supply of 
housing for the poorer section of the community, there will be a wide 
                                                 
328
 See again Wasa Li, at the heading Complains, paragraph 2, “However, it is well-established in the 
Commission's case-law that the powers of taxation are not immune from review under the Convention 
(cf. for example No. 8531/79, Dec. 10.3.81, D.R. 23 p. 203).” See the analysis of A.B.C.D. v UK, 
Application No. 8531/79, in section 2.6.a. on tax avoidance, retrospective taxation and 
proportionality. 
 
329
 Hentrich v France case (Application No. 13616/88), at paragraph 39. See further on this case, 
section 2.7.b, on fiscal penalties and proportionality. 
330
 Riener v Bulgaria (Application No. 46343/99). See section. 2.7.b) also on fiscal penalties. 
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 Van Raalte case (Application No. 20060/92, decided by Grand Chamber), paragraph 39, and 
Karlheinz Schmidt case (Application No. 13580/88) paragraph 24. See section 2.5.b. 
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margin. There is a similarly wide margin of appreciation in relation to 
policies in the area of taxation.”332 
The following sections will illustrate how proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness has been applied to some tax issues, mainly discrimination, 
retrospective taxation, excessive taxation, and in so doing recognizing or originating 
other tax principles such as ability to pay and conditions for clarity and precision in 
statutory tax law.  
 
III.2.5. Tax discrimination and the proportionality principle coupled with 
reasonableness. 
As discussed in the previous sections, proportionality lies at the heart of the concept 
of discrimination and governs the margin of appreciation. The following examples of 
tax discrimination will be assessed on grounds of proportionality in a search for 
fairness and consistency in the light of the evolving and dynamic interpretation of the 
Court. 
III.2.5.a) The joint taxation of married couples and family taxation. 
 
In Lindsay,
333
 the Commission decided that the different taxation of married and 
unmarried couples would not be discrimination, the standard of reasonableness and 
the margin of appreciation doctrine. This case was the second to apply Article 14 to a 
tax case.
334
 It may be worth analysing two aspects of the decision. First, it may 
rightly be suggested that the aim of encouraging women to work was legitimate, and 
the favourable tax regime for married women was a proportionate measure. In this 
situation, the effect was a positive discrimination in favour of married women as 
breadwinners in comparison with married men who were the main source of income. 
                                                 
332
 (2006), p.429. 
333
 Lindsay v. United Kingdom (Application No. 11089/84). See also comments on this case and on 
the same issue decided by the Commission (Hubaux v. Belgium, Application No. 11088/84,), Baker, 
Philip, “Taxation and the European Convention on Human Rights” [2000] B.T.R. 4, p.252, part 6 on 
Article 14,  (d) Taxation of husbands and wives). 
 
334
 A,B,C,D, v UK (Application No. 8531/79) was the first (see analysis in section 2.6.a). 
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The discrimination between married and unmarried couples may be arguably 
justified. The Commission referred to the Belgian Linguistic leading case,
335
 but did 
not accept that married and unmarried couples were in comparable situations. The 
Commission gave much more weight to the margin of appreciation doctrine than to 
other principles that govern the construction and application of fundamental rights, 
such as commonality, effective protection, proportionality, with no consideration at 
all as to whether different treatment between married and unmarried couples was 
seen as discriminatory in other democratic states. It seems to be that in some areas 
the Commission was ready to accept the statutory law with no due regard to 
constitutional court rulings.
336
  
Other constitutional courts had decided in favour of taxpayers regarding the more 
burdensome taxation of married couples in comparison with unmarried couples 
(cohabitees) in democratic jurisdictions. Besides the U.S. and Germany, two more 
domestic jurisdictions, Italy
337
 and Spain,
338
 applied the reasonable and objective test 
under the proportionality reasoning to override that discrimination. The lack of other 
examples of decisions of constitutional courts may result from the fact that many 
other democratic states do not adopt a mandatory joint taxation of spouses within a 
system of progressive taxation.
339
 Even the European Court of Justice in the 
Schumacker
340
 case took into consideration the legitimate aim of the split system for 
                                                 
335
 See this Chapter, section 2.3.a.  
 
336
 See for example the German Constitutional Court decision (delivered previously to Lindsay case) 
that balanced the equality of rights of the two sexes, the constitutional protection of the family, and 
the purpose of ‘bringing the working wife back to the home’ (6 BVerfGE 55, decision of 17 January, 
1957, excerpted in Kommers, Donald, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (DUP, 1997), p.498; and the US Supreme Court on Chapter II, section 1.2. (Due process, 
equality principle and proportionality), Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, decided in 1931, 
284 U.S. 206. 
 
337
 The Constitutional Court in the decision 179 of 1976 held that the joint taxation of married couples 
was unconstitutional on grounds of its unreasonableness and irrational justification in the light of 
equality, the ability to pay, and the constitutional protection of the family. 
 
338
 Thuronyi (2003), pp.93. See judgment of the Constitutional Court of Spain No. 45/89 (STC 
45/1989), of 20 February 1989, based on the principle of proportionality to guarantee non-
discrimination between married couples and cohabitees in light of the protection of family. 
 
339
 For an overview in Europe, see Soler Roch, María Teresa, Family Taxation in Europe (Kluwer, 
1999), in particular also the role of neutrality principle to avoid that married people are penalised 
because they are married (at p.5). 
 
340
 Case C-279/93 [1995] ECR I-225. See Chapter IV.5.1. 
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couples based on the ability to pay principle recognized as a fundamental principle of 
domestic and international law as opposed to joint taxation.  
Taking into account an autonomous and evolving interpretation adopted by the 
Commission and the Court, it may be suggested that the Lindsay ruling is no longer 
controlling. In other words, if in most democratic states (even in the UK) there is no 
longer tax discrimination between married couples and cohabitees,
341
 the Court 
would probably take a different view, overturning its conclusion in the Lindsay case, 
without overriding its governing principles. In Shackell
342
 the Court had the 
opportunity to explicitly liberate itself from the narrow and discriminatory view 
taken by the Commission in Lindsay, but it failed to do so by a majority of its First 
Section. In Shackell the discrimination was against a cohabitee widow, to whom the 
entitlement to social security benefits as a widow of her cohabitee on his death was 
denied.
343
 Whereas in Lindsay the discrimination was against marriage, in Shackell 
the discrimination concerned the reverse situation of cohabitation of a couple, 
although living together as a family with three daughters. The Court also based the 
decision in Shackell on Article 12 (which grants special treatment to marriage) to 
accept a more favourable treatment for formally married couples, whereas it upheld 
in Lindsay less favourable taxation. Arguably, the Court may be right on a technical 
view, but this should not restrain it from taking into account all the significant factual 
and legal circumstances of each case to avoid discrimination and enforce legitimate 
rights. The problem with these apparently unfair decisions may be the formalistic 
                                                                                                                                          
 
341
 The separate taxation for spouses was introduced by the 1988 Act, in the following year after the 
Commission Decision in Lindsay.  One might suggest there was a close coincidence of dates, having 
had the unfair and more burdensome taxation of married couples remedied according to the margin of 
appreciation by the State. See further on UK taxation, Tiley, John, “Tax, Marriage and the Family” 
(2006) C.L.J. 65(2) pp.289–300. 
 
342
 Joanna Shackell v UK (Application No. 45851/99)     
343
 The Court in its judgment of 27 April 2000, stated, “… that decision of the Commission dates from 
1986, that is, over 14 years ago. The Court accepts that there may well now be an increased social 
acceptance of stable personal relationships outside the traditional notion of marriage. However, 
marriage remains an institution which is widely accepted as conferring a particular status on those 
who enter it. The situation of the applicant therefore is not comparable to that of a widow” (paragraph 
1). The remedy for this unfairness might have been on grounds of equity, either squarely accepting a 
putative marriage between the cohabitees or allowing the deceased to reveal his will from the grave 
through his cohabitee.    
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approach adopted by some judges regarding the analysis of comparability or analogy 
between two or more situations and the weak role of proportionality.  
Proportionality is also an aid to an evolving interpretation, since a measure regarded 
as non-discriminatory and proportionate in an earlier case may become 
discriminatory and disproportionate under new economic and social circumstances.  
Shackell seems to be inconsistent with the ruling in the PM
344
 case and the rationale 
of the Marckx case.
345
 In the latter, the Commission and the Court stated that married 
and unmarried women were in comparable situations in relation to their relationship 
with their respective daughters, whereas in Shackell a formerly unmarried widow 
with three daughters was not comparable with a widow previously married with 
children.
346
  
 
In PM, the issue was the right of an unmarried father to tax deductions regarding 
maintenance payments paid to the mother of his daughter. The British government 
tried to compare this situation based on marriage taxation policy with the previous 
decisions in Lindsay and Shackell, since the only reason why the taxpayer could not 
deduct those payments was he had never been married to his daughter’s mother. 
Nonetheless the Court rightly distinguished his situation from the previous case 
law
347
 and unanimously stated that,  
 
                                                 
344
 PM v UK (Application No. 6638/03), Fourth Section, judgment of 19 July 2005. 
 
345
 (Application No. 6833/74) judgment of 13 June 1979. In this case the Court held discriminatory, 
disproportional and with no reasonable justification the difference of treatment between married and 
unmarried women as in the PM case analysed below, regarding the difference in tax treatment 
between married and unmarried fathers. Perhaps, the Commission might have decided differently if 
the married couple had children to afford and any tax allowance for children could not compensate the 
heavier tax burden on married couples in comparison with cohabitees also with children. In Lindsay, 
the married couple had children and the comparison should have been between unmarried couples 
with children. 
 
346
 It would have been more consistent with the Marckx judgment (by the Grand Chamber), had the 
Court by its First Section accepted in Shackell the similarity between married and unmarried women 
with children and then decided the case on less lenient proportionality grounds. On Marckx and the 
evolving and progressive interpretation of the Court, see also Partsch, Karl Josef, “Discrimination”  
(1993), pp.588-9. 
 
347
 The Court concluded that the applicant was in a relevantly similar position of a separated father 
who had been married before (at paragraph 27). 
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“In the present case, the applicant has been acknowledged as the 
father and has acted in that role. Given that he has financial 
obligations towards his daughter, which he has duly fulfilled, the 
Court perceives no reason for treating him differently from a married 
father, now divorced and separated from the mother, as regards the tax 
deductibility of those payments. The purpose of the tax deductions 
was purportedly to render it easier for married fathers to support a 
new family; it is not readily apparent why unmarried fathers, who 
undertook similar new relationships, would not have similar financial 
commitments equally requiring relief.”348 
Having decided on the comparability question, the Court went on to reason on the 
justification issue for a different tax treatment on grounds of the legitimate aim of the 
legislation at stake and its proportionality. Although the Court could have expressly 
reversed Lindsay on the criterion for comparable situations (married and unmarried 
couples), it did not need to, as this rule was not justified in the PM case, having given 
particular regard to the civil rights granted to and obligations imposed on unmarried 
fathers.
349
 Whereas both separated fathers, unmarried and married, could not be 
treated differently following the PM ruling, married and unmarried couples could, 
according to Lindsay. One may suggest that equality and equitable treatment can be 
granted to them only when they are separated but not while living as spouses. In line 
with the current legal obligations of cohabitees, who may have reciprocal obligations 
and rights, any difference of treatment for encouraging formal and longer 
commitments, assuming a public, legitimate interest, should be in favour of, and not 
against, marriage.
350
 Again, Lindsay’s rationale does not hold water.  
                                                 
348
 Paragraph 28 of the judgment. 
 
349
 Besides the obligation of financial help, unmarried fathers “can claim equal rights of contact and 
custody with married fathers”, Jacobs and White (2002), supra, p.428. 
 
350
 John Tiley observed another cause of “inequity” between civil partners and spouses on one hand 
and those who decided to live together without marriage or civil partnership on the other hand, 
regarding the exemption from capital gain tax provided for private residence (“Tax, Marriage and the 
Family” [2006] C.L.J., p.295). Whereas for the former only one residence can be exempt, for the latter 
each one of those living together can have an exempt private residence. 
  
 107 
Another kind of tax discrimination may occur with unmarried couples who live 
together but cannot marry since one of them or both spouses were previously 
married, having no provision for divorce in their country. In Johnston v. Ireland
351
 
the Court decided that there was no positive obligation for the State to remedy the 
different tax treatment between married and unmarried couples as a consequence of a 
constitutional prohibition on divorce. However, regarding all three applicants 
together (non-divorced spouse, his lady partner and their daughter), the Court held 
that it was a breach of Article 8 regarding family and private life, also taking into 
consideration tax consequences for an illegitimate child.
352
 The complexity of this 
case also lies in striking a balance between the principles of interpretation, which 
must be given more weight in each case, and the role of the Court itself within the 
Convention. With due regard given to the margin of appreciation and proportionality, 
the State was left with the task of choosing the means to remedy the situation 
ensuring that a “fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the interests of the individual.”353   
III.2.5.b) Tax discrimination on grounds of sex and strict proportionality. 
On the other hand, it also appears to be difficult to reconcile the above decisions of 
the Court, such as Lindsay, with Van Raalte v the Netherlands
354
 and Burden and 
Burden v United Kingdom
355
, which concern discrimination on grounds of gender 
and family circumstances for tax purposes. A way to avoid inconsistency and 
probably unfairness in each case would be to apply either the narrow or the broad 
scope of the doctrine of margin of appreciation and proportionality in the light of 
                                                 
351
 (Application No. 9697/82).   
 
352
 Johnston (Application No. 9697/82) case, paragraph 33: “An illegitimate child inheriting property 
from his parents is potentially liable to pay capital acquisition tax on a basis less favourable than a 
child born in wedlock.” 
 
353
 Idem, paragraph 77 of the judgment. In 1987 after the decision was held on 18 December 1986, the 
status of illegitimacy was abolished and the Minister of Justice for Ireland stated that it rectified the 
finding of a violation in Johnston. See comments on this case by Donncha O’Connell in Fundamental 
Rights in Europe, the ECHR and its Member States, 1950-2000, Robert Blackburn and Jörg 
Polakiewicz (Eds)  (OUP, 2001), by pp. 454-5, at 467. 
 
354
 (Application No. 20060/92).  
 
355
 (Application No. 13378/05). 
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other principles of interpretation. Wherever the margin of appreciation seems to take 
precedence over proportionality, in my opinion a more utilitarian view appears to 
inform the jurisprudence of the Court, which gives prevalence to an undefined 
general interest. Thus, this utilitarianism supersedes a more liberal view, which gives 
more weight to the recognition of individual rights and their enforcement than to the 
notion of the general interest.
356
 
In Van Raalte
357
 an exemption from social contributions was granted only to 
unmarried, childless women of 45 or over. The reason why the exemption was not 
applied to men in the same circumstances of age and being childless was that men 
over 45 could still have their own children while this was considered unlikely for 
women. The justification for the exemption itself was not to impose an unfair 
emotional burden on women who could not procreate any more. Having to pay a 
contribution for childcare benefits would continuously remind them of their childless 
situation. Although the Court made a concession regarding this arguably acceptable 
justification, it straightforwardly rejected the discrimination based on gender, for 
which the margin of appreciation seems to be less broad and proportionality test less 
loose: 
“While Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation 
under the Convention as regards the introduction of exemptions to 
such contributory obligations, Article 14 requires that any such 
measure, in principle, applies even-handedly to both men and women 
unless compelling reasons have been adduced to justify a difference in 
treatment.”358 
It is also worth noting in this unanimous decision that the Court did not take into 
consideration the argument of the domestic courts, which claimed that if the 
exemption from social contributions was discriminatory, it should be declared null 
                                                 
356
 See Dembour, (2006), supra, pp.68-70. 
 
357
 Supra, decided by Chamber, unanimously, on 28 of January 1997. See also Baker, Philip [2000] 
B.T.R., p.251, part 6 on Article 14, (c) Cases where discrimination was established, in which Schmidt 
v. Germany is also mentioned.  
 
358
 Paragraph 42 of the Van Raalte case, in which the Court also expressly applied the principle of 
proportionality (paragraph 39). 
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and void and not be extended to other persons. Nevertheless, as the Court apparently 
accepted the legitimate aim of the exemption on unfair emotional burden grounds, its 
role was to avoid unjustified discrimination and not deprive some persons of 
legitimate benefits.  
The case law of the Court tends to be stricter on sex discrimination, according to the 
evolving principle of interpretation under general or specific dynamic economic and 
social circumstances. In Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany
359
, cited as an authority in 
Van Raalte, only men were obliged to work in the fire brigade or pay a levy instead. 
The Court appreciated the fact that there were enough volunteers, even women 
among them, and as a result no man was forced to be a fire worker but only men had 
to pay that duty.
360
 The Court held this was unjustifiable discrimination, paying less 
regard to the margin of appreciation for the State and more attention to the factual 
situation and discriminatory effect on grounds of sex. The Commission had also held 
discrimination between men and women to be unjustified in more blatant cases and 
the legislation has been subsequently amended.
361
 
On the other hand, notwithstanding different age limits for men and women to have 
the right to a pension, the Court accepted these, taking into account the justification 
given by the State and the scrutiny the European Court of Justice performed on 
grounds of proportionality for a transitional period concerning the same subject 
matter.
362
 Although the application of the proportionality test by the European Court 
                                                 
359
 (Application No. 13580/88). See McBride, Jeremy (1997), supra, p.33, particularly the factual 
analysis of discrimination cases in which the margin of appreciation is much stricter. 
 
360
 Paragraph 28 of the judgment. 
361
 See MacGregor v. United Kingdom (Application No. 30548/96), in which only a man with an 
incapacitated wife had the right to an allowance and no allowance was granted a woman with an 
incapacitated husband (See Baker, Philip, idem p.252, and Meussen, Gerard, Conclusion in Principle 
of Equality in European Taxation (1999), supra, p.173). See also Crossland v. United Kingdom  
(Application No. 36120/97) and Fielding v. United Kingdom (Application No. 36940/97) in which a 
bereavement allowance was granted to women only and not to a man whose deceased wife was the 
breadwinner (apud Baker, Philip, idem p.251). All these cases were decided on the basis of reasonable 
justification and proportionality of discrimination. In the same line of reasoning, see also Hobbs, 
Richard, Walsh and Geen v. the UK (Applications No. 63684/00, 63475/00, 63484/00 and 63468/00).  
362
  Stec and Others v. The UK (Applications No. 65731/01 and 65900/01), paragraph 58, Grand 
Chamber, majority decision by 16 to 1. On sex discrimination and the exceptions to which the 
equality principle is subject regarding social security, see Ellis, Evelyn, “Proportionality in European 
Community Sex Discrimination Law”, in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(1999), pp.169-70, mentioning some cases decided by the ECJ based on the proportionality principle.  
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of Justice (ECJ) was not binding, it was regarded as persuasive, and one may rightly 
suggest that it is the same as the principle applied by the Court (ECHR). 
Nevertheless, it can be said that the latter jurisdiction applies the test of 
proportionality giving considerable weight to the margin of appreciation.
363
 
In Burden and Burden
364
 the Fourth Section of the Court rejected the same 
inheritance tax treatment of a couple engaged in a civil partnership to elderly siblings 
living together permanently. Whereas in Lindsay
365
 the Commission considered the 
situations of married and unmarried couples as non-comparable, in Burden and 
Burden the Fourth Section assumed similarity among married, civil partnership 
couples and siblings firmly committed to living together. Nonetheless, the Fourth 
Section analysed the justification for not extending the same inheritance tax regime 
to them under the test of proportionality and gave more weight to the margin of 
appreciation of the State.
366
 The Fourth Section developed the comparability of 
situations between married and unmarried couples
367
 but seems to have failed to 
reach a more consistent decision with a stricter proportionality test, in the search for 
more fairness in each case. The Grand Chamber reiterated that a formal and binding 
agreement as a requirement for marriage and civil partnership was lacking in the case 
of the two elderly sisters. It adopted a formalistic approach and again substantiated 
its conclusion on a wider margin of appreciation of States in tax matters.
368
 Although 
                                                 
363
 Evelyn Ellis (1999) points out on sex discrimination regarding social policy that there is a broader 
discretion of the Member States and that proportionality seems to be watered down, although the ECJ 
does not refer to the margin of appreciation doctrine (idem, p.180). 
 
364
 (Application No. 13378/05). See Case Comment, “Taxation: Prospective Liability of Elderly, 
Cohabiting Sisters to Inheritance Tax - Difference in Treatment as Compared with Married Couples or 
those on Civil Partnerships” [2007] E.H.R.L.R. No.2. 
 
365
 See this Chapter, section 2.5.a. 
366
 “Any system of taxation, to be workable, has to use broad categorisations to distinguish between 
different groups of tax payers. The implementation of any such scheme must, inevitably, create 
marginal situations and individual cases of apparent hardship or injustice, and it is primarily for the 
State to decide how best to strike the balance between raising revenue and pursuing social objectives” 
(paragraph 60 of the judgment). 
 
367
 The Grand Chamber overturned that assumption, stating, “The very essence of the connection 
between siblings is consanguinity, whereas one of the defining characteristics of a marriage or Civil 
Partnership Act union is that it is forbidden to close family members (see paragraph 17 above and, 
generally, B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, cited above)”, at paragraph 62 of the judgment. 
 
368
 Paragraph 65 of the judgment. 
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the Fourth Section (not the Grand Chamber) conceded that marginal cases of 
injustice can be inevitable, the precedent could be based on a firm commitment 
between the couples to live together and the special circumstances of fairness as 
rationale for a decision in favour of the very elderly sisters, which might not be 
generalised for future cases.  
 
The problem with categorisations, even in an across-the-board application, is that 
they may cause some hardship in specific cases. Moreover, one of the roles of the 
Courts is to try to remedy these special cases; the notions of equity, reasonableness 
and proportionality are useful instruments for this. It is worth noting that the Burden 
decision was taken by a very narrow majority of four to three in the Fourth Section, 
having unanimously assumed the similarity between the situations at stake, but this 
was overturned by a majority of fifteen to two in the Grand Chamber.  
 
It may be concluded from the Burden and the Lindsay
369
 cases, that reasonableness 
and proportionality did not fail. What may have failed were a formulaic and 
formalistic criterion of comparability and a loose test of reasonableness and 
proportionality. In other words, the “rhetorical use of proportionality”370 may have 
prevailed besides a lack of full explanation for the margin of appreciation, which 
may allow “marginal” injustices.371     
 
III.2.5.c) Tax discrimination on grounds of fiscal residence. 
 
In Darby v Sweden
372
 the issue was a lack of justification for granting the possibility 
of exemption from a church tax (collected together with a municipal tax) only to 
residents of Sweden. Dr Darby, a Finnish citizen living in Finland and working part 
time in Sweden, could not apply for exemption from the church tax charged on his 
                                                 
369
 See the previous section 2.5.a. 
 
370
 The explicit mention of proportionality in some cases “does not necessarily accompany a genuine, 
in particular, of the effects of the interference on the individual” (Arai-Takahashi, 2002, p.16). 
 
371
 See this Chapter section 2.4 on the interaction between proportionality test and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. 
 
372
 (Application No. 11581/85). 
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income originated in Sweden.
373
 As a non-member of the Lutheran Church, he could 
not opt for not paying the church tax only because he was not resident in Sweden. 
The Court decided against this tax discrimination, scrutinizing the legitimacy of the 
exemption only for residents. The initial justification obtained from the travaux 
préparatoires for the Bill of 1951 was that “the case for reduction could not be 
argued with the same force in regard to persons who were not resident in Sweden as 
it could in regard to those who were, and that the procedure would be more 
complicated if the reduction applied to non-residents.”374 The Court disregarded this 
explanation, which implied that reasons of simplification of the fiscal supervision 
discriminated against taxpayers on grounds of fiscal residence, as barely acceptable. 
The Court did not go into the details of the test of proportionality, as the justification 
was not reasonable, yet having noted, “the Government stated at the hearing before 
the Court that they did not argue that the distinction in treatment had a legitimate 
aim.”375  
 
The church tax might be justified since a reduction was provided pursuant to the 
freedom of religion and the part of the tax collected by the Church “was supposed to 
cover the costs borne by the parishes of certain administrative functions such as the 
keeping of population records and the maintenance of churchyards and other public 
burial-grounds.”376 Since a fair balance seemed to exist between the freedom of 
religion and the imposition of a Church tax, with the option of not paying the full 
amount for non-members and the rest of the levy being justified by some public 
interests, the test of proportionality appeared to be met.  
III.2.6. Justification for retrospective taxation. Tax avoidance and 
proportionality. 
                                                 
373
 The Double Taxation Convention allocated the right to tax his income to the country of 
employment (Sweden). 
 
374
 Paragraph 22 of the judgment. See, also, Partsch, Karl Josef, “Discrimination” (1993), p.589.  
 
375
 Paragraph 33 of the judgment.  
 
376
 Paragraph 22 of the judgment. 
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The only express prohibition on retrospective legislation concerns criminal law under 
Article 7 of the Convention. The proportionality principle may be applicable to the 
construction of the clear proscription of retrospective heavier penalties.  
The point for discussion here is how the Court has developed, as in other 
jurisdictions,
377
 restrictions on retrospective civil - as opposed to criminal - 
legislation including taxation, on the basis of the proportionality principle. Another 
issue that will be raised in this section is what difference, if any, exists between the 
proportionality tests applied to tax and to other economic and social matters, which 
may justify retrospective legislation in the public interest. 
Regarding the relationship between retrospective legislation and proportionality, the 
Court pointed this out as a natural consequence in relation to the protection of 
property (Art 1 of the First Protocol), as well as in some cases relating to the right to 
a fair trial (Article 6) and discrimination (Article 14). All cases analysed below 
illustrate how proportionality not only governs those rights but also originates from 
the reasonableness notion and generates other unwritten principles of law such as a 
principle of non-retrospective taxation.  
 
a) Retrospective legislation, tax avoidance, tax evasion and proportionality. 
 
The first case that raised the issue of retrospective legislation as an interference with 
fundamental rights was a tax case, regarding the right to property and non-
discrimination.
378
 The issue at stake in this case was the justification for targeting 
retrospectively an artificial tax avoidance scheme, into which four lawyers had 
entered (to obtain a trading loss in partnerships dealing in commodity futures) with 
the sole purpose of offsetting it against their taxable earnings as solicitors.  
 
                                                 
377
 See on retrospective taxation, proportionality and reasonableness, in the US, Chapter II.1.4, and in 
the EU Chapter IV.8. 
378
 A.., B., C. and D. v the UK (cited above). See Baker, Philip, “Retrospective Tax Legislation and the 
European Convention on Human Rights” [2005] B.T.R. 4, pp.2-4. 
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The discrimination issue was not properly raised and the Commission 
straightforwardly rejected it because the applicants failed to demonstrate that the 
distinction between situations of artificiality was not “objective and inherent in the 
terms of any provision charging tax which must clearly distinguish between those 
who are to be liable and those who are not.”379 The fact that there were other 
situations of artificial losses which were not covered by the Statute was not sufficient 
to invalidate its legitimate aim, objectiveness and reasonableness. The fact that others 
should also have to pay tax in similar circumstances of artificial transactions cannot 
exempt those affected from it. One may conclude that there is no basis for a 
complaint only because the law did not differentiate between other situations of 
artificiality, since the role of the Court is to strike down unjustified discrimination at 
stake in each case and not to provide other discriminations that should have been 
made to cover similar situations.
380
 It seems also that the Commission gave more 
weight to the blatant situation of an artificial transaction with “no commercial 
validity”, and regarded the differentiation as justifiable and reasonable, leaving the 
statutory gap, if any, to be filled by future legislation.
381
  
 
The aspect of artificiality also strongly affected the analysis of proportionality 
concerning whether or not blatant retrospective legislation was justifiable under the 
right to property. A written Parliamentary answer about the artificial tax scheme in 
question was made on 25 November 1977, and then on 11 April 1978 the 
Government announced that the legislation to make it ineffective would be 
retrospective. The new law came into force on 31 July 1978, being retrospectively 
applicable to transactions that had occurred since 06 April 1976, almost two years 
earlier than the first announcement about the possibility of retrospective legislation. 
                                                 
379
 A.,, B.,  C.  and D. case, at 210.  
 
380
 There is a parallel with the situation where the aim is legitimate, but those discriminating against 
were deprived of a right or a legitimate benefit as happened in Van Raalte (see  section 2.5.b above). 
In A.B.C.D. the applicants were discriminated against but they were not deprived of a legitimate right 
or benefit, since the exemption from tax, which was the consequence of artificial transactions, was not 
regarded as a right or a legitimate benefit.  
 
381
 The margin of appreciation of States may be broader in tax avoidance situations and the means 
available would be either to introduce a general and retrospective anti-avoidance rule addressing 
wholly artificial arrangements or to target the most relevant schemes, in terms of anti-avoidance tax 
policy.  
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The Commission analysed whether or not the measure was proportionate to its 
objectives, applying the proportionality reasoning under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol for the first time to the wording of “to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.”382 The legitimate objective to justify retrospective 
legislation was not exactly the same as the previous analysis of discrimination, since 
the measure had a far-reaching aim to combat artificial tax avoidance. The 
Commission accepted the arguments of the British government on grounds of 
necessity for making the measure really effective with the objective of warning “the 
‘tax industry’ that future artificial schemes of this kind would be legislated against in 
the same way.”383  
 
This decision, in terms of predictability and length of retroactivity, appears to 
contrast with other jurisdictions such as in the US, and the European Court of 
Justice.
384
 However, taking into account the artificiality of the transactions, their 
abusiveness and the general message that should be passed on to taxpayers not to 
embark on any artificial transactions, this decision could be in line with the “sham” 
and “substance over form” doctrines. According to these principles, the tax effects of 
artificial transactions with no economic substance or valid commercial reasons are 
absolutely disregarded from the date they are carried out. The Commission gave 
more weight to the extreme artificiality of the transaction in question and its lack of 
any commercial validity than to that of formal protection against retrospective 
taxation; as if the tax had been due since the scheme had occurred.  On the other 
hand, another measure which is possibly more effective according to proportionality 
and equality principles for all types of artificial transactions might be a general tax 
avoidance rule.
385
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 At 204.  
 
383
 At 205. 
384
 See Chapters II.4 and IV.8.4. 
385
 On tax avoidance and proportionality, see Chapter IV, sections 6, 7.1 and 8.4.  
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Still with the objective of counteracting artificial tax avoidance, it is also worth 
noting the M.A. and Others
386
 case, particularly the underlying reasoning regarding 
the legitimacy of retrospective legislation and its impact on those concerned. The 
legislation at issue had the aim of establishing the equality of tax treatment between 
salaries and remuneration from stock options. The Court primarily analysed the 
legitimate aim of the retrospective aspect itself, rather than the objective of the 
substantive legislation, in relation to which the States would have a broader margin 
of appreciation in terms of tax policy. This was clear when the Court stated that the 
higher tax rates were not confiscatory since they were the normal rates, albeit high, 
of the Finnish tax system. Thus, the real issue was the alleged retrospective 
application of the new law and the Court made a dividing line in this case between 
acceptable retrospective taxation and possibly unacceptable taxation. The 
requirement of artificiality again must be present for retrospective taxation, since the 
Court distinguished the cases of those who brought forward the date of exercise of 
the options for tax reasons and those who did not. The Tax Bill proposed in 
Parliament would catch only those who had changed the date of exercise of the 
option between the initial legislative proposal and the date on which it came into 
force. Thus, those who would have not changed the date of exercise, maybe because 
their original stock option programme already provided for a date of exercise 
between the Bill proposal and the date of its enforcement (the “pure cases” as 
referred to by the Court), would fall outside the scope of the new law and would have 
the more favourable tax rates on their gains. Whereas the artificiality in A.B.C.D. v 
U.K. was part of the transaction as a whole, here in M.A. and Others only the 
amendment to a genuine transaction was regarded as artificial as being solely tax 
motivated. The following quotation summarises the main issue of this case:  
 
 “In this respect the Court considers that the applicants did not have an 
expectation protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the tax rate 
would, at the time when they would have been able to draw benefits 
from the stock option programme according to the original terms of 
the programme, i.e. between 1 December 1998 and 31 January 2000, 
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 (Application No. 27793/95). See Baker, Philip, (2005), supra note 320, pp.5-8. 
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be the same as it was in 1994 when the applicants subscribed the 
bonds. The Court does not exclude that the situation might have to be 
assessed differently, had the law applied (which it did not) even to 
cases in which the exercise of the stock options was possible before 1 
January 1995 according to the relevant terms and conditions of the 
stock option programmes in question. In such a situation, in which the 
applicants did not find themselves, taxation at a considerably higher 
tax rate than that in force on the date of the exercise of the stock 
options could arguably be regarded as an unreasonable interference 
with expectations protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
The retroactive application of the law in the applicants’ case would 
not appear to have such drastic consequences as in respect of the so-
called ‘pure cases’. Whether it is compatible with Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 depends, first, on the reasons for the retroactivity and, 
secondly, on the impact of the retroactive law on the position of the 
applicants.” 387  
 
In the above two cases taxpayers were not protected against retrospective taxation 
because they made artificial arrangements to avoid higher taxation. Thus, combating 
tax avoidance is a legitimate objective in the general interest to justify retrospective 
legislation where artificial schemes with this sole purpose are present. Furthermore, 
retrospective legislation may be proportionate and lawful according to the particular 
circumstances of each case.  
 
Combating tax evasion was also recognised as a legitimate aim in the general interest 
to justify interference with the right to property, although retrospective taxation was 
not at stake.
388
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 M.A. and Others (Applications No. 44814/98, 45401/99, 45732/99, 47463/99, 47724/99), at 
paragraph 1 of the judgment.  
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 See Hentrich v France case (Application No. 13616/88), on section 2.7.b, regarding fiscal 
penalties. 
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It is also interesting to contrast this aim of combating tax avoidance with tax evasion, 
since the latter seems to be more compelling to justify measures that may be more 
drastic. Retrospective legislation as a matter of principle is not necessary to 
counteract evasion, as there is no need of a new law but just the application of the 
previous law in force when the evasion occurred. Thus, any penalties provided by the 
law and submitted to the principle of proportionality would be enforced. In this 
sense, it is possible to differentiate avoidance from evasion by their legal 
consequences. Whereas evasion may trigger penalties, avoidance may do not so, 
according to the principle of proportionality. Moreover, the retrospective imposition 
of heavier fiscal penalties within the context of criminal law is expressly prohibited 
pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention.  
   
b) Contrast between tax and non-tax retrospective legislation and proportionality. 
 
One of the most egregious cases of non-tax retrospective legislation is Pressos 
Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium.
389
 In this case, Belgian legislation extinguished, 
with retrospective effect going back 30 years and without compensation, higher 
claims based on tort, under which the right to compensation came into existence as 
soon as the damage occurred.  The Court balanced the public interests at stake (huge 
financial burden, re-establishing legal certainty and application of limited liability as 
more in line with other jurisdictions) and the foreseeable right to compensation. This 
right was regarded as a legitimate expectation according to previous Belgian 
legislation and case law and was analysed under the right to property and the right to 
a fair trial. The Court then again reiterated its settled case law regarding all three 
rules of Article 1 of Protocol 1, particularly, “there must be a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by 
any measure depriving a person of his possessions.”390 Thus, under the test of 
proportionality the Court held: 
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 (Application No. 17849/91), in which the court by a majority of eight to one held that the 
retrospective Belgian legislation violated Article 1 of the First Protocol. 
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 Paragraph 38 of the judgment. 
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 “The financial considerations cited by the Government and their 
concern to bring Belgian law into line with the law of 
neighbouring countries could warrant prospective legislation in 
this area to derogate from the general law of tort. 
Such considerations could not justify legislating with 
retrospective  effect with the aim and consequence of depriving 
the applicants of their claims for compensation. 
Such a fundamental interference with the applicants' rights is 
inconsistent with preserving a fair balance between the interests at 
stake.”391 
 
The claim under tort law was regarded as an asset (in line with previous case law), 
from which the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had a “legitimate expectation”.392 
As the Court clearly granted more protection under Article 1 of the First Protocol, by 
safeguarding rights which arose prior to the enactment of retrospective legislation, it 
did not apply Article 6 (right to a fair trial), under which only pending cases would 
be protected. 
 
Financial considerations per se, like in other jurisdictions
393
, may not be regarded as 
a legitimate public interest to justify retroactive legislation. Even considerations of 
equitable treatment, ethical concerns, the need to legislate on a fundamental choice 
of society; fairness, and the proper organisation of the health service, such as liability 
for damages, may not justify retrospective legislation that substantially reduces the 
compensation of pending cases. All these justifications were rejected in the Draon v 
France
394
 case, in which the Court closely scrutinised a retrospective law according 
to the proportionality principle. The margin of appreciation may be very broad, but 
                                                 
391
 Paragraph 43 of the judgment. 
 
392
 Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the judgment. 
393
 See Chapter IV.3 on proportionality and the overriding requirements in the general interest, which 
do not encompass lack of revenue, particularly the ICI v Colmer case; and IV.8.5 on proportionality 
and retrospective restrictions of limitation periods to recover taxes overly paid. 
 
394
 (Application No. 1513/03), Grand Chamber, paragraph 85, for justification and application of 
proportionality. In this case the Court also held that it was unnecessary to consider the right to a fair 
trial as the right to property was sufficient to cover and remedy the damage in question.  
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the appropriateness of the chosen measures is closely or loosely scrutinised 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the gravity and 
economic consequences to those whose rights or expectations are affected.   
However, the Court seems to be more lenient regarding tax matters, if the Draon and 
Pressos Compania Naviera cases are contrasted with the Building Societies
395
 case, 
where a tax measure aimed at overturning a precedent was retrospectively applied to 
pending cases. The facts of this case are complex and quite unusual, which may be a 
good opportunity to test the reasoning and consistency of proportionality in its 
interaction with other legal principles and rules. The applicants alleged that a 
retrospective tax statute violated the right to property, the right to a fair trial and the 
non-discrimination Articles. The Act of the British Parliament in question tried to 
validate retrospectively previous tax regulations, which had been regarded as null 
and void by the House of Lords, the highest court of the United Kingdom.
396
 The 
main issue was the tax assessment of the Building Societies during a transitional 
period. These societies, such as Woolwich and the later applicants before the ECHR, 
stated that the Regulations had established a fiscal year longer than one year for the 
transitional period and the result was double taxation for a short period. The 
judgment of the House of Lords was in favour of Woolwich, but on the ultra vires 
basis of illegality of the regulations, without ascertaining whether double taxation 
had occurred. However, the ECHR in Building Societies dismissed the claim of other 
applicants based on the following reasons: there was no double taxation, therefore no 
wrongful expropriation;
397
 the retrospective Act intended to reassert the original 
intention of the Parliament.
398
 Regarding discrimination, the alleged comparable 
situation of a taxpayer that had vested rights to restitution as a result of various legal 
                                                 
395
 The National & Provincial Building Society, The Leeds Permanent Building Society and The 
Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom (Applications No. 21319/93, 21449/93 and 
21675/93), holding unanimously that there was no violation of the right to property, and by a majority 
of eight to one, that there was no violation of that same right taken in conjunction with the non-
discrimination principle  (Article 14). 
396
 Regina v. ex parte. Woolwich Equitable Building Society, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1400. See also Dawn 
Oliver, "Retrospective Validation of Regulations: Who's With the Building Societies?" [1992] B.T.R. 
301. 
397
 See paragraphs 55-61 of the judgment. 
 
398
 Idem, paragraphs 68-70 and 81-82. 
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proceedings (the Woolwich case that had been successful before the House of Lords) 
was not relevantly similar to the other Building Societies, since these latter applicants 
had not borne legal costs and risks of litigation.
399
 The fact that the decision of the 
highest domestic Court had not ascertained whether or not there had been double 
taxation could not jeopardize the right of other applicants to challenge this issue. 
However, the Court reinterpreted the House of Lords’ decision on the issue of double 
taxation.
400
 Perhaps the most compelling argument was the retrospective nature of 
the statute itself and the original intent of Parliament that blocked this dispute in 
domestic courts
401
 and eventually prevailed in the ECHR.  
The Court stated that in Building Societies there was a technical deficiency in the 
statute and that retrospective legislation was predictable, to distinguish it from 
Pressos Compania Naviera.
402
  It has been suggested that distinguishing Pressos 
Compania Naviera from Building Societies “requires the conclusion that in the 
former the expectation was ‘legitimate’ whereas in the latter it was not.”403 Actually, 
the former fell within the notion of a claim as an asset, which was protected since the 
retrospective legislation had no justification, while the latter fell within ‘the 
assumption of vested rights to restitution.’404 This was not upheld because 
retrospective legislation was justified on grounds of necessity and proportionality to 
                                                 
399
 Idem, paragraphs 87 and 89. 
 
400
 A better position might be to leave the scope of the previous decision for the highest domestic 
court itself, or if it were possible to refer that issue to the domestic court. 
401
 The applicants discontinued their action before the domestic courts due to the minimum chances of 
being successful, having no protection against retrospective law and the sovereignty of the Parliament. 
402
 As the Court stated in the Building Societies case, paragraph 109,  
“…. these two applicant societies must reasonably be considered to have anticipated at the close of the 
Woolwich 1 litigation that the Treasury would seek Parliament’s approval to cure the technical defects 
in the 1986 Regulations and would not be content on public-interest grounds to allow a substantial 
amount of already collected revenue to be lost on account of a technicality. 
…….It is also to be noted that the Leeds and the National & Provincial instituted their restitution 
proceedings after the authorities had formally decided to seek Parliament’s approval for the 
retrospective validation of the 1986 Regulations and in the days immediately before the official 
announcement of that decision (see paragraphs 30–33 above). In these circumstances, those 
proceedings must be considered to have been an attempt to benefit from the vulnerability of the 
authorities’ situation following the outcome of the Woolwich 1 litigation and to pre-empt the 
enactment of remedial legislation.” 
 
403
 Jacobs and White (2002), supra, p.357. 
 
404
 Paragraph 70 of the judgment. 
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amend technical deficiencies in previous regulations. This also avoided a huge loss 
of revenue. Thus, what really distinguished both cases from each other was the 
degree of scrutiny, apparently more lenient with respect to taxation, at least when 
technical changes are involved. 
 
The Court also differentiated Building Societies
405
 from Stran
406
 by stating that in the 
latter there was a settled right to compensation that was later impaired by a 
retrospective law. In Stran retrospective legislation was passed by the Parliament to 
address a pending judgment to favour the position of the Greek Government. 
Although the law was held constitutional by the national court on grounds of 
authentic interpretation, which had declarative and retroactive effects, the Court held 
that the right to a fair trial was impaired by the existence of the previous proceedings, 
specifically the arbitration decision that had already resolved the issue. On the other 
hand, the interference with the right to property via a retrospective law undermining 
the compensation settled by arbitration was considered unjustifiable on 
proportionality grounds. This was different from Building Societies as the claim in 
this latter case was still under way. 
Although in Building Societies the issue was the legitimacy of a retrospective 
measure to correct deficiencies of previous regulations, arguably of a substantive 
nature, the Court regarded it as a procedural tax measure and gave more weight to 
the margin of appreciation than to the test of proportionality.  
Finally, in Building Societies the issue of impairment to the right to a fair trial was 
also raised on grounds of proportionality, but unsuccessfully for the same reasons as 
the right to property.
407
 This seems to point out that on the one hand the 
proportionality test searches for fairness and consistency, where the set of 
circumstances are the same. On the other hand, proportionality reasoning should not 
                                                 
405
 See Building Societies, paragraphs 67, regarding the right to property, and paragraph 112, 
regarding the right to a fair trial.  
 
406
 (Application No. 13427/87); see also above section 2.3.a. 
407
 See paragraphs 105 et seq of the judgment. 
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fail to take into account different aspects of the same set of circumstances where 
different rights are considered as a basis for a specific complaint. 
c) Some conclusions on retrospective legislation and proportionality. 
 
All the cases on retrospective legislation were decided on grounds of proportionality 
and under Article 1 of the First Protocol (right to property). In some cases, Article 14 
(non-discrimination) was also considered, but again proportionality lay at the core 
protection of those rights in taxation matters as well. There is no scrutiny of the 
legality of retrospective measures other than according to the proportionality test. 
The general view of the Court is that any retrospective legislation must be legitimate 
in pursuing a public interest and also proportionate to that aim. Otherwise, it will 
breach the right to property or other fundamental right enshrined in the Convention.  
On the other hand, concerning taxation, the States have a wide margin of 
appreciation that in some cases can apparently undermine the notions of 
proportionality and reasonableness as part of the rule of law.
408
 This is illustrated by 
the contrast between the Building Societies case decided against the taxpayer and 
non-tax cases such as the Draon, Stran and Pressos Compania Naviera cases decided 
in favour of the applicants. 
Regarding tax avoidance, it follows from ABC and D and M.A. and Others, also 
discussed in this section, that the Court was consistent and reached in my opinion a 
fairer balance between legal certainty and the right to property, on the one hand, and 
equity on the other, by applying the concept of artificiality in the sense of a lack of 
business purpose other than tax avoidance. 
Another conclusion that may be drawn from the above case law of the Court, besides 
the construction of proportionality as an overarching principle, is that any tax 
imposition, collection, and enforcement may affect the right to property, being 
unlawful where disproportionately retrospective. Nevertheless, unlike some national 
jurisdictions previously examined, the European Court on Human Rights, at least 
with regard to retrospective taxation, has not yet developed a more consistent method 
                                                 
408
 Section 2.4. 
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of reasoning. The explanation for this may be the role of the Court as an international 
jurisdiction that tries to reach a minimum common level of protection taking into 
account other governing principles such as the margin of appreciation doctrine.  
 
Although the Court leaves room for development via evolving
409
 interpretation and 
proportionality in order to balance all the interests and common legal principles, its 
case law contrasts with other jurisdictions such as the European Court of Justice, 
which is analysed in the following Chapter.  
As in other fields of law, proportionality in tandem with reasonableness governs tax 
law as an overarching general principle of law. In the next section, other tax issues 
will be analysed to illustrate how far proportionality may go not only in clarifying 
every fundamental right, such as the freedom of movement, but also in eliciting other 
legal principles from the existing ones and give them greater clarity. 
 
III.2.7. The principle of lawfulness, fiscal penalties, excessive taxation, VAT 
rules, proportionality and the rights to property, to a court and to the freedom 
of movement. 
 
In a number of cases illustrated below the Commission and the Court inferred further 
common and minimum guarantees for taxpayers based on the proportionality 
principle as applied to the right to property. In its role of balancing and reconciling 
principles and rules with each other, as well as ascertaining the public interest, 
proportionality has given origin to other specific principles such as those of 
lawfulness, legal certainty, predictability, clarity and protection against excessive 
taxation and fiscal penalties. These are elaborated below. 
 
III.2.7. a) Lawfulness (clarity and predictability) in taxation and proportionality. 
 
                                                 
409
 On its characteristic of dynamic interpretation adapted to new socio and legal circumstances, see 
section 2.1 above.  
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First, in order to ascertain whether a fair balance is struck by an interference with the 
right to property in the light of proportionality, it is necessary to observe the principle 
of lawfulness, which in turn requires that the domestic law at stake be “sufficiently 
accessible, precise and foreseeable.”410 The degree of predictability is open ended 
according to the circumstances of each case and may be complied with even when 
those affected have to take appropriate legal advice to assess the consequences of 
their actions or transactions.
411
 As a result, in a complex legal world, particularly in 
tax matters, the obligation may be required from taxpayers to seek legal advice to 
exercise the right to legal certainty and predictability. This is illustrated in CBC-
Union SRO v Czech Republic,
412
 in which the taxpayer questioned the clarity and 
predictability of the law regarding both transfer tax and gift taxes applicable to the 
same transaction (by auction). The taxpayer had relied on a written commentary by 
the Ministry of Finance stating that the transfer tax was due on a transaction in which 
the acquirer paid a lower market value for the property, but the tax base was 
provided by special regulations, and not by the parties. Other fiscal authorities and 
some courts had a different understanding with regards to both sets of rules - the 
transfer and gift taxes - according to which the former was due on a lower price paid 
and the latter on the difference between this price and the one fixed by special 
regulations. Although apparently confusing and complicated,
413
 what seemed to be 
quite clear was the obligation to pay either the transfer tax or the gift tax on the 
difference between the price paid and the price under special regulations. No room 
was left for simultaneously paying both taxes over the same amount, or to pay 
nothing whatever over the difference between those prices.  
 
                                                 
410
  Beyeler v Italy (Application 33202/96), Grand Chamber, at paragraph 109, citing Hentrich v. 
France (Application No. 13616/88) and Lithgow and Others (Applications No. 9006/80, 9262/81, 
9263/81, 9265/81, 9266/81, 9313/81, 9405/81). See also criminal cases taking into account not only 
statute but also case law - S.W. and C.R. v. the United Kingdom (Applications No. 47/1994/494/576 
and 48/1994/495/577), and Cantoni v. France (Application No. 17862/91). 
411
Cantoni v. France, paragraph 35. 
 
412
 (Application No. 68741/01). 
 
413
 The law was amended for the following year leaving no space for doubt, making it clear that only 
the transfer tax was due based on the price provided by the special regulations. 
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From the above CBC-Union SRO case one may conclude that according to the rule of 
law and the principle of proportionality, which weighs up other principles such as 
legality, ability to pay, economic substance and legal form, tax simplification and 
fiscal supervision, the difference of price to be taxed by the gift tax and not by the 
transfer tax must not be fictional, divorced from commercial reality, and must be 
rebuttable.  
In Spacek v Czech Republic
414
 the Court also based its decision on grounds of 
proportionality and the requirement of predictability in taxation under the right to 
property. Some specific administrative accounting rules relevant to corporate 
taxation edited by the Ministry of Finance had not been published in the Official 
Gazette, but only in the Financial Bulletin of that Ministry. In principle, this was 
contrary to the legality principle, legal certainty and predictability on which the 
Commission gave a preliminary decision.
415
 First, the Court reiterated that the term 
“law” is understood in its substantive and not in its formal meaning, but how to make 
it publicly known was primarily a matter for the Contracting States, subject to a 
review by the Court “determining whether the methods applied by the Contracting 
State are in conformity with the Convention.”416 The Court reaffirmed the 
importance of the margin of appreciation of States, but nonetheless submitted it to 
judicial review of the Court by scrutinizing the legitimate aim of the questioned 
measures and their proportionality. However, in the special circumstances, given the 
availability of access to those rules and their legal basis, which did not require its 
official publication, the Court relaxed those requirements of legal certainty and 
predictability. The Court took into account that both the applicant and its acquired 
company were aware of the accounting regulations, since they applied them in the 
previous year. Finally, as an overall assessment not only of all relevant facts but also 
legal rules and principles as required by proportionality reasoning, the Court stated, 
“the applicant company as a legal entity, contrary to an individual taxpayer, could 
                                                 
414
 (Application No. 26449/95), Third Section. 
 
415
 Decision of 14 October 1996 on the same application (No. 26449/95). 
 
416
 Paragraph 57 of the judgment. Huvig v France (Application No. 11105/84) concerned telephone 
tapping relating to tax evasion, in which the Court held that it was contrary to Article 8 of the 
Convention given the absence of clear statutory provision. 
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and should have consulted the competent specialists, the publication of the 
Regulations in the Financial Bulletin was sufficient.”417 The Court then held that 
there was no violation of the above principles and the right to property.  
The issue of fiscal penalties was not raised separately in Spacek v Czech Republic, 
but could have been taken into consideration on proportionality grounds in line with 
the incipient case law of the Court on this subject as analysed in the next section.  
In Volokhy v Ukraine,
418
 the Court again applied proportionality in requiring clarity 
and precision according to the principle of lawfulness for an interference with the 
right to privacy. The issue in this case was the interception of correspondence, which 
was provided by statutory law and authorized by judicial decision, to avoid tax 
evasion. The legal framework provided legal clarity even on proportionality grounds, 
but failed in practice: 
“The Court notes in this connection that the requirements of 
proportionality of the interference, and of its exceptional and 
temporary nature were stipulated in Article 31 of the Constitution and 
Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine “on Search and Seizure Activities” of 
18 February 1992 (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above). However, neither 
Article 187 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its wording at the 
time of the events, nor any other provision of Ukrainian law contained 
a mechanism which would ensure that the above principles were 
respected in practice. The provision in question (see paragraph 26 
above) contains no indication as to the persons concerned by such 
measures, the circumstances in which they may be ordered, the time-
limits to be fixed and respected. It cannot therefore be considered to 
be sufficiently clear and detailed to afford appropriate protection 
against undue interference by the authorities with the applicants’ right 
to respect for their private life and correspondence.”419 
                                                 
417
 Paragraph 59 of the judgment. 
 
418
 (Application No. 23543/02).  
 
419
 Paragraph 51 of the judgment. 
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The requirement of proportionality in practice is another essential characteristic of 
the legal overarching principle of proportionality, which the Court has pointed out in 
other cases as well.
420
 If the principle serves the purpose of giving life and meaning 
to fundamental rights, balancing and reconciling the apparently conflicting interests, 
in search of effectiveness and fairness, the principle itself must therefore in turn be 
effective and perform its objectives in practice. 
III.2.7.b) Fiscal penalties and forfeiture under the right to property and their 
interaction with other fundamental rights (such as the freedom of movement) and 
proportionality. 
This subject will illustrate further, how proportionality reasoning is pervasive within 
the Convention in tax matters. As discussed in the section on retrospective taxation, 
both the right to property and to a court may be breached depending on the degree of 
intrusiveness of tax measures. Here again the right to a court under Article 6 and the 
right to property will be discussed having regard to the limits of taxation, with 
particular focus on fiscal sanctions. 
In Gasus,
421
 the Court considered as legitimate according to proportionality and the 
right to property the enforcement of tax measures against the property of third 
parties, if the assets are in the possession of the tax debtor as a lessee. In this case, 
the Court held that procedural tax measures such as those for collection and 
enforcement would fall within Article 1 of the First Protocol, third sentence. As a 
result, they were expressly covered by the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality, but in a more lenient way. Gasus, a company based in Germany, 
which had retained its property title over equipment sold to a Dutch tax debtor, had 
its property seized by the Dutch tax authorities to enforce tax collection. The Court, 
adopting a broad view of the margin of appreciation and mentioning similar 
legislation in other countries, held by a majority of six to three on grounds of 
                                                                                                                                          
 
420
 See also on the requirement of proportionality in practice, in the Riener v Bulgaria case, strongly 
assessed on proportionality grounds, section 2.7.b below, and under Art 13 (effective remedy) 
Krasuski, among others in section 2.3.c.2 above. 
 
421
 Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands (Application No. 15375/89). See also 
the discussion on this case regarding the distinction between procedural and substantive tax rules in 
section 2.3.b above. 
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proportionality that there was no violation of the right to property of the German 
owner.
422
 The majority argued that the vendor should be aware of Dutch legislation, 
evaluate the financial situation of the debtor and adopt alternative measures such as a 
requirement of full payment in advance or an insurance to prevent the risk of the 
seizure of his property. The minority view argued that the proportionality test was 
the dividing line between what tax authorities can do to enforce tax collection and in 
this case the seizure of property of a third party (the vendor), which was not 
indispensable to prevent fraud or abuse, there having been no evidence of bad faith 
of the parties.
423
 Furthermore, the amount of tax collected by seizure of third parties’ 
property was negligible compared with the total amount of tax collected.
424
 From 
this, the margin of discretion seems to be wide and proportionality narrow.  
In contrast, the Court appeared to be stricter regarding the right to a court and 
restrictive measures that affect taxpayers. This occurred in Janosevic v Sweden
425
 
where the Court accepted that tax enforcement measures taken before a final decision 
over whether a tax and its surcharges are really due may infringe the right to a court. 
Having taken into account the justification for those early enforcement measures, the 
Court made the following statement, pointing out the necessary fair balance that 
there must be between the interests at play:  
“… the States are required to confine such enforcement within 
reasonable limits that strike a fair balance between the interests 
involved. This is especially important in cases like the present one in 
which enforcement measures were taken on the basis of decisions by 
                                                 
422
 The Court stated at paragraph 60 of the judgment: “In passing such laws the legislature must be 
allowed a wide margin of appreciation, especially with regard to the question whether - and if so, to 
what extent - the tax authorities should be put in a better position to enforce tax debts than ordinary 
creditors are in to enforce commercial debts. The Court will respect the legislature’s assessment in 
such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation.” 
 
423
 Regarding the good faith of the parties involved, see Lemoine v France, discussed below within the 
context of VAT, in section 2.7.d where the ECHR took a different approach, as well as the ECJ 
(Chapter IV, section 7.3). 
 
424
 Gasus might have been successful before the ECJ regarding the proportionality issue, taking into 
account the fundamental free movement of goods, as the Dutch legislation could be regarded as a 
restrictive and disproportionate measure that hindered intra-Community trade. 
 
425
 (Application No. 34619/97). 
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an administrative authority, that is, before there had been a court 
determination of the liability to pay the surcharges in question.”426 
Also in Vastberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v Sweden
427
 the Court applied the 
proportionality principle to tax surcharges under the right of access to a court, the 
reasonable length of the proceedings and the right to the presumption of innocence. 
This case dealt with the enforcement of fiscal penalties earlier than a judicial 
determination because of incorrect information given to the tax authorities with 
respect to tax assessments. Domestic law provided for the application of the 
proportionality principle to such penalties on grounds of their reasonableness, but the 
applicants failed to demonstrate the circumstances in which the penalties could be 
reduced or cancelled. They also alleged the excessive length of the proceedings, the 
impairment of the right of access to a court and the right to presumption of 
innocence.  Particularly regarding the right to presumption of innocence enshrined in 
Article 6 (2) of the Convention, the Court accepted presumptions of law and of fact 
provided by domestic legislation but submitted them expressly to the test of 
proportionality:  
 
“Thus, in employing presumptions in criminal law, the Contracting 
States are required to strike a balance between the importance of what 
is at stake and the rights of the defence; in other words, the means 
employed have to be reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim 
sought to be achieved.”428 
 
Like the presumption of innocence, presumptive taxation based on a minimum wage 
may be subjected to the test of proportionality. In the Fratrak and Balak cases
429
 a 
presumptive and irrebuttable minimum tax base was justified. In Vastberga, only 
rebuttable presumptions were acceptable. The different approach between tax base 
                                                 
426
 Paragraph 106 of the judgment. 
 
427
 (Application No. 36985/97). 
 
428
 Paragraph 116 of the judgment. 
 
429
 See the following section. 
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and the imposition of penalties may be justified by public policy reasons and 
generally accepted canons according to which fair taxation is neither a sanction nor 
in principle a restriction on fundamental rights. The same can be said of retrospective 
taxation, in which proportionality coupled with reasonableness plays an essential role 
in justifying retrospective tax measures.
430
 
 
In the Vastberga and Janosevic cases the right to property was not raised, as the issue 
was primarily the early enforcement of penalties under the right to a fair trial and not 
itself the excessiveness of penalties.
431
  In contrast, in Lemoine v France
432
 the 
Commission faced a different issue of excessiveness of a tax guarantee under the 
right to property, its early enforcement under Article 6 not having been at stake. On 
grounds of proportionality in Lemoine, the Commission held it to be disproportionate 
to secure tax debts of a lower amount against a higher value property. This measure 
went blatantly beyond what was necessary to secure the payment of the debt tax, In 
Hentrich, the power given to the fiscal authorities to buy property at its under-value 
declared by the owner to evade higher taxes on its transfer of ownership was 
considered as an expropriation “de facto.” As such, the Court closely scrutinised it 
under the test of proportionality, stating that other less restrictive measures were 
available to tackle tax evasion in situations of selling property below the market 
price.
433
 Four dissenting opinions considered that there was no violation of the right 
to property, applying also the proportionality test, but giving more weight to the 
margin of appreciation of the State. 
 
                                                 
430
 See the previous section 2.6. 
  
431
 The fines were not challenged on their excessiveness probably because of their objective amount as 
they were equivalent to 20% or 40% of the unpaid tax. 
 
432
 (Application No. 26242/95). 
433
 “.... for instance, take legal proceedings to recover unpaid tax and, if necessary, impose tax fines. 
Systematic use of these procedures, combined with the threat of criminal proceedings, should be an 
adequate weapon” (paragraph 47 of the judgment). The Court went further stating that “the question 
of proportionality must also be looked at from the point of view of the risk run by any purchaser that 
he will be subject to pre-emption and therefore penalised by the loss of his property solely in the 
interests of deterring possible underestimations of price … Merely reimbursing the price paid - 
increased by 10% - and the costs and fair expenses of the contract cannot suffice to compensate for the 
loss of a property acquired without any fraudulent intent” (paragraph 48 of the judgment).  
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Where the Commission deals with clearly more serious offences, such as smuggling, 
it tends to apply a weak form of proportionality giving more weight to the margin of 
appreciation of States. In X v Austria
434
 the Commission held proportionate the 
severe custom and duties penalties and the confiscation of smuggled goods. By 
contrast, the European Court of Justice in the Louloudakis
435
 case went further in 
squashing harsh fiscal penalties. The main issue in X was the mandatory forfeiture of 
the goods, according to which there was no room for judicial discretion, and the 
cumulative penalties over the unpaid custom duties. The aim of the legislation, which 
was considered legitimate by the Commission, was the prevention of crime. The 
Commission also applied the principle of proportionality, taking into account the 
existing conditions and rules within other States at that time and the fact that 
Austrian legislation took into consideration the financial condition of those 
concerned regarding the fiscal penalties. This demonstrates that even where 
proportionality is apparently applied in its weak form there may be some special 
circumstances to justify or to minimise its lenient application; otherwise, the lack of 
justification could seriously undermine the rule of law and the role of judicial review 
regarding the effectiveness of fundamental rights.  
Fiscal sanctions may also interfere with rights other than the right to property and to 
a fair trial. In Riener v Bulgaria,
436
 the Court held that a fiscal sanction that restricts 
the right to freedom of movement might not be compatible with this fundamental 
right according to the proportionality principle. In this case, a travel ban and a 
confiscation of passport were imposed as temporary sanctions until tax debts were 
paid. Under Article 2(3) of the Fourth Protocol, restrictions on the exercise of the 
right to movement may be lawful if they are “in accordance with law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
for the maintenance of ordre public (public policy), for the prevention of crime, for 
                                                 
434
 (Application No. 7287/75). The Commission gave weight to the Handyside reasoning regarding 
proportionality and the right of States to prohibit the circulation of goods (educational books) on 
moral grounds. 
435
 Case C-262/99 [2001] ECR I-5547. See in Chapter IV.2.1 the Louloudakis case, which is similar to 
Lindsay v C & Comrs [2002] STC 588 ruling regarding the forfeiture of the smuggler’s vehicle on 
grounds of the proportionality principle. 
436
 (Application No. 46343/99). 
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the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” The Court first held that the travel ban had the legitimate aim to secure 
payment of taxes, “maintaining of ordre public” and protection of the rights of others 
as it is the law in several States of the Council of Europe.
437
 The Court then fully 
assessed the proportionality of this restriction taking into account the relevant facts 
of the case, such as that Mrs Riener’s family was living abroad.438 The legal 
background was also scrutinised including the automatic length for which the travel 
ban was imposed with no provision for further reassessments, citing among other 
authorities the UN Human Rights Committee decision in the case of 
Miguel González del Río v. Peru.
439
 The Court made clear the necessary relationship 
between the legitimate ends and means, as well as less restrictive alternative 
measures, as follows:  
“It follows from the principle of proportionality that a restriction on 
the right to leave one’s country on grounds of unpaid debt can only be 
justified as long as it serves its aim – recovering the debt (see 
Napijalo v. Croatia, no. 66485/01, 13 November 2003, §§ 78-82). 
That means that such a restriction cannot amount to a de facto 
punishment for inability to pay. 
In the Court’s view, the authorities are not entitled to maintain over 
lengthy periods restrictions on the individual’s freedom of movement 
without periodic reassessment of their justification in the light of 
factors such as whether or not the fiscal authorities had made 
reasonable efforts to collect the debt through other means and the 
likelihood that the debtor’s leaving the country might undermine the 
chances to collect the money.”440 
                                                 
437
 Paragraphs 114-17 of the judgment. 
 
438
 Paragraph 126 of the judgment. 
 
439
 Paragraph 121 of the judgment. 
 
440
 Paragraphs 122-4 of the judgment.  
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This case is significant for its full assessment on proportionality grounds and its 
relationship with the margin of appreciation doctrine. The manifest public interest in 
recovering unpaid taxes coupled with the margin of appreciation of States “to frame 
and organise their fiscal policies and make arrangements to ensure that taxes are 
paid”441 did not hinder the analysis of less restrictive available measures. Contrasting 
this case with those dealing with the right to property it may be suggested that the 
latter is more vulnerable to secure the payment of taxes than other fundamental 
rights, such as the rights to a fair trial and the freedom of movement. 
Finally, the Court reiterated one of the main characteristics of the proportionality 
principle, according to which it must operate in practice and in law:  
“The Court considers that the ‘automatic’ nature of the travel ban ran 
contrary to the authorities’ duty under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to 
take appropriate care that any interference with the right to leave 
one’s country should be justified and proportionate throughout its 
duration, in the individual circumstances of the case. It notes in this 
context that in the domestic law of a number of member states 
prohibitions against leaving the country for unpaid taxes can only be 
imposed if there are concrete reasons to believe that the person 
concerned would evade payment if allowed to travel abroad. Also, in 
a number of countries there are limitations on the duration of the 
restrictions (see paragraphs 73, 77-80 above). Regardless of the 
approach chosen, the principle of proportionality must apply, in law 
and in practice.”442 
In other words, one may conclude that proportionality is applied to the analysis of all 
relevant facts and within the context of all applicable rules and principles in search of 
fairness in each case. 
 
                                                 
441
 Paragraph 119 of the judgment.  
 
442
 Paragraph 128 of the judgment. See also on the requirement for proportionality in practice, 
Volokhy (Application No. 23543/02) regarding the right to privacy in section 2.7.a above, and 
Krasuski (Application No. 61444/00) regarding effective remedies under Art 13, in section 2.3.c.2 
below. 
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In contrast with fiscal sanctions, the Commission and the Court seem to be more 
cautious regarding excessive taxation, but have stated some noteworthy guidelines 
based on the proportionality principle coupled with reasonableness, as discussed in 
the following section.  
 
III.2.7.c) Excessive taxation, ability to pay (‘financial position’) and proportionality. 
 
In Wasa Ömsesidigt, Försäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse, a group of 
approximately 15,000 individuals v Sweden
443
 the Commission held that a one-off 
tax to cover national debt and fund public pensions, to be collected from a specific 
category of taxpayers, was neither discriminatory nor against the right to property. 
First, the Commission reiterated
444
 the following statement:  
“Under this supervision the Commission finds that, though it is certain 
that no general prohibition of taxes payable exclusively out of the tax-
payer's capital can be derived from Article 1 (P1-1), a financial 
liability arising out of the raising of taxes or contributions may 
adversely affect the guarantee secured under this provision if it places 
an excessive burden on the person or entity concerned or 
fundamentally interferes with his or its financial position.”445  
 
Thus, excessive taxation may violate the right to property, although the margin of 
appreciation of the States is broad, taking into account financial, social and economic 
conditions of each jurisdiction. The Commission then scrutinised the legitimate 
social objective of continuing with low inflation “combined with the necessity of a 
further limitation of the national budget deficit.”446 Under the test of proportionality 
and analysing whether or not disproportionate taxation occurred, the Commission 
concluded that the one-off tax of 7% on the capital over a threshold of assets 
exceeding 10 million Swedish crowns from life insurance companies was justified, 
                                                 
443
 (Application No. 13013/87).  
 
444
 Svenska Managementgruup AB v Sweden (Application No. 11036/84). 
 
445
 Under heading “The Law”, 1, paragraph 19, of the decision. 
 
446
 Ibidem, at paragraph 21. 
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taking into account the favourable tax regime to which they were subject and which 
was still in force. 
         
In two interesting cases
447
 the Fourth Section of the Court held unanimously that the 
minimum wage might be taxed based on an apparently weak test of proportionality. 
Seemingly worse, the Court stated that a self-employed person may be taxed on the 
minimum wage even if he or she earned less than the smallest amount as occurred in 
Fratrik, with no substantive consideration for the ability to pay and equality 
principles. Particularly, no regard was given to less restrictive measures as the Court 
did in other cases or to the fact that the legitimate policy of extending the pension 
system could be reached without interfering with the financial situation of the 
taxpayer. Furthermore, even if the self-employed person did not work every month, 
as occurred in Balaz, he or she had nonetheless to pay the social contribution on the 
minimum amount, as the tax base was an average of what he or she had earned in the 
previous year (which would have indirectly taken into account the working period). 
However, there was still no consideration of the real earnings, particularly when the 
self-employed person earned less than the minimum wage. The concern of domestic 
legislation seemed to be fiscal evasion, simplification and efficiency (e.g. not to 
spend time supervising very small businesses) or in terms of policy to secure a 
pension for all, and not to favour financially unviable economic activities as a 
reasonable limit to entrepreneurship. Although in both cases the Court reiterated the 
statement of the Commission
448
 that an “excessive burden” on taxpayers (individuals 
and legal entities) or a fundamental interference with their “financial position” may 
violate the right to property, the Court apparently again gave more weight to the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, by loosely scrutinising the domestic measures via 
the proportionality test.
449
 
 
                                                 
447
 Balaz v Slovakia (Application No. 60243/00) Fourth Section, decision on admissibility; and Fratrik 
v Slovakia (Application No. 51224/99) decision on admissibility. 
 
448
 See Wasa and Svenska. 
 
449
 See Balaz, paragraph 9 and also Fratrik, paragraph 16. 
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Both the decisions of the Court in Balaz and Fratrik contrast with the German 
Constitutional Court
450
 on proportionality and on the balance between the legitimate 
aim of the legislation and its means. Whereas the German Court decided that the 
minimum wage must be exempted from taxation, according to the aim of providing a 
minimum mean of subsistence and avoiding disproportionate taxation, the ECHR 
merely pointed out that the minimum tax base of the social contribution was not 
lower than the minimum wage, which could be taxed regardless of the actual income 
of the self-employed. Furthermore, the Court agreed with the Government argument, 
stating that the self-employed person could avoid this by ceasing work and receiving 
unemployment benefits. 
 
Social and economic objectives differ, and the margin of discretion of States seems 
to be broad. Although it is unfair to charge the self-employed who earn equal to or 
less than the minimum wage proportionally more, there might be more economic 
efficiency to favouring only the economically viable citizens and discouraging risky 
entrepreneurship.  Again, social and economic objectives within the broad margin of 
appreciation took precedence over “marginal” situations of “unfairness” in the light 
of the minimum common standards of protection.   
 
III.2.7.d) VAT and the rights to deduction and refund in the light of proportionality 
and reasonableness 
The Court analysed the right to a VAT refund and deduction in two cases under the 
protection of the right of property, which was balanced with the public interest of 
avoiding abuse of the VAT system.  
In Intersplav
451
 the Court considered unjustifiable and disproportionate the 
systematic delays in obtaining a VAT refund, even after domestic court decisions 
                                                 
450
 Decision BVerfG 87, 153 of 25 September 1992 on the tax-free subsistence minimum, Dr. 
Gotthard Wöhrmann, “The federal constitutional court: an introduction”, in Law on the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Inter Nationes, 1996), ed. by Sigrid Born, translated by Martin Fry. See also 
Ault (Ed), Rädler, Albert, “General Description: Germany”, in Comparative Income Taxation 
(Kluwer, 1997), p.57. The basic exemption for personal income tax may not be lower that the 
minimum amount necessary for existence, which equals to the amount that is paid to the more 
vulnerable persons by the state welfare authorities.  
 
451
 Intersplav v Ukraine (Application No. 803/02). 
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recognised the applicant’s right. A general situation of abuse in cases of refund was 
not accepted as justification for the delays, “in the absence of any indication of the 
applicant’s direct involvement in such abusive practices.”452 At stake was the “fair 
balance” between the demands of the public interest, particularly where there is a 
general situation of abuse, and the protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions. Again, the relevant circumstances of the case were taken into account 
on proportionality grounds, to limit the margin of discretion of States, which in 
principle is wide in implementing social and economic policies.  
 
In Bulves
453
 the issue was the right to deduct the VAT on inputs where the supplier 
delayed its compliance obligations on its outputs, which included the goods provided 
to the Applicant. The Court reiterated its case law on the public interest in preventing 
any fraudulent abuse of the tax system, and stated, “it may be reasonable for 
domestic legislation to require special diligence by VAT-registered persons in order 
to prevent such abuse.”454 The key fact that was taken into account was that by the 
time the right to deduction was denied to Bulves, its supplier had already complied 
with its VAT reporting obligations. This situation was peculiar, because it makes no 
sense and it is contradictory to any VAT system to deny the VAT input where the 
supplier has already paid over the VAT on its output. However, the Court made a 
more general statement on grounds of reasonableness and proportionality, which may 
cover other more usual situations of good faith of the taxpayer when claiming the 
right to deduct the VAT inputs: 
 
“Lastly, as regards efforts to curb fraudulent abuse of the VAT system 
of taxation, the Court accepts that when Contracting States possess 
information of such abuse by a specific individual or entity, they may 
take appropriate measures to prevent, stop or punish it. However, it 
considers that if the national authorities, in the absence of any 
indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in 
                                                 
452
 Paragraph 38 of the judgment. See the same rationale in VAT cases decided by the ECJ in Chapter 
IV, section 7.3. 
 
453
 Bulves AD v Bulgaria (Application No. 3991/03). 
 
454
 Paragraph 65 of the judgment. 
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fraudulent abuse of a VAT chain of supply, or knowledge thereof, 
nevertheless penalise the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable 
supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it has no 
control and in relation to which it has no means of monitoring or 
securing compliance, they are going beyond what is reasonable and 
are upsetting the fair balance that must be maintained between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the right of property.”455 
  
The Court largely accepts the justification of combating tax abuse, evasion and 
avoidance for any restriction on fundamental rights, but submit them to the test of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness.
456
 Whether this pervasive test is either 
strict or loose depends on the factual and legal circumstances of each case. 
Generally, where the taxpayer is in good faith and not taking unfair advantage of the 
tax system, the proportionality test is strict. 
 
III.2.8. Conclusion  
 
As the above sections demonstrate, the principle of proportionality is not only a key 
and pervasive principle of interpretation and adjudication of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, but may also be regarded as ‘part and parcel of the 
rule of law.’ It is applied as an overarching principle of interpretation and application 
to all other legal principles and rules at play, taking into account all the relevant 
circumstances of each individual case. It is a lively, flexible and essential aid to 
judicial review and to control the margin of appreciation of States regarding fiscal, 
social and economic measures that may interfere with fundamental rights. As 
demonstrated in some cases, the principle of proportionality may be undermined by a 
lack of justification or where a utilitarian view prevails over the liberal notion of 
individual rights, allowing “marginal” injustices in favour of certain public policies. 
This, however, does not detract from its importance and its desirable evolution as a 
neutral principle in search of fairness in all cases.  
                                                 
455
 Paragraph 70 of the judgment.  
 
456
 See sections 2.6.a on tax avoidance and retrospective taxation, and 2.7.b on fiscal penalties. 
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It is also an optimizing principle
457
 in its role of balancing and conciliating between 
other apparently competing or conflicting principles and rights to render them as 
effective
458
 and compatible as possible. It lies at the heart of the concept of 
discrimination coupled with the notion of reasonableness as twin concepts, being 
applied not only to both implied and expressly limited rights, but also to absolute 
rights and positive and negative obligations of States within the Convention. It 
operates within the ambit of the facts, taking into account and fully assessing all 
relevant circumstances, as well as all other legal rules and principles; in other words 
therefore, it must work in practice and in law. One may fairly suggest that where 
there is no proportionality reasoning neither is there the substantive rule of law and 
justice with respect to the minimum common standards of human rights. 
 
Taxation is clearly within the scope of the general law of the Convention, although it 
appears to me that the States have a broad margin of discretion in tax matters wider 
under the right to property than under the right to non-discrimination. The broader 
the margin of appreciation, the less strict the proportionality principle. The looser the 
proportionality test, the less the search for fairness in individual cases. There is a lack 
of transparency and justification in some cases, whereas in others a lack of 
consistency and predictability. In these cases there was just a rhetorical or really 
flawed application of proportionality coupled with reasonableness, because the 
principles and interests at stake were not properly and objectively balanced. 
 
Excessive taxation may infringe the right to property based on the proportionality 
principle. The principle of ability to pay (“the financial condition”) has been taken 
into account by the Court, but when applied to specific cases resulted in less 
individual fairness whilst more weight was given to policy considerations, as in the 
minimum wage taxation cases. With respect to the utilitarian or consequentialist 
                                                 
457
 Beatty (2004), supra, p.163. See also Schwarze (1992), supra, p.679. 
458
 Steven Greer referred to the principle of proportionality as the alter ego of the principle of effective 
protection (2000), supra, p.20. See also the notion of effective remedy and proportionality under 
Article 13 in section 2.3.c.2 above. 
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view of the Court, some cases clearly demonstrate the prevalence of economic and 
utilitarian policies over ‘marginal’ cases of unfairness and injustice.459 
 
The taxes that may be more easily caught by a specific prohibition of excessive 
taxation would be those on capital. However, indirect taxes (such as VAT and other 
similar taxes on consumption) may also be excessive, as the US Supreme Court has 
discussed in some cases. On the other hand, taxes on gains could also be regarded as 
excessive if other principles ought to be taken into account, such as the ability to pay, 
economic freedom to set up new or evolving business or charitable activities, access 
to markets on a level playing field of competition, reasonable savings for capital 
protection or future expenses and economic adversities. On the other hand, due 
regard should be given to financial and social conditions that may change and affect 
those in need of minimum financial support to survive, prosper and develop their 
own abilities. 
 
The proportionality principle may work as a neutral instrument to enforce economic, 
social and fiscal policies. First, the purpose (ends) of legal rules must be identified 
objectively; and secondly, the relationship between ends and means is assessed by 
proportionality with no intrusion into their ends, unless they are not legitimate. Thus, 
the overall assessment must not be subjective, because of the objective purpose of 
the rule to be ascertained and the objective assessment of their means under the 
necessity test that is part of proportionality. Neutrality
460
 is a relevant feature of the 
proportionality principle, besides its role in weighing and reconciling between 
apparently conflicting rules and principles. It has been suggested that proportionality, 
unlike the doctrine of margin of appreciation, “is generally regarded as a neutral or 
even a good tool.”461 On the other hand, the ultimate objective of fairness, which was 
the origin of the notions of equity, justice, equality, reasonableness and 
proportionality itself, should not be undermined by neutrality. Thus, neutrality cannot 
                                                 
459
 See cases particularly on discrimination on grounds of family relationship and minimum wage 
taxation, in sections 2.5.a and 2.7.c above. 
 
460
 Generally, “neutral principles must be drawn from the constitutions and formulated in a way that 
allows them to be applied consistently”, Beatty (2004), p.161. On proportionality and neutrality, see 
Beatty, idem, pp.161-4.   
 
461
 Dembour, (2006), supra, p.90. 
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be an isolated or most important characteristic of proportionality, but must be seen 
within the general purpose of fairness.
462
 Some derogations from or exceptions to 
general policies or rules required by the test of proportionality do not necessarily 
conflict with those policies, but function as an tool to make them as fair as possible. 
A clear illustration of this may be the two following cases, one positive and other 
negative. The positive is the Van Raalte case in which the Court extended a 
legitimate tax exemption for unmarried and childless women of 45 or over to men in 
the same situation.
463
 By extending that exemption the Court did not go against the 
legitimate objective of the exemption (to avoid unfair emotional burden), but instead 
enforce it in other similar situations. The negative example is the Lindsay case in 
which the Court failed to extend the individual separate taxation of unmarried 
couples living together to the similar situation of married couples that were subject to 
the more burdensome joint taxation.
464
 The Court also failed to take into account 
other Constitutional Courts´ decisions that were in favour of married couples and 
allowed what it itself referred to as marginal cases of injustice or unfairness. 
 
However, from the evolving case law of the Court, it follows that proportionality has 
turned out to be a flexible and essential instrument to control any interference with 
fundamental rights regarding taxation, though its test is loosened or tightened 
depending on the justification and the legal and factual circumstances of each case. 
Furthermore, as an overarching principle, proportionality is the origin of other legal 
principles that may equally be regarded as part of the rule of law. For instance, in the 
PM case, the Court stick to the facts and closely scrutinised the tax discrimination 
between unmarried and married separated fathers, holding it unjustifiable, whereas 
failed to reverse the discrimination that was allowed in Lindsay between married and 
unmarried couples.
465
 In another set of cases, the Court consistently and fairly 
assessed retrospective taxation to combat tax avoidance (A, B, C, and D; and MA and 
Others cases
466
), though decided against the taxpayers, whereas in my opinion it 
                                                 
462
 On fairness, see Chapter I, section 3, and the Conclusion, section 2.3. 
463
 See section 2.5.b. 
464
 See section 2.5.a. 
465
 See section 2.5.a. 
466
 See section 2.6.a. 
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applied a loosen test in the Building Societies
467
 case to justify retrospective taxation 
to address very arguable technical mistakes of the previous legislation. 
 
The following principles may be regarded as a corollary to other principles via 
application of the proportionality principle under the Convention. First, the principle 
of non-discrimination which cannot be assessed without the notion of reasonableness 
coupled with proportionality. Secondly, the principle of lawfulness that requires 
clarity and predictability and the obligation to provide legal advice in some cases. 
Thirdly, non-retrospective legislation, which may be justified by general interests 
such as combating artificial tax avoidance. Fourthly, prohibition of excessive 
taxation and the ability to pay (“financial condition”) of individuals and legal 
entities. Fifthly, the principle of good faith that must be taken into consideration in 
cases of graver restrictions on the right to property (e.g. procedural measures to 
secure the payment of taxes) and combating artificial tax avoidance or abuse. 
 
The next section will also illustrate the role of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness as an essential principle of interpretation and application of the core 
rule of non-discrimination regarding international trade and its interaction with tax 
and non-tax rules and principles. 
                                                 
467
 See section 2.6.b. 
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III.3. The WTO – The Interaction between the Rules and Principles of 
International Free Trade, Taxation and the Role of the Proportionality 
Principle.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
III.3.1. The core principle of non-discrimination within the WTO. 
 
This section will analyse the role of proportionality coupled with reasonableness in 
assessing the relationship between ends and means, and balancing different interests, 
with particular regard to the objectives of international trade agreements. As with any 
other regulatory laws, tax policies and measures may affect trade. The section will 
also examine whether and to what extent the WTO agreements adopt a cost-benefit 
or proportionality analysis in a way that applies the tests of balance, necessity, and a 
‘less restrictive alternative’ to determine the validity of regulatory and tax measures. 
The approach will then be compared with other jurisdictions in which the 
proportionality reasoning has been applied as an overarching principle of law, such 
as in the adjudication of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
There is no written principle of proportionality within the WTO agreements, but 
there are some core rules regarding protectionism and discrimination; taken together 
with the balance of interests of different countries, these rules may be further 
assessed on proportionality and reasonableness grounds. Moreover, as the main 
objectives of the Marrakech Agreement
468
 appear to be in conflict, they should be 
balanced against each other within the WTO framework using proportionality 
reasoning.
469
 The preamble states that the legal role of the WTO is to give ‘colour, 
texture and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO 
Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 1994, in particular.’470 Indeed, 
                                                 
468
 According to the first two paragraphs of the WTO Preamble, objectives include: raising standards 
of living; ensuring full employment; ensuring growth of real income and effective demand; expanding 
the production of and trade in goods and services; allowing for the optimal use of the world's 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development; protecting and preserving the 
environment; ensuring for developing countries a fair share in the growth in international trade. 
 
469
 See Kennett, Maxine, Neumann, Jan and Turk, Elisabeth, “Second Guessing National Level Policy 
Choices: Necessity, Proportionality and Balance in the WTO Services Negotiations” (2003) Center for 
International Environmental Law, p.2. 
 
470
 Appellate Body Report on US – Shrimp (WT/DS58/AB/R), paragraph 155. 
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proportionality may enhance these tasks in order to make WTO principles, rights and 
obligations as effective and compatible with each other as possible. Furthermore, the 
preamble points to some means for achieving the WTO objectives as being the desire 
of ‘substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade’, ‘elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’, preserving GATT’s basic 
principles and furthering ‘the objectives underlying this multilateral trading 
system’.471 Proportionality may again be a relevant aid in scrutinising discriminatory 
measures in the light of the WTO’s explicit and underlying objectives. 
 
Proportionality and reasonableness may lie at the heart of the assessment as to 
whether GATT rules and principles are being infringed, particularly in cases of 
discrimination, as any restriction or regulation may also discriminate unfairly against 
cross border transactions. One of the main issues of international trade is 
liberalization against protectionism of any kind unless the latter may be justified 
under the exceptions provided by the WTO agreements. One of the most basic 
principles of multilateral trade and of the WTO has been non-discrimination. Even if 
one agrees with the 2005 WTO Report, which stated that non-discrimination has 
become the exception not the rule,
472
 the role of proportionality may still be essential 
to justify discrimination by national measures or bilateral and regional preferential 
regimes.  
 
The WTO rules dealing with protective measures may be construed according to the 
proportionality reasoning coupled with reasonableness; they are considered below.  
 
First, Articles III of the GATT and XVII of the GATS (on national treatment of 
internal taxation and regulation) prohibit any direct or indirect discrimination that 
affords protection to domestic production. This national treatment operates in tandem 
with key Articles on justification for discrimination where it meets two consecutive 
                                                 
471
 Preamble, last three paragraphs. 
 
472
 See 2005 WTO report The Future of the WTO, chaired by Peter Sutherland, its first director-
general. More than half of the 300 deals notified to the WTO were created in the past decade and tend 
to undermine the non-discrimination rule, as bilateral and regional deals, by giving preferential access 
to some countries, which does not follow the most favourable nation principle under which Member 
Countries are supposed to extend to all other members their most favourable trade terms – the lowest 
tariffs and so forth (The Economist, January 22
nd
 2005, p.81). 
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tests: (a) general exceptions on public interest which must be necessary to their 
objectives, and which (b) must not be ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade’, as provided respectively by the paragraphs and the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT: 
 
                                     “ General Exceptions”    
 “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures:  
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;  
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, ... 
[…]”473 
 
Secondly, Articles VI on Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties and XIV on 
Subsidies and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), 
                                                 
473
 Article XIV, caput and its paragraphs, of the GATS has essentially the same wording as its 
equivalent quoted above, but expressly includes the two following exceptions regarding direct 
taxation:  
“....... 
(d) inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is aimed 
at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in 
respect of services or service suppliers of other Members; 
              (e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment is the result 
of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance 
of double taxation in any other international agreement or arrangement by which the 
Member is bound.” 
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which prohibit any kind of financial incentives to domestic products with a detriment 
to imports, regulate the appropriateness of countermeasures.
474
  However, this 
section will focus only on discrimination regarding international trade because this is 
the essential principle within the WTO agreements on which all the other rules and 
principles depend.  
 
Indirect taxation may fall within the rules and principles of international trade, but 
may so direct taxes. Examples of direct tax measures were considered in US - Tax 
Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations
475
 and Bovine Hides (Argentinean 
advance tax on gains)
476
. In relation to services, Article XIV (d) and (e) of GATS 
provides explicit exceptions for the enforcement of direct taxes and double taxation 
conventions, but they are also submitted to its chapeau that prohibits ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail or a 
                                                 
474
 See, inter alia, US - Line Pipe (WT/DS202/AB/R) in which the Appellate Body applied explicitly 
the principle of proportionality and stated in paragraph 259: “We note as well the customary 
international law rules on state responsibility, to which we also referred in US — Cotton Yarn. We 
recalled there that the rules of general international law on state responsibility require that 
countermeasures in response to breaches by States of their international obligations be proportionate 
to such breaches.” See also Mitchell, Andrew D., “Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes” 
(2007) EJIL Vol. 17 no.5; and Mavroidis, Petros C., “Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place” (2000) EJIL Vol. 11, no. 4, 763-813.  
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 (WT/DS108/AB/R). The Appellate Body made clear that Art III.4 (national treatment) may catch 
direct taxation rules that diferentiate between domestic and foreign products: “The Appellate Body 
upheld the Panel's finding that the so-called ‘fair market value rule’ under the ETI Act accorded less 
favourable treatment to imported products than to like US domestic products in violation of Art. III: 4 
by providing a ‘considerable impetus’ to use domestic products over imported products for the tax 
benefit under the ETI Act”. “Under the ‘fair market value rule’, any taxpayer that sought an 
exemption under the ETI Act had to ensure that in the manufacture of qualifying property, it did not 
‘use’ imported input products, whose value comprised more than 50 per cent of the fair market value 
of the end-product” (summary of the case at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm (up-to-date at 24 February 2010, last 
visited 8 July 2010). The US did not justify that discrimination under the exceptions of Art XX of the 
GATT. On this case, see  Van Thiel, Servaas, “General Report” in Lang, Michael, Herdin, Judith and 
Hofbauer, Ines (Eds), WTO and Direct Taxation (Kluwer, 2005), pp.26-28. 
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 Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, 
(WT/DS155/R, Bovine Hides). The Panel concluded at paragraph 11.161 that both advance payments 
of the VAT and the direct tax on gains were “internal tax measures applied to products” under Article 
III:2 of the GATT. Differently from the US in the FSC case (WT/DS108/AB/RW2), Argentina tried to 
justify the apparent differentiation between domestic and imported products based on the exceptions 
of Art XX of the GATT (see further on this case the next two sections, regarding the reasonableness 
and proportionality of the exceptions and the chapeau). 
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disguised restriction on trade in services.’477 Thus, the importance of proportionality 
and reasonableness in assessing the discrimination under the chapeau may also affect 
direct taxation, including enforcement measures, double tax treaties regarding 
services
478
 and principles of international tax law. Measures to combat tax evasion 
and avoidance
479
 may be scrutinised under paragraph (d) and the chapeau of Article 
XX of the GATT and paragraphs (c) and (d) and the chapeau of Art XIV of the 
GATS. So do also other specific measures enforcing international principles, such as 
territoriality and worldwide taxation.
480
 
 
Again proportionality in tandem with reasonableness as  judge-made law principles 
must be analysed by means of WTO case law, mainly of the Appellate Body (AB), 
which is the final authority regarding the legal interpretation of WTO agreements.  
 
III.3.2. National treatment principle and other GATT/GATS rules, non-
discrimination, reasonableness and proportionality. 
 
III.3.2.a. The principle of non-discrimination, its general assessment and the two-tier 
analysis of Articles XX (GATT) and XIV (GATS). 
 
The pillars for promotion of free trade are the unconditional most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) obligation,
481
 the national treatment obligation, binding commitments to 
reduce tariffs and the elimination of quotas on imports.
482
 All these pillars are based 
                                                 
477
 For an overall view on direct taxation and WTO principles and rules, see Lang, Michael, Herdin, 
Judith and Hofbauer, Ines (Eds), WTO and Direct Taxation (Kluwer, 2005).  
 
478
 See also Van Thiel, Servaas, “General Report”, (2005), p.39. 
 
479
 See Bovine Hides and Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale 
of Cigarettes (WT/DS302/AB/R, Dominican Republic – Cigarettes). 
 
480
 Those principles were taken into account in the above well-known FSC case regarding direct tax 
subsidies granted by the USA. 
 
481
 Under Article I of the GATT, which provides the general MFN treatment, WTO members are 
immediately and unconditionally obliged to give to all trade partners the same favourable trade 
concession given to any other party to the agreement. A similar, immediate and unconditional right 
with respect to services and service suppliers is ensured by Article II (1) of the GATS. 
 
482
 Choi, Won-Mog,  ‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law, Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (OUP, 2003), p.93. 
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on the non-discrimination principle
483
 and national treatment; together these aim at 
equality of opportunity and avoidance of protectionism in the application of internal 
taxation and regulatory measures.
484
 They have given rise to some of the most 
important and disputed issues according to WTO case law.
485
 
 
Article XX of the GATT, which provides for general exceptions regarding 
discrimination, plays a key role within the whole agreement as it applies not only to 
Article III on equality of treatment between imports and domestic production but 
also to all its other Articles: 
 
“[T]he chapeau says that 'nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures ...' The exceptions listed in 
Article XX thus relate to all of the obligations under the 
General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the 
most-favoured-nation obligation, of course, but others as 
well.”486  
 
The discrimination assessment is made first under one or more specific Article of the 
GATT or GATS, and then under, respectively, Articles XX or XIV on general 
                                                                                                                                          
 
483
 Idem. 
 
484
 The Appellate Body (AB) Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II (WT/DS8/AB/R) (p. 16) 
stated, "The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application 
of internal tax and regulatory measures. More specifically, the purpose of Article III 'is to ensure that 
internal measures not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production' (footnote original: Panel Report on US - Section 337, para. 5.10). Toward this 
end, Article III obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products” (footnote original: Panel Reports on US - 
Superfund, para. 5.1.9; and Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 5.5(b)).  
 
485 Out of all WTO agreements on substantive, not procedural, provisions the GATT is still the most 
analysed by the Appellate Body decisions from 1996 to 2007 (Appellate Body Annual Report for 
2007, WT/AB/9, p. 9, figure 3), and, under the GATT/GATS agreements, discrimination has not 
surprisingly been the most important issue at stake. 
 
486
 Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p. 24. 
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exceptions in a two-step assessment.
487
 For example, if a measure fails to meet the 
requirements for the National Treatment Article,
488
 which provides equality in the 
market, then it may be upheld by some of the exceptions and by the chapeau of 
Articles XX of the GATT or XIV of the GATS. The two-step assessment under 
Articles III and XX of the GATT (XVII and XIV for the GATS) includes a 
composite scrutiny of justification under the general exceptions Article, the so-called 
“two-tier analysis” as explained below. 
 
The two-tier analysis under Article XX of the GATT requires the separate 
assessment of the necessity of measures aimed at ensuring a legitimate policy 
objective (general exceptions) subsequent to which, only where the disputed measure 
passes the necessity test, a second scrutiny must be made under the chapeau (heading 
or caput) of Article XX:
489
 
 
“In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be 
extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under 
one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) to 
(j) - listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the 
requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. 
The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional 
justification by reason of characterization of the measure 
under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the same measure 
under the introductory clauses of Article XX.”490  
 
                                                 
487
 See Ortino, Federico, “From ‘Non-Discrimination’ to ‘Reasonableness’: a Paradigm Shift in 
International Economic Law?” in Jean Monnet Working Paper (01/2005) and Verhoosel, Gaëtan, 
National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement (Hart Publishing, 2002), p.34. 
488
 Article III provides National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, and essentially, the 
same National Treatment Clause is provided by Article XVII of the GATS.  
489
 Although that does not mean that the Panel cannot assess the discrimination standard under the 
chapeau even where the discriminatory measure has failed to comply with the necessity test, since its 
analysis pursues an objective justification that may assist further the Appellate Body in its final 
decision, particularly regarding factual findings (US Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R/Corr.1, paragraphs 
343-4). 
 
490
 Appellate Body Report on US – Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R), p.22. 
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Both separate assessments involve a full scrutiny of discrimination, which together 
consider one legal issue in two stages, each of which may be assessed according to 
proportionality reasoning coupled with reasonableness. This is illustrated below.
 
 
  
III.3.2.b. The general exceptions, the wording ‘necessary’ as a requirement for non-
discrimination and proportionality. The cost-benefit analysis and proportionality. 
 
An initial parallel may be drawn between the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the GATT/GATS agreements regarding the term “necessary”. Whereas 
the ECHR took the view that necessary would be somewhere between indispensable 
and more flexible expressions such as useful, ordinary, admissible, desirable or 
reasonable,
491
 the Appellate Body considered it closer to one of the poles. meaning 
indispensable rather than to the other pole, meaning making a contribution to.
492
 
“Such a contribution exists when there is a genuine relationship of ends and means 
between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”493 Furthermore, the 
Appellate Body differentiated the requirements for permissible discriminations, 
linking all of them to the relationship between ends and means:  
 
“In enumerating the various categories of governmental acts, 
laws or regulations which WTO Members may carry out or 
promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state policies or 
interests outside the realm of trade liberalization, Article XX 
uses different terms in respect of different categories: 
  
'necessary' - in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); 'essential' - in paragraph 
(j); 'relating to' - in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); 'for the protection of' 
- in paragraph (f); 'in pursuance of' - in paragraph (h); and 
'involving' - in paragraph (i). 
  
                                                 
491
 See Handyside case on Chapter III, sections 2.3.b and 2.3.c.1. 
 
492 
Korea - Various Measures on Beef Report (WT/DS161/AB/R), paras. 161-162 and 164. 
 
493
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (WT/DS332/AB/R), para 145. 
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It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members 
intended to require, in respect of each and every category, the same 
kind or degree of connection or relationship between the measure 
under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be 
promoted or realized.”494   
 
Thus, what may vary is the degree of the relationship between ends and means, 
which pervades the whole range of acceptable justifications for discrimination under 
the paragraphs of Article XX. In US - Shrimps the Appellate Body expressly 
construed the wording ‘relating to’ in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g) of Article XX as 
expressing a relationship between ends and means as well: 
 
“Focusing on the design of the measure here at stake, it appears to us 
that Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not 
disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy 
objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle species.  The 
means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends.  The means 
and ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy 
of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is 
observably a close and real one, a relationship that is every bit as 
substantial as that which we found in United States - Gasoline 
between the EPA baseline establishment rules and the conservation of 
clean air in the United States” (emphasis added).495 
This clear demonstration of proportionality reasoning concerning the relationship 
between ends and means is followed by an analysis of less restrictive alternative 
measures, still within the requirement of necessity. The Appellate Body stated: 
“…… in order to determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ within 
the meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a panel must 
consider the relevant factors, particularly the importance of the 
interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the 
                                                 
494
 Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p.17. 
 
495
 Paragraph 141. 
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achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade restrictiveness. If 
this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is 
necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure 
with possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while 
providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective. This comparison should be carried out in the light of the 
importance of the interests or values at stake.”496 
 
It is interesting to note that under paragraphs (g), (c) and (e), the reasonable 
alternative test is not applicable, since it is more appropriate to the requirement of 
necessity under paragraphs (a), (b), (d), which use the term ‘necessary’ and perhaps 
to paragraph (j), which uses the term ‘essential’. Nevertheless, the most important 
point here is to observe how proportionality in different degrees resonates in all of 
them as general exceptions to discrimination, particularly the open-ended exceptions 
under paragraph (d) that may encompass any tax measures. 
 
In a stamp tax case on cigarettes involving tax evasion and smuggling,
497
 all the 
guidelines on the assessment of necessity were reiterated, on the basis of previous 
case law dealing with services (GATS), which adopted the same GATT principles:   
“In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body considered the ‘necessity’ 
test in the context of Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services.   The Appellate Body confirmed that an assessment of the 
‘necessity’ of a measure involves a weighing and balancing of ‘the 
“relative importance” of the interests or values furthered by the 
challenged measure’, along with other factors, which will usually 
include ‘the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends 
pursued by it [and] the restrictive impact of the measure on 
international commerce.’”498    
 
                                                 
496
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, paragraph 178 (AB-2007-4). 
 
497
 (Dominican Republic-Cigarettes) 
 
498
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, para 68, citing US - Gambling, para. 
306. 
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In Bovine Hides
499
 the withholding of VAT and a direct tax on Gains (GT) regarding 
imports were justified under paragraph (d), to counter tax evasion and avoidance. In 
this case, the Panel assessed the discriminatory nature of the higher withholding 
taxes (on VAT and GT)
500
 on imports first under paragraph (d) of Article XX 
apparently applying a looser test of necessity. The Panel regarded the discriminatory 
measure in its general design and structure as more appropriate to tackle tax evasion 
than more drastic measures such as aggressive criminal prosecution of tax offenders, 
and accepted it under paragraph (d).
501
 Nevertheless, under the chapeau of Article 
XX the disputed measure was more closely scrutinised and rejected by applying the 
test of necessity and proportionality.
502
  
The timing of payment of a Selective Consumption Tax (which was payable earlier 
for imports) would have been an issue to be decided in Dominican Republic-
Cigarettes similar to the issue in Bovine Hides of different tax rates, if the 
complainants had challenged it.
503
 Had this issue been properly argued it was 
unlikely to have been upheld in line with the rationale of Dominican Republic-
Cigarettes under either the necessity test of paragraph (d) of Article XX or the 
chapeau, as in Bovine Hides. 
From the above tax cases it follows that in principle any tax discriminatory measure, 
including direct taxes and their measures of enforcement, may be caught by Article 
XX(d) and submitted to the two-tier justification. It also appears that the same 
rationale and proportionality scrutiny are applicable to tax measures as to any 
measure falling within the general policy exceptions that can hinder international 
trade. 
                                                 
499
 Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather. 
500
 The system worked like a pre-payment of taxes on imports that would be charged in future 
transactions (re-sale) even for income purposes (GT tax on gains, IG impuesto a las ganancias). The 
higher rates on imported hides than on domestic ones might have been justified if there were a higher 
margin of profits on re-sale of imports. 
 
501
 Paragraphs 11291-11308. 
 
502
 See further analysis of this case under the chapeau, in the next section. 
 
503
 The Appellate Body stated that the Panel could not decide the issue under the WTO procedural 
rules as it was not argued as a separate issue (Dominican Republic-Cigarettes, paragraphs 126-7). 
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Balancing the full purpose of the measure (whether the alternative measure would 
provide less protection) is another characteristic of proportionality reasoning applied 
to the requirement of necessity. At least three factors must be taken into account to 
ascertain the less restrictive available measure: 
i. ‘the trade impact of the measure,  
ii. the importance of the interests protected by the measure,   
iii. the contribution of the measure to the realization of the end 
pursued.’504 
These three factors must be submitted to a weighing and balancing process to 
determine the appropriateness of the disputed measure. Thus, it can be suggested that 
the balancing process permeates the whole analysis of necessity.
505
 Summing up the 
nature of this process, the Appellate Body stated: 
 
“The weighing and balancing is a holistic operation that involves 
putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating them 
in relation to each other after having examined them individually, in 
order to reach an overall judgement” (emphasis added).506 
 
As the economic players are operating in a real world (as opposed to a theoretical 
one) the scrutiny of less restrictive measures must be as flexible as is appropriate to 
                                                 
504
  Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, at para 70 citing also the rationale of Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef (para 164), EC –Asbestos (WT/DS135/AB/R) and US – Gambling.  
 
505
 Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, pointed out the similarity between ‘proportionality’ 
and the ‘necessity test’ coupled with ‘a new and additional balance test’ (“The place of the WTO and 
its Law in the International Legal Order”, 2006 EJIL 17, 969-984, p.979). 
 
506
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, paragraph 182. A holistic approach has 
been adopted by the Appellate Body regarding the interpretation of international treaties, as follows: 
“Interpretation pursuant to the customary rules codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is 
ultimately a holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid components” (EC 
– Chicken Classification (WT/DS269/AB/R WT/DS286/AB/R), paragraph 176), and for further 
material rightly supporting this approach rather than a sequencing and hierarchical one, see Qureshi, 
Asif H. Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspectives (CUP, 2006), pp.122-3 
particularly note 16. 
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changing and real circumstances,
507
 which characterises again proportionality 
reasoning coupled with reasonableness in its search of fairness in each case. Thus, 
the States are required neither the most ideally less restrictive measure nor the most 
ideally consistent with the WTO principles.
508
 In the tax stamp case discussed above, 
the Appellate Body reached a finding that,  
 
“…requiring that tax stamps be affixed in the Dominican Republic 
under the supervision of the tax authorities ‘in and of itself, would not 
prevent the forgery of tax stamps, nor smuggling and tax evasion.’  In 
this respect, the Panel indicated that other factors, such as security 
features incorporated into the tax stamps, or police controls on roads 
and at different commercial levels, would play a more important role 
in preventing forgery of tax stamps, tax evasion and smuggling of 
tobacco products.”509 
 
As a further illustration of the full assessment of proportionality in search of a 
rational justification - not only a theoretical one but also one that is practical, 
effective and reasonably enforceable - the Appellate Body applies the ‘reasonably 
available’ test to accept or reject the less restrictive alternative analysis: 
 
“[a]n alternative measure may be found not to be 'reasonably 
available' ... where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, 
where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the 
                                                 
507
 ‘WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so 
inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgments in confronting the endless and ever-changing 
ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world’ (Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages - AB-
1996-2, last paragraph before the conclusions). 
 
508
 The three factors pointed out above will determine “whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure 
which the Member concerned could reasonably be expected to employ is available, or whether a less 
WTO-inconsistent measure is reasonably available”.  See Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, at para 
70). 
 
509
 Idem, para 71. 
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measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as 
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties.”510 
 
This type of scrutiny may be regarded as a dynamic and comparative form of cost-
benefit analysis. It takes into account the costs or technical difficulties of alternative 
measures, which must then be balanced with other factors such as trade impact, 
national policies and interests, and the degree of effectiveness. Whereas a static 
analysis merely juxtaposes the costs and benefits of a single rule, a more dynamic 
cost-benefit analysis compares the net benefits of multiple rules.
511
 Thus, Trachtman 
suggested that proportionality “may become more like comparative cost-benefit 
analysis the more it evaluates various alternatives as part of its determination of 
whether the particular measure under scrutiny is proportional.”512  
 
The Appellate Body has consistently recognized the right of States to determine their 
own level of protection according to the analysis of reasonably available 
alternatives.
513
 This was reiterated in Dominican Republic-Cigarettes in which ‘a 
zero tolerance level of enforcement with regard to tax collection and the prevention 
of cigarette smuggling’ were recognized as the desired level of protection.514 
 
                                                 
510
 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paragraph 308. Just ‘administrative difficulties’ are not 
sufficient in regarding an alternative measure as not reasonably available (Panel Report on US - 
Gasoline, paras. 6.26 and 6.28). 
 
511
 Trachtman, Joel P. “Trade and … Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity” (1998) EJIL 
9, pp.36 and 70.  
 
512
 Idem, p.76. 
 
513
 In US Gambling, regarding services on morals’  justification, the Appellate Body stated, 
“Moreover, a ‘reasonably available’ alternative measure must be a measure that would preserve for 
the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective 
pursued ... .” (paragraph 308).  
 
514
 Paragraph 72. See the same reasoning regarding health purposes in EC Asbestos, paragraphs 168 
and 174, and Korea - Various Measures on Beef, paras. 8.213 and 8.214. See also Regan, Donald H. 
“The meaning of ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: the myth of cost–benefit 
balancing” (2007) W.T.R., 6(3), 347–369, at 350, citing EC-Abestos, US-Gambling, Dominican 
Republic-Cigarettes, and Korean-Beef as examples of cases in which the choice of members for their 
own level of protection is respected but with no assessment of the benefits of their objectives vis a vis 
their costs. 
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Furthermore, the second factor pointed out above (the importance of the interests 
protected by the measure) for assessing the necessity requirement apparently does 
not require a full evaluation of their benefits.
515
 This approach may be contrary to a 
classical cost-benefit analysis,
516
 which assesses the underlying objectives of a 
measure and its benefits to ascertain whether or not it is lawful. In other words, any 
alternative measure must achieve the same level of protection pursued by the 
disputed discriminatory measure, which cannot be challenged on grounds of 
excessive degrees of protection, unless caught by the chapeau on arbitrary 
discrimination (as will be discussed in the next section). Thus, proportionality 
encompassing the necessity test may be distinguished from a pure cost-benefit 
analysis by the margin of appreciation of States,
517
 though nonetheless inherently 
applying a balancing process, which is also ‘at the very heart of what proportionality 
is all about.’518 
 
III.3.2.c. Chapeau of Articles XX and XIV: balance and non-abuse of rights, 
disguised restriction to international trade and arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination. 
 
It is worth noting that there are three cumulative standards of review over whether or 
not a measure satisfies a valid exception to discrimination under the chapeau of 
Articles XX (GATT) and XIV (GATS).
519
 The first is characterised as arbitrary 
                                                 
515 See the appraisal of interests as an aid to ascertain the necessary requirement, discussed above in 
section 3.2.b: “the more vital or important [the] common interests or values' pursued, the easier it 
would be to accept as 'necessary' measures designed to achieve those ends"
 
 (AB Report Dominican 
Republic -Cigarettes, para 68, quoting EC – Asbestos para 172 and Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef, para. 162). 
 
516
 A cost-benefit analysis applying a balancing test “must stand ready to say of some measure that: 
(a) it achieves a legitimate local goal, and (b) there is no other less trade-restrictive way to achieve the 
same level of that goal, but (c) the measure is nonetheless illegal because the local benefits do not 
justify the trade costs” Regan, Donald H., (2007) at p.348. 
 
517
 See Regan, Ibidem, pp.352-3, 356-7; Trachtman (1998), p. 77. 
 
518
 Hilf, Meinhard and Puth, Sebastian, “The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT 
Law”, in Armin Von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis, Yves Mény, (Eds) European Integration and 
International Co-Ordination, (Kluwer Law International, 2002), 199-218,  p.210. 
 
519
 Inter alia, see paragraph 150 of US – Shrimps. In Brazil Retreaded Tyres where the Appellate Body 
stated that the requirements of the chapeau are two fold, implying a closer relationship between 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, ‘The chapeau's requirements are two-fold. First, a measure 
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discrimination, the second as unjustifiable discrimination, and the third as a disguised 
restriction on international trade. All of them are assessed on proportionality 
grounds, particularly in balancing the rights of Contracting Parties (as discussed 
below).  
 
The interaction and the differentiation between the chapeau of Article XX and its 
paragraphs were explained in the discussion of the two-tier analysis.
520
 They may be 
mentioned here again to demonstrate further their relevance regarding proportionality 
reasoning in practice and as a corollary of the doctrine of abuse of rights. In US-
Shrimp the Appellate Body stated the following:  
 
“The general design of a measure, as distinguished from its 
application, is, however, to be examined in the course of determining 
whether that measure falls within one or another of the paragraphs of 
Article XX following the chapeau.  
… 
In United States - Gasoline, we stated that it is “important to 
underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses of 
Article XX is generally the prevention of 'abuse of the exceptions of 
[Article XX]'.” The Panel did not attempt to inquire into how the 
measure at stake was being applied in such a manner as to constitute 
abuse or misuse of a given kind of exception.”521 
 
As Hilf and Puth well captured it, the exceptions of “paragraphs (a) to (j) address the 
abstract measure, whereas the chapeau clause addresses the application of the 
                                                                                                                                          
provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of Article XX must not be applied in a manner that 
would constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” between countries where the same 
conditions prevail. Secondly, this measure must not be applied in a manner that would constitute “a 
disguised restriction on international trade”’ (paragraph 215). Ascertaining to some extent the 
vagueness of ‘disguised restriction’ in US Gasoline the Appellate Body stated that “considerations 
pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to 'arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination', may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a 
'disguised restriction' on international trade” (at p.25). 
 
520
 See the previous section 3.2.a.  
 
521
 Paragraph 116. 
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abstract measure in the single case.”522 In other words, a measure can be justified in 
general (‘in abstract’) under the general exceptions but fail to pass the test of 
justification under the chapeau in practice in each case, particularly if there is abuse 
of the exceptions, taking into consideration the rights of other States. 
 
From a literal reading of the chapeau one might draw the conclusion that it would 
either be similar to other non-discrimination Articles or have only the limited role of 
tackling absurd or irrational discrimination.
523
 The Appellate Body stated, however, 
that this type of discrimination is distinct from that covered by other Articles:  
 
“[under the chapeau, first,] the application of the  measure must result 
in discrimination.  As we stated in United States – Gasoline, the 
nature and quality of this discrimination is different from the 
discrimination in the treatment of products which was already found 
to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 
1994, such as Articles I, III or XI.  Second, the discrimination must be 
arbitrary or unjustifiable in character.”524 
 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body adopted a purposive, contextual and logical 
interpretation when it recognised in a number of cases a broader and clearer role for 
the chapeau of Article XX: 
 
“[A] balance must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke 
an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to 
respect the treaty rights of the other Members. 
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, 
essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception 
                                                 
522
 “The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT Law”, p.213. 
523
 On irrational or absurd measure in the light of the reasonableness standard of review, see different 
and similar approaches, respectively, Chapters I, II.4 (The possible distinction between what is 
reasonable and what is non-arbitrary), III.2.2 (The meaning and ascertainment of reasonableness via 
proportionality reasoning), and IV.1 (Proportionality as a general principle of European Law).  
524
 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 150.  
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under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying 
substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that 
neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby 
distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations 
constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The 
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not 
fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the 
measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases 
differ.”525 
 
Thus, even after being regarded as proportionate to a legitimate policy, a measure 
may fail to pass the second test, which may also be described as a balancing test 
between the relevant measure and the rights of other Sates. If under the paragraphs of 
Article XX only the interests of the host State are taken into account (relevant policy 
and appropriate measure to achieve it), under the chapeau the interests of all other 
States must equally be taken into account, particularly the right not to be 
discriminated against.  
Another difference between the discriminatory analysis under the chapeau and its 
paragraphs is the prima facie scrutiny in the former and its application in practice 
under the latter. However, one may still suggest that the same standard of 
discrimination applicable to the necessity test is required to pass the chapeau test. 
This line of reasoning would result in a mechanical application of the chapeau to a 
measure which has already been regarded as discriminatory under, for instance, 
Article III (national treatment), but necessary under any paragraph of Article XX. 
Thus, either the discriminatory measure would be necessary and then should always 
pass the chapeau test or it would always fail this second test for being unnecessarily 
discriminatory. This understanding would deprive the chapeau of any sound and 
effective meaning (effect utile).
526
 Some examples can be helpful to clarify the lack 
of contradiction and the logical relationship between the two justifications.  
                                                 
525
 Appellate Body Report on US - Shrimp, paragraphs. 156 and 159. 
 
526
 “A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out 
in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that "[o]ne of the corollaries of the 
'general rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and 
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In US - Gasoline, measures designed to protect ‘clean air’ were accepted under 
paragraph (g), but failed to pass the chapeau test for being in their application 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’ 
mainly because of:  
“… two omissions on the part of the United States: to explore 
adequately means, including in particular cooperation with the 
governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative 
problems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting 
individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs for 
foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory 
baselines.” 527 
 
In US - Shrimps four reasons were given as support for regarding measures addressed 
to the protection of sea turtles first as unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau, 
although they were justified under paragraph (g).
528
 First, the application of 
guidelines on exceptions to the embargo of importing shrimps only accepted in 
practice the method applied in the US, not taking into account different conditions 
existing in other countries.
529
 Second, the actual exclusion from the market of 
shrimps caught according to the US guidelines only because they had been ‘caught in 
waters of countries that have not been certified by the United States’ was another 
flaw in their application in practice which was hardly reconcilable with the policy 
                                                                                                                                          
effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility" (Appellate Body Report 
on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, p. 12).  On the principle of effective interpretation, see 
further Qureshi, Asif H., Interpreting WTO Agreements (CUP, 2006), pp. 13, 110 and 163. On 
effectiveness of rights and proportionality, see the case law of the ECHR (Chapter III regarding the 
effectiveness of fundamental rights ‘in practice and in law’ and particularly section 2.3.c.2 on 
effective remedies, and sections 2.7.a and 2.7.b) and the ECJ (Chapter IV.8.5 on the principle of 
effectiveness).  
 
527
  US - Gasoline, pp.28-29. 
 
528
 See section 3.2.b above on the provisional justification of those measures under Article XX(g) to 
which proportionality is also applied as a requirement of proportionate relationship between ends and 
means.  
 
529
 Paragraphs 162-4.  
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itself.
 530
  Third, the adoption of a unilateral measure only against some countries in 
lieu of promoting an international agreement on protection of migrant sea turtles was 
against other international agreements,
531
 and discriminatory against those 
countries.
532
 Two points are noteworthy here: a) other international agreements may 
justify or not discrimination under the chapeau,
533
 and b) the argument of negotiation 
and conclusion of an agreement with some countries as being a clear “demonstration 
that an alternative course of action was reasonably open”534 shows the application of 
the reasonably available alternative test in assessing discrimination under the 
chapeau. Fourth, the differences between countries concerning the US efforts to 
transfer technology and time concessions for adjustments were held unjustifiable.
535
 
Thus, under the first standard of discrimination the Appellate Body drew the 
following conclusion concerning all the foregoing differences:  
“considered in their cumulative effect … constitute ‘unjustifiable 
discrimination’ between exporting countries desiring certification in 
                                                 
530
 Paragraph 165. 
 
531
 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, paragraph 2.22(i) of 
Agenda 21 Article 5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex I  of the Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (paragraphs 167-8). 
 
532
 Paragraph 172. 
 
533
 See also Bovine Hides, discussed below, in which an international agreement might justify 
discrimination under the chapeau.  
 
534
 “Moreover, the Inter-American Convention emphasizes the continuing validity and significance of 
Article XI of the GATT 1994, and of the obligations of the WTO Agreement generally, in maintaining 
the balance of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement among the signatories of that 
Convention. …. The Inter-American Convention thus provides convincing demonstration that an 
alternative course of action was reasonably open to the United States for securing the legitimate policy 
goal of its measure, a course of action other than the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the 
import prohibition under Section 609” (paragraphs 170-1). 
 
535
 Paragraphs 173-5. The AppellateBody gave due regard to the fact that the immediate enforcement 
of the protective measures to some countries was determined by judicial decision, by stating that “this 
does not relieve the United States of the legal consequences of the discriminatory impact of the 
decisions of that Court.  The United States, like all other Members of the WTO and of the general 
community of states, bears responsibility for acts of all its departments of government, including its 
judiciary” (at paragraph 173). See a similar line of reasoning regarding judicial decisions of domestic 
courts concerning general principles of international public law in US Gasoline, p.28 and Brazil Tyres, 
paragraph 246.  
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order to gain access to the United States shrimp market within the 
meaning of the chapeau of Article XX”536 (emphasis added). 
The Appellate Body also elaborated on the second standard of discrimination as 
‘arbitrary’ in this decision. The two elements of arbitrariness were: a) ‘the rigidity 
and inflexibility’ of the regulatory programme that should be the same as the one in 
force in the US; and b) the lack of a due process in the certification procedure, such 
as no opportunity to counter-argue during the process, and ‘no formal written, 
reasoned decision, whether of acceptance or rejection’,537 from which the AB came 
to the following conclusion:  
“…effectively, exporting Members applying for certification whose 
applications are rejected are denied basic fairness and due process, 
and are discriminated against, vis-à-vis those Members which are 
granted certification.”538 
The relationship between arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination seems to be clear, 
particularly where the analysis of legitimate ends and appropriate means are 
ultimately in play in search of fairness. In other words, if States are supposed to be 
treated equally, any differentiation must be justified on reasonable and convincing 
grounds, mainly avoiding measures that not only restrict rights but also make less 
effective the legitimate policy pursued.   
In Brazil -Retreaded Tyres
539
 the justification for discrimination under the chapeau of 
Article XX was the protection of the environment which was the same justification 
as under paragraph (b). The question whether the discrimination under the chapeau is 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in the light of the objective of the 
                                                 
536
 Paragraph 176. 
 
537
 Paragraph 180. 
 
538
 Paragraph 181. The Appellate Body also based its decision on Article X(3) of the GATT that 
requires due process for measures complying with the treaty; a fortiori measures that are exceptions to 
GATT rules and principles should also be subject to formal and substantive requirements of the due 
process. 
 
539
 In this case, Brazil tried to justify imports of used tyres (environmental unfriendly goods) only 
from MERCOSUR stating that they were not substantial. See, on this case, Calster, Geert van, “Faites 
Vos Jeuxs Regulatory Autonomy and the World Trade Organisation after Brazil Tyres” (2008) JEL 
20(1). 
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measure’540 that in this case had been on environmental purposes under the necessity 
test. As a result, there may be a clear application of the same rationale for any 
discrimination, which requires a reasonable or logical relationship between ends and 
means that is an inherent feature of proportionality reasoning coupled with 
reasonableness. Moreover, demonstrating another possible correlation between the 
two different standards of discrimination, the Appellate Body held that under the 
chapeau a necessary measure would be unlawful “when the reasons given for this 
discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview 
of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective.”541 Thus, a 
discriminatory measure justified as necessary on environmental grounds under 
paragraph (b) of Article XX, must pass another test under the chapeau, which 
prohibits discrimination, in practice, grounded on baseless allegations or on an 
objective that is contrary to environmental protection. That is why a special treatment 
for Mercosur could not be upheld since it would harm the environment in the 
importing country.
542
  
From this reasoning it follows that, although “the provisions of the chapeau cannot 
logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive rule has 
been determined to have occurred”543, there must be a logical relationship between 
them. As a matter of principle, the chapeau of Article XX does not allow a 
conflicting justification with a policy objective accepted to justify the general 
structure and design of a discriminatory measure under its paragraphs.  
The rationale of discrimination under the chapeau may be similar to, different from 
or even opposed to policies expressly listed in paragraphs of Articles XX (GATT) 
                                                 
540
 Paragraph 227. 
 
541
 Idem, ibidem paragraph 227. 
 
542
 The Appellate Body stated at paragraph 246, “As we explained above, the analysis of whether the 
application of a measure results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the cause 
or rationale given for the discrimination. For Brazil, the fact that Brazilian retreaders are able to use 
imported casings is the result of the decisions of the Brazilian administrative authorities to comply 
with court injunctions. We observe that this explanation bears no relationship to the objective of the 
Import Ban-reducing exposure to the risks arising from the accumulation of waste tyres to the 
maximum extent possible. The imports of used tyres through court injunctions even go against the 
objective pursued by the Import Ban.” 
543
 United States - Gasoline, at p.23 
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and XIV (GATS) and in the open-ended policies under paragraphs (d) and (c), 
respectively. The reasoning of proportionality permeates the legal analysis of their 
similarities, differences, and (particularly where seemingly conflicting policies are at 
stake) its role of balancing and reconciliation is remarkable. Pascal Lamy highlighted 
the importance of this “form of ‘balancing test’ or ‘proportionality test’ between set 
of values, or between sets of rights and obligations.”544  
In the Bovine Hides case (discussed in the previous section concerning the necessity 
test), the withholding of VAT and Gains Tax on imports was justified under 
paragraph (d), to avoid tax evasion and avoidance.
545
 However, they were not upheld 
under the chapeau of Article XX, as the taxes were higher than those on domestic 
products. The analysis of alternative reasonable measures was also made under the 
chapeau, such as equal withholding tax rates for imports and domestic goods or 
reimbursement of interests in compensation for the higher rates.
546
 This analysis 
would be more appropriate to the necessity test and not to the standard of 
unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau.
547
 Nevertheless, there was in 
principle a more appropriate argument under the chapeau. Argentina alleged as 
justification for discrimination the Economic Policy Memorandum and a Technical 
Memorandum from the International Monetary Fund on tackling the relevant 
problem of tax avoidance and evasion particularly on the resale market. The Panel 
did not accept that reason because the commitment to the IMF neither provided for 
nor suggested those specific discriminatory measures.
548
 Thus, apparently other 
                                                 
544
 “The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) EJIL 17, 969-984, 
p.980. 
545
 See the previous section. 
546
 Paragraphs 11325-11327 and 11329. The reimbursement of interests as an automatic compensation 
could be an appropriate alternative measure to combat tax avoidance or evasion of imports.  If the tax 
paypayer simply evaded the tax in the domestic resale market, he would not be entitled to the 
reimbursement of higher taxation on imports. In other words, he would be ´encouraged´ not to evade 
the tax on resale of goods, because he could get a repayment or compensation for the higher tax rates 
paid at customs. 
 
547
 By contrast, the Appellate Body made a more logical and principled analysis in Dominican 
Republic - Cigarettes, in which the stamp tax requirement failed to pass the necessity test as alternative 
measures were available with no further assessment under the chapeau whose analysis as a result was 
unnecessary (paragraph 74). See section 3.2.b above. 
 
548
 Paragraph 11.328 . 
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international agreements could justify discrimination between countries, if necessary 
and reasonably justified on grounds of not being arbitrary or a disguised restriction to 
international trade.
549
 Again, even under a different standard for assessing what is 
arbitrary or unjustifiable (perhaps because the former is more closely related to 
irrationality, capriciousness or unreasonableness and the latter to objective 
justification), proportionality is a relevant tool to ascertain their apparently broad and 
vague meaning. Likewise, the disguised restriction to trade may in the end be 
scrutinised on the same grounds: whether or not it is justified by an imperative 
purpose and is an adequate measure taking into consideration other principles, such 
as good faith and the interests of all other States. 
As discussed in the previous section, for a measure to be necessary under the policy 
exceptions it must be less restrictive and reasonably available. This test also requires 
a balance in assessing the costs of those alternative measures and their benefits in 
relation to the degree of enforcement or protection desired by the State, but it goes no 
further. On the contrary, the chapeau has the different role in pushing the legal 
analysis towards the interests of other States. In other words, a restrictive measure 
would be actually proportionate only if it does not disproportionately affect the rights 
and interests of other States within international trade. That is why international 
agreements, which necessarily involve more than one country or international 
organizations, were taken into account to uphold or not discriminatory measures 
under the chapeau and not under the necessity test in the US - Shrimps, Bovine Hides 
and Brazil - Tyres cases. On the other hand, a type of necessity test may also be 
applied under the chapeau as occurred in US - Shrimps.
550
 This may be because there 
has to be some logical connection between the policies for exceptions and the 
chapeau.
551
 
                                                 
549
 On the interaction of different international legal orders and the role of the WTO Appellate Body in 
applying all of them, Ibid, p.983. As well in Brazil Tyres the Panel indicated “that it was not 
suggesting that ‘the invocation of any international agreement would be sufficient under any 
circumstances, in order to justify the existence of discrimination in the application of a measure under 
the chapeau of Article XX’” (paragraph 219).  
 
550
 See US Shrimps analysed above in which a reasonable available alternative test was applied. 
 
551
 See US Gasoline and Brazil Tyres discussed above. 
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Finally, it is worth analysing the relationship between proportionality and other 
general principles of international law, such as good faith, with respect to non-
protectionism in international trade. The Appellate Body interpreted the chapeau not 
only according to but also as an expression of the general principle of good faith and 
the doctrine of abuse of rights: 
 
“The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the 
principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of 
law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise 
of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the 
application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits 
the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the 
assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty 
obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably”552 (emphasis added). 
 
Again proportionality reasoning coupled with reasonableness (in its role of balancing 
different rights) is present, particularly where “in practice, the evaluation of 
reasonableness implies a due balancing of competing rights”, which is “the basic idea 
of proportionality.”553 In the same vein, as the Appellate Body stated in an earlier 
case, the exceptions in the paragraphs “must be applied reasonably, with due regard 
both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the 
                                                 
552
 US - Shrimp, paragraph 158. In this decision the Appellate Body also pointed out the competing 
rights between the States and the task under the chapeau to balance them: “The task of interpreting 
and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of 
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of 
the other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that 
neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the 
balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The 
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line 
moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific 
cases differ" (paragraph 159). 
 
553
 Hilf, Meinhard and Puth, Sebastian, “The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT 
Law” (Kluwer Law International, 2002), p.213. On competing rights and the role of proportionality 
regarding fundamental rights, see Chapter IV, sections 2.3.c.3 and 2.7.b. On the law of balancing as a 
main characteristic of proportionality and reasonableness, see also Chapters I and II on the US. 
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other parties concerned.”554 Furthermore, in US - Shrimps the Appellate Body based 
its rationale for ascertaining the notion of reasonable exercise of rights on the 
general principles of international law, such as bona fides, fairness and equity in the 
light of the purpose of the competing rights.
555
 Thus, the idea of reasonable 
application and exercise of rights appears to be closely linked with a proportionality 
balance between them under the chapeau as well.  
In conclusion, the Appellate Body applies a complete test taking into consideration 
the purposive wording of the chapeau and the nature of the GATT and GATS 
treaties, which are more like law-making treaties (traité-loi) rather than simple 
contractual treaties (traité-contrat). As multilateral treaties based on good faith. The 
most-favoured nation principle encourages cooperation and avoids unilateralism 
(which is required for international tax issues, such as counteracting international tax 
avoidance and evasion, exchange of information, worldwide taxation, transfer 
pricing, and controlled foreign corporation taxation). With discrimination and 
necessity on one hand, and good faith, reasonableness and abuse of rights on the 
other, all inextricably entwined with proportionality and at the core of the 
GATT/GATS agreements, it may be argued that proportionality reasoning coupled 
with reasonableness is a key principle of interpretation and application of these 
agreements. 
 
III.3.3. Contrast with other jurisdictions and conclusion.   
  
                                                 
554
 US - Gasoline, p.22. On the differentiation and interaction between proportionality and 
reasonableness standards, see Chapters I; II.2; IV, sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
555
 At paragraph 158, footnote 156, the Appellate Body cited the following authorities: “B. Cheng, 
General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 
1953), Chapter 4”; and “Jennings and Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed, Vol. I 
(Longman's, 1992), pp. 407-410, Border and Transborder Armed Actions Case, (1988) I.C.J. Rep. 
105; Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco Case, (1952) I.C.J. Rep. 176; Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 142.” Particularly, a quotation of the former was worth 
mentioning:  “A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in such a case is one which is 
appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the 
right is intended to protect).  It should at the same time be fair and equitable as between the parties 
and not one which is calculated to procure for one of them an unfair advantage in the light of the 
obligation assumed.  A reasonable exercise of the right is regarded as compatible with the obligation.  
But the exercise of the right in such a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other contracting 
party arising out of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona fide 
execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty”, p.125 (emphasis added in the Appellate 
Body decision at footnote 156). 
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Within the WTO agreements, the non-discrimination provision is a fundamental 
principle, and the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body largely applies the test of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness, mainly in its aspects of necessity 
(reasonably available alternative measures) and balancing. It may also be right to 
suggest that in the WTO (GATT 1994) case law there is a dynamic or a more holistic 
approach to the issue of discrimination, under both the standard of the likeness of 
products between domestic and foreign goods,
556
 and the two-tier test of 
discrimination (Article XX).  
 
The ECJ has evolved mandatory requirements in the general interest, such as fiscal 
supervision, combating tax avoidance, tax coherence and allocation of taxing powers 
between Member States, to justify restrictions on fundamental freedoms; all are 
subjected to the proportionality test.
557
 The WTO has recognised some tax 
restrictions on free trade, also based on proportionality reasoning, to accept 
discriminatory treatment on grounds of public policy under Article XX including 
combating tax evasion and avoidance (Bovine Hides and Dominican Republic - 
Cigarettes cases). It is worth noting the open-endedness,  particularly of Article XX 
(d), concerning measures ‘necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement’, since compliance 
with any law or regulation might in principle justify restrictive trade measures.  
 
Although as regards non-discrimination under the commerce clause in the US, the 
cost-benefit analysis may be more relevant, its similarity to proportionality reasoning 
is also clear given the factual circumstances and the interests at stake in each case.
558
 
Perhaps, the main difference between proportionality and cost-benefit analysis is that 
the former ‘generally provides a margin of deference to the local regulation’ and 
                                                 
556
 "In view of the objectives of avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions 
and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships, we decline to take a static view of the 
term 'directly competitive or substitutable.'"(Appellate Body Report on Korea - Alcoholic Beverages, 
paragraph 120). 
 
557
 See next Chapter. 
 
558
 As Joel Trachtman pointed out “in the EU and the US contexts, terms like proportionality and 
balancing tests, and even cost-benefit analysis, are often used interchangeably” (p.77). See also 
Regan, (2007), pp.352-3. 
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focuses on ‘proportionate costs and benefits instead of benefits in excess of costs.’559  
These differences may not be greater than their similarities, and may depend on how 
they are applied in practice and the relative importance of their labels in each case. In 
the ECHR the tool of proportionality as a trade-off is also clear, particularly where a 
utilitarian line of thought prevails, with a clear but controlled application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. 
 
Proportionality reasoning might arguably be the same as that applied in EU Law to 
avoid double standards regarding restrictions on free trade, particularly on goods and 
services. The justifications on grounds of public policy and the general interest 
should be and have been assessed in terms of their legitimacy and fairness within an 
international context. In other words, it may not be fair if the EU applies a close 
scrutiny on proportionality grounds for a restriction to trade between Member States, 
whereas transactions with third countries would be subject to a more lenient test of 
proportionality under the WTO rules and principles against discrimination. On the 
other hand, developing and least-developed countries could be in a more 
continuously unfavourable position, if their products had to be scrutinised in a way 
that would hinder their access to the world market more than that of developed 
countries. Thus, their development could be harder in the realm of international 
trade, which is understood not only as free but also fair. Meanwhile, discrimination 
may be necessary to promote the main objectives of international trade liberalisation 
since free trade and competition are means and not ends in themselves.  
The next chapter will illustrate the role of proportionality as an overarching principle 
of interpretation and application of other legal principles and rules in the conciliation 
and harmonization of objectives within EU law in tax matters.  
                                                 
559
 Idem, p. 74, citing the definition of Sunstein ‘as requiring that aggregate social benefits are 
proportionate to the aggregate social costs’, at note 178 (C.R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: 
Reconceiving the Regulatory State, HUP, 1990, at 181). 
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IV. European Union Law (the European Court of Justice) 
 
In contrast with all the other jurisdictions analysed in the previous Chapters, the 
proportionality concept appears to be slightly more pervasive and effective under the 
European Union system of jurisprudence. This Chapter will essentially analyse how 
the European Court of Justice (the Court) has been applying proportionality to tax 
matters.  
First, after some comments on its nature and main characteristics as a general 
principle of EU law, proportionality will be considered with regard to the four 
fundamental freedoms of movement (of goods, persons, services, and capital), and 
also through the rule of reason. The European Court of Justice has decided that some 
differences between national tax systems are acceptable and others unacceptable 
under the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the TFEU,
560
 and proportionality has 
been the most flexible and dynamic instrument for that determination.  
Secondly, this Chapter will describe and make some comments on the importance of 
proportionality regarding the imperative requirements in the public interest in tax 
matters (effectiveness of fiscal supervision, coherence of the tax system, allocation of 
taxing powers between Member States, combating tax avoidance, including tax 
measures with environmental protection purposes).  
Thirdly, it will analyse the Value Added Tax (VAT) case law to demonstrate how 
important is proportionality to determine and enforce its tax principles such as 
neutrality and abuse of rights within the internal market. Finally, it will examine 
proportionality as an overarching principle of law concerning retrospective 
legislation in its role of balancing other key principles of Community law such as 
legal certainty, legitimate expectation and the general interest.    
                                                 
560
 “So called reasonable national rules …. could be left to the discretion of Member States’ national 
courts and their legal systems” in Swaine, Edward, “Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the 
European Court of Justice” (2000) Harv. I.L.J. 41, p.21-22. The role of proportionality can also be 
seen in justifications for compatibility of Double Taxation Conventions with EU Law, see O’Shea, 
Tom, EU Tax Law and Double Tax Conventions, (Avoir Fiscal Limited, London 2008), Chapter 3.  
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IV.1 Proportionality as a general principle of Community Law  
 
Craig and De Burca emphasize that, “proportionality is now a well established 
principle of Community law” and “a version of the principle is now enshrined in 
Article 5 EC, which provides that action by the Community shall not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty”.561 It is well accepted that 
proportionality may permeate all Articles of the Treaty and may assume different 
nuances depending on the subject matter of each case brought to the Court.
562
 As a 
matter of principle, the European Court of Justice has been applying the 
proportionality notion in challenging EU and State actions, ascertaining their 
reasonableness and proportionality according to their purposes and to the objectives 
of the Treaty. Furthermore, proportionality has been a useful and vital instrument in 
balancing and determining the meaning of all principles, rights, fundamental 
freedoms, and objectives the Treaty explicitly or implicitly pursues. 
Normally, there are three steps in order to determine whether a particular measure is 
proportionate or not:  
(1) Whether the measure is suitable to achieve the desired end; 
(2) Whether it is necessary to achieve the desired end; 
                                                 
561
 EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP, 2003), p.372. Community has changed to Union since 
December 2009 and the expressions 'European Community law' and 'European Union law' are used 
interchangeably throughout the text. The legal basis of the principle of proportionality is the general 
principles of law like the rule of law itself, and that any limit to the freedom should not go beyond the 
degree necessary in the public interest, rather than specific articles of the Treaty (Jacobs and White, 
2002, p.2; Tridimas, 1999, p.89; Emiliou, 1996, p.134-138).  
 
562
 See Tridimas, p.103; Emiliou, p.134; and Craig and Burca, idem. See also Jürgen Schwarze, who 
demonstrated that the proportionality principle is “applicable in virtually every area of Community 
law as a criterion in the assessment of the legality of actions of the Community institutions and of 
national authorities, which has often had a decisive effect, in relation to both legislative and executive 
action.” in European Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1992) p.853, and Chapter 5 on the 
principle of proportionality. 
 
 174 
(3) Whether the measure imposes a burden on the individual that is 
excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved 
(proportionality stricto sensu).
563
  
In the words of the Court, the three-prong test of proportionality is quite clear: 
“It must be recalled that the principle of proportionality, which is one 
of the general principles of Community law, requires that measures 
adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is 
appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately 
pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between 
several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least 
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to 
the aims pursued.”564   
In other words, that test may require that a measure ought to be reasonably related to 
its objective, ought to be the least restrictive or the least burdensome or still the least 
intrusive means of obtaining the desired objective, and that its benefits ought not to 
outweigh its costs. The latter aspect appears to be the most relevant and it has been 
called “true proportionality”.565 Apparently, one requirement seems to be lacking in 
those three steps: the legitimacy of the objectives.
566
 However, there is an alternative 
view according to which the determination whether the means and the ends 
                                                 
563
 Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, p.372. On the three steps of the principle and its closeness to the 
German concept of proportionality, see Emiliou, Ibidem, p.134, citing the Fedesa case analysed below 
in the topic related to the retrospective legislation (section 8 of this Chapter). See also Tridimas, 
Ibidem, (p.92) on the tri-partite test under which in practice there may be no distinction between the 
second and the third according to the cases decided by the Court. 
 
564
 United Kingdom v Commission Case C-180/96 [1998] ECR I-2265, paragraph 96. See also the 
Fedesa case cited as authority on retrospective legislation, in section 8 below. 
 
565
 Snell, Jukka, Goods and Services in EC Law (OUP, 2002), p.200. 
 
566
 See Engel, Christoph, supra note 97, p.3.  See also Handyside (ECHR, Chapter IV.2.2) on the 
requirement of a pressing social need and Lindsay v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2002] STC 
588, in which the English Court of Appeal seems to have applied the four tests, in which the 
legitimacy of the objective would be a  “pressing social need” whereas the others are suitability (“a 
way of achieving that end”), necessity (“no less intrusive way of achieving it”), and proportionality 
“stricto sensu” (“it does not involve an excessive interference with rights”). 
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themselves are legitimate or not is prior to the proportionality test.
567
 A better view 
would appear to be that the Court may scrutinize the legitimacy of the ends under the 
constitutionality test, and not necessarily under the proportionality test.
568
  My view 
is that the analysis of whether the ends are legitimate or not is a logical, sensible and 
fair requirement to apply the test of proportionality coupled with reasonableness. 
There is no application of proportionality where the objective of the questioned 
measure is illegitimate, but this assessment of legitimacy must be made, or else 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness would turn into a formulaic process with 
no ultimate purpose of fairness.
569
 For instance, the Court may strike down any 
measure that directly and clearly falls foul of the Treaty without further examination 
of its suitability, necessity, and intrusiveness, since the objective itself may be 
manifestly unlawful. It has been suggested that in practice the Court does not 
evaluate the objectives of the Member States’ measures, provided that the purpose is 
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 See Messerschmidt, Klaus, “Efficiency and the Principle of Proportionality” available at 
<www.eurofaculty.lv/papers>, p.4. This author rightly points out that proportionality cannot be 
attributed to only one nation and illustrates the Supreme Court of Canada as having the following 
concept of proportionality, “The proportionality requirement has three aspects: (1) the existence of a 
rational connection between the impugned measure and the objective; (2) minimal impairment of the 
right or freedom, and (3) a proper balance between the effects of the limiting measures and the 
legislative objective.” (Regina v Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, apud Messerschmidt, p.5). This decision 
was expressly referred to by the Constitutional Court of South Africa when the death penalty was 
regarded as unconstitutional under the test of proportionality (Jackson, Vicki C, and Tushnet, Mark, 
Comparative Constitutional Law, (Foundation Press, 1999), pp. 605-06). This may illustrate the 
borrowing of the proportionality principle as an unwritten principle of interpretation and application 
of other legal rules and principles from other constitutional and international courts. 
 
568
 That seems to be summarized in particular cases decided by the Court, in which firstly it analyses 
the legitimacy of the objective of a measure under the imperative requirements in the general interest 
for justification of a restriction to the fundamental freedoms, such as tax avoidance, fiscal supervision, 
and tax coherence objectives; and secondly the same measure is scrutinized under the proportionality 
test. See, inter alia, Gebhard case C-55/94 [1995] ECR II-1135, Bosman Case C-415/93 ECR I-4921 
in section 3 of this Chapter, and all tax cases regarding justification on those grounds. 
 
569
 The analysis of legitimacy of the ends is also extensively made by the ECHR sometimes explicitly 
as happened in the following cases: Reiner (Chapter III, section 2.5.c), Darby (Chapter III, section 
2.5.c), and  M.A. and Others (Chapter III, section 2.6.a). An implicit analysis of the legitimacy of the 
ends was made in Van Raalte (Chapter III, section 2.5.b), as the Court extended a (legitimate) tax 
exemption to a situation not set out in domestic law. If this tax exemption was not legitimate, and in 
my opinion it really was, it should be struck down and not extended to similar situations. See also the 
discussion on the margin of appreciation and the principle of proportionality within the ECHR 
(Chapter III, section 2.4.a).   
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not economic, but scrutinizes the suitability and necessity of the means employed, 
“thus flushing out protectionist measures” 570  
There is no proper definition of each of the above three steps of proportionality; and 
it has been suggested that proportionality remains a vague concept because 
ambiguity pervades the three constituent elements, and leads to uncertainty as to 
which interests have to be taken into account.
571
 One may say that suitability, for 
example, falls somewhere between “indispensability” and “usefulness,”572 but that 
relative indeterminacy is a constant of that principle that is inherently flexible, and 
whose role is also to balance opposite interests and apparently conflicting rules and 
principles.
573
 In my opinion that flexibility of the standard of reasonableness, which 
pervades the three steps of proportionality, is important to reach fairness in all cases, 
particularly where a purposive and contextual construction should prevail over a 
literal interpretation of municipal and international law, paying due regard to all 
relevant facts. The principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness must not 
be a mathematical formula, but it must be applied in a consistent and fair way taking 
into account and balancing all the principles at stake as well as all the objective 
factors.   
It has been also suggested that the most striking point about the doctrine of 
proportionality is the great margin of discretion of the Court.
574
 However, the greater 
the discretion may be, the higher the standard of consistency that must be demanded, 
since the fundamental role of proportionality has been to weigh different and 
apparently conflicting rules and principles in specific circumstances to reach a 
reasonable and balanced sense of fairness. 
                                                 
570
  Snell (2002), p. 218. On the economic purpose prohibition, see inter alia the Open Skies 
(Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Case C-466/98 [2002] ECR I-
9427, paragraph 56.  
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 Gerven, Walter van, The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the European 
Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe (Hart, Oxford 1999),  pp.39 and 60. 
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 See Jans, Jan H., “Proportionality Revisited” (2000) L.I.E.I. 27(3), p.245. 
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 On the differences and similarities between the principle of proportionality and the reasonableness 
standard of review and their interaction, see Chapter I, sections 1 and 2. 
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 Hartley, T.C. The Foundations of European Community Law (OUP, USA 2003), p.152. 
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Since the reception of proportionality from some national jurisdictions,
575
 the Court 
has developed this concept in order to make the principles and fundamental rules 
enshrined in the European Community Treaty (ECT, or by its present name the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU, the Treaty) really effective, 
according to its economic and social objectives. This also has germane effects in the 
tax field, as discussed below.  
                                                 
575
 Both the EU principles of proportionality and the protection of legitimate expectations have been 
regarded as originally borrowed from the German legal order (Lenaerts, K., Comparative Law and EC 
Law, p.121). As analysed in Chapter II, the same notion of proportionality is seen in  US 
jurisprudence, and other international jurisdictions, and has been argued to be a general principle of 
international public law and as a relevant rule of international law, within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public 
International Law (OUP, 1990) at 626, apud Montini, Massimiliano, “The Nature and Function of the 
Necessity and Proportionality Principles in the Trade and Environment Context” [1997] RECIEL, vol. 
6 (2), p.129.  
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IV.2. Proportionality, taxation, and the fundamental freedom of goods 
IV.2.1. Custom duties (Articles 28-30 TFEU) 
The Court in Louloudakis
576
 gave a clear demonstration of how proportionality 
works, balancing apparently conflicting principles and deciding which circumstances 
must be taken into account in each case. In this case, the principle of proportionality 
was explicitly applied in order to determine the balance between the tax penalty and 
the gravity of the infringement, in the light of the freedom of movement of goods. 
The Court also stated that the good faith of the offender, and the difficulties raised by 
the determination of the applicable arrangements, ought to be taken into account. 
This was in contrast with the general principle of law under which everyone is 
presumed to know the law.  
The facts and the legal issue were whether a means of transport temporarily imported 
by a Greek national married to an Italian national, and having family and business 
interests in both countries, was exempt from excise duties or not. The Court gave 
precedence to the principle of good faith over the principle according to which 
ignorance of the law is inexcusable. The purpose of the directive that granted 
exemption to vehicles temporarily imported was ascertained under the freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty. From that perspective, the penalties were also considered 
disproportionate because they went beyond what was strictly necessary for the 
objectives pursued (requirements of enforcement and prevention of evasion) that 
may justify national legislation setting penalties at a certain level of severity. In 
conclusion, the Court said that even a particular circumstance such as the vehicle’s 
age ought to be taken into account when fixing the penalty, because otherwise to fix 
the penalty only on the basis of cubic capacity could increase the duties, which might 
be as much as ten times the charges at issue. Proportionality was clearly applied in 
that case, not only for balancing two apparently conflicting principles but also for 
determining which particular circumstances ought to be taken into account. 
                                                 
576
 Case C-262/99. See the opinion of Michael Dougan (“Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing EU 
Law”, in The evolution of EU Law, edited by Paul Grainne and Grainne De Burca, Oxford, 2011, p. 
426 note 97) on how the Court was simply applying in this case general principles of EU law. See also 
EC Tax Review 254 – 255, (Vol. 10, No. 4, 2001). 
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IV.2.2. Trade restrictions on imports and the rule of reason (Articles 34-30). 
Reasonableness, proportionality, and the origin of the overriding requirements 
in the public interest. 
The basis of the rule of reason may demonstrate a close relationship between 
reasonableness and proportionality.  It is generally accepted that in the well-known 
case Cassis de Dijon
 577
 the seeds of the rule of reason, which were sown in an earlier 
case (Dassonville),
578
 came to fruition.  As Jukka Snell pointed out, in Dassonville 
the Court “both gave a wide formulation to the scope of Article 28 (ex 30) EC and 
hinted at an exception for ‘reasonable’ rules.”579 A certificate of origin (from the 
British authorities) required by Belgian law was regarded as very difficult to obtain 
with respect to goods (Scotch whisky) already in free circulation in a third country 
(France). After having stated that the most important characteristic of measures 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions was their effects, the Court ruled as follows:  
“In the absence of Community system guaranteeing for consumers the 
authenticity of a product’s designation of origin, if a Member State 
takes measures to prevent unfair practices in this connexion, it is 
however subject to the condition that these measures should be 
reasonable and that the means of proof required should not act as a 
hindrance to trade…”580  
Under Belgian law, only direct importers would be able to meet that requirement, 
which might constitute an arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.  
In conclusion, the Court held that requirement unreasonable pursuant to the 
fundamental freedom of movement of goods, taking into account that indirect 
                                                 
577
 Rewe Zentral AG Case C-120/78. See also Craig and De Burca (2003), pp.636-39; Emiliou (1996), 
pp. 232-39; and Tridimas (1999), pp.126-9. 
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 Dassonville, Case C-8/74 [1974] ECR-837, in which the Court stated that “all trading rules enacted 
by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trader” are forbidden by Art. 28 (ex-30) on quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect. See Terra, Ben and Wattel, Peter, EU Tax Law (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 
p.31; Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, p. 636; Emiliou, Ibidem , pp.230-1. 
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 Goods and Services in EC Law, p. 182. See also Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, p.617.  
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 Paragraph 6 of the judgment (emphasis added). 
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importers were not really in a situation to satisfy it “without facing serious 
difficulties.”581 As circumstances change and the notion of “reasonable” may be 
living and changeable as well, in a later decision the Court regarded as acceptable the 
requirement of a certificate of origin that had become easier to obtain, according to 
new information provided by the British and Belgian governments.
582
 Furthermore, 
in that case the Court, after having referred to Dassonville, stated that the essential 
issue was whether the measures taken to ensure the authenticity of origin were 
unreasonable or not, that was, whether they were disproportionate or not in relation 
to that objective.
583
 In other words, the Court ascertained the meaning of reasonable 
as being closely related to proportionate. 
In contrast with Dassonville, in Cassis the Court dealt with a non-discriminatory 
rule. In the latter case, the Court declared invalid a German rule that required a 
minimum content of alcohol to certain alcoholic beverages under which a French 
liquer could not be commercialised in Germany. The relevant legal issue was that the 
rule was not discriminatory because it was also applied to domestic beverages and 
Article 28 EC (now Article 34 TFEU) in principle dealt with restrictive situations 
only on imports. The derogations from Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC) are in 
Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC), which allows Member States to discriminate 
against imports on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security, and 
other economic and social reasons.
584
 Thus, the legal scenario was that non-
discriminatory rules (restrictive on both domestic and imported goods) did not fall 
within Articles 28-30 EC. However, the Court stated that even non-discriminatory 
rules were covered by Article 28 EC in order to pursue the objectives of the Treaty (a 
                                                 
581
 Idem, paragraph 8. 
 
582
 Commission v Kingdom of Belgium Case C-2/78 [1979] ECR-1761, paragraph 43.  
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 Idem, paragraph 38. On the role of proportionality in ascertaining reasonableness see also Chapters 
I, section 2; and III, section 2.2..  
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 Including expressly “the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection 
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial 
and commercial property” (Art. 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). On the 
extension of these explicit exceptions to services and other fundamental freedoms, which do not 
provide for the same but public policy, public health and public security, see next sections 3, 4 and 5. 
See also on similar justifications applied to goods and services, particularly on environmental 
protection, Snell (2002), p.185 (and n.99), and section 4 of this Chapter.  
 
 181 
single market with no barriers on intra-community trade, among other social and 
economic objectives), and, as a consequence, restrictions on imports and exports 
should be read down as any restriction that may hinder community trade. 
Furthermore, in the same decision (Cassis) the Court established reasonable 
derogations from that new and creative construction of Article 28 EC, that is, the so-
called imperative requirements
585
  (relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions 
and the defence of the consumer).
586
 Thus, since Cassis, even non-discriminatory 
rules have been prohibited if they hinder trade in the Community and cannot be 
reasonably justified under the test of the imperative requirements.
587
 The ideas of 
reasonableness and proportionality were clearly highlighted in that decision when the 
Court stated that, in order to protect the customers from being deceived – the alleged 
purpose of German law – some less restrictive means could be adopted. These 
included liquor labels simply demonstrating their alcoholic content and not the most 
restrictive measure of prohibiting the circulation of light alcoholic beverages, as this 
went against the fundamental freedom of movement of goods.  
Although not so clear at the beginning, the further application of the overriding 
requirements has helped to make crystal clear the role of proportionality
588
 and point 
out its difference from the notion of reasonable construction and ascertainment of 
legal rules and principles. It is also important to note that these imperative 
requirements were extended to the other fundamental freedoms (of movement of 
                                                 
585
 The notion of general interest that the imperative requirements pursue may be considered as 
synonymous with the notion of pressing social need for justification under a broad test of 
proportionality.  
 
586
 The list of the heads of justification is already a long one and many examples can be found 
according to the developing cases of the Court (Snell, 2002, p.191-2). 
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 As Tridimas (1999) pointed out since “Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon liberated Article 28[30] 
from the notion of discrimination, the Court had no option but to rely on the principle of 
proportionality in order to draw the demarcation line between lawful and unlawful impediments to 
trade”, p.128. 
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 In Sandoz Case C-174/82 [1983] ECR-2445, the Court had already ruled that the principle of 
proportionality is the basis of the last sentence of Art 30 EC “to attain the legitimate aim of protecting 
human health” (para. 18, apud Craig and De Burca, 2003, p.633). There would be no reason why the 
same principle should not underpin the imperative requirements as reasonable derogations from the 
public express exceptions. 
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persons and capital, and to provide services) with relevant tax consequences 
discussed in the following sections (IV.3, IV.4, IV.5 and IV.6).
589
 
IV.2.3. The relationship between State aid and the freedom of movement of 
goods (Articles 34-36 rule of reason and 107 TFEU) 
Under Articles 107-109 TFEU (ex Articles 87-89 EC) State aids are in principle 
contrary to the common market; however, there are some exceptions that may be 
lawful. Whereas that incompatibility does not have direct effect and are subjected to 
a de minimis rule, Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC) has such direct effect and is 
not submitted to the latter rule.
590
 Although those differences are quite clear and 
settled, the Court applied the notion of proportionality in order to regard a particular 
measure as falling within either Art. 34 or Art. 107 TFEU (ex Art. 28 or Art. 87 EC). 
As decided in the Iannelli case, even though some measures form part of a system of 
aid, they may be considered as “not being necessary for the attainment of its object 
or for its proper functioning,” and in this situation there are no reasons why other 
provisions of the Treaty should not be applied.
591
 
In a specific tax case decided by the Court under Article 28 EC (Article 34 TFEU), 
an incentive given by French tax legislation to newspaper publishers was held invalid 
because there was no reasonable justification for having an equivalent effect to 
                                                 
589
 Luc Hinnekens argued that the Court has applied the rule of reason in a more restrictive way in the 
direct tax area (“European Court Goes for Robust Tax Principles for Treaty Freedoms. What about 
Reasonable Exceptions and Balances?” [2004] EC Tax Review, 2004, p.66). However, the point that 
should be made is that the public interest requirements are open ended and not limited in principle to 
fiscal supervision, tax coherence, environmental protection, tax avoidance, and balance in the 
allocation of taxing rights as further discussed on those sections, in which proportionality has been an 
essential tool for the enforcement of the fundamental freedoms, since same economic and legal 
principles underpin them. 
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 Oliver, Peter, Free Movement of Goods in the EC (Sweet and Maxwel, 2003), pp.99 and 107 
(Cases 296 and 318/82, Commission v Netherlands, regarding State aid; and Cases 177-8/82 Van de 
Haar [1984] ECR 1795 regarding Art 28). 
 
591
 Idem, p. 107, quoting Iannelli C-74/76 [1977] ECR-557. The Court ruled that Art 28 EC would 
apply to an “arrangement whereby aid is granted to traders who obtain supplies of imported products 
through a State agency but is withheld when the products are imported direct, if this distinction is not 
clearly necessary for attainment of the objective of the said aid or for its proper functioning” (idem, 
ibidem).  See also Craig and De Burca (2003), p.1163, on this case regarding the relationship between 
State aid and the rule of reason.    
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quantitative import restrictions.
592
 Besides the application of the relevant test of 
justification, that case is also interesting since a direct tax on profits was used as a 
means of indirectly restricting imports.
593
 The incentive was that either any 
expenditure incurred for acquiring assets used for publishing would be a current 
allowance (not subjected to depreciation over a number of years), or any reserve for 
that purpose would be tax-free, under the proviso of it not benefiting in any respect 
any part of the publication being printed abroad. The French government also tried to 
defend the incentive under Article 87 EC (Article 107 TFEU), since it argued that the 
tax provision could not be separated from the general aid scheme for the newspaper 
industry. Here again proportionality was a useful instrument to balance both Articles 
(State aid permissible under some economic and social conditions and the prohibition 
of restrictive measures on imports), pointing out that they have a common objective, 
namely to ensure the free movement of goods, and that the “mere fact that a national 
measure may possibly be defined as aid within the meaning of Article 92 [now 87] is 
therefore not an adequate reason for exempting it from the prohibition contained in 
Article 30 [now 28].”594  
It has been suggested that the relationship between Articles 34 and 107 TFEU is still 
in a situation of uncertainty.
595
 However, one may consider that in the field of State 
aid and the common market, social, political, and economic factors are changeable 
and to some extent unpredictable, and that proportionality reasoning coupled with 
reasonableness may bring more certainty without eliminating some margin of 
discretion.
596
 
In has also been submitted that proportionality is the most flexible instrument for 
determining the legality of restrictions on trade, and the same could be said with 
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 Commission v France, Case C-18/84. See comments on that case in Terra and Wattel (2003), pp. 
34-5; and Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, pp.1163-4. See also Peter Oliver (2003), p.108. 
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 On the use of direct taxation to restrict imports, see also Chapter III.3 in the WTO context. 
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 Quoting the decision, Craig and De Burca, Ibidem n.533, p.1164.   
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 Oliver (2003), p.108. 
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 On the role of the rule of reason and proportionality to ascertain the state aid definition, see 
Eeckhout, Piet, and Biondi, Andrea, “State Aid and Obstacles to Trade”, particularly pp. 114-15, in 
The Law of State Aid in the European Union (OUP, 2004).  
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regard to taxation. Although one may also accept that, in economic terms, 
proportionality may not necessarily be the most efficient because “it inserts a degree 
of uncertainty, encourages litigation, and, in that respect, it is liable to increase 
transaction costs”.597  However, it is also vital to remember that, in taxation, there are 
many principles and rules apparently conflicting and open, which need to be 
reconciled and ascertained by judicial decisions, and that may be a sensible cost for 
more consistency, fairness, and effectiveness of some principles that should not be 
simply aspirational. For example, if the Courts give more prevalence to objective 
justification under the full assessment of proportionality in tandem with 
reasonableness in search of fairness in every individual case, in detriment to a 
utilitarian view, more exceptions to general rules and more cases will have to be 
decided.
598
 The problem with categorizations is that they may cause hardship in 
specific cases, and one of the roles of the Courts is to remedy these cases as well. For 
fairness not to be just an aspiration, but really enforceable, and not just theoretical, 
but effective in the real life for all cases, more litigation may be necessary.   
IV.2.4. Domestic taxation and protective measures (Articles 110-113 TFEU). 
Discriminatory and non-discriminatory rules under the test of justification. 
If the previous rules regarding the freedom of movement of goods deal with actual or 
potential cross border transactions only (Articles 28-30 on excise duties and Articles 
34-36 TFEU on restrictive measures on imports and exports, providing the right of 
access to the market), Articles 110-113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union fill the gap that could exist for discrimination against the products 
of other Member States through internal taxation when those products would already 
be in a Member State (right of equality in the market). They prohibit internal taxation 
that either directly or indirectly discriminates against domestic and similar imports or 
that afford indirect protection to other products.
599
 For the first set of rules, mainly 
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 Tridimas (1999), p.127. 
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 See the case Burden and Burden (at Chapter III, section 2.5.a), for instance, where the ECHR 
accepted the utilitarian argument to avoid more exceptions to the general rule, concerning inheritance 
tax that contained some special treatment for a special case (civil partnership), but not for the other at 
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 See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.30; and  Craig and De Burca (2003), pp.593 and 607. 
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Articles 28-30, discrimination is not necessary, whereas for the second (Articles 110-
113), direct or indirect discrimination is a requirement. This aspect may induce the 
view that, for “a restriction of access to the market place of a Member State” to be a 
breach of the freedoms, discrimination is not required, while, for “interference with 
participation in that market”, discrimination is required.600 
The above distinction is relevant in order to determine if a particular measure falls 
within either Article 34 or Article 110 TFEU, since for the former there is no need 
for discrimination, and it may cover tax rules as well. Proportionality once more may 
have an important role in that differentiation. Terra and Wattel give an example of a 
Danish tax that was imposed on the registration of both new cars and imported used 
cars. The Commission considered the tax on new imported cars so high that would be 
a protective measure under Article 110 TFEU (ex Article 90 EC),
601
 but the Court 
also stated that Article 110 was inapplicable as there was no similar or competing 
domestic production (Denmark did not manufacture cars). However, Article 34 
might apply since that high tax could restrict intra-Community trade, even if it was 
not discriminatory or protective given the absence of domestic production.  
On the other hand, the concept of similarity itself is not defined and the Court has a 
substantive approach to ascertaining its meaning, taking into account the economic 
characteristics of each product and its relevance in the market, in the light of the 
fundamental freedom of movement of goods. If the products are similar, 
discrimination falls within Article 110(1) and the offending State has to equalize the 
taxes on domestic and imported products. If the products are not similar, but there is 
indirect protection of some of them, there will be breach of Article 110(2) and the 
protective effect has to be removed.  
For example, there is a clear difference between wine and beer. However, in order to 
undertake a non-discriminatory tax treatment, the Court understood that the 
excessive English domestic tax on wines, when compared to that on beer, was in 
                                                 
600
 Ghosh, Julian, “The Jurisprudence of the European Court on Tax and the Fundamental Freedoms” 
(2000) C.T.R. Vol.3 (1), p.4. 
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 Terran and Wattel, European Tax Law (2003), p.10 on Commission v Denmark Case C-47/88 
[1990] ECR I-4509. 
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breach of Article 110(2).
602
 The beer was largely produced in England, while the 
wine was mainly imported. Such measure applied to softer wines represented an 
indirect protection of their products.  
The Court used the same approach regarding whisky and liqueur fruit wine, in which 
case it decided that they are not similar but the different tax treatment may be caught 
by the prohibition of indirect protection.
603
 Although whisky was taxed 
disproportionately heavily in comparison with the Danish liqueur, the relevant 
circumstance that was taken into account was that the former was taxed not alone in 
a separate category, but together with many other Danish spirits.
604
  
In contrast with those cases mentioned, the Court apparently had difficulty in 
ascertaining with certainty the similarity between spirits from cereals and other 
spirits, and concluded that in those circumstances of doubt or contestation, Article 
110(2) would be applicable.
605
 Although it may be suggested that these cases may 
confuse the issues that could be subjected to the subjective impressions and tastes of 
the judges, the point is that the conclusion may have achieved some degree of 
certainty in an area itself uncertain, even after further economic and consumer 
research had been requested. Thus, in a case where there is a sound uncertainty on 
similarity, one may reasonably expect or predict that indirect protection may be 
caught by the second paragraph of Article 110.  
In these sorts of cases, the Court’s task consists in analysing not only the form but 
also the economic substance of a measure and its effects. This was also demonstrated 
                                                 
602
 Commission v United Kingdom Case C-170/78 [1983] ECR-2265. The internal market is one of the 
factors to influence consumer and has neither to crystallize given consumer habits nor to consolidate 
an advantage acquired by national industries (Tridimas, 1999, p.138). 
 
603
 John Walker v Ministeriet for Skatter, Case C- 243/84 [1986] ECR-875. See Craig and De Burca 
(2003), p.602. 
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 See Farmer, Paul, and Lyal, Richard, EC Tax Law (OUP, 1994), p.74. In this case it was alleged 
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 Commission v France, Case C-168/78 [1980] ECR-347. See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.600-1 
and Emiliou (1996), p.151. 
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in Commission v Belgium,
606
 in which the Court considered that the difference of 6% 
between the taxes on beer (a domestic Belgian product) and wine (mainly imported) 
was insufficient to characterize a discriminatory tax treatment. There was a 
substantial difference between the cost of the two products, and the relatively small 
difference of the tax rate could not be used and considered as a protection measure 
for Belgian beer producers.  
One last case is worth mentioning because proportionality was again expressly 
applied to tax penalties, but now under Article 110.
607
 In this case, Italian legislation 
that allowed for a penalty of imprisonment and confiscation in cases of importation 
was considered disproportionate, as comparable penalties were not provided in the 
case of tax offences on domestic transactions. Although some differences in penalties 
would be admissible, by virtue of different circumstances that concern both the 
constituent elements of the offence and the greater or lesser extent of the difficulty of 
discovering them, the difference was considered disproportionate in the light of the 
free movement of goods, under Article 110 of the Treaty.  
It is thought that, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, a more stringent test of 
proportionality is required where the Treaty is in play, because its underlying 
objective is to promote an economic constitutional order rather than to facilitate free 
trade (like other agreements between the EU and third states).
608
 On the other hand, 
the decisions of the Court may be open to criticism since it seems to have applied 
different tests of justifications regarding Art 110 (internal taxation on goods) and the 
other freedoms.
609
 Whilst in the former the Court seemingly applied a more lenient 
test of justification and proportionality, in the latter the Court may have applied them 
in a stronger way. The Court seemed to be more stringent in reviewing the similarity 
of goods under Articles 90-93 EC (now Articles 110-113 TFEU) including even an 
economic analysis and thus not needing to apply a broader test of proportionality to 
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 Case C-356/85 [1987] ECR-3299. See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.605 and Terra and Wattel 
(2003), p.305. 
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 Rainer Drexl Case C-299/86. See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.11; Tridimas (1999), p.159; and 
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 Tridimas, Ibidem, p.124. 
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 Wenneras, Pal, “The De Coster case: Reflections on Tax and Proportionality” (2002) L.I.E.I. 29(2), 
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enforce the protection against discrimination.
610
 However, as discussed in the 
following sections, the objective reasons to justify different treatment either are the 
same or have a similar rationale to the imperative requirements (such as 
environmental taxation, tax coherence, allocation of taxing powers, fiscal supervision 
and tax avoidance). 
                                                 
610
 This view on being more stringent and broad on comparability analysis appears to contrast with the 
case law of the ECHR, which seems to be stricter in relation to proportionality but less strict in 
relation to comparable situations. On the fundamental role of proportionality regarding objective 
justification of ‘discrimination’ and ‘distinction’ in treatment,  see the case law of the ECHR, Chapter 
III.2.3.a, as well as tax discrimination justified by general interest concerning international trade and 
the WTO (Chapter III.3).   
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IV.3. Free movement of persons, services and capital (proportionality as an 
explicit condition for any restrictive measure) and the overriding requirements. 
 
In Gebhard,
611
 the Court summarized the rule of reason, which had already been 
applied to the freedom of movement of goods, with regard to other fundamental 
freedoms (persons, services, and capital), and clearly stated that proportionality is an 
explicit requirement for any measure that, in the public interest, may affect those 
freedoms. It then stated:               
“It follows […] from the Court’s case law that national measures 
liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions:        
               -     they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
- they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest; 
- they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; and 
-    they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it.”612 
 
As the conditions are cumulative, it follows from that decision that if a restriction on 
establishment is discriminatory, then without further question it falls within the 
Treaty’s prohibitions, and it may be possible to rely for justification only on the 
express derogations on the grounds of public policy, security, and health in Article 
52 TFEU (ex Article 46 EC). In other words, any restrictions on the fundamental 
freedoms may be justified either under the Treaty’s express exceptions613 or under a 
                                                 
611
 Case C-55/94. See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.785; Terra and Wattel (2003), p.33; and Ghosh 
(2000), p.4. 
 
612
 Gebhard, paragraph 37. See also Kraus C-19/92 [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32; Centros C-
212/97 [1999] ECR I-1459, paragraph 34; and Inspire Art C-167/01 [2003] ECR I-10155, paragraph 
133 among others. 
 
613
 Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC) for the free movement of goods, Article 45 TFEU (ex Article 
39 EC) for the free movement of workers, Articles 52 and 62 TFEU for the freedom of establishment 
and of services, and Article 65.1(a) [non-residents and residents may be treated differently for tax 
purposes] and Article 65.1(b) [public policy proviso], which applies to the free movement of capital 
and payments. See Ghosh, (2000) p.12. 
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broader and more open category of Court-developed exceptions (imperative 
requirements in the public interest),
614
 according to the rule of reason. 
 
That case is also relevant to tax matters and proportionality because direct 
discriminatory rules are almost automatically caught by the Articles that prohibit 
them, and the explicit exceptions on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health, to which proportionality may also be applied, are unlikely to be 
relevant to taxation.
615
 Thus, if a tax rule were discriminatory, it would be invalid 
without further examination of its necessity and proportionality.
616
 On the other 
hand, indirectly discriminatory and even non-discriminatory tax rules may fall under 
the exception of public interest that includes, according to the Court case law, fiscal 
supervision, fiscal coherence, allocation of taxing powers, and prevention of tax 
avoidance, provided that they are suitable and do not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve those objectives (proportionality test). 
 
It was thought that the relevant articles related to the fundamental freedoms of 
persons, services, and capital might catch only discriminatory measures.
617
 It was not 
then so clear whether the Cassis de Dijon rule of reason, regarding the movement of 
                                                                                                                                          
 
614
 See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.814. As already said, the Court also uses the terminology 
“overriding requirements in the general interest” as synonymous with imperative requirements. 
 
615
 See Ghosh, (2000) p.12 (n.45) mentioning paragraph 28 of the Advocate-General Opinion in ICI v 
Colmer [1998] STC 874. The public policy derogation neither encompasses the protection of the 
social order nor of consumers  (Commission v Spain, paragraphs 44-45, Case C-153/08 [2009] ECR-
0000). As stated by the Court, the public policy exception that may allow discriminatory measures is 
also under the proportionality scrutiny (Open skies, Case C-466/98, paragraph 57). A clear example of 
the applicability of proportionality to the public derogations is Campus Oil case C-72/83 [1984] ECR-
2727 with regard to public security (paragraph 37, apud Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, p.631). In 
Commission v Spain, the Court also stated that regarding “the objective of preventing money 
laundering and combating tax evasion, it is not necessary to determine whether that objective could 
fall within the definition of public policy,” where the tax exemption only for national lotteries was 
discriminatory in nature and unjustifiable by being disproportionate to those objectives (Case C-
153/08, paragraph 39). 
 
616
 On a similar issue whether environmental protection falls within either Art. 36 or the developed 
imperative requirements, see the next section.  
 
617
 See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.41, regarding persons and undertakings, and Tridimas (1999), p.78, 
regarding persons and services. See also Farmer and Lyal (1994), p.31, on Commission v Greece Case 
C-305/87 [1989] ECR-1476, in which the Court stated that the Articles regarding the fundamental 
freedoms specifically implemented Article 6 EC (now Article 18 TFEU) that prohibits discrimination 
on grounds of nationality.  
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goods (Article 34 TFEU), could also protect the other fundamental freedoms, even 
from non-discriminatory rules, that might hinder or simply make less attractive the 
exercise of those freedoms. Similarly, what was indicated regarding goods was that 
the emancipation of the freedoms “from the notion of discrimination elevated 
proportionality to the determining criterion of compatibility with Community 
law.”618 
 
From a systematic, logical and principled construction, one may agree that the Court 
illustrated “convergence and harmonization in the interpretation and application of 
the fundamental freedoms”,619 which should be similarly construed since the same 
principles underpin them.
620
 On the other hand, it is suggested that the Court has not 
always been consistent in applying either the rule of reason (imperative 
requirements) or the Treaty’s express derogations. This is because it apparently 
applied the former where there was clear discrimination, even though indirect 
(Bachmann
621
), and the latter only in other discriminatory situations (Commission v 
France,
622
 Avoir Fiscal case, and Royal Bank of Scotland
623
).
624
 However, there is an 
alternative view, with which I agree in part,
625
 in the sense that the rule of reason is 
also applicable to indirect discrimination and not only to non-discriminatory rules, 
while the express derogations would be more appropriate to direct discrimination.
626
 
                                                 
618
 Tridimas (1999), p.94. 
 
619
 See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.41. 
 
620
 See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.784. They rightly suggest that the Court in recent years has put 
less emphasis on discrimination and more on liberalization, at p.768. 
 
621
 Case C-204/90 [1992] ECR I-249. In this case the Court indicated that covert (indirect) 
discrimination could be justified by imperative requirements (Farmer and Lyal, 1994 p.130). 
 
622
Case C-270/83 [1986] ECR-273. 
 
623
 Case 311/97 [1999] ECR I-2651. 
 
624
 See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.43. According to Farmer and Lyal (1994), p.331, the discrimination 
in the Avoir Fiscal case was direct and could not justify a derogation from Article 52 EC (now Article 
49 TFEU). 
 
625
 See my comment on the Commission v Spain case (C-153/08) below in this section. 
 
626
 Ghosh, (2000) p.12.  This author pointed out that in Royal Bank of Scotland, the Court said that 
there was direct discrimination, which means that there was automatic breach of the Treaty, since tax 
reasons did not fall within the express derogations of public policy.  
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The point in terms of consistency is relevant since the principle of proportionality is 
hopefully flexible, but it is not desirable that it leads to uncertainty and 
inconsistency. Craig and De Burca also pointed out that in Bachmann
627
 and 
Commission v Belgium
628
 the Court decided that the national rules held indirectly 
discriminatory could be justified under the imperative requirements test (cohesion of 
the tax system i.e. optional deduction of contributions and taxation of the pension 
retirement or, vice-versa, non deduction and later exemption, in which only 
contributions paid in Belgium could be deducted),
629
 without the need for the state to 
invoke the special grounds of exception in Article 48(3) EC (now Article 54(3) 
TFEU).
630
   
 
Still another view may be worth considering as simpler and less complicated than 
that taken by the Court for explaining and applying the overriding requirements. As 
Oliver pointed out, the more straightforward approach might have been to regard 
those public interests (fiscal supervision, fiscal coherence, tax avoidance, etc) “as 
covered by the public policy exception.”631 However, the Court had, at the time the 
rule of reason developed, a stricter view of the public policy derogation, which could 
hardly be expanded.
632
 The main concern of the Court was to empower itself of the 
                                                                                                                                          
 
627
 Ibid. 
 
628
 Case 300/90 [1992] ECR I-305. 
 
629
 The Court stated that refusing deduction is a disproportionate measure to safeguard the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, but it could be acceptable under the criterion of fiscal cohesion. 
See Terra and Wattel (2003), p. 64, and the next section on further comments about Bachmann. 
 
630
 EU Law, p.721. See also the point made in relation to Bosman on the range of justifications 
considered by the Court for the (arguably directly discriminatory) nationality restrictions (p.787, 
footnote 100). Terra and Wattel also mention that important decisions besides Gebhard, within the 
ambit of measures without distinction that may be acceptable if they pass the test of the rule of reason 
(pp. 41-2). In Bosman the proportionality test was applied in all its steps, including the acceptable 
legitimacy of the objectives of the UEFA rules (financial and competitive balance between clubs, 
supporting the search for talent and the training of young players, as imperative requirements in the 
public interest by being of ‘sporting interest only’). The measure regarding the transfer fee, which was 
indistinctively applicable, failed, however, on grounds of adequacy and less intrusiveness (paragraph 
14 of the judgment). 
 
631
 Peter Oliver (2003), p.288. 
 
632
 See Segers Case 79/85 [1986] ECR-2375, n. 130; Donatella Calfa Case C-348/96 [1999] ECR I-11 
para. 21, and Commission v Spain case C- 114/97 [1998] ECR I-6717 para. 46, apud Snell, p.180, n. 
71 (n. 205).  
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authority to strike down even non-discriminatory rules, which could hinder the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms; but only those that were regarded as 
unreasonable under the imperative requirements coupled with the test of 
proportionality. Consequently, since then it has been thought that the most relevant 
distinction between the public express derogations and the imperative requirements 
“lies in their scope of application”: whereas the latter would catch only “equally 
applicable measures,” the former would catch “distinctly applicable rules.”633  
 
It has been pointed out that the Court has also applied the overriding requirements 
even to discriminatory measures.
634
 From those cases, one may infer that where a 
clear distinction between direct and indirect discrimination may not be feasible, the 
Court may apply the imperative requirements, if there is a pressing social need to do 
so through a more or less stringent test of proportionality. The more uncertainty on 
the distinction between overt and covert discrimination – or even between distinctive 
and indistinctive rules – the more the need for a close proportionality test that may 
reduce or even eliminate the level of uncertainty for justification of apparently 
unreasonable measures.  
 
My view on this issue is that the Court may implicitly apply the rule of reason to the 
prohibition on discrimination and its express exceptions on public policy, public 
security, and public health grounds. In other words, only “unreasonable” 
discrimination would fall within that prohibition and its derogations, so that any 
discriminatory measure - unrelated to public policy, health and security - that would 
not be allowed, if the proviso on discrimination were literally interpreted, would be 
permissible as long as being reasonable. Similar reasoning was made by the ECHR, 
the ICJ, and some domestic constitutional courts, such as the Supreme Court of the 
US, where they inserted the wording “unreasonable” in the prohibition on 
discrimination.
635
 The difference here is that the rule of reason is applied to the 
                                                 
633
Snell (2002), p.186. See also, on the strain of that distinction, Craig and De Burca (2003), p.660. 
 
634
 Oliver (2003), p.218, and Craig and De Burca, Ibidem, p.634-5. See also Bosman, analysed above, 
ICI v Colmer as explained below, and the tax environmental cases in the next section.  
 
635
 See Chapter I, section 2. See also the US Supreme Court cases Quaker and Hoeper (Chapter II.3); 
in the ICJ see Minority Schools in Albania case (Chapter III.2.3.a). Within the WTO all the explicit 
exceptions to the non-discrimination principle as well as the general prohibition on ‘arbitrary or 
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exceptions to discrimination, but the rationale is the same as where it is applied to 
any rules regarding direct or indirect discrimination in search of fairness. Thus, 
discriminatory tax rules, which would be outside of the scope of the public policy, 
security, and health exceptions, and as result automatically banned, only if they were 
unreasonable, according the to the imperative requirements of general interest under 
the test of proportionality. However, this does not seem to be the view of the Court, 
which has been strict in accepting direct discrimination based on the imperative 
requirements other than the public proviso exceptions.
636
 
 
One may agree that if even direct discrimination could be justifiable under the 
imperative requirements, and not under the public express derogations, there could 
be less inconsistency between the freedoms, since the most fundamental value would 
be to protect intra-Community trade and not necessarily only the prohibition of 
discrimination. In other words, a discriminatory measure might be justified under the 
broad notion of imperative requirements because what would underlie the prohibition 
of discrimination would be the notion of a single market and its corollary of 
exercising the four freedoms and other fundamental Union rights, which might not 
have been significantly hindered, depending on the circumstances of each case, and 
according to a particular pressing social need. Thus, the point may be that the same 
idea of justification should be applied to all freedoms. As Craig and De Burca appear 
to suggest, “the generic term ‘objective justification’” may have different formal 
aspects or even names (mandatory requirements for goods, imperative requirements 
for workers and services), but essentially underlie the same principles and objectives 
of the Treaty.
637
 Once again, the role of proportionality has been seen as an essential 
                                                                                                                                          
disguised discrimination’ were construed in the light of the reasonableness standard and the 
proportionality reasoning (Chapter III.3.2.c).  
 
636
 In the Commission v Spain case (C-153/08), in which tax exemption was restricted to winnings 
from lotteries and games of chance organized  by certain national bodies and entities, the Court also 
stated that direct discrimination is scrutinised under the public proviso Articles, whereas indirect 
discrimination is tested according to the imperative requirements, but analysed the justification on 
some grounds (preventing money laundering and combating tax evasion) put forward by the Spanish 
government and rejected them on proportionality grounds (paragraph 39). 
 
637
 Op. cit. p.815. See also Oliver, p.218. See again Bosman (n.74), in which the Court held that a 
requirement of ‘sporting interest only’ may justify both indistinctively applicable rules as imperative 
in the general interest and direct discriminatory rules under the test of objective justification. See also 
the tax cases in the next section. 
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element for EU legal reasoning, since “the notion of objective justification 
incorporates that of proportionality.”638 
 
A related issue is the meaning of public policy regarding taxation. As the approach of 
the Court seems to be living and changeable, Ghosh points out that where the Court 
in Royal Bank of Scotland
639
 declared that “only an express derogating provision, 
such as Article 56…could render…discrimination compatible with Community law” 
(paragraph 32 of the Judgment), it was suggested that discrimination against the 
claimant was direct discrimination “but that the public proviso could, contrary to 
previous thinking, encompass tax considerations”.640 Also in ICI v Colmer the Court 
pondered that the tax discriminatory measure in issue (a consortium relief available 
only to companies controlling subsidiaries whose seats were in the national territory 
of a Member State) could not be justified by ‘reduction of tax revenue,’ whose 
ground of justification fell neither within Article 56 EC (now Article 63 TFEU) nor 
within the overriding requirements.
641
 Thus, the need to avoid a reduction of tax 
revenue is not accepted for mere restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
642
  However, 
that question still appears to be open, and the Court might conclude, depending on 
                                                 
638
 Tridimas (1999), p.126.  
639
 Case 311/97. 
 
640
 Idem, p.25, n.75. The Court stated, in paragraph 33 of the judgment, “The Greek Government has 
not relied on any of the grounds referred to in Article 56 of the Treaty in order to justify the 
discrimination contained in the legislation in question.” In the Commission v Spain case (C-153/08) 
the Court also stated that direct discrimination are scrutinised under the public proviso Articles, 
whereas indirect discrimination is tested according the imperative requirements, but analysed the 
justification on some grounds put forward by Spanish government and reject them on proportionality 
grounds. 
 
641
 ICI v Colmer Case C-264/96 [1998] ECR I-4695, paragraph 28. In order to ascertain the 
comparability of situations between resident and non-resident companies, and whether or not there 
was justification for discrimination, the Court scrutinized other imperative requirements, particularly 
the one concerning tax avoidance (see section 6 of this Chapter). Regarding the similarity of 
justification for discriminatory and non-discriminatory tax measures see also the next section, on tax 
environmental protection, and the tax coherence justification, in section 5, particularly Schumacker C-
279/93.  
 
642
 See inter alia the following cases:  Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04 ECR I-7995, paragraph 49; and 
Lasteyrie du Saillant, C-09/02, paragraph 60. In cases of justification based on tax avoidance there is 
also a loss of revenue, but what is essentially involved is the lack of good faith of taxpayers 
implementing wholly artificial arrangements or not exercising a genuine commercial activity (see 
sections 6 and 7.2).  
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the particular circumstances of each case, potential erosion of fiscal systems would 
fall within either the public policy justification or the imperative requirements. To 
both of which the test of proportionality would be applicable in order to balance the 
apparently conflicting interests, yet without undermining the fundamental freedoms. 
In my opinion the mere reduction of tax revenue cannot solely and in its own right be 
a justification, unless temporarily and under exceptional circumstances, such as an 
extreme financial crisis. That is unlikely to happen, as other less drastic and more 
important justifications can be applied under the present imperative requirements or 
taken together with the erosion of the tax base.  
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IV.4. The interaction between environmental taxation and the fundamental 
freedoms. The role of proportionality in objective justification and in the 
scrutiny of protection of the environment as an overriding requirement in the 
general interest. 
 
 
Even before Article 2 of the EC Treaty (replaced, in substance, by Article 3 TEU) 
expressly provided for a high level of protection of the environment as a Community 
task, the Court had already considered it one of its essential objectives.
643
 As a 
consequence, either under Articles 110-113 (tax discriminatory and protective 
measures) or under Articles 34-36 TFEU (trade restrictions on imports), and still 
regarding other fundamental freedoms, environmental considerations may have been 
taken into account to justify any actually or potentially restrictive measure. That is 
what the Court has ruled in a number of cases in which the reasoning has been based 
on the proportionality test.
644
  
 
Furthermore, Article 6 of the EC Treaty provided that “environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the 
Communities’ activities and policies referred to in Article 3”, like the abolition of 
obstacles to the fundamental freedoms (Art 3(1)(b) EC), and the prohibition of all 
measures having the equivalent effect of restrictions on import and export of goods 
between Member States (Art 3(1)(a) EC).
645
 Pursuant to that express rule, which “is 
not merely programmatic; it imposes legal obligations,”646 the role of proportionality 
may have become clearer and somehow stronger in environmental protection in 
contrast with the fundamental freedoms, since the main objectives of proportionality 
                                                 
643
 See Commission v Kingdom of Denmark Case 302/86, paragraph 8.  
 
644
 Regarding Arts. 34-36 see the previous note and within an environmental tax policy see Preussen 
Elektra case C-379/98 [2001] ECR I-2099; concerning Art. 110 see Commission v Italian Republic 
Case C-21/79 [1980] ECR-1 and Outokumpu Oy Case C-213/96 [1998] ECR I-1777; and relating to 
services (Art. 49) see De Coster Case C-17/00 [2001] ECR I-09445.  
 
645
 Craig and De Burca, EU law (2003), p.32. Art 11 TFEU has the same purpose of Art 6 EC, but 
with no specific reference to other Articles of the Treaty.  
 
646
 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, paragraph 231, in PreussenElektra C-379/98. 
 
 198 
are to balance different principles according to their purposes, reconcile apparently 
conflicting rules and principles, and scrutinize them under the requirements of 
necessity, suitability and less intrusiveness. The following cases may demonstrate 
that statement. 
 
First, in terms of discrimination under Article 93 EC (now Article 113 TFEU), the 
Court accepted, in one of the leading cases regarding environmental justification, that 
tax advantages may be granted on ecological grounds, for example to encourage 
undertakings of recovery and re-use of used oils.
647
 Having accepted ecological 
considerations as a justification, the Court analysed the issue concerning the different 
taxation between regenerated oils produced in Italy and regenerated oils from other 
Member States. The Italian government tried to justify the discrimination on 
practical grounds, since the impossibility to distinguish regenerated oils (more 
ecologically friendly product) from oils of primary distillation, would lead to tax 
evasion whenever those products were imported. The Court refused that argument, 
stating that importers could produce evidence that the oils were regenerated, like a 
certificate from the authorities in the exporting State. Moreover, the Court considered 
that a higher standard of proof was not necessary in order to eliminate the risk of tax 
evasion.
648
 In other words, the Court established that less restrictive measures were 
available in order to make the different taxation on ecological grounds compatible 
with the fundamental freedom of goods under Art 90 of the Treaty (now Article 110 
TFEU).  
 
Similarly, in Outokumpu Oy,
649
 whereas the Court reiterated its statement in the 
Danish bottles case, in which it blatantly applied the proportionality test,
650
 and 
additionally mentioned Art 2 of the EC Treaty on environmental protection, it 
                                                 
647
 Commission v Italian Republic Case 21/79. See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.594. 
 
648
 Paragraph 21. 
 
649
 Case 213/96. See Terra and Wattel (2003), p.288-9.  
 
650
 Commission v Denmark Case 302/86 [1988] ECR-4607. See on this case and proportionality, 
Langer, Jurian, and Wiers, Jochem, “Danish Bottles and Austrian Animal Transport: the Continuing 
Story of Free Movement, Environmental Protection and Proportionality” (2000) RECIEL 9(2), 
pp.188-92. 
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dismissed the reason submitted by Finland that practical difficulties could justify the 
application of internal taxation that discriminated against products from other 
Member States.
651
 Although it was extremely difficult to determine precisely the 
electricity method of production (either nuclear or water power method and the raw 
materials used), the Court considered that Finnish legislation did not even give the 
importer the opportunity of demonstrating the method of production and eventually 
qualifying or not for the tax rate applicable to domestic electricity produced by the 
same method.
652
 Again, in other words, the Court accepted the objective criteria for 
different tax rates on environmental grounds but did not accept the rough measure 
adopted, since there were less restrictive means available such as permitting some 
sort of evidence in order to demonstrate the method of production.  
 
It is worth noting that the flat rate duty on imported electricity, whatever its method 
of production, was submitted as ‘equitable’ because it was not higher than the 
domestic highest rate. Thus, only in certain cases is that tax higher in comparison 
with the lowest duty charged on more environmentally friendly electricity. From a 
practical point of view and in terms of simplification, the flat rate might have been 
regarded as fair and reasonable to its aims on environmental considerations; it failed, 
however, on grounds of being the least restrictive measure in which proportionality 
plays a fundamental distinctive role from the mere notion of reasonableness or from 
a broad idea of equity in taxation.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in this case, similarly to the one previously 
analysed (Case 21/79), by balancing and contrasting the essential Community 
objective of environmental protection with the fundamental freedom of goods under 
Art 90 of the Treaty (Article 110 TFEU), through that disputed tax measure, one may 
achieve both objectives, because Finland “was left with the choice of either 
introducing a single (average) rate or of offering the importer the opportunity to 
demonstrate the method of production.”653  
                                                 
651
 Case 213/96 paragraph 38. 
 
652
 Idem, paragraph 39. 
 
653
 Terra and Wattel (2003), p.289. 
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The above cases clearly illustrate that environmental grounds may justify different 
tax regimes provided that there is neither discrimination nor any other less intrusive 
means available. It is debatable whether environmental considerations may justify 
discriminatory measures.
654
 Apparently not, but the Court has not clearly settled that 
issue yet, and maybe there will be no need to do that. The point again, as discussed in 
the previous section, would be that if only non-direct discriminatory measures might 
be justified under the imperative requirements, and the public policy, public security 
and public health exceptions might not encompass environmental protection, any 
direct discriminatory measure might not be justified on those grounds. On the other 
hand, under Article 30 EC (Article 36 TFEU) with regard to goods, if “the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals or plants” includes environmental purposes, as 
seems to be accepted in the Aher-Waggon
655
 and PreussenElektra
656
 cases, there 
might be some inconsistency in the application of the fundamental freedoms as a 
whole, since the underlying principles would be the same.
657
 In my view this 
apparent inconsistency would be solved by the application of the rule of reason to the 
express exceptions on discrimination, so that only ‘unreasonable’ non-public health 
measures would fall within the prohibition on discrimination and its public proviso 
derogations, as explained in the previous section.
658
  However, since environmental 
                                                 
654
 See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.634. They point out that there is no reason why Article 30 EC 
(Article 36 TFEU) should not include consumer protection and the environment (p.661). Further on 
this, see below De Coster, in which a discriminatory tax measure might have been justified as long as 
it had been proportionate to the objective of environmental protection. 
 
655
 Case C-389/96 [1998] ECR I-4473, in which the Court stated that German restrictions on air traffic 
noises that affected more strictly, but temporarily, aircraft registered in other Member States were 
justified by considerations of public health and environmental protection, since they were 
proportionate to the objectives pursued and those objectives were not achievable by measures that 
were less restrictive of intra-Community trade (paragraphs 19-25). 
  
656
 Case C-379/98, in which, apparently, discrimination was justified on environmental protection 
grounds within the express derogation of protecting the health and life of humans, animals and plants 
as provided in Article 30 of the Treaty (paragraph 75 of the judgment). On a seemingly contrary view, 
see Snell who points out that environmental protection is not found in Article 30 and that the Court 
“stretched the concept of health” (op. cit. p.180). 
 
657
 As Oliver (2003) at p.218 pointed out, the grounds of justification set out in Article 30 EC (now 
Article 36 TFEU) are more numerous than Article 46(1) EC (now Article 52 TFEU), as a 
consequence, more convergence was needed. The Court then has also applied the imperative 
requirements even to discriminatory measures, such as in some tax cases as well (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, ICI v Colmer), as analysed in the previous section. 
 
658
 See note 627. 
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considerations may serve essential and changeable objectives from time to time, a 
second best view may be that the protection of the environment may justify both 
discriminatory measures within the public health proviso and non-discriminatory 
(indistinctively applicable) rules or even indirectly discriminatory ones within the 
overriding requirements in the general interest, depending specifically on the legal 
and the factual circumstances of each case.  
 
Whereas in PreussenElektra
659
 an apparently discriminatory measure was justified 
on environmental grounds (to promote renewable energy sources) within also the 
public health express derogation, in the Danish bottles case (Commission v 
Denmark)
660
 a clear, non-discriminatory rule was justified under the overriding 
requirement of the protection of environment. In this latter case, the Cassis list was 
once more extended to encompass environmental justification within the imperative 
requirement of the general interest.
661
   Whatever the nature of a particular measure, 
whether distinctively applicable or not, there must be justification under the 
proportionality test. 
On the other hand, in De Coster
662
 the Court, apparently for the first time, accepted 
that environmental considerations might justify a discriminatory tax measure under 
the overriding requirements.  Taking into account the role of proportionality and the 
conflicting interests at play, the main facts and findings of that case are the 
following. The inequality of treatment, within the freedom of services, was between 
cable and satellite broadcasting companies, since only the latter method of reception 
of television programmes was subjected to a tax on satellite dishes.
663
 The 
                                                 
659
 Idem, in which was stated that the obligation on electricity suppliers to purchase electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources at minimum prices located within the respective supply area 
of each undertaking concerned, as an environmentally oriented tax policy, was “capable, at least 
potentially, of hindering intra-Community trade” (paragraph 71).  
  
660
 Case 302/86. 
  
661
 See Snell (2002), p.192, 206-7, and Craig and De Burca (2003), p.666-7. 
 
662
 Case C-17/00. 
 
663
 See an interesting analysis on how an indistinctly applicable tax on goods (internal taxation under 
Art. 90 EC – now 110 TFEU) may be regarded as breaching the Treaty under Art. 49 (Art. 56 TFEU)  
(services), in Wenneras, Pal, “The De Coster case: Reflections on Tax and Proportionality”, L.I.E.I. 
(2002) 29(2), pp.219-230.  
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Commission had observed that, whilst broadcasters established in Belgian enjoyed 
unlimited access to cable distribution, others from some Member States did not.
664
 A 
further factor of inequality was that most television broadcasting programmes from 
those Member States could only be received by satellite dishes, and a tax on them 
was likely to discourage the recipients in that region from seeking access to 
television programmes broadcast from abroad.
665
 The Municipality of Watermael-
Boitsforts, Belgian, had introduced a tax of five thousand francs per year on satellite 
dishes, regardless of size and frequency of use, preventing their uncontrolled 
proliferation, and preserving the “aesthetics of the urban environment.”666  The Court 
held that that protection of the quality of the environment could be achieved by other 
less restrictive measures available such as the regulation of the size of the dishes, 
their position, the way they are fixed or the use of communal dishes.
667
  
The similarity with the previous cases is clear regarding the way the Court justifies 
discriminatory tax measures either under Article 90 EC (internal taxation, now 
Article 110 TFEU), as stated in Commission v Italian Republic (C-21/79) and in 
Outokumpu Oy (C-213/96) or under Article 49 EC (services, now Article 56 TFEU), 
as held in De Coster (C-17/00). The test of proportionality pursuant to ecological 
considerations has been applied either under the objective justification reasoning or 
under the seemingly more elaborate, but likewise open-ended, category of imperative 
requirements in the general interest in order to achieve similar protection of the 
fundamental freedoms.
668
 De Coster is also worth noting since it may demonstrate 
the interaction between the overriding requirements of non-fiscal nature and specific 
tax measures, like the one questioned (a tax on satellite dishes) that was ultimately 
quashed only because it failed to comply with the proportionality principle. 
                                                 
664
 Paragraph 32 of the judgment. 
 
665
 Idem, paragraph 33. 
 
666
 Wenneras, op.cit., p.220. 
 
667
 Paragraph 38. 
 
668
 The intensiveness of the test of proportionality may minimize the apparently arbitrary result that 
Wenneras pointed out regarding the disparity between internal taxation on goods, which follows the 
test of non-discrimination, and internal taxation on the other freedoms, which follows the rule of 
obstacle to trade (op. cit. p.227).  
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IV.5. Proportionality and tax imperative requirements (fiscal coherence, 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, balanced allocation of taxing powers and tax 
avoidance) 
 
In Cassis,
669
 there was a list of examples of what could be understood as being 
within the public interest: the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of 
public health, the fairness of consumer transactions, and the defence of the consumer. 
Therefore, the same open-texture or open-ended requirements may apply to persons, 
services, and capital, and the Court in taxation matters has developed other possible 
justifications such as integrity of the system (fiscal coherence), and the need to 
prevent abuse of law (tax avoidance), besides fiscal supervision, but all of them are 
subjected to a close scrutiny of proportionality. In tax matters, that list is not all-
inclusive, and the Court may develop other justifications according to the public 
interest under the rule of reason. 
 
Most cases analysed below deal with direct taxation, which falls within the 
competence of the Member States, but their fiscal sovereignty in this matter has been 
limited by the obligation to comply with EU law
670
, particularly the fundamental 
freedoms.  The Court balances the fiscal sovereignty in direct taxation with the 
obligations of non-discrimination against nationals of other Member States and of 
making the exercise of the fundamental freedoms tax neutral or not less attractive, 
according to the rule of reason and the test of justification (proportionality). 
 
IV.5.1. The tax system coherence as a justification under the proportionality 
test. 
 
In relation to fiscal coherence as an imperative requirement, the Court has not 
accepted simply potential, indirect, and sometimes-illogical links between a 
                                                 
669
 See this Chapter, section 2.2. 
 
670
 Among other cases analysed below, see Schumacker (supra), paragraph 21; Wielockx case C-80/94 
[1995] ECR I-2493, paragraph 16; Gschwind Case C-391/97 [1999] ECR I-5451, paragraph 20; 
Verkooijen Ccase C-35/98 [2000] ECR I-4071, paragraph 32; and Barbier (supra), paragraph 56. 
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restrictive tax rule and its justification. Whereas in Bachmann
671
 the means used (non 
deduction of contributions to foreign insurers) was considered proportionate in order 
to make effective the option provided by the tax system, that is, (non) deduction – 
(non) taxation,
672
 in Asscher,
673
 the coherence of the tax system was not accepted 
because the Netherlands was making an unjustified link between taxation and social 
security contributions. In this latter case, the Court stated that the application of a 
higher tax rate on income did not provide any social security protection, and pursuant 
to Council Regulation No 1408/71 insurance is required in principle solely in the 
State of the employees’ residence where they pursue part of their professional 
activity.
674
 Furthermore, that higher tax rate could be regarded as very rough and 
disproportionate.
675
 Indeed, in Asscher a fundamental question may arise about the 
nature of the fiscal systems pursuant to two kinds of fairness, which may have to be 
balanced via proportionality on a case-by-case basis. On one hand, the fundamental 
freedom of workers requires that they would not be worse off by moving from one 
state to another because that would be unfair; on the other, personal income tax and 
social security systems may interact and seek for fairness as well, in a sense of 
achieving a fair share within the European Union.
676
 
                                                 
671
 Case 204/90. In Bachmann the Court stated that the cohesion could not be ensured by means of 
measures that were less restrictive according to the following considerations: an undertaking by an 
insurer could prove not to be enforceable in the other Member State for public policy reasons; the 
requirement of a deposit would not work because the additional expense would make it disinteresting 
for the insurer to maintain the contracts; the allocation of tax jurisdiction could only be reached by 
double tax treaties or by harmonization; and any other measure to guarantee the recovery of tax on 
payments made by foreign insurers would have consequences similar to those resulting from the non-
deductibility of premiums (I-282 and 283 points 21 to 27), apud Van Thiel, Servaas (EU Case Law on 
Income Tax, IBFD, 2001, pp.234-5). See also Farmer and Lyal (1994), pp.327-8, Terra and Wattel 
(2003), pp.63-7, and Williams, David, EC Tax Law (Longman, 1998), pp.106-9. 
 
672
 There is no good reason in principle why that option should not be regarded as logical and fair, 
because to tax both the contribution (non-deductible) and the benefit “would be excessive taxation”, 
whereas to tax neither would be a “subsidy” (Williams, op.cit. pp.108, n. 55). 
 
673
 Asscher Case C-107/94 [1996] ECR I-3089. The issue in this case was whether under the Treaty a 
Dutch national could be required to pay Dutch income tax at a higher rate on income accrued in the 
Netherlands, because he was not liable to social security contributions there, but in Belgium where he 
was a resident.  
 
674
 Para. 60 of the decision. See also on the social security coordination, Williams (1998), p.112-4. 
 
675
 Terra and Wattel (2003), p.58. 
 
676
 Williams, op. cit. pp.114-8. That author suggested that the Court in those cases did not ask: “is this 
person paying more tax within the EU than someone who has not moved. They ask only: is this person 
paying more within this part of the EU?” (idem, pp.117-8). 
 205 
 
Similarly, the Court held in Wielockx
677
 that, under the proportionality test applied to 
fiscal coherence, the Dutch rule that allows only residents to deduct payments to a 
pension reserve is not justified because there are less restrictive means to achieving 
the objective (the correlation between deduction and taxation) such as taxation at 
source upon liquidation, since, unlike in Bachmann, the pension reserve was 
established in the Netherlands and was not outside its jurisdiction.
678
  
 
The above-analysed cases concerned one of the main fiscal questions of personal 
income taxes in Europe: how to deal with pensions.
679
 Since they are treated as 
deferred remuneration and workers can move and receive them in another country, 
proportionality has been a useful tool for searching for principles and fairness. First, 
the rule of reason taken together with proportionality was the legal tool to develop 
the tax coherence imperative requirement that in my view is fair in trying to make 
compatible national tax systems, including its relevant principles, with the 
fundamental freedoms.
680
 Secondly, where the tax coherence appears to be just a 
formal and strict logical requirement, proportionality comes into play to assess 
national tax rules by balancing the fundamental freedoms with a fair share in the tax 
system of both host and origin countries. One may suggest that some decisions may 
help free movers to avoid responsibilities (a fair share in a tax system that interacts 
with a social security system),
681
 but where there may be evidence of abuse of a 
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 Case 80/94. See Van Thiel (2001), pp.333-81. 
 
678
 Van Thiel, Ibidem, p.359. Even if a bilateral tax treaty provided that pensions received are only 
taxable in the resident country, and as a result the reserve would never be taxed in Netherlands, the 
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 Williams (1998), p.106. 
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 See also below in this section, the fair decision in the Schumacker case, in which the Court gave 
due regard to and enforced the ability to pay and worldwide taxation principles balanced with the 
fundamental freedom of workers in the EU. 
  
681
 Idem, p.118. 
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fundamental freedom another imperative requirement, combating tax avoidance, may 
justify reasonable restrictions via the proportionality test as well.
682
 
 
The argument of coherence of the tax system was also rejected in Baars
683
 and 
Verkooijen
684, following from those authorities that establish “the link between tax 
deferral and later realization of the tax claim within the same tax and with the same 
taxpayer, or even within the same contract.”685 A direct link between deductibility 
and subsequent taxation was required in Svensson and Gustavsson,
686
 in which a 
macro-economic link between tax expenditure and tax revenue (a subsidy for 
mortgages taken out only with a Luxembourg bank, whose profits made by issuing 
mortgages would finance that subsidy) was considered insufficient.
687
 
 
Another interesting case is Schumacker,
688
 in which the Court balanced the 
imperative requirement of tax coherence with a possible justification for 
discrimination. The issue was whether a resident of Belgian employed in Germany 
could benefit from the tax regime at source like residents, mainly in respect of the 
preferential rates for married couples (the “splitting tariff”) and the annual 
adjustment for tax assessment purposes. Since Mr Schumacker was not resident in 
Germany, and consequently not subject to the worldwide income taxation (unlimited 
liability) there, he could not claim for personal allowances that were properly granted 
in the State of residence. The coherence of the tax system was accepted in principle 
to justify the different treatment between residents and non-residents, since according 
to international tax principles the overall taxation of taxpayers by taking into account 
their personal and family circumstances in order to determine their ability to pay is a 
                                                 
682
 See this Chapter, section 6.2. 
 
683
 Case 251/98. 
 
684
 Case 35/98. 
 
685
 Terra and Wattel (2003), p.71. 
 
686
 Case 484/93 [1995] ECR I-3955. 
 
687
 Terra and Wattel, Ibidem, p.71. 
 
688
 Case C-279/93. 
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matter for their State of residence.
689
 In Mr. Schumacker’s situation, however, as he 
obtained all or most of his income in the source State (Germany), and under Art 15 
(1) of the Belgium-German Treaty, which followed the OECD Model and 
empowered the State of source to tax income from employment, he would not be 
taxed in Belgian, where otherwise his personal and family circumstances might have 
been taken into account. In principle, the difference in tax treatment between 
residents and non-residents was considered necessary and suitable to reconcile and 
enforce the principles of worldwide taxation (unlimited liability) and ability to pay. 
As the Court considered, neither of those principles would be enforced in Mr. 
Schumacker’s case. Thus, the Court held that the rule was indirectly discriminatory 
and unjustifiable where the taxpayer’s personal circumstances could not be taken into 
consideration neither in the State of his or her residence nor in the State of source (of 
employment).
690
 Neither the justification on grounds of administrative difficulties in 
ascertaining non-resident income and personal circumstances, nor administrative 
simplification for annual adjustment of deductions,
691
 were accepted under the 
objective criteria for discrimination between residents and non-residents, which 
follows the same reasoning as the proportionality test applied to the imperative 
requirements that may justify restrictions to the fundamental freedoms. The Court 
once again made a balanced decision taking into account the specific individual 
circumstance of the taxpayer. This could not be ignored under the principles of 
justice as fairness, and at the same time the Court made compatible the freedom of 
work and the relevant tax principles at stake as shown above.  
 
                                                 
689
 Paragraphs 32, 33, and 40 of the judgment. On the splitting system for married couples, see also 
the decision of the German Constitutional Court, based on the balancing of different principles (ability 
to pay, family protection and effectiveness of tax rate progression via proportionality test (comparing 
some national jurisdictions and the ECHR (Chapter III.2.5.a) and the US (Chapter II.3). 
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 Germany has introduced new legislation that provided for the right to the splitting system and 
account of other family and personal circumstances on condition that either at least 90% of total 
income be taxed there or that income from exempt foreign sources does not exceed a certain ceiling. 
That legislation was held valid under the Treaty in Gschwind Case C-391/97, although the taxpayer 
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Netherlands), since under the Dutch-German treaty on double taxation the income from Germany was 
exempt in the Netherlands. That situation was clearly unfair and disproportionate to the objectives of 
the bilateral treaty and to the ability to pay principle enforced in both countries, but the remedy should 
be to claim against the Netherlands. That happened in F.W.L. de Groot Case C-385/00 [2002] ECR I-
11819.  
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 Case C-279/93, para. 43-5 and 51. 
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IV.5.2. The fiscal supervision requirement and the proportionality test. 
 
Regarding the imperative requirement of fiscal supervision, in Futura
692
 the Court 
also closely considered proportionality. In that case, Luxembourg required separate 
accounting in accordance with its domestic standards; these accounts should have 
been kept there during the year in which the loss was made for carry-over purposes 
by branches of foreign companies. As Terra and Wattel point out, the Court accepted 
that tax rules may limit loss compensation to losses economically connected to the 
Member State income (‘fiscal territory principle’), and that evidence to safeguard 
that principle was necessary.
693
 However, the Court stated that Luxembourg could 
not limit the means to showing evidence just to its domestic accounts held there in 
the year of loss following its own standards. Moreover, Luxembourg should also 
permit any other reliable evidence, which could be less restrictive, like evidence 
based on the French accounts (country of the head-office), adapted for Luxembourg 
tax purposes. It was irrelevant that resident companies also had to keep accounts 
there, because the requirement to keep double accounts according to different 
standards (France and Luxembourg) was hindering market access. In this case, the 
Court most closely scrutinised the means to achieve the legitimate objective of 
ascertaining clearly and precisely the losses actually incurred in Luxembourg.
694
 
First, the Court dismissed the apportionment requested by Futura. Since the profits 
could be accrued on that basis, there seemed to be no reason why the taxpayer should 
not apply the same method for losses. However, “given that the apportionment 
method involves inaccuracies,” the Court stated that that method alone should not put 
a Member State under any obligation to accept it.
695
 Secondly, the Court did not 
accept the Commission suggestion of referring to the accounts kept at the place of 
the taxpayer’s seat. This method would be less restrictive than keeping a “proper 
account” in Luxembourg, but it was considered inappropriate because tax authorities 
                                                 
692
 Case 250/95 [1997] ECR I-2471. See Terra and Wattel (2003), pp.76-7; Craig and De Burca 
(2003), pp.794-5; and Ghosh (2000), p.9. 
 
693
 Op.cit. p.77. 
 
694
 Paragraph 39 of the judgment. 
 
695
 Idem, paragraph 42. 
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would have to refer to accounts pursuant to the other Member States’ rules, which 
would be contrary to the right of a Member State to provide its own rules on taxable 
income or losses.
696
 Finally, the Court regarded as acceptable in a way less restrictive 
to both the tax authorities and the taxpayer, by weighing their interests and rights, 
any clear and precise demonstration of the amount of losses actually incurred in the 
State and under its substantive domestic rules governing the calculation of income 
and losses.
697
 
 
Still with respect to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, it is worth mentioning the 
Baxter case,
698
 in which the principle of proportionality was again expressly applied. 
The Court stated that French tax legislation (that allowed a deduction from the 
Corporation tax for expenditure on research carried out only within its domestic 
jurisdiction) violated the fundamental freedom of establishment, and could not be 
justified under the overriding public interest of fiscal supervision. The French 
government submitted that this restriction was essential for the tax authorities to 
ascertain the nature and genuineness of the research expenditure incurred. Taking 
into account that in most cases foreign undertakings would have developed their 
research activities outside the territory of the levying State (indirect discrimination), 
and that other less restrictive measures would be available like the annual accounts 
and the consolidated accounts from which the tax authorities could proceed in their 
supervision of research expenditure, the Court regarded as unjustifiable the a priori 
prevention from providing relevant documentary evidence that expenditure had 
actually been incurred. Furthermore, as the Commission pointed out regarding the 
specific needs of fiscal supervision, “the competent authorities have the power to 
require production of supplementary information, subject to the principle of 
proportionality.”699 In other words, there were less restrictive means available to the 
tax authorities “to ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the 
research expenditure incurred in other Member States.”700 This case is closely related 
                                                 
696
 Idem, para. 32-4. 
 
697
 Idem, para. 43. 
 
698
 Case C-254/97 [1999] ECR I-4809. See also Jans, Jan H., “Proportionality Revisited”, p.257. 
699
 Paragraph 17 of Baxter decision. 
 
700
 Idem, paragraph 20.  
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to Amprafrance in terms of fiscal supervision or practicability justification, although 
the main issue then was tax avoidance.
701
 The imperative requirements may interact 
and the public authorities may submit two or more different justifications for the 
same measure. 
 
As has been analysed, it is settled that any restrictive measure, even if non directly 
discriminatory, must comply with the requirements summarised in Gebhard, 
particularly proportionality (in its version of suitability, necessity and non-
availability of less restrictive means to achieve the legitimate public interest in terms 
of environmental taxation, fiscal supervision, fiscal coherence, and tax avoidance, 
which are at times interwoven and not all-inclusive).  This may be illustrated by 
another type of imperative requirement - the fair balance of taxing rights between 
Member States - that may also go in tandem with combating avoidance.  
 
IV.5.3. The allocation of taxing powers between Member States, tax avoidance 
and proportionality.  
 
In Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes),
702
 the 
Court by its Grand Chamber created another type of imperative requirement in the 
general interest that may affect the exercise of fundamental freedoms, also subject to 
the test of proportionality.
703
 This case dealt with UK group taxation relief according 
to which losses accrued by subsidiaries in the UK could be offset against profits of 
parent companies, whereas their foreign subsidiaries could not be part of the same 
tax group relief treatment. In this regard, setting up subsidiaries in other Member 
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States could be less attractive than to set them up in the UK in situation of losses and 
taking risks. The UK government alleged that it did not tax the profits of foreign 
subsidiaries and consequently it should not be obliged to grant relief for their losses, 
and sought to justify the restriction on three grounds:  
“First, in tax matters profits and losses are two sides of the same coin 
and must be treated symmetrically in the same tax system in order to 
protect a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
the different Member States concerned. Second, if the losses were 
taken into consideration in the parent company's Member State they 
might well be taken into account twice. Third, and last, if the losses 
were not taken into account in the Member State in which the 
subsidiary is established there would be a risk of tax avoidance.”704 
The Court accepted the justification based on these three grounds taken together as 
legitimate objectives as “overriding reasons in the public interest and that they are 
apt to ensure the attainment of those objectives.”705  
 
Regarding the first, the Court stated, 
 
“In effect, to give companies the option to have their losses taken into 
account in the Member State in which they are established or in 
another Member State would significantly jeopardise a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States, as 
the taxable basis would be increased in the first State and reduced in 
the second to the extent of the losses transferred.”706 
 
The Court then analysed if that tax restriction went beyond what was necessary to 
achieve its legitimate objectives, stating two conditions on grounds of 
                                                 
704
 Paragraph 43 of the judgment. 
 
705
 Paragraph 51 of the judgment. 
 
706
 Paragraphs 45-46. The other two justifications concerned tax avoidance and abuse were taken 
together in this case with the fair allocation of taxing rights. A similar tax avoidance and abuse of 
rights doctrine are considered as a separate imperative requirement in the next section.   
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proportionality.
707
 Also based on proportionality the Court stated that, although less 
restrictive measures might be available, they would require tax harmonization 
regarding direct taxation, balancing the fiscal sovereignty of Member States and the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms.
708
 One may suggest that the circumstances of 
terminal losses were very specific, a risk that is inherent to any economic activity, 
and the Court could have held that it was a problem for the host State to solve. 
However, the role of the Court is to reach fairness in each specific situation, and it 
would be unfair if the group relief taxation in the case of terminal losses were 
available only for those that did not exercised the fundamental freedom of 
establishment, making it less attractive, though only in this specific circumstance.  
Thus, in my opinion the decision in Marks & Spencer was right and fairly balanced, 
taking into account the objectives of tax avoidance, and the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights, and at same time optimizing the fundamental freedom of establishment 
in a situation of terminal losses. This role of balance is also inherent in the principle 
of proportionality (which the Court sometimes does not expressly mention because it 
is already implicit in its ruling).
709
  
 
Also on grounds of the allocation of taxing rights between Member States, the Court 
in N
710
 analysed another tax restriction and closely scrutinised it under the test of 
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 In order to offset the losses of foreign subsidiaries, the parent company has to demonstrate first, 
that “the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the possibilities available in its State of residence of 
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 N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo Case C-470/04. 
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proportionality. The issue was the obligation of a tax declaration and guarantee to 
obtain a tax deferral on increases in the value of securities, when the taxpayer moved 
to another State.
711
  The Court held both measures appropriate under the first prong 
of the test of proportionality (suitability to achieve the legitimate objectives of a fair 
allocation of the power to tax and to avoid double taxation).
712
   Regarding the 
second prong of the proportionality principle (the necessity test), the Court held 
proportionate the requirement of a tax declaration but not the guarantee.
713
   
The Court seems to adopt a minimum impairment approach, comparing the 
guarantee, which was regarded as excessive based on the availability of less 
restrictive measures, under the test of necessity and according to the importance of 
the objectives pursued:  
       “On the other hand, the obligation to provide guarantees, necessary for 
the granting of a deferment of the tax normally due, whilst doubtless 
facilitating the collection of that tax from a foreign resident, goes 
beyond what is strictly necessary in order to ensure the functioning and 
effectiveness of such a tax system based on the principle of fiscal 
territoriality. There are methods less restrictive of fundamental 
freedoms.”714 
         Lastly, regarding the third prong (the balance of all interests at stake) of the three-
prong test of proportionality, the Court held that the failure to take into account any 
reductions in value at the time of transfer of residence would result in any 
administrative measure infringing the fundamental freedom at play: 
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       “Finally, in order to be regarded in this context as proportionate to the 
objective pursued, such a system for recovering tax on the income from 
securities would have to take full account of reductions in value capable 
of arising after the transfer of residence by the taxpayer concerned, 
unless such reductions have already been taken into account in the host 
Member State.”715  
Sometimes the overriding requirement of a balanced allocation of taxing rights 
between Member States may work only where there is another justification for a 
restriction to the fundamental freedoms, as the Court stated in Rewe Zentralfinanz.
716
 
The German tax rule at stake only allowed the deduction of a reduced book value in 
respect of shareholdings in domestic subsidiaries. The German government 
reasoning in this case was similar to the UK’s in Marks & Spencer, by alleging that 
profits and losses were two sides of the same coin, and as profits of foreign 
subsidiaries were not taxed, their losses should not be taken into account. The Court 
refused this justification by holding that the restriction was not addressed to tackle 
tax avoidance, unlike in Marks & Spencer.
717
 
On the other hand, the tax avoidance requirement in tandem with the fair allocation 
of taxing rights differs from the autonomous tax avoidance requirement discussed in 
the next section. Whereas the former allows Member States to tackle any abusive 
transaction, in which there may be some business purposes other than tax mitigation, 
the latter encompass only wholly artificial arrangements. The Court made this clear 
in Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI),
718
 in which Belgian transfer pricing rules 
that applied an arm’s length standard were upheld to protect a fair allocation of 
taxing rights. These transfer pricing rules did not address only wholly artificial 
prices. The role of proportionality is not only present in taking together and balance 
                                                 
715
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that requirement with a broad notion of avoidance,
719
 but also in the scrutiny of the 
specific measures to secure arm’s length prices between related parties in cross-
border transactions.
720
 
These above cases demonstrate how proportionality reasoning might be the 
determining factor in the recognition of new imperative tax requirements. My view is 
that under the rule of reason whose underpinning is equity or fairness, the 
proportionality principle is an important requirement to assess more objectively all 
measures that pursue general public interest that is undefined. Thus, where there is 
some uncertainty (the definition of general public interest), proportionality comes 
into play to bring more clarity and certainty, particularly under its necessity test and 
the overall interests at stake (not only the public interest), what is a fair balance 
between equity (rule of reason)
721
 and legal certainty. The second and third prongs of 
the proportionality test were applied to assess the restrictions in order to make the 
fundamental freedoms as compatible as possible with the overriding requirement of a 
balanced allocation of taxing rights between different States. As discussed in Marks 
& Spencer, Rewe Zentralfinanz and SGI, the allocation of taxing rights may be in 
tandem with combating avoidance.  This last requirement as a separate standard from 
the allocation of taxing rights and its close relationship to the general principle of 
good faith and abuse of rights and proportionality will be analysed in the next 
section.  
                                                 
719
 Paragraph 66 of the judgment in an implicit way. 
 
720
 The Court first stated that the taxpayer must be “given an opportunity, without being subject to 
undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may 
have been for that transaction”; and secondly, “where the consideration of such elements leads to the 
conclusion that the transaction in question goes beyond what the companies concerned would have 
agreed under fully competitive conditions, the corrective tax measure must be confined to the part 
which exceeds what would have been agreed if the companies did not have a relationship of 
interdependence” (paragraphs 71-72 of the judgment). 
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 On the equity grounds of the rule of reason, see Chapters I, section 1; and IV, sections 2.2 and 9. 
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IV.6. Proportionality, abuse of rights and tax avoidance. 
 
IV.6.1. The importance of addressing tax avoidance and the role of 
proportionality 
Before analysing some cases on this topic, it is worth making some general 
comments on tax avoidance and some underlying principles that may justify specific 
or general rules addressed to that question. 
 Tax avoidance is challenging and the issues raised by general or specific anti-
avoidance rules may “go to the foundations of a country’s tax system.”722 Taxpayers 
have the right to legitimately organize their activities and business in the most 
suitable way, including a tax viewpoint. This is perfectly lawful behaviour and a 
customary doctrine recognized by many countries.
723
  
Starting from the pure liberalism point of view, “a radical separation of legal form 
and economic substance …  [is required, and] … laws must be addressed to the 
generality of legal subjects, without distinction as to their social or economic 
position.”724 This theory is considered untenable, due to its extreme inequalities at a 
socio-political level. Consequently, pure liberalism has given way to “welfare 
liberalism”, establishing an adequate and substantive social basis and providing 
conditions that allow formal equality to be performed.
725 
Thus, interventionist forms 
supplant the liberal forms of regulation.  
Although equality, ability to pay, fairness, and the concept of abuse of rights may 
support the adoption of general or even specific anti-avoidance provisions, these 
rules may damage the requirements of certainty, predictability, and protection of 
fundamental freedoms, which are essential elements in a liberal system. However, 
Picciotto again highlights that this assertion unrealistically assumes that formal rules 
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 Arnold, Brian J. “The Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule”, in Tax Avoidance and the Rule of 
Law, (IBFD, 1997), p.243. 
 
723
 See Vanistendael, Frans, “Judicial Interpretation and the Role of Anti-Abuse Provisions.” (IBFD, 
1997), p. 132. 
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 Piccioto, Sol, (W&D, London 1992), p.79 
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 Idem, p.81. 
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can be defined by referring them to completely factual conditions, or objectively 
ascertainable circumstances. The resort to less precise standards is often made in 
private law (“good-faith”, “foreseeability”, “reasonableness” etc.).726 Similarly, it is 
reasonable to affirm that tax laws based only on specific and formal rules tend to be 
amended often; to the extent that they could be considered a battlefield between 
taxpayers and the Treasury. The optimal relationship between tax authorities and 
taxpayers should be fair play, capable of providing reasonable certainty, stability and 
predictability - the main objectives of those who support and defend liberal 
formalism as well. Thus, reasonable general or specific anti-avoidance rules may 
provide a fair relationship between taxpayers and fiscal authorities, avoiding abuse 
from both sides. Another great advantage of anti-avoidance rules, depending on how 
they are provided and enforced, is that they give opportunities to find principles of 
taxation and grant them “a vital function in the interpretation of tax legislation”.727 
A different perspective over tax avoidance matters considers the creation of 
legislative uncertainty as an essential weapon to control situations that would not be 
acceptable from the point of view of justice. Moreover, such situations would not be 
acceptable from the standpoint of the treatment of equivalent economic situations 
and of tax collection itself. “However, discretion and uncertainty are not necessary 
companions. Indeed, the exercise of discretion is how you offer certainty where legal 
definition cannot.”728 For instance, in terms of anti-avoidance measures, they may be 
specific or general. In this latter case, some discretion is necessarily left to fiscal 
authorities and judges to consider whether there is, in each case, a business purpose 
other than artificially avoiding taxes. In my view, the revenue discretion is more 
appropriate where necessary to ascertain objective factors and legal issues regarding 
tax avoidance; however, it must be submitted to judicial review. The broader the 
discretion the closer the scrutiny may be necessary to avoid subjectivism, bias, 
arbitrariness, and a lack of sound commercial reality, particularly when dealing with 
business purpose requirement. Thus, the tax assessment founded on tax avoidance 
must observe the fundamental rights that require no excessive burden of proof and 
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fair rebuttal, no interference with the taxpayers´ right to manage their own business 
(except where artificial arrangements are made solely for tax purposes), no excessive 
penalties or guarantees, no restrictions to carry economic activities while tax 
assessment is under way, independent commissioners and judges, and other rights, 
such as an overall fair assessment that is part and parcel of due process and the rule 
of law. As part of the assessment on tax avoidance, the role of proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness is to ascertain as fair and objectively as possible the 
legal issues and relevant facts with their open-ended circumstances, such as business 
purpose, abuse of rights, or valid economic reasons.
729
 
It is also essential to mention the fundamental role the principle of proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness may have in balancing all tax principles that justify 
tackling tax avoidance, mainly equity and the doctrine of abuse of rights, against 
other relevant principles, such as good faith, legal certainty, and predictability. All of 
them are important and none of them should be absolute or exclusive. First, general 
or specific anti-avoidance rules should be suitable for the attainment of the desired 
objective (to avoid artificialities and abuses, for example); second, the necessity of 
the measure in a sense that it is the least restrictive of individual freedoms that could 
be adopted; and third, the requirement of the proportionality of the measure to the 
restrictions involved (balancing).  
Having considered some issues regarding tax avoidance rules
730
 and proportionality, 
this section will analyse how the European Court of Justice has developed and 
applied them in the light of the fundamental freedoms and other general principles of 
EU law, such as the general principles of good faith and abuse of rights,
731
 through 
the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness.   
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IV.6.2. Development of a general anti-avoidance rule in direct taxation and the 
doctrine of abuse of rights. 
 
The first landmark case in which tax avoidance was put forward as justification for 
discrimination was Commission v France (Avoir Fiscal).
732
 Though the essential 
issue in this case was not tax avoidance, as explained below, France tried to convince 
the Court to accept a discrimination against branches on that ground, and the first 
thoughts of the Court on this topic are worth discussing here. Under French tax 
legislation only resident shareholders had the right to a credit against their personal 
or corporate income tax for the corporate tax charged on the profits out of which a 
dividend was paid. In this case, French branches of German insurers were denied the 
tax credit, since branches have no separate legal existence and therefore could not 
have their residence in France, even though they were subject to tax on their branch 
profits. France argued that the foreign shareholders had the option of setting up 
subsidiaries instead, but the Court did not accept this argument based on the then 
Article 52 EC (now Article 49 TFEU) that provides for the choice of the legal form 
to be adopted in order to exercise the freedom of establishment. Consequently, that 
fiscal rule restricted a fundamental freedom using the legal criterion of residence. 
Moreover, as the rationale for the tax credit for shareholders was to avoid economic 
double taxation, and since the branches were taxable on their attributable profits, the 
same reason was present for them to claim the tax credit. The Court also rejected the 
other argument of combating tax avoidance that France presented, in a sense that 
there could be an abuse of the utilization of branches by foreign companies, and that 
only bilateral treaties should grant the credit. The Court responded on the basis that a 
fundamental freedom could not be conditional on bilateral negotiations with Member 
States. The Court finally gave no further consideration to the specific abusive 
purpose.
733
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
paragraph 38), analysed below, in which the ECJ expressly stated that the prohibition of abuse of 
rights is a ‘general Community law principle’. 
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As Terra and Wattel point out, there was no reference to the rule of reason and the 
overriding requirements in the Avoir Fiscal case.
734
 The Court simply stated that the 
Article does not permit any derogation on that ground. It may be suggested that the 
allegation of potential avoidance was not regarded as serious, or there was no risk of 
abuse whatsoever. It was possibly regarded as implicit that the public policy 
exception did not encompass tax considerations.
735
  
 
Similar to the requirements of fiscal coherence and fiscal supervision, the Court has 
accepted a tax avoidance imperative requirement by applying the test of 
proportionality to assess measures addressed to abusive situations. In two landmark 
cases related to direct taxation, the Grand Chamber developed the principles applied 
to the doctrine of abuse of tax law or tax avoidance. 
  
In ICI v Colmer 
736
, the Court held that a tax rule under which parent companies 
could offset losses from their subsidiaries only if the majority of them were bodies’ 
corporate resident in the UK (consortium relief) was incompatible with the freedom 
of establishment. Pondering the justification based on the risk of tax avoidance, the 
Court stated: 
                   
“…. the legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not have the 
specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up 
to circumvent United Kingdom tax legislation, from attracting tax 
benefits, but applies generally to all situations in which the majority 
of a group's subsidiaries are established, for whatever reason, outside 
the United Kingdom. However, the establishment of a company 
outside the United Kingdom does not, of itself, necessarily entail tax 
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avoidance, since that company will in any event be subject to the tax 
legislation of the State of establishment.”737 
 
In Cadbury Schweppes,
738
 the Grand Chamber closely scrutinised under the test of 
proportionality the UK Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) legislation that was 
designed to tax foreign profits of subsidiaries set up in lower tax jurisdictions. The 
UK CFC rules provided for an exception where the parent company could 
demonstrate that its main purpose or one of its main purposes was not tax motivated. 
The Court in principle accepted the legitimate purpose of tackling tax avoidance, but 
rejected the specific CFC rules, as they did not provide for an exception for genuine 
and not wholly artificial transactions, even if they were tax driven.
739
 In other words, 
the legislation in principle went beyond what was necessary to counteract only 
abusive transactions (wholly artificial and not genuine). The means to achieve this 
objective were reasonably available and provided by the exchange of information 
and mutual assistance between national tax administrations by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation and by the Double Tax 
Convention between the United Kingdom and Ireland.
740
 If a transaction is 
performed or a company is set up in another jurisdiction and its main purpose is to 
obtain a tax advantage, this must be genuine (not wholly artificial) to be valid for tax 
purposes. The way the Court found to make fiscal sovereignty in direct taxation 
compatible with the fundamental freedoms was to accept the combating of tax 
avoidance as a legitimate interest that may restrict the exercise of the freedom of 
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establishment, but only where the specific anti-avoidance rule targets wholly 
artificial arrangements subject to the proportionality test.
741
   
 
Another case that is worth discussing under tax avoidance, abuse and the 
proportionality test in direct taxation is Lankhorst-Hohorst.
742
 This concerned 
German thin capitalization rules, under which interest paid by a resident subsidiary to 
its parent company (resident abroad or not) might be considered for fiscal purposes 
as a hidden dividend. The objective of that legislation was to avoid the abuse of a 
reasonable debt-equity ratio, as tax advantages are provided by the deduction of 
interest whereas dividends are not deductible. There may be also an advantage in 
relation to different rates of withholding tax on dividends and interest. Thus, the 
parent company could always opt for a loan instead of capital contribution for 
exclusive tax purposes if there were no specific anti-avoidance legislation. The 
problem with the German rule was that, although it provided for an exception under 
which if the subsidiary could also have obtained the loan from a third party under 
identical terms (arm’s length) then the thin capitalization rule would not apply, this 
derogation could not be applied in Lankhorst, since it was over-indebted and unable 
to provide security in order to obtain a similar loan from a third party.
743
 Moreover, 
the subsidiary justified the loan from its parent company in order to reduce the 
interest charged on bank loans and proved that its losses in the relevant years 
exceeded the interest paid.  The Court cited ICI v Colmer and noted that the German 
legislation at issue did not have the aim of preventing “wholly artificial 
arrangements”, since it applied to any situation in which the parent company had its 
seat outside Germany.
744
 There are good grounds for saying that there was no abuse 
in a sense of artificial transactions without any commercial reasons. Accordingly, the 
restrictive measure went further than was necessary to prevent tax advantages 
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obtained from loans and not from share capital pursued with the objective of abusive 
tax avoidance. On the other hand, it has been suggested that even if national 
legislation were addressed to combat tax avoidance, the Court would not accept this 
justification where some tax is paid on interest somewhere in the Community.
745
  
 
Furthermore, even if taxpayers make investments solely for tax reasons, such as 
avoiding registration duties and taking tax advantages of legal structures provided in 
other Member States, their freedom of movement or capital may not be restricted. 
This happened in Barbier where the Court stated the following: 
 
“… the tax consequences in respect of inheritance rights are among 
the considerations which a national of a Member State could 
reasonably take into account when deciding whether or not to make 
use of the freedom of movement provided for in the Treaty.” 746 
 
Another interesting case regarding tax avoidance, abuse and proportionality is De 
Lasteyrie du Saillant.
747
 In this case, the Court first determined the objective of the 
French tax rule at stake, and asserted that avoidance is closely related to abuse in the 
sense of artificial transactions, by stating that French taxation regarding securities 
was,  
“… not specifically designed to exclude from a tax advantage purely 
artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing French tax law, but is 
aimed generally at any situation in which a taxpayer with substantial 
                                                 
745
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holdings in a company subject to corporation tax transfers his tax 
residence outside France for any reason whatever.”748 
Secondly, the Court applied the proportionality principle by holding that the French 
tax rule could not, ‘without greatly exceeding what is necessary in order to achieve 
the aim which it pursues’, assume ‘an intention to circumvent French tax law on the 
part of every taxpayer who transfers his tax domicile outside France.’749 The Court 
went on to give examples of less restrictive measures
750
 relating them again to the 
principle of good faith: 
 
“As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraph 64 of his 
Opinion, the French authorities could, for example, provide for the 
taxation of taxpayers returning to France after realising their increases 
in value during a relatively brief stay in another Member State, which 
would avoid affecting the position of taxpayers having no aim other 
than the bona fide exercise of their freedom of establishment in 
another Member State.
751
   
 
From these authorities I conclude that, in principle, only abuse in the sense of wholly 
artificial transactions may fall within the requirements of prevention of tax 
avoidance, and that “tax jurisdiction shopping” is legitimate in an internal market.752 
The Court appeared to follow in direct taxation the doctrine of business purpose so as 
to avoid only transactions that are solely tax motivated.
753
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Another relevant case for the discussion of abuse is Centros.
754
 This case concerned 
the use of a legal form in the UK expressly to circumvent Danish minimum capital 
contribution requirements. First, the Court stated that the fact that a “company does 
not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and 
pursues its activities only in the Member State where its branch is established is not 
sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct.
755
  As the 
justification based on abuse failed, the Court then considered the objectives of 
avoidance of fraud and protection of creditors under the proportionality test, 
explicitly stating that there were other ways less restrictive to the freedom of 
establishment, such as “making it possible in law for public creditors to obtain the 
necessary guarantees.”756  
 
The Court reiterated the notion of abuse in Inspire Art, stating,  
 
“….. that the fact that the company was formed in a particular 
Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more 
favourable legislation does not constitute abuse even if that company 
conducts its activities entirely or mainly in that second State.”757 
 
Thus, in contrast with the notion of abuse for tax avoidance, only if the company 
registered in a Member State were fraudulent - or not genuine as being wholly 
artificial - might the other Member State restrict its freedom of establishment. 
However, as a matter of company law, if a Member State allowed a letterbox 
company to have legal  personality and registration of its seat with little or no 
physical presence - even with no or little staff and premises - the other Member State 
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could do little to restrict the right to set up branches or subsidiaries in its territory.
758
 
Again, in Inspire Art, the justification of abuse did not prevail and the Court went on 
to consider other overriding requirements in the public interest based on 
proportionality as regards possible justification on grounds of: 
 
“... protection of fairness in business dealings and the efficiency of tax 
inspections, it is clear that neither the Chamber of Commerce nor the 
Netherlands Government has adduced any evidence to prove that the 
measure in question satisfies the criteria of efficacy, proportionality 
and non-discrimination mentioned in paragraph 132 above.”759 
 
The clearer the situation of abuse, the easier it is to be caught, as was demonstrated 
in Emsland-Starke.
760
 In this case, goods were exported to a third State outside the 
Community and subsequently were re-imported. The apparent fiscal advantage was 
that the export repayments under EC Regulation 2730/79 were higher than the 
customs duties paid on import. The Court held that situation to be an abuse of EU 
law. Generally, a situation of abuse occurs where there is an artificial creation 
(“subjective element”) and the purpose of a rule is not achieved (“objective 
element”)761; in this case, persons may not benefit from Community rights, but any 
denial of benefits may not go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to either 
avoid or reverse the consequences of the abuse (proportionality).
762
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IV.6.3. Specific tax avoidance rules and proportionality. 
 
An interesting point related to specific anti-avoidance measures is how far the Court 
may apply the proportionality test for direct taxation purposes. The Merger Directive 
authorizes a Member State to refuse some of its provisions (like deferral of capital 
gains and fiscal reserves) if a cross-border operation (merger, division, transfer of 
assets or exchange of shares) appears to have no valid commercial reasons i.e. if it 
has tax avoidance as its principal objective.
763
 There is no definition of valid 
commercial reasons, but the Merger Directive gives an example of what could be 
considered as such (restructuring or rationalization of the companies). However, 
even that example is given only as a presumption of the operation having no tax 
motivation as its principal purpose. Before any Court decision on this matter, Farmer 
presumed that proportionality would require that national provisions should not go 
further than is necessary and have the effect of disadvantaging genuine operations.
764
  
 
This was what happened later in Leur-Bloem.
765
 In that case, the Court explicitly 
applied the principle of proportionality, not only considering the objectives of that 
Directive but also determining some guidelines that should be applied to domestic 
procedures for ascertaining the open concept of valid commercial reasons.
766
 That 
case concerned a Dutch tax rule that excluded some categories of operations from the 
tax advantage without examining the tax avoidance purpose. For example, the fact 
that the same person, who was the sole shareholder and director of the acquired 
company, stays in the same position in the acquiring company automatically 
prevented the fiscal regime provided for by that Directive. In the given example, it is 
clear that it would be more effective to consider it automatically excluded from the 
scope of the Directive in terms of fiscal supervision, simplification, economic costs, 
and even perhaps statistic probability of tax motivation of that transaction. However, 
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the point may not be that. The relevant point may be that the interpretation and 
application of legal rules and principles, which should be considered and interact 
with other fundamental principles and concepts, such as fairness, in each individual 
case, may obviously have its costs. The Court held those automatic exclusions 
invalid because they went further than was necessary for preventing tax avoidance 
and would undermine the aim of the Directive, which was to introduce neutral tax 
rules in terms of competition and prevent those cross border operations from being 
hindered by restrictive national tax provisions.
767
 The role of proportionality may 
also be seen in clarifying what is vague or open-ended in search of the relevant 
objectives of rules and other principles in play: 
 
“In the absence of more detailed Community provisions concerning 
application of the presumption mentioned in Article 11(1)(a), it is 
for the Member States, observing the principle of proportionality, to 
determine the provisions needed for the purposes of applying this 
provision.”768  
 
On the other hand, as already discussed in the previous section (6.2), the arrangement 
of genuine business transactions in order to minimize taxes is not an abuse. That may 
be why the Court as a second statement in that case said that ‘valid commercial 
reasons’ “must be interpreted as involving more than the attainment of a purely fiscal 
advantage such as horizontal off-setting of losses.”769 It may be suggested that tax 
advantages are legitimate and can be pursued together with other more substantial 
economic objectives under the Merger Directive. Although the Court in Kofoed 
stated that the notion of ‘valid economic reasons’ reflects the general principle of 
abuse of rights in EU law, the Merger Directive requires more than the mere lack of 
wholly artificial arrangements.
770
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The role of proportionality in balancing fiscal sovereignty and fundamental freedoms 
may have been essential to determine a different approach under the Merger 
Directive and for VAT purposes, from direct taxation that is not yet harmonized. 
Where a specific tax is not harmonized within the European Union, the Court may 
have found a minimum common ground for Member States that least impairs the 
balance between the bona fide exercise of fundamental freedoms and their fiscal 
sovereignty.
771
 In other words, the Court did not adopt the concept of avoidance 
introduced by the Merger Directive (broader than mere artificial arrangements), 
because otherwise it would be excessively interfering with the fiscal sovereignty of 
Member States in direct taxation. It avoided that interference by applying the 
principle of proportionality. 
 
In conclusion, one may infer that only artificial arrangements may be caught by the 
imperative requirement of tax avoidance under EU case law dealing with direct 
taxation. Furthermore, the notion of abuse of law is an important tool to limit the 
fundamental freedoms in the light of the general principle of good faith. Each 
restriction may be tested under the principle of proportionality in tandem with 
reasonableness. These balance their legitimate objectives in the public interests, such 
as combating tax avoidance in concert with the notions of abuse and good faith, and 
their intrusiveness to the fundamental freedoms. It also follows from these analysed 
decisions that anti-avoidance measures are always subject to a detailed test of 
proportionality under the fundamental freedoms and principles of EU law.
772
 The 
principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness not only created the 
overriding requirement of tax avoidance for any restriction to the fundamental 
freedoms, where not provided by secondary or primary legislation, but is also an 
essential tool to scrutinize any tax avoidance measure. It is right to conclude that 
there is a fairer and more balanced concept of tax avoidance when proportionality is 
in play.  
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 Not only CFC and Transfer Pricing rules may be scrutinized by proportionality, but also any 
general or specific anti-avoidance tax rules that may affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
within the EU, and the Court tends to enforce them as far as possible according to its settled evolving 
law.  
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IV.7. VAT principles and proportionality (neutrality and right to deduction 
balanced with fiscal supervision, simplification, tax evasion and tax avoidance) 
 
The purpose for having a specific section in this thesis on Value Added Tax (VAT) is 
to show how proportionality may be useful to identify the fundamental principles of 
a particular tax and make them effective. One may suggest that VAT within the 
internal market is related to the fundamental freedoms of goods and services and 
could have been dealt with in the previous sections.
773
 However, the main objective 
of this section could be missed or given too little attention. On the other hand, some 
similarities will be found between this and the previous sections, such as justification 
based on combating tax avoidance, abuse of rights, fiscal supervision and 
simplification for a restriction on neutrality and the right of deduction of input tax. 
Restrictions on a fundamental freedom in direct taxation are also based on fiscal 
supervision, tax avoidance, abuse of rights, and coherence of the tax system.  Both 
set of justifications - for VAT and direct taxation - are underpinned by similar aims 
of a common market within the Community and must be construed and consistently 
applied. The role of proportionality may be to make those imperative requirements in 
the general interest more consistent and predictable, reaching a right balance between 
the fundamental freedoms and the fiscal interests of Member States.  
Furthermore, the objective of this section is also to demonstrate that proportionality 
is an essential instrument of judicial review not only for restrictions on fundamental 
freedoms and Communities rights, but also for specific taxes, to which that test may 
be applied in a consistent way in concrete cases in the search for and the enforcement 
of fundamental tax principles, such as neutrality.  
This section comprises three parts and a short conclusion on VAT principles and the 
role of proportionality. The first deals with substantive measures that may directly 
affect the right of deduction and the principle of neutrality; the second analyses the 
creation of a substantive rule of abuse of rights according to proportionality 
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reasoning; and the third scrutinises procedural measures with similar objectives of 
simplification, fiscal supervision, avoidance and evasion that may indirectly but 
disproportionately affect the right of deduction and the principle of neutrality.            
IV.7.1 Tax avoidance, tax evasion, simplification, neutrality and fairness 
(substantive measures). 
The first set of cases to be considered relates to substantive rules regarding specific 
measures to be adopted for simplification, tax avoidance or evasion purposes, under 
Article 27 of the Sixth Directive (Art 395 of Directive 2006/112).
774
 The first case to 
which the Court expressly applied the principle of proportionality was Commission v 
Kingdom of Belgium decided on 10 April 1984.
775
 The Court held that any national 
derogating measures must be strictly interpreted and may not depart from the main 
basis for charging VAT as provided by Article 11 of the Sixth Directive, except 
within the limits strictly necessary for achieving the aims stated in Article 27 (tax 
simplification, anti-avoidance and anti-evasion), whose reasoning is governed by the 
proportionality test.  
The Belgium government had introduced a VAT minimum basis on new cars 
according to a price catalogue with no regard to discounts or rebates, whereas under 
Art 11 of the Sixth Directive the taxable amount is composed of the consideration, 
which has been or is to be obtained having regard inter alia to price discounts and 
rebates allowed to the customer and accounted for at the time of the supply. The 
justification for that derogation was tax evasion and avoidance in the motor trade, 
particularly where sellers give “a false declaration of the price of new cars, especially 
when accepting used cars in part-exchange, and in buyers deducting unpaid input 
tax”, under Article 27 of the Sixth Directive.776 However, the Court refused that 
justification, since the Belgian legislation departed in a too general and systematic 
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way from Article 11 that had left no room for accounting price discounts and rebates. 
In this sense that legislation was considered disproportionate to its objective, and the 
price catalogue was not proved to be a necessary measure to achieve that aim.
777
 
A more elaborate decision regarding the principle of neutrality and the right of 
deduction, under which VAT by its nature is not to be a cost component, is 
Ampafrance.
778
 In that case, the Court explicitly applied the proportionality test to a 
substantive rule regarding tax deduction and according to the VAT fundamental 
principles. The legal issue in this case was whether Council Decision 89/487, based 
on Article 27 of the Sixth Directive, and which authorised the French Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 17(6) of that Directive, would be invalid 
under the general principle of proportionality. The measure was introduced to deny 
traders the right to deduct VAT on expenditure in respect of accommodation, 
hospitality, food and entertainment for the benefit of persons not employed by them, 
which they could show to be of a strictly business nature. In principle, from a 
formalistic point of view, the Council Decision was legally based on the exceptions 
provided by the Sixth Directive that governs VAT principles and rules. However, the 
substantive issue was whether, on grounds of practicability (simplification) and 
prevention of tax avoidance, the specific measure was excessive, in contrast with 
fundamental principles like neutrality and the essential right of deduction.  
The Court stated that, since the measure excluded all the expenditures mentioned as a 
matter of principle, and appropriate means less detrimental to the right of deduction 
could be provided or already existed in domestic law,
779
 it was not a means 
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 For VAT purposes, the tax charged is only deductible if the inputs are necessary to the business 
(paragraph 47); and for corporation tax, expenditure in respect of accommodation, food, hospitality 
and entertainment of a business nature may be deduct from profits (paragraph 49). In both situations 
the fiscal authorities rely on documents and other evidence to verify the business nature of those 
expenses.  
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proportionate to the objectives of simplification or combating tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, it had a disproportionate effect on the purposes and principles of the 
Sixth Directive. Although the Court stated that it was not its role to comment on 
other appropriate measures available to tackle tax avoidance, two examples were 
mentioned: the introduction of a fixed amount to be deducted or a control similar to 
that provided for corporate tax.
780
  Therefore, less restrictive measures could be to 
demand some documentation indicating the business purpose of the expenditure or to 
allow a fixed amount taking into account either the reasonable or the average costs of 
those expenses.
781
  
Regarding the role of proportionality in balancing tax principles, such as tax 
avoidance on the one hand, and tax neutrality on the other, it may be suggested that 
the most fundamental principle of VAT is neutrality and not necessarily 
simplification or prevention of avoidance. These are legitimate objectives since they 
are the means to achieve that principal aim, but not an end in themselves. From a 
practical, anti-avoidance perspective, to deny those deductions might be more 
effective, but the effectiveness of the principle of neutrality must govern all the other 
rules.
782
 
In contrast with Ampafrance, in which the refusal of the right of deduction on certain 
inputs for tax avoidance purposes was regarded as disproportionate in the light of the 
principle of neutrality, in Sudholz
783
 the Court accepted the justification for a 
limitation on the right of deduction on grounds of tax avoidance and simplification. 
Whereas in Ampafrance there was no deduction at all for expenses that may be 
related to business and private purposes (food, accommodation, etc), in Sudholz the 
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deduction was limited to 50% of the VAT charged on a passenger car used partly for 
business and partly for private purposes. The relevant facts were that Mr Sudholz 
used his car 70% for business and only 30% for private purposes, and the 20% 
difference would be a cost that at the end should be passed on to the consumers as a 
component of the price of his services and not as a VAT charge. Since he was willing 
neither to bear that cost nor to pass it on to his clients, he brought an action against 
that German tax rule on grounds of the principle of neutrality and proportionality, as 
other measures less restrictive could be implemented for tax avoidance and 
simplification objectives without undermining the former principles. The German 
government had also been authorised by a Council Decision under Article 27 of the 
Sixth Directive to limit to 50% the right to deduct the VAT charged on cars with 
mixed use, unless their use for private purposes did not exceed 5% of their total 
use.
784
 The justification for that restriction was based on grounds of tax avoidance, 
evasion and mainly simplification purposes, since the “difficulty of actually verifying 
the breakdown between business and private expenditure” was acknowledged, which 
may cause “tax evasion or abuse.”785 The Commission stated that, like in 
Ampafrance, since the taxpayer could prove the proportion of business use, there was 
no reason why the same view should not be taken in the light of the principles of 
neutrality and proportionality. The less restrictive measure for tax avoidance purpose 
could be to demand some evidence from the taxpayers; however, the Court 
considered that, in terms of simplification, that requirement would be useless since 
its objective was precisely to avoid an effective verification by checking documents 
and so on.
786
 Furthermore, in Ampafrance there was not a flat rate in question, and 
the Court had given an illustration in that case of limiting deductions to a fixed 
exclusion.
787
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Having distinguished Sudholz from Ampafrance, the Court regarded the flat rate as 
reasonable, based on the following reasons: the accuracy of the average in itself was 
not challenged; there was a safe harbour of 5% for private use to which that average 
limit was not applicable; other Member States adopted the same average that, 
moreover, was put forward by the Commission in a proposal for a Council Directive 
amending Directive 77/388.
788
  
Although convincing to some extent, this reasoning brings some concern regarding 
the notion of reasonableness, since the flat rate is irrebutable, and consequently it 
appears to be incompatible with other decisions of the Court (to be analysed in this 
section) in respect of some procedural measures and presumptions.
789
 The average 
rate was not the less restrictive measure. However, paying due regard to 
simplification and undermining negligibly the neutrality principle, the more open and 
flexible notion of reasonableness prevailed over a stricter proportionality test in this 
case. Whereas in Outokumpu Oy,
790
 a flat rate for less environmentally friendly 
products with respect to the taxation of electricity was considered disproportionate, 
since other measures less restrictive were available (such as to prove its origin, 
whether from renewable sources or not, although with some difficulty), in Sudholz 
the flat average deduction was treated as proportionate on grounds of simplification 
to avoid the difficulty of checking documents. In the latter case, that difficulty was 
accepted as justification for not having adopted less restrictive measures, while in the 
former that similar difficulty was not accepted to justify a restrictive flat rate. 
Nevertheless, in the Outokumpu Oy case there was also a relevant issue of 
discrimination on imports under Art 90 of the Treaty (now Article 110 TFEU), which 
was not in question in the Sudholz case. This demonstrates that the Court more 
closely scrutinises directly and indirectly discriminatory tax measures via 
proportionality reasoning than particular tax restrictions on VAT deductions that may 
have a minor impact within the common market. How much deeper the reasoning is 
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may depend on whether the Court sticks to the facts of each case (as seems to be in 
the case for VAT) or decides the issues more broadly (as seems to be the case for the 
fundamental freedoms). In my view this different approach to legal issues under the 
proportionality test is satisfactory where the issues are different, as in the cases of tax 
discrimination on the one hand, and tax simplification on the other. This does not 
mean that for tax simplification purposes a looser test of proportionality may be 
always acceptable, as other interests and principles may come into play, such as 
consistency and the ultimate objective of fairness. 
However, as the Sudholz decision could seem to be inconsistent with the previous 
cases on neutrality,
791
 it was convenient and necessary to the Court to elaborate on its 
reasoning in search for consistency and predictability.
792
 The Court stated that the 
impact on neutrality would be negligible, falling within the express permission 
provided by Art 27 of the Sixth Directive, because the deduction limit would not 
affect the level of prices and VAT payable in the Community, as the number of cases 
in which more tax is paid “is likely to correspond generally to the number of cases 
where less tax is paid.”793 The amount of tax that could not be deducted may not be 
negligible from an individual perspective, since the right of deduction is conferred on 
each taxpayer, as a way of neutralizing the VAT effect on the level of prices charged. 
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality as a tool for construction and 
application of general or specific rules and principles should pay due regard to 
individual cases and take into account all relevant circumstances of each case to 
achieve a desirable degree of fairness.
794
 The Court tried to achieve that objective 
justification on neutrality in the following statement: “even in individual cases, the 
effects on VAT due at the final consumption stage will be limited, given that it is 
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possible for the supplier to apportion the VAT to all the goods sold over the years for 
which he keeps his vehicle.”795   
IV.7.2. Abuse of rights as a general anti-avoidance rule within the VAT system 
and the proportionality principle. 
The second set of cases concerns a substantive rule of the interpretation of VAT 
provisions and the qualification of transactions in the light of the doctrine of abuse of 
rights. This doctrine of abuse of law is analysed separately from the previous section 
on specific tax avoidance legislative measures, such as in the Ampafrance and 
Sudholz cases, for two reasons: first, it is a general anti-avoidance rule, and secondly 
it was developed by the Court based on VAT principles and the general doctrine of 
abuse of Community law.  
The Grand Chamber in the landmark Halifax
796
 case held that a series of transactions 
might be disregarded and the immediate VAT deduction of inputs denied if there was 
an abusive practice, for which two requirements were necessary: 
“first, that the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal 
application of the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of 
the Sixth Directive and of national legislation transposing it, result in 
the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to 
the purpose of those provisions. Second, it must also be apparent from 
a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions 
concerned is to obtain a tax advantage.”797 
Thus, the Court took into consideration the purposes of the tax provisions in play that 
cannot be distorted by implementation of inappropriate or abusive transactions with 
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no economic substance to obtain tax advantages.
798
 The Court also reiterated its 
settled case law on the application of the proportionality test to scrutinise measures 
that address the issues of combating tax avoidance, evasion and fraud:  
“It is important, however, to note in that respect that the measures 
which the Member States may adopt under Article 22(8) of the Sixth 
Directive in order to ensure the correct levying and collection of the 
tax and for the prevention of fraud must not go further than is 
necessary to attain such objectives” (emphasis added).799 
The issue of combating tax avoidance or abuse of tax law may require a balance 
between equity and social solidarity on the one hand, and legal certainty and the 
freedom to carry out a commercial activity on the other. This right includes tax 
considerations, as it is the settled case law of the Court:   
“Moreover, it is clear from the case-law that a trader’s choice between 
exempt transactions and taxable transactions may be based on a range 
of factors, including tax considerations relating to the VAT system. 
Where the taxable person chooses one of two transactions, the Sixth 
Directive does not require him to choose the one which involves 
paying the highest amount of VAT. On the contrary, as the Advocate 
General observed in point 85 of his Opinion, taxpayers may choose to 
structure their business so as to limit their tax liability.”800 
The proportionality principle coupled with reasonableness weighs those principles 
and rights in search for an optimal solution, which may be to avoid abuse of tax law 
                                                 
798
 Whereas in Starke and ICI and other cases the Court referred only to the element of artificiality or 
wholly artificial arrangements (see the previous section 6), in Halifax it appears to have gone further 
by stating that it is sufficient that the requirement of lacking an essential economic objective other 
than a tax benefit for a series of transactions to be abusive. This was still made clearer in Part Service, 
in which the Court reiterated that there is abuse where the principal (not the sole) objective of a series 
of transactions is to pursue tax advantages against the purpose of the tax rules at stake. 
 
799
 Halifax, paragraph 92. Art 22(8) is the current Art 273 of Directive 112 of 2006 that authorizes 
Member States to “impose other obligations which they deem necessary for the correct collection of 
the tax and for the prevention of evasion” under certain conditions of non-discrimination and 
restrictions on intra-Community trade. 
 
800
 Halifax, paragraph 73. 
 
 239 
and abuse of rights. Again, as open-ended concepts, the notion of abuse may be 
ascertained via proportionality in tandem with reasonableness within the context of a 
tax system and the factual circumstances of each case. Out of the different options to 
decide the Halifax case, it seems that the Court opted for the concept of the abuse of 
rights as the more appropriate measure, taking into consideration the particular VAT 
system and its neutrality within an internal market.
801
 
The Court also in Halifax balanced the doctrine of abuse of law with the principle of 
legal certainty and lawfulness, by disallowing - differently from fraud
802
 - the 
imposition of penalties in case of abuse:  
“…. a finding of abusive practice must not lead to a penalty, for which 
a clear and unambiguous legal basis would be necessary, but rather to 
an obligation to repay, simply as a consequence of that finding, which 
rendered undue all or part of the deductions of input VAT.”803 
Consequently, a surcharge as a penalty would be disproportionate where the tax 
authorities and the courts conclude that a series of transactions is abusive for a lack 
of essential commercial reasons other than tax considerations. Contrariwise, in cases 
of tax fraud or evasion, penalties may be not disproportionate, unless they are 
excessive to their objectives.
804
 To apply penalties only to situations of fraud and 
evasion seems to be fair, as the notion of abuse in a tax context may be much vaguer 
and not easily ascertained. As the Court stated in Halifax and Part Service, not only 
the purpose of the tax provisions at stake must be identified, but also a number of 
objective economic factors must be ascertained. These may vary widely and be open-
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ended, which may make their consideration and ascertainment more difficult to 
predict.
805
 
Furthermore, proportionality in concert with reasonableness may play the role of 
weighing and contrasting all the relevant economic factors in the light of the tax rules 
and principles at stake. Frans Vanistendael may have well captured this point,  
“... the ECJ lists several criteria of economic, legal or personal nature 
to assess the substance of the transaction, which points to the essential 
purpose and implies a balancing judgment between several purposes 
against one another.”806 
To avoid the impression that the Court randomly applies tax principles or that they 
are chosen to base a decision previously made, it is important to point out and 
differentiate the guiding principles from those less important, particularly in the 
leading cases, such as in Halifax. My opinion is positive on this case, because the 
Court, by developing a doctrine of tax abuse (which by definition involves some 
uncertainty) within the VAT,  gave some clarity on the governing principles of 
abuse: due regard to the principle of good faith, legal certainty on the right of 
taxpayers to “limit their tax liability” unless there is abuse, a prevalence of purposive 
over literal interpretation of tax law, and with the requirement of setting out the 
objective factors to be taken into account (to avoid subjectivism and arbitrariness). 
Furthermore, the Court disallowed the application of penalties in those situations, 
what is fair, given more protection in an area of some uncertainty about the outcome 
of the decisions of the courts on tax abuse, having balanced equity and certainty.  
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In conclusion, where there is a situation of abuse, the fiscal authorities must redefine 
the transactions “so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed in the 
absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice.”807  
Seemingly, this notion of abuse is similar to abuse in direct tax cases, in which the 
principles of proportionality and reasonableness have a fundamental role as well. 
However, whereas the objective element of abuse in direct taxation is more focused 
on the artificiality of transactions, the abuse for VAT purposes encompasses not only 
wholly artificial arrangements but also transactions with the principal objective of tax 
avoidance. The Court apparently applied a more stringent test of abuse perhaps 
because VAT is more harmonized and must be applied harmoniously within the 
States, whereas in direct taxation States retain their fiscal sovereignty unless there is 
a disproportionate interference with the fundamental freedoms. 
V.7.3. Fiscal supervision, fraud, neutrality, fairness and proportionality 
(procedural measures). 
The third set of cases to be considered concerns procedural measures that may 
directly or indirectly restrain the right of deduction and the principle of neutrality. An 
example is Garage Molenheide, in which the Court discussed whether a Member 
State could apply preliminary measures to retain the refundable VAT credit 
balance.
808 
 The Sixth Directive regarding the right to VAT deductions entitles 
Member States either to give a refund or to carry the excess forward to the following 
period. However, that Directive does not expressly encompass preliminary measures 
such as those introduced by Belgian legislation: non-refund on grounds of tax 
evasion or the existence of a debt claimed by the tax authority and disputed by the 
taxpayer. After having made a general statement on proportionality grounds, the 
Court held: 
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“Accordingly, whilst it is legitimate for the measures adopted by the 
Member States to seek to preserve the rights of the Treasury as 
effectively as possible, they must not go further than is necessary 
for that purpose. They may not therefore be used in such a way that 
they would have the effect of systematically undermining the right 
to deduct VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common 
system of VAT established by the relevant Community 
legislation.”809  
The Court gave an illustration that an irrebuttable presumption was excessive and 
went further than was necessary in order to recover the alleged tax debt, because a 
guarantee could be a sufficient measure to protect the interests of the fisc and would, 
at the same time, be less onerous for the taxpayer.
810
 The nucleus of the decision, 
though, could be considered pertinent to the judicial remedies relating to suspension 
of tax claims. However, its implications are clearly related to tax rules and principles, 
and may defeat any particularly disproportionate rule.  
The Court also expressly applied proportionality in another case, while interpreting 
the Eighth Directive, which requires a taxpayer who is not established in a Member 
State to present the original invoice for a VAT refund.
811 
According to the Court, a 
literal and clear interpretation without exceptions would lead to the acceptance only 
of the original invoice. Nonetheless, the possibility of a Member State granting a 
refund in exceptional cases had to be considered. For instance, there may be cases in 
which the transactions were undeniably performed, and the taxpayer cannot be 
penalised for the loss of import invoices or documents, and in which there is no risk 
of new refund applications.
812
 As a matter of principle, the requirement for the 
original invoice to obtain a VAT refund is reasonable and adequate, since it would be 
unnecessary only where there is no possibility of further applications for a refund 
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regarding the same tax paid. Again, the proportionality test played the role of 
weighing apparently conflicting principles in the light of the specific circumstances 
of the case: on the one hand, equity and neutrality, on the other the speed of 
refunding process, certainty and simplification.
813
 As the Court decided that the 
exclusion of a refund in those circumstances was not necessary to prevent fraud or 
tax evasion according to the proportionality principle,
814
 one may suggest that in this 
case justice as individual fairness prevailed over justice as administrative 
convenience and order. This would be unsatisfactory according to a utilitarian view 
of proportionality that allows marginal cases of injustice; however, in my conception 
of fairness that was the right outcome.
815
  Furthermore, the application of 
proportionality in this case did not undermine the objectives of preventing fraud or 
tax evasion, which may also fall within the overriding requirements related to the 
fundamental freedoms.  
One last set of cases, in which the proportionality principle coupled with the standard 
of reasonableness played an essential role, dealt with the so-called ‘carrousel fraud.’  
In a number of cases,
816
 the fraudulent scheme was the following. Company A 
exported goods to B, which went missing after having sold them at a lower price to 
C, which resold the same goods to company D making a profit until the goods were 
finally sold back to company A. As exports are tax exempt (the VAT must be paid on 
the subsequent transaction in the importing Member State), company A can claim the 
VAT refund on its inputs, without the prior requirement of company B having paid 
its VAT on the same goods when reselling them to other traders. The UK (among 
others) tried to refuse a VAT refund to company A for obvious reasons, alleging that 
denying the exemption or the refund was in accordance with the principles of 
proportionality and legal certainty. However, the Court did not agree with this 
argument, taking into consideration the good faith of the initial trader (company A) 
                                                 
813
 Paragraphs 16 and 19 of the judgment. 
  
814
 Paragraph 30 of the judgment. See also with a similar line of reasoning the Intersplav and Bulves 
cases decided by the ECHR (Chapter IV, section 2.7.d). 
 
815
 On the concept of fairness, see Chapter I, section 3. 
 
816
 Optigen Ltd, Fulcrum Electronics Ltd and Bond House Systems Ltd v Commissioners of Customs 
& Excise Joined Cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 [2006] ECR I-483. 
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as it had ‘no knowledge and no means of knowledge’ of the fraudulent scheme.817 In 
the Albert Collée case, the Court balanced the lack of good faith of the taxpayer with 
the risk of a revenue loss to scrutinise the argument of proportionality put forward by 
the German tax authorities.
818
 To deny “the status of exemption transaction solely on 
the ground that the evidence of such a supply was not produced in good time” was 
regarded as disproportionate even where there was no good faith, if there was no tax 
to be collected.  
The Court made clear in Federation of Technological Industries the role of 
reasonable behaviour and good faith by explicitly submitting the joint tax liability 
between the seller and the buyer to the proportionality principle: 
        “… a taxable person, to whom a supply of goods or services has 
been made and who knew, or had reasonable grounds to 
suspect, that some or all of the VAT payable in respect of that 
supply, or of any previous or subsequent supply, would go 
unpaid, may be made jointly and severally liable, with the 
person who is liable, for payment of that VAT. Such legislation 
must, however, comply with the general principles of law which 
form part of the Community legal order and which include, in 
particular, the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality.”819 
The Court illustrated as reasonable of suspicion the situation where the price of 
goods was lower than the market price, but even in this circumstance, such a 
                                                 
817
 Paragraph 51 of the judgment. 
 
818
 Albert Collée case C-146/05, paragraphs 27 in relation to proportionality and 35-36 regarding the 
good faith and loss of revenue. It is interesting to note that in this case, although the taxpayer was not 
acting in good faith, the correction of his mistake could not be denied, as there was no loss of tax 
revenue. By way of contrast, where the taxpayer did act in good faith, the Court found that it was not 
relevant if the correction of his/her mistake could cause a loss of revenue (Karageorgou and Others 
Joined Cases C-78/02 to C-80/02 [2003] ECR I-13295, paragraph 50).  
 
819
 Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Attorney General v Federation of Technological Industries 
and Others case C-384/04 [2006] ECR I-4191 (paragraph 35). 
 245 
presumption must be rebuttable.
820
 Furthermore, the Court held that a system of strict 
liability, in which presumptions are formulated in a way as to make it excessively 
difficult to rebut them, would go “beyond what is necessary to preserve the public 
exchequer’s rights.”821 From this case, it may be suggested that the proportionality 
principle may work in tandem with the open-ended reasonableness standard in two 
ways. First, where proportionality may appear too strict (against any presumption); 
the reasonableness standard makes it more flexible by allowing rebuttable 
presumptions. Second, where the examples of what may be reasonable appear to be 
too vague, with no limit (any presumption might be allowed) proportionality through 
its test of necessity (by going beyond what is necessary) may aid to set its 
boundaries. In my opinion this ascertainment of what is reasonable through 
proportionality, and vice-versa to give more flexibility to proportionality, is another 
characteristic that shows how they work in tandem to reach a fairer decision. To 
disallow the joint liability would undermine the public interest in making easier to 
collect tax in suspicious cases of evasion, whereas allowing in all situations a joint 
liability would harm taxpayers in good faith. A utilitarian view of proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness would have favoured the joint tax liability as a matter of 
principle, though it would have allowed marginal cases of injustice.
822
 
Again as an important requirement in applying the proportionality principle as to 
whether fiscal measures are fair and appropriate to tackle fraud, avoidance, evasion, 
the Court gives great regard to the good faith of taxpayers, as held in Teleos: 
      “Accordingly, the fact that the supplier acted in good faith, that he took 
every reasonable measure in his power and that his participation in 
                                                 
           
820
 The Court stated that the taxpayer could prove “that the low price payable for the goods was 
attributable to circumstances unconnected with failure to pay VAT” (paragraph 31 of the judgment). 
 
821
 Paragraph 32 of the judgment. 
 
822
 See on the ascertainment of the reasonableness standard via proportionality, Chapters I, section 2, 
and note 60; III, section 2.2; and IV, section 2.2. See also in the same line against a utilitarian 
application of proportionality, this section above, the cases Societe generale des grandes sources 
d’eaux minerals financaires (C-361/96).  
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fraud is excluded are important points in deciding whether that supplier 
can be obliged to account for the VAT after the event.”823 
This concludes the section on procedural measures that are closely scrutinised 
according to the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness. The 
discussion shows that the Court balances not only tax principles such as neutrality 
and the right to deduction or exemption, but also other general principles of law such 
as the good faith of taxpayers in each case, against the public interest to tackle 
evasion and fraud.  
IV.7.4. Conclusions on VAT principles and proportionality. 
 
This section demonstrates that the Court has also applied implicitly or explicitly the 
test of proportionality in order to accept the justification of fiscal supervision, tax 
simplification, fraud and tax avoidance, within the ambit of a specific tax, depending 
on particular circumstances of each case in which the VAT fundamental principles 
had to be taken into account. Moreover, the Court created in Halifax the abuse of 
rights doctrine to be applied to the VAT system, according to the principle of 
proportionality in concert with reasonableness.  
 
As already observed as a general principle of EU Law, the principle of 
proportionality is applicable not only to tax matters with regard to the fundamental 
freedoms, but also to specific taxes such as VAT, as the Court decided in all cases 
analysed in this section.  This spells out that tax matters are not considered a separate 
body of rules and principles that would not fall within a system of law that 
encompasses other general legal principles, particularly proportionality, which is an 
essential tool for examining and enforcing tax rules and principles in as fair a way as 
possible. Conversely, one may suggest that proportionality is unnecessary to search 
for principles of specific taxes such as VAT while neutrality has been recognized and 
enforced as a fundamental principle, regardless of any proportionality reasoning.
824
 
                                                 
823
 The Queen, on the application of Teleos PLC and Others v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, 
Case C-409/04 [2007] ECR I-7797, paragraph 66. 
 
824
 As a matter of principle, neutrality has been found within the VAT Directives and developed by the 
case law, in which proportionality did have neither any explicit nor apparently implicit role. This can 
in a number of decisions on neutrality and the definition of economic activity, such as in the Fini case 
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However, even then the role of proportionality remains crucial for weighing and 
reconciling different tax principles in the search for consistency and fairness in 
specific circumstances. These principles include neutrality, the right of deduction and 
good faith on the one hand, and simplification, fiscal supervision, procedural 
measures for assessment and refund, tax evasion and tax avoidance on the other 
hand.  
 
Overall, it may be additionally suggested that the principle of proportionality has a 
great regard for fairness, equity, good faith and consistency, as has been seen in the 
Court decisions. Where both fairness and consistency or either appears to be 
undermined (such as again in Sudholz), the Court has tended to stick more to the 
facts of the case to justify its reasoning in order to protect those objectives and the 
lively, flexible and changeable notion of reasonableness.  
 
The next section will analyse the interaction between different principles of taxation 
(public interest in retrospective tax legislation, and also tax avoidance and 
simplification) in contrast with the protection of the legitimate expectation and the 
effectiveness of EU rights, and whether and why proportionality has a more stringent 
test or not. 
                                                                                                                                          
(C-32/03 [2005] ECR I-1599, paragraph 25), in which was stated that “The common system of VAT 
consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities”, and also Terra and 
Wattel (2003), pp.271-273. However, from the cases analysed in this section one may deduce that 
proportionality mostly enforces neutrality and to a minor extent undermines it, demonstrating that 
neutrality is not as complete and absolute as seems to be stated in the above dictum in Fini, taking into 
account other general and specific tax principles and rules.  
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IV.8. Retrospective tax legislation, legitimate expectation, and proportionality 
 
IV.8.1. The principles of legal certainty and its corollaries of legitimate 
expectation and non-retrospective legislation. Types of retrospective measures 
and the principle of proportionality.  
This section will illustrate how the Court has inferred the unwritten principle of non-
retrospective taxation from some general principles of EU Law, like legal certainty 
and legitimate expectation, via the proportionality principle coupled with 
reasonableness. In other words, it will be clearly demonstrated not only that “there is 
a close link between the principle of proportionality and non-retroactivity”,825 but 
also the extent to which the proportionality reasoning, whether express or not, has 
established limits to retrospective taxation in accordance with the principles of legal 
certainty and legitimate expectation.  
Depending on the public interest at play, which may be regarded as a pressing social 
need to justify a retrospective measure, the Court may accept such a measure in 
exceptional circumstances in a way that individuals affected could not have had any 
reasonable protection based on their legitimate expectation. However, with regard to 
the protection of non-retroactivity of legislation imposing a heavier burden there has 
not been any precedent yet upholding this, unless the legitimate expectation can be 
regarded as protected under national rules with respect to tax avoidance, and 
sufficient warning has been given to the taxpayers that new legislation could be 
enforced retrospectively to the date when that intention was made public.
826
 On the 
other hand, where not dealing with such circumstances, the Court has invalidated 
retrospective tax measures in concrete cases based on the general principles of law 
                                                 
825
 Emiliou, (1996), p.144. On the close relationship between legitimate expectation and 
reasonableness, see also Hartley, (2003), p.149. The first point to be considered to establish the 
meaning for an expectation to be legitimate is whether or not it is reasonable in a sense that “a prudent 
man” (as either a taxpayer, or a consumer, or a trader, or an individual exercising any Treaty right) 
“would have had the expectation” (ibidem).  
 
826
 See the joined cases Leusden and Groep (C-487/01 and C-7/02 [2004] ECR I-5337) and Goed 
Wonen C-376/02 [2005] ECR I-3445 (Grand Chamber).  
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such as: the rule of law, legitimate expectation, and legal certainty.
827
 The instrument 
applied by the Court in all these cases was once again the test of proportionality, 
balancing conflicting interests. In terms of retroactivity as a whole, the Court weighs 
the alleged public interest as a justification against the legitimate expectations of the 
parties that are affected, discussing in each case which of them takes priority over the 
other. That means the measure or rule in question must be justified as a matter of 
necessity, proportional to its objectives, contrasting or balancing the public interest 
with the legitimate or reasonable expectations of taxpayers. 
Two types or degrees of retrospective measures may be distinguished: the first may 
be called true or actual retroactivity, according to which the transaction or act 
performed under the revoked law is complete, whereas the second type may be 
regarded as apparent or quasi-retroactive, under which the transaction that falls 
within the new law is not complete yet.
828
 The former appears to be more unfair and 
harder to justify, whereas the latter may be justified more easily provided that the 
legitimate expectation of individuals and legal persons may not be unreasonably 
affected. A case that has not been tested yet in Court is whether or not a true or actual 
retrospective measure may be justified for anti-avoidance tax purposes under the 
principle of proportionality. The least intrusive measure may not be retrospective 
legislation, because there may be other available measures like the abuse of rights 
doctrine to catch wholly artificial past transactions that have circumvented European 
                                                 
827
 Jürgen Schwarze captures the point regarding the origin of the principles of legal certainty and the 
protection of legitimate expectations correctly stating that they are “merely general maxims derived 
from the notion that the Community is based on the rule of law…” (European Administrative Law, 
1992, p.867). As there are other principles that may run counter to those of legal certainty and the 
protection of legitimate expectation, “the right balance will need to be struck” (ibidem, and Chapter 6 
on legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations). There, the role of proportionality 
comes into play. See also Schlossstrasse, Case C- 396/98 as analysed below. 
 
828
 See Hartley (2003), p.147. See the same distinction under German Constitutional Law: proper or 
typical retroactivity and improper or atypical retroactivity, Tipke, Klaus, “La Retroattivita in Diritto 
Tributario”, in Trattato di Diritto Tributario (Cedam, Padova 1994) pp.437-447; Schwarze (1992), 
p.1120; and Thuronyi (2003), pp.79-80. Actual retroactivity, where the law changes previously 
determined taxes, and de facto retroactive application. The latter is equivalent to the atypical or quasi-
retroactivity, which allows the Parliament to be more flexible with a broader margin of discretion. 
Within the same context and meaning, see also the distinction between actual and apparent 
retrospective legislation in Craig and De Burca (2003), pp.380 and 382.  
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law. If there is a tax loophole or lacuna, the better way to fill it may be via new 
prospective legislation.
829
  
Another form of retrospective legislation involves procedural rules that provide 
conditions for the recovery of undue charges. New legislation may establish shorter 
limitation periods for future claims or any other rule that may be more stringent than 
those in force when the payment was made or when the Court held some fiscal 
charge to be invalid. New limitation periods may be similar not only to actual 
retroactivity (as they may affect to some extent an earlier undue payment regarding a 
complete transaction, that may be not recoverable any longer), but also to apparently 
retrospective measures as they may just affect future payments, where transitional 
arrangements are provided to protect the legitimate expectations of those 
concerned.
830
 
In comparing criminal law and tax law in respect of the principle of non-
retroactivity, it is worth noting that the principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law 
is expressly stated, is common to all European legal systems, and is protected as a 
fundamental right under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
831
 
In contrast, there is no specific article that provides for protection against more 
burdensome, retrospective tax legislation in any European Treaty. Thus, from a 
literal approach there might not be a similar protection against retrospective taxes, 
since reasonable taxation is not regarded as a penalty or a sanction.
832
  
Nevertheless, there are some other principles that favour that protection in contrast 
with others that appear to justify retrospective measures; here, proportionality may 
                                                 
829
 See this section, item 4. 
 
830
 This issue is particularly discussed in item 5 of this section. 
 
831
 See Regina v Kent Kirk Case C-63/83 [1984] ECR-2689, paragraph 21, apud Craig and De Burca 
(2003), pp.381-382. 
 
832
 Essentially a criminal fine involves, as a tax on a course of conduct does not, “an offence or breach 
of duty in the form of a violation of a rule set up to guide the conduct of ordinary citizens” (Hart, 
H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 1961, p.39). Whereas the incidence of tax is not a sanction in civilized 
societies, the economic natural role of taxation also differs from criminal law, since not only because 
the former may provide for an equitable redistribution of income and wealth, but also for the 
appropriate allocation of economic resources and economic stabilization (James and Nobes, The 
Economics of Taxation, Financial Times-Prentice Hall, New York 2000, pp. 7-10).  
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come into play to weigh all of them. Furthermore, this principle may not represent a 
mere consolidation of rules and principles of each Member State, because to some 
extent the Court may have gone further than some national jurisdictions, even in 
comparison with the European Court of Human Rights in terms of individual 
protection.
833
 
The following cases will be separately analysed according to their justifications, and 
will point out the role of proportionality in construing the principle of non-
retrospective taxation, starting with some non-tax cases.  
IV.8.2. Proportionality, legitimate expectation and retrospective legislation in 
general. 
In the landmark case of Racke
834
, the Court enunciated the principle of non-
retroactivity in light of the purpose of the retrospective measure and the protection of 
legitimate expectations as follows:  
“Although in general the principle of legal certainty precludes 
a Community measure from taking effect from a point in time 
before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise where 
the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the 
legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly 
respected.”835 
In that case, the Commission had altered the monetary compensation for a product 
using a regulation that provided for its application fourteen days before its 
publication. The Court stated that for the compensation to be effective, it had to take 
effect from the events that created it, and therefore new amounts could be applicable 
                                                 
833
 For an overview on other jurisdictions see Thuronyi, (2003), p.76-82 on non-retroactivity.  See also 
McGuigan, Catherine, and Ross, Howard, “Tax and Retrospective Legislation” (1997) Tax J. 407, 11-
16. On the European Court of Human Rights case law, see Baker, Philip, “Retrospective Tax 
Legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights” [2005] B.T.R. 1, 1-9, and Chapter 
IV.2.6.  
 
834
 Case C-98/78. See Craig and De Burca (2003), p.380; and Tridimas (1999), p.170. 
 
835
 Paragraph 20 of the judgment (Case C-98/78). See Craig and De Burca, idem pp.380-1; and 
Emiliou (1996), p.145. 
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“to facts and events which occurred shortly before the publication of the regulation 
fixing them in the Official Journal”.836 Regarding the legitimate expectations of those 
concerned, the Court said that it was inherent for monetary compensation purposes 
that “traders must expect any appreciable change in the monetary situation possibly 
to entail the extension of the system” to new goods and new amounts, taking into 
account also that the Commission had adopted “special measures for them to be 
brought to the attention of the various sectors of industry concerned.”837 
A case, in which the Court for the first time expressly applied the principle of 
proportionality in its clear three steps, is Fedesa.
838
  The legal issue in this case was 
the validity of a retrospective Directive adopted at the beginning of March, which 
was to be applied from the first of January of that same year. There was a temporary 
legal vacuum because an earlier Directive had been annulled on the grounds of 
procedural defects. Since the substance of the matter was agricultural protection 
(hormone substances for animals), the Court stated that the traders could not have 
had a reasonable expectation of the law changing only because of a lack of 
scientifically conclusive findings concerning their dangers. The Court considered 
valid that retrospective measure, indicating that in matters of public health 
proportionality is laxly applied.
839
 In order to justify retroactivity in those particular 
circumstances, the principle of proportionality was applied through its three elements 
(necessity, suitability, and non-availability of less restrictive measures).  
The examples in the commerce and public policy fields are very fertile; and the 
fundamental principles were also applied to tax matters, as is shown in the following 
cases, in which the Court weighed on the one hand public interest as a justification 
for retrospective taxation (either to tackle tax avoidance and abusive transactions or 
to close loopholes), and on the other hand the legitimate expectation of taxpayers, via 
proportionality. 
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 Case C-98/78, paragraph 20. See Emiliou, idem p.145. 
 
837
 Case C- 98/78, paragraph 20. 
 
838
 Case C-331/88.  
 
839
 Tridimas (1999), p.102-3. See also Craig and De Burca (2003), pp.376-377 and 382. 
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IV.8.3. Actual retrospective taxation and legitimate expectation. Simplification 
as a justification. 
In Schlossstrasse,
840
 the Court held invalid under the protection of legitimate 
expectations a VAT legislative amendment post-dating a supply of goods or services 
for letting operations, which had not yet commenced, and which pre-dated the start 
of those operations and, consequently, their tax assessment. The objective of the 
change was to limit the scope of the option regarding the taxation of the letting of 
land as an instrument of simplification and to counteract tax avoidance. Under 
previous legislation, the taxpayer had the right to choose between an exemption and 
the right to deduct the VAT, unless the entrepreneur proved that the land has not 
been used or was intended for different activities from the undertaking. The new law 
on the simplification of tax legislation only permitted the option (of exemption or 
deduction) if the use (or intended use) of the land were only for operations, which 
did not preclude the deduction of input tax. Thus, one of the objectives was to avoid 
the deduction for operations that could be exempt. The German tax authorities 
alleged that there was no retroactivity because only after the use of the property 
could there be a final assessment of the VAT due, although the legislation allowed 
for the deduction at the moment of the supply of goods and services. The Court 
rejected this argument, stating that the principles of legitimate expectations and of 
legal certainty precluded the retrospective revoking of that option, if the national 
court found that the intention to commence economic activities giving rise to taxable 
transactions was declared in good faith, and that this intention was supported by 
objective evidence, as provided for by the previous legislation. In other words, it was 
for the national court to consider whether there was abuse or not, but not to decide 
whether there was violation or not of the principles of legitimate expectation and 
proportionality, since this matter was already settled by the Court.  
In the same line, the Court held in Sudholz that a retrospective tax measure must be 
scrutinised under the test of proportionality, in the sense that it must be “justified by 
the purpose which it seeks to achieve, and whether the legitimate expectations of 
                                                 
840
 Case C-396/98. See Case Comment by Troyer, Ilse de, and others “VAT – Art. 17 of the Sixth 
Directive – Deduction of Input VAT – Deduction Precluded by an Amendment to National 
Legislation Removing the Possibility of Opting for Taxation of the Letting of Immovable Property” 
(2000) EC T.R. 9(4), 257. 
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those concerned have been respected.”841  Although the term ‘proportionality’ was 
not explicitly mentioned, the role of proportionality reasoning is again the thrust of 
that decision, since not only had the necessity and suitability of the measure to be 
ascertained, but also the balance with other principles, such as legal certainty and 
legitimate expectation, had to be considered.  
The legal issue in this case was whether Council Decision 2000/186, which was 
published on 4 March 2000, would be valid retrospectively from 1 April 1999, on 
request from the German authorities. The reason for this was the Commission’s delay 
in processing the request submitted by the German State for derogating measures to 
be authorised under Article 27 of the Sixth Directive. The German government 
lodged its request on 11 November 1998, and introduced the derogating national 
measure on 24 March 1999 imposing a limit on the deduction of input VAT 
regarding cars purchased after 1 April 1999 for simplification purposes. While the 
Court said that Article 27 did not preclude the disputed Council Decision being 
adopted after the national derogating measure, it stated that its retrospective effect 
was contrary to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation.
842
 The 
reason for that conclusion was that there was no suggestion in the preamble of 
Decision 2000/186 why a retrospective derogation had been necessary, and the 
argument put forward by the German authorities when the national measure had been 
introduced - delays of the Commission in processing the requested derogating 
measure - did not justify the retroactivity of the Council Decision.
843
 Whereas the 
Court seemed not to have taken a formalistic approach in stating that Article 27 
allows a Council Decision being adopted later than a national derogating measure, 
any retrospective legislation may be closely scrutinised by the requirements of its 
necessity, transparency and significance, weighing different and apparently 
conflicting interests in play. Furthermore, the simplification requirement invoked as 
the main purpose for limiting the right of deduction in Sudholz appears to be no more 
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 Case C-17/01 (paragraph 35). 
 
842
 Paragraphs 24 and 40-41 of the judgment. 
 
843
 Paragraphs 36 and 42 of the judgment. 
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relevant than other requirements such as combating tax avoidance, abuse and evasion 
that were brought into play to justify actual and apparent retrospective taxation.
844
  
IV.8.4. Retrospective taxation and justifications of combating tax avoidance, 
abuse and evasion. Actual and apparent retrospective taxation. 
In Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep
845
 the Court held that taxpayers as a matter of 
principle cannot have a legitimate expectation against the revocation of a legal 
framework, which allows tax evasion, avoidance or abuse.
846
 In respect of tax 
avoidance, although taxpayers cannot be censured for taking advantage of a specific 
provision, or a loophole or a lacuna in the legislation that may not be regarded as an 
abuse, its retrospective revocation as such cannot breach a legitimate expectation 
based on EU law, which can only protect against the lack of reasonable transitional 
arrangements for the implementation of a retrospective amendment.
847
 The national 
legislation at stake in this case had amended the previous law to some extent 
retrospectively, and introduced compulsory exemption and consequently the 
withdrawal of the right of deduction, which resulted in an adjustment of deductions 
made over a number of years on immovable property acquired as capital goods to be 
let.  
This case may give a clear example of quasi or apparent retrospective taxation,
848
 as 
the legislative amendment in question “has effects on the future consequences” 849 of 
situations that arose while the previous rules were in force.  The amending legislation 
introduced transitional provisions and the specific case was not covered because the 
amount of the rent was artificially low. It was a case of apparent retrospective 
                                                 
844
 See Gemeente  and Holin Groep, Joined cases C-487/01 and 7/02, and Stichting Goed Wonen, Case 
C-376/02, analysed below. 
 
845
 Ibid. 
 
846
 In Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep, paragraph 78, the Court reiterated its case law, particularly 
the landmark Case C-110/99, Emsland-Starke, . Regarding the revocation of administrative unlawful 
acts, “it may be necessary to balance the public interest in legality and the private interest in legal 
certainty” (Craig and De Burca, 2003, p.387).  
 
847
 Paragraphs 77, 79 and 81 of the judgment.  
 
848
 On the distinction between actual and apparent retrospective legislation, see above, section 8.1. 
 
849
 Paragraph 45 of the judgment.  
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legislation due to the adjustments to be made for the future for those apparently 
abusive tax avoidance transactions. The Court applied the proportionality principle 
and concluded that it did not appear that the amending law ought to “be considered to 
have gone further than its objective required or to have breached a legitimate 
expectation of taxable persons.”850  
From the above cases, and reconciling Schlossstrasse and Sudholz with Gemeente 
Leusden and Holin Groep, it is right to conclude that where there is a completed 
transaction, although tax motivated but with no abuse,
851
 retrospective taxation is not 
an appropriate measure to tackle tax avoidance because of the principles of legal 
certainty and protection of legitimate expectation. It may be otherwise in a situation 
of transactions not yet completed.  Additionally, for transactions which have future 
consequences (e.g. deduction for VAT purposes spread over several years), there 
must be transitional arrangements to protect the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectation, unless there is abuse.
852
  
In my view, according to a more rigorous proportionality test, a better protection 
should be granted to VAT taxpayers: to guarantee the right of deduction for capital 
goods under the rules in force when the right itself arises, that is on their supply, for 
the following reasons. Since the taxpayer takes into account the tax costs of the 
supply, including consideration of the time over which the VAT on capital goods 
may be deducted, and the principle of neutrality requires that the final consumer 
bears VAT charged even on capital goods, that right of deduction could be neither 
revoked nor changed (e.g. extended from 5 to 10 years) in relation to transactions in 
course. Otherwise, either or both the legitimate expectation and the neutrality 
principles would be jeopardised.  
                                                 
850
 Paragraph 80 of the judgment. 
 
851
 In a situation where the taxpayer may choose between two ways to have a car for his business by 
either buying it or renting/leasing it, and the former is chosen just because he can deduct wholly once 
the tax charged on the acquisition and not only on the rental payments, there is no abuse, because he 
actually needs the car, the price is real, and in particular there is no intended equal tax treatment for 
both types of contracts. 
 
852
 Actually, where there is abuse, there is no need for a retrospective legislative measure, since, as the 
Court has already repeatedly stated, “If the tax authorities were to conclude that the right to deduct has 
been exercised fraudulently or abusively, they would be entitled to demand, with retrospective effect, 
repayment of the amounts deducted” (I/S Fini H v Skatteministeriet, Case C-32/03, paragraph 33).                                                                                                                                             
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For abusive transactions, the more appropriate remedy is not, in my opinion, a 
retrospective legislative amendment, but simply disregarding them under the abuse 
of rights doctrine.
853
 For tax motivated operations the more appropriate measure 
seems to be a prospective legislative amendment, without affecting transactions 
already performed and without detriment to the time over which the deduction may 
be made. An apparently retrospective measure may be necessary either to address 
some wholly artificial arrangements with no economic substance (different from tax 
motivation and abuse), or to fill a legislative lacuna or loophole, eliminating or 
changing the right of deduction for the future regarding a previous supply of capital 
goods. 
In Stichting Goed Wonen,
854
 the Grand Chamber seemed to have summarised the 
doctrine of proportionality between legitimate expectation and retrospective 
legislation as a measure to be justified on grounds of tax avoidance as a requirement 
in the general interest. The case dealt with a general scheme supposedly to a great 
extent practised in Netherlands, in which making a usufruct economically similar to a 
straightforward leasing would circumvent a disallowed deduction. Thus, an 
exempted transaction with no right of deduction (leasing) was avoided by the 
creation of a right in rem similar to the right of use derived from the leasing, in order 
to give rise to a right of deduction, in circumstances where the economic value of the 
right of usufruct was not at arm’s length. The objective of the new legislation was 
clearly to tackle those tax motivated and seemly artificial transactions, in a 
retrospective way: the amending law came into force on 29 December 1995, but took 
effect as from 18:00 hours on 31 March 1995, the date and time the future law was 
made public by a press release.
855
  
In principle the Court has exceptionally accepted a justification founded on the 
alleged concern that those contrived arrangements (rights in rem with no economic 
substance) would be performed on a large scale between the time of the press release 
                                                 
853
 See the previous note and Halifax case, section 7.2. 
 
854
 Case C-376/02. See case comment by Carr, Frank, “Retrospective Legislation” (2005) Ir. T.R. 
18(4), 340-341. 
 
855
 Paragraph 8 of the judgment.  
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and the amending law coming in to force, as the prevention of those apparently 
artificial arrangements might be in the general interest.
856
 Although the Court 
referred to the national court to finally decide the case, it again gave some guidelines 
regarding weighing the legitimate expectation and the tax avoidance requirement for 
a retrospective measure. The Court stated that an assessment of whether or not the 
risk of a large use of those contrived arrangements “was significant enough to justify 
the retrospective legislation” was necessary, and also whether or not the press 
releases of 31 March and 3 April 1995 were sufficiently clear for those concerned “to 
understand the consequences of the legislative amendment planned for the 
transactions they carry out.”857 It is still worth noting that in this case not only 
apparently retrospective taxation could be accepted (for adjustments after the date of 
entry into force of the amending law), but also actually or truly retrospective 
legislation, since the deductions that had been made from the press release to the date 
the new law came into force would be affected if there was tax avoidance with no 
economic substance.  
This circumstance may be regarded as one step further than the previous cases, since 
from its conclusion may follow the lawfulness of actually retrospective taxation 
where the objective is to block tax avoidance with no economic substance, under the 
test of proportionality, but with a flexible requirement of some notice in advance to 
the taxpayers to satisfy the principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectation. In 
cases of non-completed transactions, which were performed before the press release, 
even in tax avoidance transactions with little or no economic substance at all, the 
better remedy may be to accept only the apparent or quasi retroactivity, affecting 
only the futures consequences like the deduction of adjustments over several years 
for capital goods, as discussed above.
858
 
                                                 
856
 Paragraphs 38-39 of the judgment. Showing consistency, the Court in this case regarded tax 
avoidance as an overriding requirement in the general interest likely to justify a restriction on the 
principle of legitimate expectation, likewise in similar cases regarding restrictions on the fundamental 
freedoms (see particularly section 6.2 of this Chapter).  
 
857
 Paragraphs 39 and 45 of the judgment. 
 
858
 See above comments on Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep (Joined cases C-487/01 and 7/02). 
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In conclusion, in my opinion retrospective legislation to tackle tax abusive 
transactions should not be allowed any more within the EU after the precedent of 
Halifax
859
 on abuse of rights. At the time the Court decided the cases analysed in this 
section, the doctrine of tax abuse within the VAT was not developed yet, and under 
the test of proportionality the less intrusive measure is to tackle abuse in each case. 
Thus, all guarantees would be granted according to the doctrine of abuse, such as a 
proper assessment based on objective economic factors, no applications of penalties, 
and under the due process of law. Though Member States might consider 
retrospective legislation as a most efficient way to warn taxpayers about any abusive 
legal issue, this specific task could be left with the fiscal authorities through circulars 
and not through an Act of Parliament, which may cause more general uncertainty 
among taxpayers.  
IV.8.5. Retrospective taxation and procedural rules regarding limitation periods 
– proportionality, legitimate expectation and the principle of effectiveness.  
Member States have had different reactions to Court decisions that held national tax 
rules invalid under EU law. Some of them, like France, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Belgium, have tried to limit the right to recover taxes or charges unduly paid 
under the justification of limiting the unexpected loss of revenue, without affecting 
substantially the public budget. They justified specific restrictions under the 
argument of legal certainty and reasonable response from the taxpayers in a sense 
that those affected were reasonably aware of undue charges that could be recovered. 
The Court has considered those restrictions under the general principles of EU law 
and has either accepted in principle reasonable measures or struck down some 
unreasonable restrictions on grounds of whether they rendered virtually impossible 
or excessively difficult the exercise of EU rights (the principle of effectiveness), and 
met the requirement of not being less favourable than those regulating domestic 
situations (the principle of equivalence).
860
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 See this Chapter, section 7.2. 
 
860
 See, inter alia, Rewe Case C-33/76 [1976] ECR-1989, paragraph 5; Denkavit Case C-61/79 [1980] 
ECR-1205, paragraph 25; Dilexport Case C-343/96 [1999] ECR I-579, paragraph 25; 
Metallgesellschaft and Others Joined Cases C- 397/98 and C-410/98, paragraph 85; and  Marks & 
Spencer Case C-62/00, paragraph 34. On limitation periods and the principles of equivalence, 
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The idea of reasonableness once again is taken into account to hold those measures 
valid or not, pursuant to the objectives of other principles such as effectiveness and 
equivalence. The role of proportionality reasoning appears to underlie the judgments 
of the Court in all those cases, not only in balancing apparently conflicting interests 
or principles (on the one hand the effectiveness of rights and equivalence, and on the 
other the public interest in legal certainty in limiting the period during which claims 
for recovery of undue charges may be made). Thus, the reasonableness of measures 
may be evaluated according to a broad standard balancing the wide discretion of the 
national legislature and the ultimate requirement of not making impossible in 
practice the exercise of the right of refund in case of an undue payment. Here again 
the role of proportionality reasoning is relevant to ascertain the degree of 
reasonableness that may be acceptable within the boundaries of discretion, even in 
determining that a transitional period of three months for new rules to come into 
force may not be appropriate while a six months period may be.
861
 The requirements 
of equivalence and effectiveness are cumulative, but the latter may take precedence 
over the former either where national legislation may have no domestic procedural 
rules at all, or in a situation where some conditions laid down for internal matters and 
for EU law are the same, but make the refund excessively difficult. This occurred in 
some cases regarding first the reasonableness in principle of the limitation period of 
3 years,
862
 and secondly with respect to the burden of proof for the reimbursement of 
undue charges that have been passed on to consumers.
863
 The Court seemed to be 
flexible given the differences among national jurisdictions regarding the statute of 
limitations, but appeared to have reconciled a variety of principles in play, and 
rejected clearly unfair rules such as those that provided for no recovery at all for 
                                                                                                                                          
effectiveness and proportionality, see Southern, David, “VAT, the Three Year Cap, Rules and 
Principles” (2004) VAT Int.  22(1), 2051-2054. 
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 Where the limitation period has been reduced from five to three years, the transitional period of 3 
months was regarded as clearly insufficient (Grunding Italiana, Case C-255/00 [2002] ECR I-8003). 
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 The Court held that a three years limitation period reckoned from the date of the undue payment 
seemed to be reasonable in the following cases, inter alia, Edis Case C-231/96 [1998] ECR I-4951, 
paragraph 35, SPAC Case C-260/96 [1998] ECR I-4997, paragraph 19, Aprile Case C-228/96 [1998] 
ECR I-7141, also paragraph 19, and Dilexport Case C-343/96, paragraph 26.  
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 Denkavit C-61/79, paragraph 26; Spa San Giorgio Case C-199/82 [1983] ECR-3595, paragraph 18; 
and Dilexport, Case C-343/96, paragraph 48.  
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those who had not brought an action before the judicial decision that has held the tax 
or charge contrary to EU law.
864
  
 
Regarding the second issue that the undue charges might have been passed on to 
third parties, the Court gave a number of reasons for not accepting that the burden of 
proof lay on the taxpayer based on other principles, rules and facts, which may be 
balanced with the unjust enrichment doctrine. These include free market competition, 
the difficulty of sometimes proving who actually bears the burden of fiscal charges, 
the unreasonable acceptance of only documentary proof, and the necessity of broad 
and flexible rules of evidence that may facilitate the exercise of the right of recovery 
and not make it nearly impossible in practice.
865
 Overall, there is no right if there is 
no remedy or action to make it reasonably effective and enforceable. 
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 See Barra Case C-309/85 [1988] ECR-355 that dealt with the recovery of an environmental tax on 
cars held invalid in the Humblot Case C-112/84 [1985] ECR-1367, where a subsequent statute 
provided that only those who had brought action before the Humblot decision would be able to 
recover the discriminatory tax.  
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  See Spa San Giorgio Case C-199/82, paragraphs 14-16. Regarding the burden of proof the current 
understanding of the Court seems to be what was held in Dilexport: it is acceptable for the burden of 
proof to be laid down on the administrative authorities and not on the taxpayers, and unacceptable 
even a rebuttable presumption that charges unlawfully collected have been passed to third parties 
(paragraphs 44-54). 
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IV.9. Conclusion on the EU and some comparisons with other jurisdictions. 
The open-ended, overriding requirements in the general interest (combating tax 
avoidance, tax simplification, fiscal supervision, coherence, and a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers) are balanced with other general or specific tax 
principles, such as legal certainty, predictability, legitimate expectation, neutrality, 
ability to pay, fairness, the fundamental rights and the fundamental freedoms, 
through proportionality reasoning.  
The nature of the overriding requirements (whether relating to discrimination, or on a 
rule of reason and equitable basis, or regarding the residual competences of Member 
States, or related to a general principle of EU law) is debatable.
866
 The most 
appropriate explanation for these overriding requirements seems to be mainly based 
on equity and the rule of reason, in which the proportionality test coupled with 
reasonableness, plays a fundamental role. Most significantly, proportionality remains 
a core tool and concept to achieve effectively the objectives of the Treaty and make 
all its principles and rules compatible with each other as far as possible. This 
principle may also affect the analysis of the means proposed for collection of 
revenue, such as retrospective taxation, environmental taxation, direct and indirect 
discriminatory tax rules, and even indistinctly applicable tax rules that may make less 
attractive or less effective the exercise of EU rights.  
The public interest that may justify retrospective measures may encompass 
combating tax avoidance, the practicability and simplification of the tax system, but 
must be weighed against the protection of legitimate expectations, and the 
effectiveness of EU rights. Overall, the former has not generally taken precedence 
over the latter, except in exceptional circumstances. Most cases decided by the Court 
have dealt with indirect taxes; however, there would be no great surprise if the Court 
comes to decide whether a direct tax might be retrospective (as the European Court 
of Human Rights has done). In direct taxation the Court balances the fiscal 
sovereignty of Member States and the restrictions of fundamental freedoms that may 
result from tax measures. Any national direct tax that is retrospective should have a 
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 See Snell (2002), pp.193-4 
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legitimate objective and be weighed against the legitimate expectations of those 
concerned.  
The legitimate expectation doctrine is also based on the reasonableness and reliance 
principles, which should guide the life of any society, even in a Union with different 
legal traditions, cultures and rules. The role of the proportionality principle has been 
shown to be pervasive, as it may be applied not only to the measures but also to the 
objectives themselves when applying the test of justification.  
Within the VAT system, the role of proportionality is overwhelming, covering all 
types of rules, such as procedural and substantive measures that may directly or 
indirectly affect the right of deduction and the principle of neutrality. This may be 
one of the clearest illustrations how proportionality coupled with reasonableness 
functions as an analytical tool to assess the overall fairness of a particular tax. The 
ends of specific measures must be weighed against other objectives of the rule of law 
and general principles of law, such as good faith and the abuse of rights.  
An interesting comparison may be made between the EU and the WTO in relation to 
non-discrimination and proportionality. Within the WTO agreements, the non-
discrimination provision is also a fundamental principle and the jurisprudence of the 
Appellate Body largely applies the test of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness, mainly in its aspects of necessity (reasonably available alternative 
measures) and balancing.
867
  
 
One contrast between the ECJ and the Appellate Body of the WTO may be pointed 
out, however. This concerns non-discriminatory rules that may make the exercise of 
the fundamental freedoms within different States less attractive. The ECJ freed itself 
from discrimination to focus on restrictions essentially based on proportionality with 
regard to the fundamental freedoms; the WTO has still applied proportionality to 
assess whether or not domestic measures are discriminatory and justifiable. One 
might suggest that there would be some room for applying WTO rules even to 
indistinctively applicable measures (per se non-discriminatory), if they were 
inconsistent with international free trade either because of their manifest illegitimacy 
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 See on the WTO case law, Chapter III.3.2.  
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or their wholly disproportionate nature, with due regard to the competing interests at 
stake. Another contrast is that Articles 110-113 of the TFEU (ex Articles 90-93 of 
the EC Treaty) also prohibit internal discrimination between domestic and foreign 
goods similar to Article III of the GATT 1994, but whereas the former seems to be 
applied strictly with neither margin of discretion nor strict proportionality 
justification,
868
 the latter is open to any exception for discrimination under Article 
XX (but in this case submitted to its two-tier scrutiny with proportionality 
reasoning). 
 
Concerning these two possible approaches to proportionality - one more closely 
related to the justification for discrimination in the WTO and the other more broadly 
linked to indistinctively applicable rules in the EU – they may be justified by two 
distinct objectives: trade liberalisation in the former and market integration in the 
latter.
869
 That is why one may agree with Mavroidis on the WTO being ‘about non-
discrimination, not about deregulation!’,870 if one takes into account the differences 
and similarities of objectives and scope between the WTO as a multilateral trade 
agreement and the EU as a community treaty pursuing an internal market and the 
fundamental freedoms of movement of capital, services, goods and workers.  
 
In the US, similar proportionality reasoning is applied under the commerce clause 
focused on discrimination and non-protectionism.
871
 A plausible explanation for a 
broad test of proportionality in the EU may be justified by the necessity of market 
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 See this Chapter, section 2.4. However, the ECJ appears to have adopted a broader approach on 
environmental grounds under Articles 90-93, but also applying an objective justification analysis 
based on proportionality (see section.4).  
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 Trade liberalisation is understood as ‘a process aimed at reducing tariffs and quotas’ among 
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and WTO Dispute Settlement, Hart Publishing, 2002, pp.4-7 and note 9). See also Chapter III, section 
3.3.  
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 Verhoosel, Ibidem, p.7, citing Mavroidis giving the opening lecture of the WTO Law at Columbia 
Law School in 1999.  
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 See Chapter II, sections 1.1 and 5; and Chapter III, section 3.2. 
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access rather than stability as it is in the US where “the focus is in reducing 
transaction costs” rather than access.872  
Finally, in relation to other general principles of the rule of law, such as the principle 
of legal certainty, it can be said that proportionality has become an overarching and 
essential principle of interpretation and application of EU law as it is has for the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Overall, in search of consistency, 
predictability, efficiency and fairness, there may be no way of reaching them all with 
a reasonable balance between conflicting interests and principles as effectively as 
applying the proportionality principle coupled with reasonableness. 
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 Maduro (1998), p. 97. 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Proportionality and Reasonableness as Overarching or General 
International Principles or Standards of Law. 
 
Before any specific or general conclusion, it would be worth summing up a general 
description or definition of the principle of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness according to the jurisprudence analysed in all previous Chapters. The 
generally accepted conception is that proportionality in tandem with reasonableness 
is a general principle of law for interpretation and application of other legal 
principles and rules, according to which principles must be balanced against each 
other, aiming at their optimization and conciliation. In addition, all measures 
pursuing legitimate objectives and policies must be proportionate to them (a 
reasonable relationship between ends and means) in a less intrusive way to those 
concerned. All reasonable measures must be suitable and necessary. This 
requirement of necessity may be called the ‘less restrictive alternative test’ that may 
also require the analysis of whether alternative measures are ‘reasonably available’. 
Sometimes a more restrictive measure may be accepted, if it is more efficient 
according to its legitimate ends, because there must be also a balance between its 
disadvantages and the overall interests in play.
873
 
 
                                                 
873
 The three-prong test of proportionality (suitability, necessity and balance) may encompass the 
analysis of the legitimacy of the ends pursued by specific or general measures. Examples of legitimate 
objectives would be fiscal supervision, tax coherence, combating tax avoidance, environmental 
protection, balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction, compliance with international agreements. See also 
Chapter I. The margin of discretion (or appreciation, or deference) doctrine has also a role to play in 
proportionality reasoning which may be the overarching principle of interpretation and adjudication 
(on the differences and interplay between margin of appreciation doctrine and proportionality, see 
Chapter III, section 2.4). Metaphorically, one may say that the margin of discretion would be the 
driver and proportionality in tandem with reasonableness the whole coach, not only its four wheels 
(four tests: suitability, necessity, disadvantages not being disproportionate to the aims pursued, and 
legitimacy of the ends), as the latter must govern the driver him or herself (the judicial, administrative 
or legislative authority). Sometimes, depending on the subject matter even when expressly applying 
the proportionality principle, the Courts give little or no deference to the margin of appreciation of 
States regarding for instance self-defence (see for example the ICJ Case Concerning Oil Platforms, 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Judgment of 6 November 2003, General List 
No. 90, paragraph 73, Chapter III.1), and apparently on sex discrimination (see Chapter III.2, section 
5.b, on the European Court of Human Rights and similar contrast with other jurisdictions such as the 
US regarding the joint taxation of spouses).  
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The first conclusion that may be drawn is that the principle of proportionality in 
concert with the notion of reasonableness is a general principle of law recognized 
and applied in international and domestic constitutional courts. This research gave 
more weight to the analysis of international over national courts for three reasons. 
First, demonstrating how proportionality may be distinct from and work in tandem 
with reasonableness was easier via the analysis of the case law of international 
jurisdictions, since in some individual countries they may be interchangeable and 
their interaction is not clear. Secondly, international judges tend to apply legal 
methods of interpretation and application of law as generally accepted that might go 
beyond national borders. Thirdly, this thesis is on taxation and there appears to be 
great interaction in that context between international fundamental rights and 
international trade.
874
 Consequently, proportionality coupled with reasonableness 
may also be regarded as a general principle of law under Art 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.
875
 Sometimes the test of proportionality in tandem 
with reasonableness seems to be applied as an overarching principle of law, 
particularly regarding international trade, fundamental rights and freedoms.
876
 From 
this, it may follow that the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness 
is not only a general principle of European Law or Human Rights, but also a general 
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 For example, the WTO jurisprudence in this sense is quite important as 153 countries have joined 
that international organization and, if Russia for instance has not joined it yet, it is a party to the 
European Court of Human Rights, whose case law is compelling on proportionality. Many countries 
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words, principles inherent in the concept of legal system itself – such as the principles of good faith 
and proportionality” in “The Appellate Body and treaty interpretation”, p. 459 in Sacerdoti, Giorgio, 
Yanovibh, Alan and Bohanes, Jan, (Eds) The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement 
System (CUP, 2006). 
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 See the overwhelming and compelling jurisprudence of the ECHR (Chapter III.2) and the 
European Court of Justice (Chapter IV) regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as in the 
US (Chapter II) and other international courts such as the ICJ and the Appellate Body of the WTO 
(Chapter III, sections 1 and 3, respectively).  
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principle of international law and applied in many domestic jurisdictions as a general 
principle of law. It may be regarded as ‘part and parcel’ of the rule of law.877 There 
may also be an international concept of proportionality different from the 
international concept of reasonableness; not only do international jurisdictions use 
them as two joint tools, but also some domestic jurisdictions generally use them 
interchangeably.  
 
Proportionality and reasonableness may also interact where the law provides the 
notion of reasonableness as a standard (like reasonable expense, reasonable price, or 
reasonable tax rate
878
). In these cases, the proportionality principle may play a 
fundamental role in ascertaining the standard of reasonableness. As Sunstein pointed 
out the term ‘reasonable’ is vague because it needs “a great deal of specification to 
have meaning for particular cases,”879 and proportionality may have this essential 
function.
880
 It follows from this that the proportionality principle may work in 
tandem with the apparently more open-ended reasonableness standard. Moreover, 
where proportionality may again appear too rigid (against any presumption); the 
reasonableness standard makes it more flexible by allowing rebuttable 
presumptions.
881
 Where what may be reasonable appears to be too vague, with no 
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 “The universal model of the rule of law would necessarily include a proportionality tool. 
Proportionality would be required for the rule of law theories that include a notion of individual rights 
and/or distributive equality to provide a mechanism to rationally limit government discretion” 
(Sullivan and Frase, 2009, p.175, and their reference to the formal and substantive theories of the rule 
of law). See also Tamanaha, Brian Z., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (CUP, 2004). 
See also Beatty, (2004).  
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 See the OECD Reports on harmful tax competition that seem to be in search of a reasonable level 
playing field among all countries and jurisdictions that does not undermine the fairness and integrity 
of each country's tax system. See also Chapters I.2, and II.6.  
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 Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (OUP, 1996), p.124. 
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 As the European Court of Justice has done in a number of cases, particularly in Dassonville (C-
8/74), and further in Commission v Kingdom of Belgium, Case C-2/78 (Chapter IV.2.2), as well as the 
ECHR in ascertaining the legal standard of reasonableness (Chapter III.2.2). See also the above cases 
of discrimination in taxation in the US, the ECHR, and the WTO, and the cases Societe generale des 
grandes sources d’eaux minerals financaires v Bundesamt fur Finanzen (C-361/96) and Federation of 
Technological Industries (C-384/04) on Chapter IV, section 7.3. 
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 The ECJ systematically repeals general irrebuttable presumptions of tax avoidance based on the 
proportionality test (Leur-Bloem, Lankhorst, ICI cases, at Chapter IV.6, and Amprafrance section 7.1). 
See also Garage in which an irrebuttable presumption of tax evasion was considered as 
disproportionate when the taxpayer has a tax claim against him or her (Chapter IV.7.3); and 
Federation of Technological Industries according to which a circumstance of suspicion of tax evasion 
must be rebuttable to be proportionate (Chapter IV.7.3). Whereas in Fratrak and Balak the ECHR 
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limit (any presumption might be allowed), proportionality through its test of 
necessity (not going beyond what is necessary) may aid to set its boundaries.  Thus, 
it may be right to suggest that the better way to construe or ascertain the term 
reasonable seems to be through the proportionality test, as it appears that the better 
way for proportionality to remain flexible is by applying it through the more open-
ended standard of reasonableness. The proportionality and reasonableness tests run in 
tandem, and the concept of proportionality may cohere with the notion of 
reasonableness, from which it cannot be separated, as if they both formed a double 
helix device in legal reasoning, making it hard sometimes for judges and interpreters 
to treat the two separately. Sometimes it may be required to have an overall picture 
or an holistic view of the test of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness as the 
interplay between light (more certainty and clarity) and shadow (more uncertainty 
and lack of clarity) is required to fairly reflect economic and dynamic reality, such as 
in cases of tax abusive transactions; however, there must be enough clarity to 
ascertain objectively the legal and factual issues.  
The originality of this analysis may also lie not only in substantiating that conclusion 
with case law from international courts, but also in pointing out tax issues that arise 
from domestic and international trade rules and principles, and from fundamental 
freedoms and rights. In other words, this general conclusion has been demonstrated 
mainly from an analysis of tax cases. This also shows that fiscal sovereignty of States 
is limited by unwritten principles of law, such as the principle of proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness. For instance, the role of proportionality is also clear in 
balancing federal and state powers related to taxation, such as in the US,
882
 as well as 
                                                                                                                                          
accepted a presumptive and irrebuttable minimum tax base as justified, in Vastberga concerning 
criminal law, only rebuttable presumptions were acceptable. The different approach between tax base 
and the imposition of penalties may be justified by public policy reasons and generally accepted canon 
according to which fair and reasonable taxation is neither a sanction nor in principle a restriction on 
fundamental rights (Chapter III.2.7.a). 
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 In my opinion proportionality coupled with reasonableness can be related to federalism in two 
ways. First, by balancing federal and state powers (see Sullivan, E. Thomas, and Frase, Richard, 2009, 
p.83; and Chapter II, section 1.1, particularly McCulloch case); secondly, by varying the degree of 
scrutiny according to the different powers at stake. For instance, where indirect discriminatory 
taxation affects a federal right, states have less leeway in comparison with situations of no 
involvement of a federal right other than discrimination itself, and the tax measure is more closely 
scrutinised (see Chapter II, section 3, the comparison of Grosjean with other cases). Also where state 
taxation is not discriminatory, but it can affect the federal power to regulate inter-state commerce, the 
scrutiny under the fair apportionment is not as strict as under the proportionality test (see Chapter II, 
section 5, Barclays case).  
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in making compatible fiscal sovereignty in direct taxation of the EU Member States 
with the fundamental freedoms.
883
 Likewise regarding the compatibility of domestic 
legislation with international agreements, such as those within the WTO, 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness has a fundamental role to conciliate 
domestic interests and the international obligation of non-discrimination, so that tax 
powers cannot favour protectionism unless they pass a close scrutiny.
884
 Lastly, 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness is an essential tool to strike “a fair 
balance between the public interest and the applicant’s rights,” regarding 
fundamental rights.
885
 
In its own right, or as a fundamental principle of construction and application of 
other general and specific tax principles and rules, the principle of proportionality in 
tandem with reasonableness may be employed to resolve fundamental tax issues.  
2. Fundamental Tax Issues and the Role of Proportionality and 
Reasonableness. 
2.1. Equality, Non-Discrimination and International Tax Law 
As discussed, the application of the principle of proportionality in tandem with 
reasonableness lies at the core of discrimination and equality, drawing the conclusion 
that where to some extent there is no proportionality and reasonableness there is no 
equality.
886
 In addition, if “the concept of equality is a universal notion”,887 there 
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and Discrimination Under International Law (OUP, 1983). This author concludes that non-
discrimination is a general principle of law, or as others may prefer a general rule derived from the 
principle of equality, and if they are right as they are, there is no justification for discriminatory 
measures unless there is a reasonable relationship between legitimate aims and proportionate means. 
See also the relevant case law, mainly the landmark and leading decision of the ECHR in the Belgian 
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must be a minimum common denominator, in whose determination the legal 
standards of reasonableness and proportionality may have a relevant role.  The extent 
to which this standard is used to assess the reasonableness of classifications or 
discrimination depends on the importance given to the values at stake according to 
cultural and legal traditions, and socio-economic circumstances in each case.  
A clear illustration of this as well as the role of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness is the case of joint taxation of married couples, as compared with 
unmarried couples in the same jurisdictions. Married couples have been submitted to 
a higher income tax rate by virtue of progressive taxation, which discourages 
marriage from a strict tax perspective. The US Supreme Court and the German 
Constitutional Court both scrutinized the joint taxation of spouses, but weighing 
different principles and constitutional values. The US Supreme Court held unlawful 
the mandatory joint taxation that discriminated against married couples, which 
pursued the objective of combating tax avoidance,
888
 whereas the German 
Constitutional Court balanced the ability to pay principle in light of the equality of 
rights of the two sexes, the constitutional protection of the family, and the purpose of 
‘bringing the working wife back to the home.’889  Differently from the above 
jurisdictions, the ECHR refused to recognize as comparable the situations of married 
and unmarried couples as cohabitees, although its jurisprudence seems to be 
evolving; and where there is discrimination the ECHR always applies the test of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness.
890
 What went wrong with the ECHR´s 
                                                                                                                                          
linguistic case (Chapter III, sections 2.3.a, and 2.5), the US Supreme Court (Chapter II, section 1), and 
the WTO (Chapter III.3). 
 
887
 Schwarz, Jonathan, Schwarz on Tax Treaties (Wolters Kluwer, 2009), p.256. 
888
 Regarding regulatory measures, through which the State might exercise its police power, the joint 
taxation of spouses would be lawful where a constitutional provision provided for a more favourable 
tax regime for single persons to the detriment of married couples, or another constitutional allowance 
for taxing the economic or social benefits of marriage, or if an earlier regime were still valid in which 
the wife did not have any right to her own income. In terms of tax avoidance, the measure could be 
regarded as excessive and as such disproportionate, since other measures would be available to control 
tax avoidance, taking into account the fiscal supervision to check if one and not the other spouse have 
actually accrued income. See Chapter II.3. 
889
 6 BVerfGE 55, decision of 17 January 1957, excerpted in Kommers, Donald, The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (DUP, 1997), p.498. See also Chapter III.2.5.a.  
 
890
 See the criticism of this decision that may not be controlling, in Chapter III.2.5.a, and on tax 
discrimination sections 2.3.a and 2.5.a,b, and c. Besides the U.S. and Germany, two other domestic 
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unfair decision on joint taxation of spouses was a formulaic approach to comparable 
situations, and the missing application of reasonableness in tandem with 
proportionality. Thus, it may be concluded that where equality and discrimination are 
at stake, the principle of proportionality coupled with reasonableness may be an 
analytical tool to ascertain their legitimacy and appropriateness.  
Another side of the coin of tax discrimination is to use a tax measure as a 
requirement for exercising a fundamental right, such as the right to vote
891
 and to 
move or change residence (exit taxes).
892
 Arguably the same may be equally true of 
the right to change nationality or citizenship, which can be conditional on 
proportionate tax measures, such as the requirement of a minimum period of time for 
taking effect, or provisional measures to secure the payment of tax on potential gains 
previously crystallized to tackle tax avoidance.
893
 
A clear similarity between the US, the EU, the ECHR
894
 and the WTO regarding 
discrimination lies in the use of proportionality reasoning to justify reasonable and 
acceptable exceptions. In tax matters the proportionality principle coupled with the 
margin of appreciation doctrine is perhaps adequate to control discrimination, as well 
as measures to combat tax avoidance or tax evasion, fiscal supervision, 
simplification, allocation of tax jurisdiction, fiscal subsidies and enforcement of 
other non-tax policies, such as environmental and consumer protection, free and fair 
                                                                                                                                          
jurisdictions, Italy and Spain, applied the notion of a reasonable and objective test under the 
proportionality reasoning in balancing different principles in play to override that discrimination. 
Even the European Court of Justice in the Schumacker case took into consideration the legitimate aim 
of the split system for couples based on the ability to pay principle recognized as a fundamental 
principle of domestic and international law as opposed to joint taxation.  
 
891
 In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections [1966] 383 U.S. 663 the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional the poll tax of US$ 1.50 charged on every individual to be entitled to vote (see 
Chapter II.3). On grounds of proportionality the ECHR decided in Hirst v United Kingdom 
(Application No. 74025/01, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 06 October 2005) that a blanket and 
automatic ban on voting imposed on prisoners violates the right to vote under Article 3 of Protocol 1 
of the ECHR. On this issue of implied limitations to some fundamental rights and proportionality, see 
also Chapter III, section 2.3.b.4. 
 
892
 See cases regarding exit taxes in the European Union (N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Oost/kantoor Almelo Case C-470/04, Chapter IV.5.3, and De Lasteyrie du Saillant, Case C-9/02, 
Chapter IV.6. See also the ECHR (Chapter III, sections 2.5.c and 2.7.b, particularly the Riener case). 
 
893
 See below particular conclusions on tax avoidance. 
 
894
 Though the ECHR applies a wider margin of discretion than the other Courts, on direct 
discrimination it is strict particularly on sex grounds (Chapter III, sections 2.5.b). 
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trade. The cost-benefit analysis, contrariwise, may not be appropriate to control 
taxation given its greater intrusiveness in assessing the benefits of specific taxes to 
hold them lawful or not. This may be a task for the legislature of each jurisdiction 
with due regard to fundamental rights. In relation to cross-border trade in 
jurisdictions where the federal government may intervene such as in the U.S., the 
cost-benefit analysis has provided provisional and effective solutions by assessing 
state measures.
895
 It seems reasonable to adopt a stricter scrutiny of a cost-benefit 
analysis, with no margin of discretion to states, since it is based on a principle that 
prohibits the state legislature from infringing the commerce clause in the US, under 
which the states only have residual powers and while the federal government does 
not legislate.
896
  
Furthermore, it is right to suggest in my opinion that proportionality in tandem with 
reasonableness cannot be placed on a rank of equality with other principles and rules, 
since it is an overarching principle that may govern, construe, ascertain, and balance 
all the others as a tool of reconciliation and optimization. If “the method of eliciting 
general principles from hundred of cases sometimes make it difficult to see the wood 
for the trees”,897 the proportionality test coupled with reasonableness may make it 
easier to elicit those general principles not only from cases but also from statutory 
instruments, codes, constitutions and treaties. 
2.2. The Abuse of Tax Law and Other International Tax Principles 
Developed via Proportionality and Reasonableness. 
In its role of construing other principles and of eliciting or revealing new legal 
principles, the case law analysed is striking, where legitimate aims and adequacy 
between ends and means are scrutinised under the test of proportionality implicitly or 
explicitly coupled with reasonableness. Many other examples (besides the 
ascertainment of equality and non-discrimination) illustrate its creative and lively 
                                                 
895
 Even in the U.S. the Supreme Court restrains itself from scrutinising state taxes based on the cost-
benefit analysis, rather preferring the reasoning of internal consistency instead, that is quite similar to 
proportionality reasoning with an implicit margin of discretion for State Legislatures (see Chapter II, 
sections 1.1 and 5). 
 
896
 On the cost-benefit analysis see Chapters II, section 1.1; and III, section 3.2.b. 
 
897
 Lacey, Nicola, A life of H.L.A. Hart: the Nightmare and the Noble Dream (OUP, 2004), p.213. 
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role. These include the case law on non-retrospective taxation,
898
 the effectiveness 
principle,
899
 legitimate expectation,
900
 non-prohibitive or non-excessive taxation,
901
 
lawfulness principle (clarity and predictability),
902
 limitation to fiscal penalties,
903
 
neutrality in taxation,
904
 tax evasion and fraud,
905
 fiscal supervision and tax 
simplification,
906
 and tax avoidance and abuse of rights. Particularly, regarding tax 
avoidance and evasion, proportionality may have the role not only of developing a 
reasonable doctrine of abuse, having regard to other legal principles such as good 
faith and limitation of fundamental rights to property and freedom, but also of 
                                                 
898
 One of the examples analysed in depth in this thesis was the role of proportionality and 
reasonableness while ascertaining whether retrospective tax legislation is admissible or not, according 
to other principles of law that should be taken into account such as the reasonableness and 
predictability under the due process clause in the U.S.; the right to property and legal certainty 
according to the ECHR (Chapter III.2.6); and the rule of law, legal certainty and the legitimate 
expectation within EU law (Chapter IV, sections 8.1-8.3 and 8.5).  
 
899
 See Chapter III, sections 2.3.c.2 (right to an effective remedy and effectiveness in practice and in 
law), 2.3.d (its role of optimization in making other principles as effective as possible); and Chapter 
IV sections 2.2 and 2.5 (effectiveness of fiscal supervision as an imperative requirement in the general 
interest to justify proportionate restrictions to the fundamental freedoms), and 8.5 (disproportionate 
procedural measures that make rights ineffective).  
 
900
 See ECJ cases, Chapter IV, sections 8.1-8.3 and 8.5. 
 
901
 See US and ECHR cases Chapters II, section 1.1, and III, sections 2.7.b) and c, and 2.8.  
 
902
 See ECHR cases, Chapter III, section 2.7.a. 
 
903
 See ECHR and ECJ cases, Chapters III, section 2.7.b; and IV section 2.1. 
904
 The ECJ applied the test of proportionality in order to make effective the underlying principle of 
the Value Added Tax (neutrality) and to ascertain the right to deduction as an essential right in 
contrast with the objectives of tax simplification and fiscal supervision, sometimes intertwined with 
tax anti-avoidance (Chapter IV, sections 7.1 and 7.3). Regarding direct taxation the Court also in 
Leur-Bloem took into consideration the objective of tax neutrality by construing the Merger Directive 
and assessed restrictions on its application according to the test of proportionality (Chapter IV.6.3). 
905
 See Hentrich, decided by the ECHR (Chapter III.2.7.b). See also Federation of Technological 
Industries and Telios on the joint tax liability to prevent tax fraud (Chapter IV.7.3). 
 
906
 See in the ECHR Darby (Application No. 11581/85) regarding fiscal simplification as a 
justification for discrimination (Chapter III.2.5.d); and in the EU (Chapter IV) Outokumpu Oy on 
environmental taxation and simplification (section 4), Schumacker on administrative difficulties and 
simplification for justifying discrimination (section 5.1), Futura and Baxter on grounds of fiscal 
supervision (section 5.2).  
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assessing the tax consequences of abuse and evasion. Furthermore, specific measures 
may be assessed on proportionality and reasonableness grounds.
907
 
From the application of the proportionality test coupled with reasonableness to tax 
avoidance, one may conclude that retrospective legislation may be appropriate to 
catch only wholly artificial transactions,
908
 whereas it may be disproportionate to 
catch tax-driven transactions with genuine commercial purpose. It is also interesting 
to contrast this aim of combating tax avoidance with tax evasion,
909
 since the latter 
seems to be more compelling to justify measures that may be more drastic. 
Retrospective legislation as a matter of principle is not necessary to counteract 
evasion, as there is no need of a new law but just the application of the previous law 
in force when the evasion occurred. Thus, any penalties provided by law and 
submitted to the test of proportionality would be enforced. In this sense, it is also 
possible to differentiate avoidance from evasion by their legal consequences. 
Whereas evasion may trigger penalties, avoidance may not do so, according to the 
principle of proportionality. Counteracting tax avoidance is a legitimate objective 
recognized by domestic and international jurisdictions, but anti-avoidance measures 
provided by law must be proportionate to that end. In other words, they must be 
suitable, necessary and balanced with other interests and principles at stake, such as 
the fundamental freedoms,
910
 the fundamental rights,
911
 and non-protectionism in 
international trade.
912
  
                                                 
907
 See Hoeper in the US (Chapter II.3 on equality and taxation of spouses to avoid manipulation of 
attribution of income between the spouses); within the WTO, see Bovine Hides and Dominican 
Republic - Cigarettes cases on tax avoidance, evasion and proportionality (Chapter III.3.2.b and c); 
and within the ECJ among others the cases ICI, Cadbury Schweppes, Emsland-Starke, Leur-
Bloem,and Lankhorst-Hohorst (Chapter IV, section 6); Skripalle, Ampafrance and Sudholz on 
substantive measures regarding tax avoidance (Chapter IV.7.1); HE case regarding procedural 
measures to tackle tax avoidance (Chapter IV.7.3). 
 
908
 See in the US the cases Milliken v. US, US v Carlton, Nichols v. Coolidge, Boldgett v. Holden, and 
Untermayer v. Anderson (Chapter II.4); within the ECHR, A., B., C. and D. and M.A. and Others 
(Chapter III, section 2.6.c); and within the ECJ the joined cases Gemeente and Holin Groep, and 
Stichting Goed Wonen  (Chapter IV.8.4). 
 
909
 On an international distinction between tax avoidance and evasion, see Baker, Philip, “Tax 
Avoidance, Tax Mitigation and Tax Evasion” <www.taxbar.com/Articles> (last visited 8 July 2010). 
 
910
 See Chapter IV, sections.6 and 7.2. 
 
911
 Mainly the rights to property, non-discrimination, and freedom of movement within the ECHR. 
See Chapter IV, sections .2.4. a (family taxation), and c (discrimination on grounds of fiscal 
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Furthermore, in terms of tax policy the principle of proportionality in tandem with 
reasonableness may determine appropriate means to tackle avoidance, such as fixing 
limits to a general judge-made abuse of law doctrine, and assessing general and 
specific anti-avoidance rules either separately or concurrently.
913
 Particularly 
regarding tax avoidance, it is debatable whether a system based on general principles 
rather than prescriptive rules may be more appropriate, depending on the legal 
traditions and constitutional systems of each jurisdiction. In my view a system with 
general principles, such as an objective abuse of rights doctrine (taking into account 
objective economic factors, the principle of good faith, no application of penalties, 
objective ascertainment of the purpose of the tax legislation at stake, and an overall 
fair assessment) is more appropriate to tackle tax avoidance, because it balances 
equity and legal certainty, whereas prescriptive rules favour legal certainty only or 
mostly. A combination of a general rule with prescriptive ones, for greater clarity and 
legal certainty, would be better depending again on what would be more appropriate 
to the legal systems of each jurisdiction. The principle of proportionality in concert 
with reasonableness may work well either within a system where detailed and 
prescriptive rules prevail over intellectually demanding general principles or 
otherwise. Overall, the proportionality test coupled with reasonableness may 
examine whether specific or general anti-avoidance measures taken together or not 
are suitable, necessary (do not go beyond what is necessary to tackle avoidance or 
abuse, as there may be less restrictive measures) and reasonably balanced and 
compatible with other relevant interests and principles at stake. These other relevant 
principles or rights that ought to be taken into account would be legal certainty, the 
right to property and the fundamental freedoms.    
 
                                                                                                                                          
residence), 2.6.b (retrospective taxation and avoidance), and 2.7.b (fiscal sanctions and freedom of 
movement). 
 
912
 Tax avoidance may not justify disguised protectionism within the WTO agreements, particularly 
under Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of the GATS to which the tests of reasonableness and 
proportionality are applied. See Bovine Hides and Republic Dominican -Cigarettes cases, at Chapter 
IV.3.2.b and c. 
 
913
 See also on the challenges of tackling avoidance through rules or principles, Jones, John Avery, 
“Tax Law: Rules or Principles?” [1996] B.T.R., 6, 580.  
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In terms of policy and economics of taxation, taxes may be assessed on a number of 
grounds: how they affect incentives, how fair they are, how efficient to raise revenue, 
how they interact with other taxes within a system and how simple. These canons of 
taxation as identified by Adam Smith (equity, certainty, convenience, and economy) 
have to be balanced and reconciled. In addition, they may be separately tested on 
grounds of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness, for example where 
“enforcement and collection costs should be reasonably proportionate to the 
receipts.”914 
In summary, the role of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness is to construe, 
apply, enforce, develop, and sometimes elicit other rules and general principles of 
law as consistently and efficiently as possible. Thus, its role may not only be to avoid 
absurd or formulaic legal construction, but also to give life and useful meaning by 
achieving the worthwhile policy objectives underlying the law.  
2.3. The Features of Proportionality (optimization, effectiveness and 
neutrality) and the Principle of Good Faith in Assessing Fair Taxation. 
 
Furthermore, proportionality may be thought of as a vital method, not only to balance 
apparently conflicting principles, rules, and interests, but also to reconcile them in 
search for more fairness, consistency and effectiveness.  This optimization
915
 of 
principles can be said to be a primary function of proportionality in law. The 
maximum of fairness with the minimum of disorder would be an optimal situation 
and the dividing line between unfairness and order would depend on policy 
considerations and the role of the rule of law in society. The choice between fairness 
with disorder and unfairness with order may be a false dilemma, and the principle of 
proportionality may serve to enforce fairness with order.
916
  
                                                 
914
  International Tax Glossary, IBFD, 4
th
 Ed, p. 49. See enforcement and collection measures tested 
under the principle of proportionality at Chapters III, section 2.7.b (mainly the Gasus, Lemoine, and 
Hentrich cases) on the ECHR, and section 3.2.b on the WTO (Argentina Hides and Dominican 
Republic-Cigarettes cases), and IV on the ECJ, sections 5.2, 7.1 and 7.2 (see Futura, Ampafrance, 
Garage cases, among others). 
 
915
 Beatty, (2004), p.163. See also Schwarze (1992), p.679. According to Robert Alexy proportionality 
reasoning in this aspect of weighing other principles expresses the idea of Pareto-optimality (“On the 
Structure of Legal Principles”, Ratio Juris, 13/3, 2000, p.298). See also Chapter I. 
 
916
 See inter alia Garage and Sudholz (Chapter IV. sections 7.1 and 7.3). 
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Another essential feature of the proportionality principle coupled with 
reasonableness is its operation ‘in law and in practice’ as well. Not only must the 
principle of effectiveness work in practice via proportionality and reasonableness, 
but so must any fundamental right or freedom.
917
 Thus, the proportionality test 
coupled with reasonableness may not be a mere aspirational principle nor serve the 
purpose to interpret and apply other principles of law merely in a way that is 
aspirational and not effective, with practical and substantial consequences. 
Still in its role of weighing principles among themselves, proportionality may be 
regarded as an overarching principle that demonstrates its sense of flexibility and 
fairness. In each case depending on its particular circumstances, proportionality may 
give precedence to an open principle such as good faith over an apparently rigid one 
that seems to have no exceptions, such as everyone is presumed to know the law, 
even in tax matters.
918
 It may be suggested that such cases are exceptional and very 
rare, but the point is that proportionality may catch even those special cases where 
the usual methods of interpretation and construction might not achieve a fairer 
decision through a more sensible reasoning without undermining the consistency of 
legal systems. The case law on tax avoidance, fiscal supervision, evasion, fraud and 
some on retrospective taxation demonstrate great weight being given to the principle 
of good faith, when balancing other rights, interests and principles.
919
   
                                                                                                                                          
 
917
 See inter alia on the requirement of proportionality in practice the ECHR cases Krasuski, Riener, 
and Volokhy (Chapter III, sections 2.3.c.2, 2.7.b, 2.7.a), and the effectiveness principle mentioned 
above within the EU. As well the discriminatory analysis under the chapeau of Article XX of the 
WTO/GATT and its paragraphs requires the prima facie scrutiny in the former and its application “in 
practice” regarding the latter (Chapter III.3.2.c).  
  
918
 See Chapter IV.2.1 (Louloudakis, Case 262/99). 
 
919
 See the following cases explicitly decided on abuse, good faith and proportionality grounds 
Intersplav and Bulves regarding the right to tax refund decided by the ECHR (Chapter III.2.7.d); De 
Lasteyrie du Saillant (Chapter IV.6); Optigen Ltd, Fulcrum Electronics Ltd and Bond House Systems 
Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise (carrousel fraud cases) and Federation of Technological 
Industries and Telios regarding joint tax liability requiring reasonable behaviour, good faith and 
proportionality (Chapter IV.7.3); Schlossstrasse concerning retrospective taxation, legitimate 
expectation and good faith (Chapter IV.8.3); US Shrimps and Bovine Hides on the interpretation of the 
chapeau of Art XX of the GATT regarding the bona fide exercise of rights of States and its 
relationship with reasonableness and arbitrary or disguised protectionism (Chapter III.3.2).  
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The case law on good faith and taxation may reveal a moral dimension of 
proportionality coupled with reasonableness. One may highlight the difficulty in 
conceptualizing words like “reasonableness” or “rationality” because these 
expressions might go beyond legal matters.
 
One distinction that may be drawn 
between reasonable and rational is the acceptability of a decision or a rule. An 
unreasonable decision may be more related to its unacceptability for being just unfair 
or for not having taken other principles into account rather than its lack of rationality 
or logic.
920
  
One may also consider that these concepts may be founded on criteria that are more 
sociological than merely legal, namely, including economic, cultural and ethical 
aspects. As Sunstein pointed out, “some people think that conduct is reasonable if it 
passes a cost-benefit test;”921 … or “compliance with community norms;” or still 
“respect for certain understandings of individual autonomy,” asserting that 
“dictionaries cannot resolve this question.”922 Rawls’ description of reasonable 
persons as free, equal, acting in cooperation with others
923
 has also a moral element. 
Thus, unilateralism would not be reasonable, nor a lack of reciprocity in an 
international tax context. For example, where States adopt protectionist tax measures 
or have no regard to a fair allocation of taxing rights.
924
  
The moral dimension of proportionality coupled with reasonableness may also be 
seen in the logical and moral opposition to the truism “the ends justify the means”, 
                                                 
920
 One distinction that may be drawn between reasonable and rational is the acceptability of a 
decision or a rule. An unreasonable decision may be more related to its unacceptability for being just 
unfair or for not having taken other principles into account rather than its rationality or logic. On 
further differences between reasonable and rational see also Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice (HUP, 
2009) pp.183 and 195. 
 
921
 On the difference between the cost-benefit analysis and proportionality, see Chapter III.3.2.b. 
 
922
 Sunstein, Cass R., Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, pp.123-4. 
 
923
 Sen, Amartya (2009), p.79. 
 
924
 In this sense, both CFC and Transfer Pricing rules may be tested under the tests of reasonableness 
and proportionality regarding their purpose of tackling tax avoidance which should give some regard 
to the tax treatment of profits accruing in other jurisdictions. Sometimes even unilateral measures may 
be justified regardless of other States measures, such as an unilateral tax credit to avoid double 
taxation where worldwide taxation is in force in light of the capital export neutrality principle. 
Another example of a unilateral tax measure that may be justified would be the application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rule to avoid abuse of tax treaties by wholly artificial arrangements to exploit 
unintended double non-taxation.  
 280 
because besides the legitimacy of the ends, the means must be proportionate, 
reasonably balanced, and fair to pass the test of justification. This aspect of fairness, 
the notion of reasonable person, and the principle of good faith in reasonableness and 
proportionality may also evoke the ancient Roman law according to which “Iuris 
praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.”925 
Thus, it may be right to suggest that the principle of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness would be a modern concretization and application of fundamental 
principles and rules of law also with a moral component.  However, it may not be 
right to suggest that exploiting loopholes in the legislation for tax purposes would be 
immoral or morally wrong. The concept of morality may depend on a number of 
reasons and circumstances involving the consciousness of the individuals and in my 
opinion cannot be a legal standard by itself to define whether or not there is abuse for 
tax purposes. The legal concept of abuse of rights can be inspired or underpinned by 
moral elements likewise the principle of good faith, but it must be as objective as 
possible, because other fundamental tax principles must be taken into account, such 
as the legality or lawfulness principles and its corollaries of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations. Thus, as stated in the previous section, the notion of tax 
abuse must be ascertainable by objective economic factors in line with the 
commercial reality, the principle of good faith, and the objective and logic purpose of 
the tax legislation at stake.  
In an apparent contrast with that objective moral element, another characteristic of 
proportionality can be its neutrality,
926
 as a neutral instrument to enforce economic, 
objective and fiscal policies. It has been suggested that proportionality, unlike the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation, “is generally regarded as a neutral or even a good 
tool.”927 On the other hand, its neutrality should not undermine the ultimate objective 
of fairness, which may have given origin to the notions of equity, justice, rule of 
reason, equality, reasonableness and proportionality itself. Thus, neutrality cannot be 
                                                 
925
 Ulpian in his Regole (Digest. 1.1.10pr). 
926
 Generally, “neutral principles must be drawn from the constitutions and formulated in a way that 
allows them to be applied consistently” (Beatty, 2004, p.161).  
 
927
 Dembour (2006), p.90. See also on the utilitarian view over the notion of individual rights, Chapter 
III.2.8.  
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an isolated characteristic of proportionality, which may serve a utilitarian perspective 
on human rights or fundamental freedoms, but it must be seen within the general 
purpose of fairness.  
 
With respect to the utilitarian or consequentialist view of the Courts, some cases 
clearly demonstrate the prevalence of economic and utilitarian policies over 
‘marginal’ cases of unfairness and injustice.928 In my opinion that is the main 
problem of the Courts, besides sometimes a lack of consistency and objective 
justification, particularly where a margin of appreciation (subjective) prevails over 
the proportionality test that is fairly objective when applied properly.  All similar 
situations should lead the courts to refuse any unfairness, however trivial it may 
seem to society as a whole, because injustice in each particular case opposes fairness 
just as light opposes darkness, as equity opposes inequity, as equality opposes 
unreasonable discrimination. This being so, the more the principle of proportionality 
coupled with reasonableness in search of fairness is applied, the more justice as 
fairness there will be. This can be implemented not only in the field of human rights 
by giving more prevalence to the more objective reasoning of proportionality rather 
than the subjective margin of appreciation doctrine, but also by granting to every 
individual case the guarantee of a proper and balanced assessment. Above all the law 
is not only about rules, but fundamentally also principles and ultimately fairness. 
Efficiency is a relevant value but it should not supersede justice. Individual rights 
versus a utilitarian public interest may be at stake in cases decided by courts under 
the test of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness. 
 
To avoid subjectivism and caprice in law and even more uncertainty and unfairness, 
the proportionality test in tandem with reasonableness must be as objective as 
                                                 
928
 See Chapter III particularly on discrimination on grounds of family relationship Lindsay and 
Shackell (section 2.5.a) and Burden and Burden (section 2.5.b), and the minimum wage taxation 
(Fratrak and Balak cases, section 2.7.c.). See also Chapter IV, Sudholz (section 7.1) in which a more 
open and flexible notion of reasonableness prevailed over a stricter proportionality test in contrast 
with Ampafrance (also section 7.1), and Outokumpu Oy (section 4). On the other hand, marginal cases 
of injustice were clearly disallowed against a utilitarian application of proportionality in the cases 
Societe generale des grandes sources d’eaux minerals financaires (C-361/96) and Federation of 
Technological Industries (C-384/04), on Chapter IV, section 7.3. 
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possible, particularly its objective necessity test
929
, and giving due regard to all 
interests at stake. Nevertheless, it may not be desirable to systematize the 
proportionality concept to an extent that could stifle its content and flexibility. In 
other words the principle must be open to new economic and technological 
circumstances, new similar exceptions not set out in previous law, and new complex 
facts, so that it can serve as a legal tool to overturn previous case law or thinking 
without lacking consistency.
930
 Also a mere formalistic approach may not be helpful, 
since that principle, for its own nature and purpose, should somehow be flexible to 
construe both apparently rigid and vague norms.  
 
From the analysis of several jurisdictions it may be suggested that proportionality in 
concert with reasonableness is an open-ended concept and inherently flexible.
931
 This 
does not mean that it tends to be ineffective and subjective. On the contrary, as 
demonstrated above, proportionality may act mainly as an essential instrument to 
identify fundamental principles of each system and make them really effective, such 
as the previous examples of equality and non-discrimination, measures to tackle 
avoidance and evasion, and other measures to secure an efficient and fair tax system.  
 
2.4. Proportionality and Reasonableness as Applied to Double 
Taxation Conventions. 
Another aspect of the contribution of this research to international law may be a 
conclusion concerning the application and interpretation of double tax conventions, 
for which proportionality in concert with reasonableness may have the role of an 
                                                 
929
 On the necessity test as part of proportionality, see the Conclusion, section 1, and some quite 
illustrative objective assessments, such as the Handyside case (Chapter III, sections 2.3.b and 2.3.c.1;  
US – Gasoline  and Dominican Republic Cigarettes cases (Chapter III, section 3.2.b); Futura, N, and 
De Lasteyrie du Saillant cases (Chapter IV, respectively sections 5.2, 5.3, and 6.2).  
 
930
 See, for example, the Quill Corp case overturning the Bella Hess case (internet sale development 
affecting the use tax, Chapter II, section 1.4); and the Louloudakis case that allowed an exception to 
the principle of law under which ‘everyone is presumed to know the law’(Chapter IV, section 2.1).   
 
931
 Interesting ways to further investigate the term ´reasonableness´, but not here as there is no space, 
would be a research of national tax legislation and how this term is interpreted and applied by tax 
authorities and judges, and how its use is analysed by tax scholars of each country. 
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overarching international tax principle.
932
 As such and in its own right, it may be 
applied to a number of issues, such as the allocation of tax jurisdiction, balancing the 
ability to pay and benefit principles,
933
 solving transfer pricing and other 
disagreements regarding treaty interpretation,
934
 exchange of information between 
fiscal authorities and tax collection enforcement.
935
 Particularly in transfer pricing 
rules under Art 9 of the OECD Model, a secondary adjustment may be a necessary 
and proportionate measure to be implemented by one of the Contracting Parties 
where the other applies the reasonable standard provided by the treaty to determine 
the profits in transactions performed between associated enterprises.
936
  
Moreover, the standard of reasonableness permeates the OECD guidelines on 
transfer pricing, as well as the Code of Conduct of the European Commission, under 
which only reasonable requirements and documentation should be demanded from 
                                                 
932
 Concerning the precedence of Human Rights over Double Tax Conventions where Contracting 
States are signatories of Human Rights Conventions, see Schwarz on Tax Treaties (2009), p.84, and 
Baker, Phillip Double Taxation Conventions (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) (R.I-1-8, Double taxation 
conventions and Human Rights). For those countries who are not yet signatories to Human Rights 
Conventions, their Constitution or a special Bill of Rights may enshrine fundamental rights which 
may prevail over DTCs. Thus, where proportionality and reasonableness are key principles to construe 
rights and obligations under domestic or international law they should also be applicable to DTCs 
when they interact with fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
933
 Regarding the same income, while developing countries tend to support the benefit principle that 
provides legal and economic basis for the source taxation, developed countries are inclined to sustain 
the ability to pay principle that is more related to the residence taxation. Those economic and legal 
principles like many others in the international tax arena have to be reconciled and arguably 
compromised to achieve a workable and acceptable fairness, not to hinder international trade and 
social and economic cooperation. 
 
934
 See for example the suggestion made on Mutual Agreement Procedure under the principle of 
proportionality and its reasonable implementation by the OECD Proposals for Improving Mechanisms 
for the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes (Proposal 6: Suspension of collection of tax) of 1 February 
2006.  
 
935
 Concerning the application of the rule of reason and the principle of proportionality to the 
exchange of information, see “Article 26 of the OECD Model in Light of the Right to Informational 
Self-Determination”, by Prof. Dr Schaumburg, Harald, and Dr Schlossmacher, Stefan, in Tax Treaty 
Monitor, (IBFD, October 2000), pp.522-28. 
936
 For example within the EU, the Convention 90/436/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in 
connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises is an attempt to reach a reasonable 
agreement between occasionally conflicting tax jurisdictions in which proportionality may have a 
relevant role to play in interpretation and effectiveness of international and domestic legal principles 
and interests.   
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taxpayers.
937
  These reasonable requirements must be proportionate and not go 
beyond what is necessary to ascertain an arm’s length or a reasonable profit in the 
general and specific economic circumstances of each taxpayer. In contrast with the 
actual economic profits that may be hard to reveal in the real world, to achieve 
simplification other measures might be introduced such as the profit split method. 
The U.S. worldwide unitary taxation rule was considered proportionate and 
reasonable in the U.S. but it had to be limited due to its international economic 
problems, which foreign investors regarded as unfair and disproportionate.
938
 Thus, 
the tension continues between fair and real profit taxation (encompassing tax 
avoidance considerations), and simplification and efficiency that may be better 
solved under the test of proportionality coupled with reasonableness in a bilateral or 
multilateral forum. 
There may be other international tax issues that can be resolved via proportionality in 
tandem with reasonableness, such as determining the compatibility of domestic anti-
avoidance rules and principles with tax treaties, interpretation of limitation on 
benefits clauses (anti-avoidance), interaction between capital export and import 
neutrality and the credit and exemption systems, and non-discrimination. Particularly 
regarding tax avoidance and discrimination, under the WTO agreements there is 
specific provision regarding services and settled case law regarding goods, allowing 
discrimination on the basis of tax treaties or domestic rules founded on the 
justification of combating tax avoidance. However, this exception must pass a test of 
justification quite similar (one may say the same, regarding the role of balancing and 
abuse) to reasonableness and proportionality under the chapeau of Articles XX 
                                                 
937
 See for example the following suggestion, “not impose unreasonable compliance costs or 
administrative burden on enterprises in requesting documentation to be created or obtained” (Code of 
Conduct on Transfer Pricing Documentation for Associated Enterprises in the EU, 07.11.2005, COM, 
2005, 543, Art. 6a), among other express reasonable requirements and guidelines.   
938
 See Chapter II.5, particularly the logical reasons given for the explanation of the internal and 
external consistency of the specific rules, based on the assumption that all jurisdictions together could 
not tax more than the entire corporate income, and that the factors used should reflect the way the 
income is generated. It is noteworthy that the discussion between the UK and the US concerning this 
state tax was regarded by Enzo Cannizzaro as an illustration of a normative standard of 
proportionality applied to diplomatic intercourse in taxation (“The Role of Proportionality in the Law 
of International Countermeasures” 2001 EJIL 12(5), p.902 and note 35).  
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(GATT) and XIV (GATS),
939
 to avoid disguised discrimination. The same may be 
said regarding the non-discrimination article of DTCs, under which discrimination 
would be lawful, if justified by tax avoidance, evasion or other requirement in the 
public interest, such as an environmentally friendly tax policy, and through 
proportionate measures. In this sense, express provisions would not be necessary for 
excluding the benefit of non-discrimination in relation to any law designed to prevent 
the avoidance or evasion of taxes, such as the Article 25 of the UK-Australia Treaty, 
among others. However, it may be fair to consider that in the absence of a similar 
provision in a DTC (but taking into account other international tax principles, such as 
legal certainty, ability to pay and benefit principles, good faith, trade neutral 
allocation of tax jurisdiction, and reciprocity), tax avoidance that would justify 
discrimination could target only wholly artificial arrangements or sham transactions 
whose sole purpose was unintended abusive tax avoidance.
940
 Furthermore, the 
interpretation and application of limitation on benefits (LOB articles) as anti-
avoidance rules in light of the principle of proportionality coupled with 
reasonableness may be a corollary of their own nature according to the case law of 
domestic and international courts. 
3. Costs and Benefits of Proportionality. International Tax Certainty and 
Fairness. 
There may be some uncertainty where the courts accept the public interest to justify 
discrimination or restrictions on fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms and non-
protectionism. However, the courts have explained on what grounds the open-texture 
public interest is acceptable (such as fiscal supervision, tax coherence, combating tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, simplification, the allocation of taxing rights, 
environmental purposes, a trade neutral allocation of tax jurisdiction, securing the 
payment of taxes, as examples) and submitted it to a close test of proportionality in 
tandem with reasonableness. This may prevent the abuse and indeterminacy of the 
                                                 
939
 See Bovine Hides and Dominican Republic - Cigarettes cases on tax avoidance, evasion and 
proportionality (Chapter III.3.2.c). 
 
940
 On the apparently narrow interpretation of the DTC article on discrimination, see the case law 
analysed in Baker, Philip, Double Taxation Conventions, and a comparative approach between the 
non-discrimination DTC article, the case law of the ECJ and the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement (SCM) within the WTO, Friedlander, Lara, “The Role of Non-Discrimination 
Clauses in Bilateral Income Tax Treaties After GATT 1994” [2002] BTR 2, pp.71-118.  
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general interest justification on behalf of the rule of law, consistency, fairness, and 
accountability. This may also bring more determination to the somewhat abstract 
public interest and more certainty to taxation in terms of what could fall within that 
open-ended concept, exemplified (not all-inclusively) as imperative requirements in 
the general interest. This again results in more certainty within the application of 
those requirements. Nevertheless, certainty is just one of the many principles that 
have a relevant role in each legal system; it must be considered and contrasted with 
all other fundamental principles of each system as a whole, in search of consistency 
as well as fairness.  
This leads to a final comment on the extension of judicial review and the increase of 
litigation as a possible disadvantage arising from the rule of reason and the necessary 
application of the principle of proportionality in tandem with reasonableness. 
Whereas proportionality may be proposed as the most flexible and perhaps most 
effective instrument to ascertain the validity and limits of legal principles and rules, 
it may not be the most efficient in economic terms. This is because it brings with it 
some degree of uncertainty, more litigation, and (in all likelihood) more transaction 
costs.
941
 However, only new situations may be litigated so that there will be a 
temporary increase of litigation. Furthermore, it is important to note that in taxation 
there are many apparently conflicting principles and rules, which can also be vague. 
These need to be ascertained by administrative and judicial decisions, and under the 
fair objective assessment on proportionality grounds, particularly its necessity test, 
more certainty can be achieved. The costs involved in this process may be sensible 
for more fairness in each individual case, as well as for more effectiveness of some 
principles, which should not be merely empty words or only aspirational. Concerning 
judicial activism and a lack of predictability, the margin of appreciation or discretion 
doctrine may restrain the Courts from over-reaching themselves,
942
 and the analysis 
of the case law may aid to give consistency and reasonably predict future cases.  
 
                                                 
941
 Tridimas (1999), p.127. 
 
942
 On the margin of appreciation doctrine, which may allow some marginal injustices to occur for the 
sake of simplification and workability, inspired by some utilitarian thoughts, see Chapter III sections 
2.4, 2.5.b (Burden and Burden), and  2.7.c (Balaz and Fratrak).  See also Chapter IV.7.1. (Sudholz) 
and the first note of this conclusion. 
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From a pragmatic perspective, it would not be desirable to eliminate the principle of 
proportionality and reasonableness, since democratic States have accepted them as a 
tool in international and domestic law. This approach in international law may run 
against defenders of the Westphalian principle that state sovereignty trumps all; 
however, this principle seems to be unsound, particularly in relation to Human 
Rights, state responsibility, international trade, and tax matters.  
 
Ultimately, the rule of law must have a guardian in giving a final decision, 
particularly in hard cases. The solution seems to be to give courts the necessary 
guarantees and obligations to be practical, consistent, and impartial, in order to apply 
the proportionality principle coupled with reasonableness. Additionally, as a 
necessary requirement of proportionality and reasonableness, the more reasoning and 
justification for relevant circumstances that should be taken into account (and 
irrelevant circumstances that should be ignored), the more consistency there should 
be in each system without undermining fairness. Its application has been evolving 
and widening in many jurisdictions; and it may be one of the greatest legacies from 
the 20
th
 century in terms of a general principle of law, having originated from the 
rule of reason
943
 as developed and applied by international and domestic courts. 
                                                 
 
943
 See Chapter I. Metaphorically one might suggest that the rule of reason and the standard of 
reasonableness may be not only a symbol of rationality and fairness, but in a certain way contain 
within themselves the principle of proportionality as a seed contains the tree, and a spring contains the 
river.  
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